Examination of witness (Questions 1053
- 1079)
TUESDAY 3 NOVEMBER 1998
MR
PETER
PENFOLD,
CMG,
OBE
Chairman
1053. Mr Penfold, may I welcome you to the
Committee on behalf of my colleagues? We recognise that you have
had a very dramatic and traumatic 18 months or so, more so than
most foreign service personnel would probably have had in a lifetime,
feted in Freetown and yet invigilated at home with an inquiry
and now before this parliamentary committee. Can you tell us what
lessons you have learned from this saga?
(Mr Penfold) I think there have been a number
of lessons learned by the office as a whole. The Secretary of
State is keen to implement changes in the way sanctions are monitored,
implemented and looked after in the Foreign Office. There have
also been discussions on the contacts with security and military
firms. Those lessons have been learned by the Foreign Office and
acted upon.
1054. But you were Her Majesty's representative
first in Freetown and then in exile with the President in Conakry.
There were at least a number of profound misunderstandings. From
your vantage point in the Post overseas, what lessons have you
learned?
(Mr Penfold) It goes without saying that the situation
in Sierra Leone with what happened is very unique.
1055. Every situation is unique.
(Mr Penfold) That is true but I think there are
many things about the Sierra Leone story which are particularly
unique, certainly in my experience of dealing with Africa for
15 years. The way that the political events unfold in Sierra Leone;
the fact has been commented on that, when I was evacuated from
Freetown I then went to Conakry and tried to establish virtually
a one man mission. These sorts of things had not happened before
and because they had not happened before, we had no experience
of how best to deal with the situation. Certainly I would ensure,
if I was asked—hopefully, I would not be—that the
system of running a mission like that was more smooth and that
communications were better.
1056. It is communications you would look
at particularly?
(Mr Penfold) Communications were a particularly
difficult issue in dealing with the situation I found myself in.
1057. What other advice would you give to
ensure that any successors in Sierra Leone or other parts of Africa
and the world were not faced with difficulties similar to your
own?
(Mr Penfold) I find that hard to answer. In these
sorts of situations, one has to make judgments at the time. I
personally have no regrets on what I did, my involvement, and
I had no doubt at all that everything I did was being done properly
in fulfilment of legal requirements and in fulfilment of British
Government policy.
1058. In retrospect, you would not have
done anything differently?
(Mr Penfold) There are one or two small things
that I would have tried to ensure. One point has been made already
in the Legg Report. It was a pity that I did not have the opportunity
to make a written report of that meeting that I had with President
Kabbah on 19 December. The circumstances made it very difficult
to do that. Every other meeting that I had with President Kabbah
or any other significant meeting, as I think one can see from
the records that have been made available to this Committee, was
always very properly acted upon.
1059. You recall that it was the view of
at least one Foreign Office official that effectively you had
ceased to be Her Majesty's Government representative and you had
moved over to become an adviser to the President of the country
to which you were accredited.
(Mr Penfold) I deny that. At all times I was representing
Her Majesty's Government as the British High Commissioner of Sierra
Leone.
Ms Abbott
1060. Mr Penfold, you said in response to
questions from the Chairman that there is nothing you would have
done differently. Can I suggest to you there is at least one small
thing you might have done differently and that is actually read
the UN Resolution? One of the many parts of the text of Legg which
seems scarcely credible is where, in paragraph 5.10, it says you
were sent the full text of the Resolution. Legg's words are that
you perused it but were not disturbed in your assumption that
the UN arms embargo applied only to the junta. The UN Resolution
was perfectly clear. Do you not think, in retrospect, it might
have been better if you had read the text and gone by the text
rather than your assumptions?
(Mr Penfold) I did read the UN Resolution but
it has to be read in the context of what the situation was. The
UN Resolution grew out of the ECOWAS proposals for dealing with
the Sierra Leone situation. When President Kabbah's government
was overthrown, it was the OAU who were the first to condemn the
overthrow and they designated ECOWAS to be the ones responsible
for pursuing the OAU policy of the restoration of President Kabbah's
government. They in turn designated to the five foreign ministers
to carry that through. In their meeting in July, they proposed
the three prong approach to seek the restoration of President
Kabbah's government. That was dialogue, embargo or sanctions and
force. ECOWAS was then supported by the British Government. The
British Government announced that they were supporting ECOWAS
in seeking the restoration of President Kabbah's government. Indeed,
as we saw it, we welcomed this approach because it was an African
solution to an African problem. When the ECOWAS sanctions were
then introduced, they called upon the United Nations for support.
