Examination of witness (Questions 1260
- 1279)
TUESDAY 3 NOVEMBER 1998
MR
PETER
PENFOLD,
CMG,
OBE
1260. One last question: one person who
was working for Sandline at the time and who may have had some
involvement, his name has been put to me and I ask you whether
you are aware of him and any activities he may have had in Sierra
Leone, a gentleman called Simon Mann? Does that mean anything
to you?
(Mr Penfold) No. I have seen the name mentioned
in press reports but only —
Mr Illsley
1261. Mr Penfold, you have told the Committee
that you assumed the Blackstone contract which listed $10 million
referred to the supply of arms but that you did not actually see
it written that it referred to arms, yet in the Legg Inquiry,
paragraph 6.45 refers to your minute of 2 February and a reference
in it says: "Kabbah showed me", i.e. you—"in
confidence the copy of the contract with Blackstone, which in
return for diamond mining concessions, they would make available
to Sandline up to US $10 million for the purchase of arms",
and the words "for the purchase of arms" are underlined.
How do you react to that? Do you think that is a factual report
in Legg or do you think again Legg has misconstrued what you said?
(Mr Penfold) First of all, it is not my underlining.
I think Legg has underlined that.
1262. But was that in your minute of 2 February?
(Mr Penfold) Yes, it is, and my minute of 2 February
specifically says that, but I think it is a shorthand version.
What I am not saying specifically there is that in the copy of
the contract with Blackstone it was specifically saying the words
"for the purchase of arms and equipment". It says I
said I reached the conclusion that I was drawing, that the contract
was explaining rather than quoting verbatim the Blackstone contract.
1263. Do you think there was some confusion
in the Foreign Office in relation to the British Government policy
towards Sierra Leone, bearing in mind that Mr Murray supposedly
asked for you to be recalled on the basis that you were advocating
the use of force, and yet his memorandum was returned by Mr Dales
with a reference to it that this was actually the policy, that
there was a question of force being used if the junta did not
give up by peaceful means?
(Mr Penfold) No, I did not feel there was particularly
confusion over that. What concerned me is that following discussion
with Mr Murray, there was a feeling that perhaps there was consideration
of abandoning our policy of formally seeking the restoration of
President Kabbah's government, that that was another way perhaps
of getting democracy back to negotiations with the rebels, joint
government or whatever, and that is what particularly concerned
me because it had been such a cornerstone of our policy right
from the very beginning. Indeed, the entire international community's
position was that President Kabbah's government was the legitimate
government of Sierra Leone, that the junta did not exist as a
government as such and that, therefore, that government had to
be restored and you could not fudge on that issue. You could look
at other things after that but that had to have priority and,
of course, it is not just the position of the international community,
it is the position of the Sierra Leone people. It is one of the
remarkable things in the Sierra Leone story that for ten months
the people of Sierra Leone refused to have anything to do with
the junta. They refused to go to work, they refused to go to school,
the banks remained closed, the schools remained closed. People
either fled the country or they just stayed at home and suffered
for ten months. That I find quite remarkable. This is why, Chairman,
I am saying that Sierra Leone has been so unique. That has never
happened at all in my experience and I think the position that
we, the international community took—and we can be proud
that Britain were the ones who took the lead on this, to fully
support that position of the people of Sierra Leone that they
wanted their democratic government back, and I did not wish to
see, therefore, any suggestion that our policy should be watered
down in order to achieve that.
1264. When you had meetings with Tim Spicer
from Sandline and he referred to the contracts for arms and intervention
and all the rest of it, did you look upon that as though he was
organising some specific event in Sierra Leone or that he was
simply accruing arms, munitions, etc. to be part of the ECOMOG
initiatives? Did you look upon it as the fact that he was about
to embark upon some invasion of Sierra Leone to restore President
Kabbah?
(Mr Penfold) No, not at all, because it would
be farcical to think he could do that.
1265. With his 12 men?
(Mr Penfold) Yes, 12 men, and even $10 million
would not do that. As I said earlier, what I saw Sandline were
doing was providing some extra assistance in terms of manpower,
resources and equipment to ECOMOG and the forces working with
ECOMOG. This notion that Sandline were going to overthrow the
junta when 12,000 Nigerian soldiers could not do that I find quite
farcical.
