Examination of witness (Questions 1220
- 1239)
TUESDAY 3 NOVEMBER 1998
MR
PETER
PENFOLD,
CMG,
OBE
1220. But when you had meetings on 29th
January, 30th January, apparently the subject of this letter did
not crop up then?
(Mr Penfold) I cannot recall specifically. What
I did was, I made reference to the letter in the memo I prepared
for 2nd February; I think I may well have mentioned the letter.
1221. I get the impression that the tenor
of the meetings, particularly the 30th if not the 29th, was some
surprise, if I read Legg correctly. The response from the people
you were meeting was of some surprise when you were telling them
about certain bits of information you had discovered about Sandline.
Is that correct?
(Mr Penfold) The tenor of the meeting, as I recall
it, was that there was a concern by Ann Grant not so much about
the Sandline contract as such but whether in my discussions with
President Kabbah I had been advocating the use of force and therefore
going beyond what was British Government policy.
1222. But given that particular meeting
and if that was the line being taken in the discussions, would
it not have occurred to you to say, "But I told you all this
in the letter I wrote"?
(Mr Penfold) It may have. I may well have said
that. I cannot specifically recall that. What I do specifically
recall is that I definitely mentioned the letter in the memo I
prepared on 2nd February reporting that conversation.
Mr Wilshire: Could
I take you back to the meeting of 23rd December when you were
told about the £10 million being made available to Sandline
and you said you came to the conclusion that meant arms were included.
Chairman: Dollars.
Mr Wilshire
1223. Dollars, sorry. Why would you come
to that conclusion?
(Mr Penfold) It seems such a sizeable amount of
money. It seemed to me to be going beyond, say, just making available
advisers. I could not imagine that just a whole number of advisers
who were part of the programme would cost 10 million dollars,
so there had to be equipment.
1224. You would base that sort of reaction
on the experience you had gained from other similar types of episodes
and information coming before you earlier in your career?
(Mr Penfold) Yes. In a general sense a 10 million
dollar contract to me is more than just providing people.
1225. So if you were able, through your
career, to learn to make that judgment, is it reasonable to assume
that this is the sort of judgment an FCO official would make when
he or she saw that sort of information?
(Mr Penfold) I guess you would have to specifically
ask the others, but that is certainly in my experience the conclusion
I came to. I had expected the others to reach the same conclusion.
1226. You would not hold yourself out as
the only person in the FCO who would reasonably come to that conclusion?
(Mr Penfold) No, there is nothing special about
me.
1227. So you would presume anybody else
given that information would come to the same conclusion?
(Mr Penfold) I would have thought others would,
yes.
1228. And you are clear about the information
you give as to whom you reported to and when they knew it?
(Mr Penfold) Yes.
1229. So, even if there is some dispute
about whether your letter appeared or whether something was said
on the 29th or 30th January, there is no doubt in anybody's mind,
as I understand it, that by the beginning of February you were
not the only person in the FCO to be aware that arms and ammunition
were involved?
(Mr Penfold) Certainly anybody who read my minute
of 2nd February would have no doubt, because I had specifically
mentioned arms and equipment.
1230. And that information, from then on,
would have been available to anybody wanting to brief the Minister?
(Mr Penfold) It was available in the Department
for them to use in any way.
1231. Who would have seen your minute?
(Mr Penfold) Because it was Ann Grant who had
specifically asked for it, it was addressed to her and I gave
it to her—if not to her personally, to her PA or where the
Heads of Departments' papers are. But anything you make available
within a department is available to everybody in that department.
What happened outside the Department, I have no idea.
1232. Just two other matters which do not
arise out of what colleagues have asked you. When were you first
made aware, or when were you first warned, there could be illegal
activity taking place in connection with Sandline in Sierra Leone?
(Mr Penfold) I think the first inclination was
in a telephone conversation I had when I was talking in Freetown,
when we were then fully engaged in getting all the emergency relief
supplies through the use of HMS Cornwall. It was in conversation
with Tim Andrews, the head of section, who said something along
the lines, "There is some concern and interest here about
Sandline", and I said something along the lines, "Gosh,
we are very busy here, what is this about?" He said, "There
may be a breach of sanctions." I said, "Well, as you
know, we have always believed the sanctions do not apply to the
supply of equipment for President Kabbah and ECOMOG."
1233. When did that conversation take place?
(Mr Penfold) It was around about the middle of
March. That was the first inclination that I had. A message came
back, "No, it is not UN sanctions, it is a UK Order in Council",
and that was when I said I had not seen the UK Order in Council.
1234. Did you then subsequently acquire
a copy?
(Mr Penfold) I was led to believe that a copy
would be coming out in the bag service, but of course the bag
service had not been established.
1235. So you did not get one immediately
after?
(Mr Penfold) I did not get one until I came back
and then a copy was produced to me in my lawyer's office, who
showed it to me for the very first time.
1236. In your time in the High Commission
in Sierra Leone, were there any personnel attached to the embassy
or working through the High Commission who were involved with
the British intelligence services?
(Mr Penfold) None.
1237. You are certain of that?
(Mr Penfold) To my knowledge there were none.
Certainly there were no members in the staff nor anybody else
operating.
Mr Wilshire: Thank
you.
Mr Heath: Could I
just preface my remarks, Mr Penfold, by saying to you what I said
to the Foreign Secretary in a previous hearing, which is that
no one could read the telegrams from Freetown and Conakry without
being aware of the dedication and indeed the degree of heroism
you brought to your duties at that time, and I want that recorded.
Now to move on to the more difficult questions!
Chairman: That is
the softener!
Sir Peter Emery: Worth
recording though.
Mr Heath
1238. Can I test you a little further on
your understanding of the Government's policy, because I think
I heard you correctly earlier but I want to make absolutely sure?
You were talking about a gradation of policy and your clear understanding
was that as a matter of last recourse force would be necessary
if other measures failed in Sierra Leone. Have I understood that
correctly?
(Mr Penfold) Yes. I would put it slightly differently.
The policy of the British Government was to seek the restoration
of President Kabbah's Government by peaceful means if possible.
We never ever ruled out the possible use of force but, more importantly,
within the policy of a peaceful restoration—and, as I say,
this is linked to the Conakry Peace Accord—in order for
us to get that peaceful restoration through the Conakry Peace
Accord, the junta had to believe there was a credible threat of
force and which could be used against them if they did not implement
the Conakry Peace Accord.
1239. Is your interpretation of policy recorded
anywhere, because it certainly does not appear, as I have read
them, in Ministers' speeches at the time?
(Mr Penfold) For a start, that is recorded in
my annual review which I submitted at the end of December and
was circulated all around the world, and annual review despatches
are usually submitted to Ministers as well, so they would have
seen that. It was also recorded in the other documents, which
have been made reference to earlier, about the limited use of
force and about the ability of ECOMOG to implement UN sanctions.
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