Then the United Nations passed their Resolution on sanctions.
The first I saw was the press line issued by the Foreign Office
on the UN Resolution, which made it very clear that the sanctions
were directed against the junta. I then received a copy of the
UN Resolution by fax at my home from ODA, but I had already seen
the press line which in effect would be the briefing for what
the UN Resolution was.
1061. But, Mr Penfold, you are a career
civil servant. The British Civil Service is nothing if not an
organisation dominated by the culture of the word. We are politicians;
we know how press briefings can vary from the facts. It seems
to me wholly incredible that you did not acquaint yourself with
the actual text of the Resolution. It seems to me further incredible
that you never asked to see a copy of the Order in Council.
(Mr Penfold) There was always this assumption
of mine that the sanctions applied only to the junta.
Ms Abbott: Mr Penfold,
with respect, you have told me about your assumptions and I quite
understand that your assumptions were well founded. My point is
that, as a career civil servant, to go on your assumptions rather
than looking at the text of the Resolution seems to me, at the
very least, to be surprising.
Chairman
1062. Did you read the text of the UN Resolution?
(Mr Penfold) Yes, and I read it alongside all
the other documentation that I had received or seen.
1063. No gloss on that Resolution is as
important as the Resolution itself and the Foreign Office legal
adviser is absolutely clear that that involves a ban on arms shipment
to all parties in Sierra Leone.
(Mr Penfold) In any legal text, any Resolution
like that is usually accompanied by a briefing note for missions
around the world. We are not all lawyers. I have not had any legal
training as such. In addition to the press line, I also saw the
Commonwealth Heads of Government communique which again specifically
referred to sanctions against the junta. There was a number of
other documents that I was shown which again always referred,
and only referred, to sanctions against the junta. I have subsequently
seen the statement made by the Assistant Secretary General of
the United Nations Legal Affairs Department. He himself has said
that the sanctions were directed against the junta and indeed
allowed for equipment to go to ECOMOG. I was also talking to people
about them, like President Kabbah. President Kabbah has always
remained of the view that the UN sanctions were directed against
the junta. He had 23 years' experience in the United Nations.
He was being advised by Ambassador Jonah, a Sierra Leone ambassador
who has had long experience in the United Nations and has indeed
been involved in drafting sanctions resolutions by the United
Nations. All this documentation, all these conversations, every
contact that I had with the Foreign Office, all led me to believe
that the sanctions were directed against the junta. It was not
until I saw the Order in Council on 30 April that I immediately
saw—I was shown that in my lawyers' office—where the
reference was made to the government of Sierra Leone. Unlike the
United Nations sanctions, the UK Order in Council attempted to
define what it means by Sierra Leone. In that definition, the
very first thing it defines is the government of Sierra Leone.
Surprisingly, the UK Order in Council does not refer to the junta
or the AFRC. Because it had been such an important point in our
policy all along that the government of Sierra Leone was President
Kabbah's government, I immediately saw the significance of that,
but that was on 30 April and that was the first occasion when
I saw the Order in Council.
Ms Abbott
1064. There is a mismatch between your assumptions
and the text of the Resolution, but let us move on. I want to
ask you a little bit about your previous knowledge of Sandline
before you took up your post because, as you are aware, the Legg
Report describes how, before taking up your appointment, you visited
Branch Energy in London. Mr Spicer says he was present but you
say you do not recall meeting him. Mr Spicer says he gave you
his card but you say that did not occur. How can there be this
mismatch between your two recollections?
(Mr Penfold) I am not saying it did not occur.
As part of my briefing before going out to Sierra Leone, as is
normal for any head of mission, you are advised which are the
leading British companies it would be good to call upon. For example,
I was given a list including Barclays Bank, Standard Chartered
Bank, De Beers and so on. Amongst those was Branch Energy so I
went to visit Branch Energy. I think it was more like December
1996 when I went there. There, I specifically recall meeting Mr
Grunberg who I think chaired the meeting. I recall meeting Mr
Buckingham and I recall being introduced to Mr Bowen who was their
representative in Sierra Leone. There were several other people
in that meeting but those are the only ones I specifically recall.
1065. You do not remember giving Mr Spicer
your card?
(Mr Penfold) I think it is quite likely. I gave
cards to everybody. I just handed out to my card to all who were
there.
1066. What was Mr Buckingham's role at that
meeting?
