Examination of witness (Questions 880
- 899)
TUESDAY 3 NOVEMBER 1998
MR
TIM
SPICER,
OBE
880. I asked you that you had no reason
not to expect that Mr Penfold would have made that available to
officials of the Foreign Office.
(Mr Spicer) I would have assumed that as a natural
part of his reporting that might be the case.
881. Can you categorically say that of the
18 contacts that you had and two meetings there was no suggestion
from any of the Foreign Office officials that the action that
you were taking would be contrary to the Order in Council?
(Mr Spicer) If we can break up that catalogue
of contacts, the majority of telephone calls that you were referring
to were really to pass on information. We have addressed that
subject. This is in the period when the junta were in control
in Freetown and President Kabbah was in exile, probably in the
period May to December. After that, once President Kabbah had
agreed to the action—I am sorry, just to go back to these
telephone calls, there was no contemplation of action at any stage
although we were clear that we were in contact with President
Kabbah with a view to helping him if he required it. After about
the 5 December the picture changed and in the meetings and telephone
calls that took place after that date it would have been referred
to and at no stage was I discouraged from it by anybody.
882. Just to make the facts absolutely clear,
there were nine telephone calls up to and including the 17 December
and I think 12 calls after that date. In those 12 calls, let me
put my question again, at no time was it made clear to you that
you were acting contrary to the Order in Council?
(Mr Spicer) No.
883. Would you not have expected, because
of the relationship that you had set up with the Foreign Office,
because of the way that you had supplied information to the Foreign
Office, that if the Foreign Office had considered you were breaking
the Order in Council you would have been informed?
(Mr Spicer) I believe I should have been and probably
would have been.
884. And therefore you would have expected
to have been if the Foreign Office had thought that you were breaking
the Order in Council?
(Mr Spicer) Yes.
885. May I then ask you what action did
you take after the publication on the 18 May: "Sandline had
FO warning", absolutely clear and the leading line of the
Evening Standard of the 18 May? What did you consider and what
action did you take when you saw that paper report?
(Mr Spicer) I did not actually see it but I saw
lots of others. This is the 18 May this year.
886. That is right.
(Mr Spicer) And it is after the Customs raid and
investigation started and the matter was now in the hands of our
lawyers, and I believe that that may refer to comments made by
Government officials in relation to what took place between myself
and my company and the Foreign Office, and I have already answered
the question, that I was never given a red letter warning or a
line by line guided tour of the UN Resolution or the Order in
Council.
887. So whoever supplied the paper with
that information was in fact not supplying the paper with the
truth?
(Mr Spicer) I have not read the article, but from
the gist—
888. "Sandline had FO warning. Officials
read out red letter caution on arms to coup firm's chief".
(Mr Spicer) That is inaccurate.
889. That is untrue?
(Mr Spicer) Totally untrue.
890. Can you understand why somebody should
be trying to put into the public domain and to the press that
sort of report?
(Mr Spicer) I would not wish to comment on that.
I do not know who did it and all I can say is that the factual
reports that I have heard given are at variance with my understanding
of the facts.
891. Can I then ask you whether, as you
said, you should get better information recorded in the future,
that whenever you have meetings with any Government officials
you take minutes of those meetings and I would suggest that you
send copies of those minutes to the officials to have them agreed.
Then there can be no doubt because in this instance there appears
to be considerable doubt between what officials are saying and
what you are saying. Why do you think that is the case?
(Mr Spicer) I do not wish to speculate on why
it is the case. I am very clear on what my recollection is. I
believe that in the discussions that I had with the High Commissioner
and the officials what I was doing was right. If they choose to
interpret the meetings, the discussions and anything else in a
different way, that is a matter you would have to address to them.
892. "Recollection" is not the
strongest of words. Are you actually saying you are convinced
that you never had a warning from Foreign Office officials?
(Mr Spicer) I am absolutely convinced of that.
Mr Rowlands
893. I do not want to go over the same ground.
There are just one or two aspects I would like to pursue. The
first one that has not properly been raised is your letter to
President Kabbah on the 4 December. This was the time you presumably
put to President Kabbah the possibility of offering military support
and some financial arrangements to enforce that. Is that right?
(Mr Spicer) No, we had discussions before. We
had initially made contact with him very early on after the coup
and said, "We are here, we are ready to help you if you want
us to." Nothing really transpired till I believe some time
in August or September, I cannot be precise about the time, when
he asked me to do a recap of military options that I had in fact
already done through his ministers. I tried to fax them to him
but unfortunately his fax was not working so I had to read the
gist of it to him over the telephone. Again nothing really came
of that but the letter in early December was a natural continuation
of that process and the plan, or the concept, was largely unchanged.
It was just refined as the situation changed.
894. And the letter clearly could not be
interpreted any other way other than suggesting military support
including arms etc would be given to President Kabbah to restore
him?
(Mr Spicer) That is right.
895. That letter then is clear on that point?
(Mr Spicer) Yes.
896. You have indicated that in fact that
letter was seen by Mr Penfold. Why do you believe that?
(Mr Spicer) I do not know for a fact that it was
seen by Mr Penfold but I believe that to be the case.
897. Why did you present it as evidence
if you did not know it? Why do you say you understood it to be
the case?
(Mr Spicer) Because I think that it is referred
to in the Legg Report, but I also believe at the meeting we had
on the 23rd it was referred to. I am pretty clear that Mr Penfold
mentioned to me that he had seen it, and it would not surprise
me at all—this is opinion, speculation—that President
Kabbah showed that sort of letter to somebody who had become very
supportive and helpful.
898. Anybody reading that letter could not
be in any way in any doubt that the whole burden of the discussions
you were having with President Kabbah was for some form of military
support including arms and so on to restore his regime?
(Mr Spicer) Yes.
899. At this meeting of 23 December, one
of the key parts of the Legg Report and where there is a conflict
of evidence between yourself and Mr Penfold, you say you handed
Mr Penfold the actual contract or the paper that was available
at that moment in time and he took it away. Mr Penfold says otherwise.
There was a third party, Mr Buckingham, at that meeting.
(Mr Spicer) Yes.
| 
