Examination of witness (Questions 1240
- 1259)
TUESDAY 3 NOVEMBER 1998
MR
PETER
PENFOLD,
CMG,
OBE
1240. So no one ever handed you a caveat
at any stage at that time that you had misinterpreted in any way
the Government's policy?
(Mr Penfold) No, no caveat. What was made clear
in discussion in the Department was if force had to be used, then
we would need to go to the UN Security Council in order to get
approval to use force, so it was not just using it, we would have
to get the cover of the UN Council. We did not believe, for example,
that the ECOWAS provision for the use of force was sufficient
from our point of view; from an international point of view.
1241. Before you took up your post you went
in March 1997 to see Branch Energy in London, and you saw there
Mr Buckingham, whom we have had reference to, Mr Bowen and Mr
Grunberg, and Mr Spicer says he was there but your recollection
was he was not. That was on the recommendation of the Foreign
Office itself?
(Mr Penfold) Yes. First of all, it was more likely
about December 1996 that I went. In March I was already in—in
fact I had left the UK in February because I drove to Sierra Leone
in my Land Rover. I was given the names of firms by, I am fairly
certain, the head of section in the Africa Department. At that
time there was another person called Philip Rouse—there
have been five different heads of section since I have been High
Commissioner. As regards Spicer saying he was there, I do not
dispute it necessarily, all I am saying is I do not recall him
being there.
1242. The Africa Desk at the time had no
reservations about the people you were going to see, knowing they
had connections with Executive Outcomes and possibly some involvement
in activities elsewhere on the continent? Nobody suggested you
should treat them with a little care when you went to see them?
(Mr Penfold) No, I got none of that. I was told
I was going to see Branch Energy because they are the leading
British company in the mining industry.
1243. Therefore, when Mr Everard recorded
his reservations in December 1997, when asked to have a meeting
with Branch Energy at that point, and his attitude was clearly
different, that was because of events which had taken place in
the intervening period?
(Mr Penfold) I assume so. I was never made aware
whilst in Conakry that these contacts were being carried out by
John Everard and Executive Outcomes.
1244. You say you became aware of Sandline
and Mr Spicer in October in regard to Papua New Guinea, was that
while you were in Africa or when you were back in London?
(Mr Penfold) It was while I was in Conakry, just
looking at some of the CNN reports on the television in my hotel
room which brought up Papua New Guinea.
1245. Just that. They set no alarm bells
ringing at the time about contracts which might be taking place
in Conakry or elsewhere?
(Mr Penfold) Absolutely none, because I was at
that time totally unaware there were any links between Sandline,
Executive Outcomes, Lifeguard or Branch Energy.
1246. On 1st August the Toronto Globe
ran their story about contacts in Vancouver or Canada and concern
was expressed by the High Commission in Ottawa, which was prompted
to ask for advice from the FCO in London as to the line they should
take. Was that concern ever transmitted to you?
(Mr Penfold) No, I was unaware of that.
1247. Do you not find it rather odd that
the FCO did not feel it appropriate to advise the High Commissioner
in Sierra Leone of a major news story about the potential fact
of arrangements between the Government of Mr Kabbah and mercenaries
of one kind or another to actually affect the outcome in Sierra
Leone?
(Mr Penfold) I would have liked to have been sent
copies of that article and any telegrams about it. But, again,
you have to bear in mind how limited our communications were for
receiving material, even faxed material, it was not always that
easy. It was never easy to send or receive any kind of material,
even unclassified.
1248. I still find it extraordinary that
no one in the Foreign Office thought it appropriate to tell the
High Commission that a potential plot was being put together to
restore the Government in Freetown, but let us move on. On 9th
October we had the UN Resolution and you were given the full text
whilst you were in London, is that right?
(Mr Penfold) Yes, I obtained my fax in fact from
the ODA.
1249. Why?
(Mr Penfold) I know I got it from the ODA because
my copy of the text is a faxed copy which shows it was sent from
the ODA, and this was after I had already seen a copy of the press
line. I believe it came about because I was talking to the ODA
from my home in Abingdon about some of the ODA projects we were
promulgating in Conakry and the contact in the ODA mentioned that
the Resolution had been passed and I think I said, "I have
not yet seen a copy" and they said, "Would you like
me to fax a copy?" That was the first time I got a copy of
the UN Resolution.
1250. So, again, the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office did not feel it necessary to send you the full text of
the Resolution regarding the country in which you were High Commissioner?
(Mr Penfold) I suspect they would expect I would
go into the office and would pick up a copy when I went in.
1251. But you did not?
(Mr Penfold) Well, as I say, I got a copy from
the ODA.