(Mr Penfold) I do not think it was specifically
to make notes. He was obviously associated with that company in
some way. One of the points I do remember about that meeting was
how he was talking about his planned trip to a trans Euro-Asian
rally. I am interested in rallying as well so we had a discussion
about that.
1067. When you returned to the UK in December,
Mr Spicer rang you at home. How do you think he got your number?
(Mr Penfold) I assumed he was given it either
by President Kabbah or possibly Rupert Bowen. More than likely
the latter.
1068. Why would it be more likely to be
Rupert Bowen?
(Mr Penfold) Bowen was out there at the time.
He may already have had my home telephone number. My home telephone
number was fairly widely known in Conakry because of the fact
that people were always asking how to get in touch with me if
I was not in Conakry at the time. It was no secret.
1069. Finally, your lunch with Mr Spicer
on 23 December. There seem to be two different recollections of
what took place at that lunch. Are you able to explain that?
(Mr Penfold) Which specific points?
1070. The specific point is this: that Mr
Spicer said that he gave you a copy of the contract; you folded
it up and put it in your pocket.
(Mr Penfold) I am convinced that I did not come
away from that lunch with a copy of the contract. I heard what
Mr Spicer said. In terms of the rest of that discussion that took
place in the restaurant, there is not a great degree of difference.
On this question of leaving with the contract, no, I did not.
1071. Were you shown a copy of the contract?
(Mr Penfold) Yes, I may well have been shown a
copy of the contract.
1072. Did you read it or was it like the
UN Resolution and you went on your assumptions?
(Mr Penfold) I was having lunch over a small table
so I did not study it in any detail, but if I had come away with
a copy of that contract then I would have obviously given it into
the Foreign Office, as I did the other document they gave me.
Equally, if I had wanted a copy of that contract, I am sure if
I asked President Kabbah for a copy he would probably have given
it to me. During the Customs investigation when I was shown a
copy of that contract, it was my lawyer who spotted that, in fact,
on the Sandline copy, the fax time date on it indicated they had
received it after the lunch was over.
1073. That is not to say that there could
not have been earlier draft copies of the same contract.
(Mr Penfold) That is possible.
1074. The fax date is immaterial. You state
in your evidence to Legg that you indicated your agreement with
the need for a credible threat of force against the junta. Is
that true?
(Mr Penfold) Yes.
1075. How did you indicate your agreement?
(Mr Penfold) To Sandline?
1076. Yes.
(Mr Penfold) By the time we were having that meeting
in the restaurant, the position was that we were still looking
to see how the Conakry Peace Accord could be used to achieve the
restoration of President Kabbah's government by peaceful means.
That agreement had been initially agreed between ECOWAS and the
junta in October. President Kabbah was not directly involved in
that agreement but he said he would go along with it. By 1 December,
disarmament was supposed to have been taking place. It was very
clear to everybody who was monitoring the Sierra Leone situation
that that was not happening; the Conakry Peace Accord was bogged
down. Indeed, more than that: it was very clear that the junta
had very little intention of implementing the Conakry Peace Accord.
The feeling was that the junta had to believe that, if they did
not implement the Conakry peace plan, there was the credible threat
of force that could be used against them.
1077. You said "the feeling was";
whose feeling was that? Was it your feeling?
(Mr Penfold) It was my feeling; it was the UN
Secretary General's representative's feeling; it was President
Kabbah's feeling. It was the view of many international NGOs,
UN Agencies, and it was the view of the people I spoke with in
the Foreign Office. It is a policy also. It is very common, it
seems to me. We talk about it with Kosovo; we talk about it with
Iraq. We impose sanctions and there is always the threat that
force may be used if the recipient does not honour or carry out—
Chairman
1078. When you conveyed that feeling, did
you believe you were doing so with the authority of the British
Government?
(Mr Penfold) No. I made it clear that, at that
time, there was not an agreed view yet within the Office. By mid-December,
we had reached a conclusion that the Conakry peace plan was stalled
and stagnant. There were still discussions going on over what
could be done to try and get the Conakry peace plan working. It
would have been in those terms that I spoke to Spicer and Buckingham.
I made it very clear to Spicer and Buckingham, as indeed to any
other person I spoke to, that the British Government policy was
to see the restoration of President Kabbah's government and we
wanted to see that achieved by peaceful means. We were putting
all of our support at that time behind the Conakry Peace Accord.
1079. Already the Order in Council was almost
two months old. Are you suggesting that none of the people on
the spot was aware of the ban under the implementing Order in
Council?
(Mr Penfold) Which people?
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