1252. Moving on from that, we have the preparation
of the Order in Council, which is of course the critical element
as far as legality is concerned in this country. That was being
prepared, I think, up until the point on 16th October when it
was first submitted to the Minister for approval. You were actually
in the United Kingdom until 13th October, you then returned on
18th October, flew to CHOGM, and at no time were you consulted
about the terms of the Order in Council?
(Mr Penfold) At no time. Neither that nor was
I consulted about the draft UN Resolution.
1253. Did your curiosity not make you want
to know what the terms of the Order in Council were, or your professional
duties as High Commissioner whilst you were in London? Was that
not a perfect opportunity to discuss it?
(Mr Penfold) I was aware in general that an Order
in Council had to be passed in the UK for enforcement of something
like a UN Sanctions Resolution. I knew the process had to be done.
I assumed there would be no difference between the UK Order in
Council and the actual UN Resolution, therefore I did not feel
any particular need to ask specifically for it. I had the text
of the UN Resolution. What normally happens in these circumstances
in missions is that the UK Order in Council is put in the bag
to go out to post but, as I say, we did not have a bag service
as such at Conakry.
1254. I understand the difficulties of communication
once you were in Conakry but whilst you were in London communications
might be thought to have been a little simpler, and perhaps somebody
might have consulted you and considered the terms with you so
you could give advice to any British company that was seeking
to do business with the Government in exile or in Sierra Leone
as it was embargoed. But that did not happen?
(Mr Penfold) I was not consulted at all, nor was
I aware that at this time the British Order in Council was going
through at that time.
1255. Could I ask you about your relationship
with President Kabbah? Did you feel at any stage that it developed
to a relationship which was more than a normal diplomatic relationship?
(Mr Penfold) No, I do not think it developed to
more than a normal diplomatic relationship. I would hope that
any of our heads of mission overseas are able to establish a working
relationship with the head of government to whom they are accredited.
There were aspects of our relationship—the fact we were
both in Conakry, for example—but we have always maintained
diplomatic niceties. To this day I refer to him as "Your
Excellency" and he refers back to me as "Your Excellency"
and there is a formality about our discussions.
1256. You say you believe your relationship
did not extend beyond, that it was a normal diplomatic relationship,
yet I believe I am right in saying that in one of your messages
to the Foreign Office after the restoration you did indicate that
you would wish to return to—and here I quote—"a
normal diplomatic relationship" with President Kabbah and
were therefore seeking to perhaps extend the intervals between
conversations or interviews with the President. Is that not the
case?
(Mr Penfold) Yes. I think by returning to normal
diplomatic relations, which is obviously in terms of either the
re-establishment of a High Commission, building an office, President
Kabbah would be re-establishing his government properly in his
office, and yes, it would be my intention perhaps not to see him
as frequently as I was seeing him in Conakry, unless, of course,
there was a need to do so.
1257. And during the period when you were
seeing the President on a regular basis and you were discussing
to an extent domestic policy with him and the process of that,
did you feel that you were being drawn further than perhaps might
normally be the case for a representative of another country,
no matter how friendly, in terms of giving him policy advice?
(Mr Penfold) He asked me advice on things which
perhaps one would not normally be asked advice on. I think I would
refer to the fact that, for example, he was concentrating on what
changes he would make to his cabinet when he went back to Sierra
Leone and he sought my views on personalities within his sort
of cabinet. That is obviously a subject on which there is no British
Government view, nor would one normally get involved in that,
and, therefore, I made it clear to him that any comments I offered,
I was obviously not speaking on behalf of the British Government.
The British Government was not necessarily supporting one individual
or another, but if he wished to find out from me what my experience
or the Government's experience had been of a certain individual,
I could pass them on to him. I think it is important to note that
he, particularly with his long experience with the United Nations,
is very much an international statesman. He clearly understood
that I was not giving a British Government view on his cabinet.
1258. Your minute of 2 February that Ms
Grant requested, what was her purpose in requesting those minutes?
What do you understand her motivation to be?
(Mr Penfold) I understood what she wanted was
a clear report of the meeting with President Kabbah because of
the concern she had that I had been advocating the use of force
in terms of supplying a solution to Sierra Leone.
1259. But you said earlier that you felt
that the agreed UK policy was, as a matter of last resort, to
use force, so we are talking about the timing rather than the
intention, if she disagreed with that point, or did she understand
UK policy to be different?
(Mr Penfold) No, I never felt there was any difference
between Ann Grant and myself as to what our policy was. I think
she just wanted specifically to be clear what was said at that
meeting.
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