1266. Did ECOMOG need Sandline? Did they
need that expertise of Sandline? Did they need the extra?
(Mr Penfold) If you ask ECOMOG they say no. The
only statement that I have seen made by ECOMOG in relation to
this issue is, of course, that they are totally dismissive of
any assistance or proposed assistance. However, what I would say
is that I do believe that the helicopter that they provided, or
if not Sandline, Executive Outcomes, was, in fact, quite useful
for ferrying around some of the senior ECOMOG officers. That was
useful but otherwise, nothing else.
1267. In your conversation with Mr Spicer
after the Customs and Excise had raided his office and his home,
in his evidence he says that you were angry about the lack of
cover which had been provided from the Foreign Office to you and
that you had been told to keep quiet. Is that true? You complained
that you had not been covered adequately by the Foreign Office?
(Mr Penfold) I do not think I said it in those
words. I was concerned not to be kept fully informed about what
was going on. For example, it was not until 30 March that I was
aware that Customs had been advised that there may have been a
possible breach of sanctions.
1268. Throughout all this do you feel at
any point that you encouraged Sandline to breach the arms embargo?
Do you feel that you actively encouraged Sandline in what they
were doing?
(Mr Penfold) I certainly do not believe I actively
encouraged Sandline to breach the arms embargo, mainly, one, because
it was still my view at that time that what they were proposing
to do was not in breach of the embargo. Indeed, if I had thought
at all it had been, obviously I would have immediately told them
not to do it or I would have sent instructions to them to have
nothing to do with it. What I do accept, as I said in the Legg
Committee, in the way that they spoke to me and the way I explained
how I saw the situation, that I neither encouraged nor discouraged
them and, therefore, by the act of not positively discouraging
them, I saw no particular point to discourage them if it was not
going to be illegal from the way I understood it. They may have
taken it that I was giving the nod, but even now I still firmly
refute that. Me listening to them in that way does not mean that,
therefore, they had the formal approval of the British Government.
They are and were in touch with the Government here in London.
I am just the High Commissioner home on leave for a couple of
weeks obviously. They were in touch with the Department and they
knew that it would be through the Department that they would get,
if they needed it, formal approval or not.
1269. In your minute of 2 February, the
other information given to the Foreign Office officials, did you
assume that it would be passed further up the chain of command,
and in particular did you assume that ministers would be made
aware of what you had been telling Ms Grant and Mr Murray?
(Mr Penfold) When I prepared the minute of 2 February
that was essentially for the Department. It was specifically at
their request.
1270. For ministers or —
(Mr Penfold) If it was as important as it turns
out, then obviously I would have expected them to pass it on to
whoever they needed to do. Mine was written to the Head of Department,
which was already a fairly senior level, and the Department decides
where it goes on from the Department. All my reports go to the
Department and I rely upon the Department then to issue them to
whoever they think necessary.
1271. Mr Dales did not think anything untoward
about your minute, did he, because he replied on 4 February to
Mr Murray that everything was in line with policy?
(Mr Penfold) I never, nor have I ever, had any
response to my minute of 2 February.
1272. Did you ever consider faxing your
letter of December before you went on holiday, bearing in mind
that you photocopied on your fax machine, rather than posting
it, knowing you were going on holiday for four weeks? Did it ever
occur to you perhaps if you faxed it you might have got acknowledgment
that it had been received?
(Mr Penfold) That is a very good point. The frank
answer is yes, I wish I had done that now. I suppose it was still
the Christmas/New Year period. I was not even sure who was in
the Department on 30 December.
Chairman
1273. That does not matter surely? It goes
to the Department, the fax machine, and someone will pick it up?
(Mr Penfold) That is true. I think you also have
to bear in mind I had just spent a very frustrating nine months
trying to fax things. When I was in Conakry, I might say, sometimes
I sat in front of the fax machine for two hours just trying to
get one fax through to London, so faxes were not my favourite
means of communicating during that time.
Mr Rowland
1274. Was no-one worried that the arms went
to Nigerians?
(Mr Penfold) No, I do not think so. When you say
no-one, certainly nobody from the Sierra Leone side or the ECOMOG
side.
1275. Neither you, ECOMOG nor the Department
were worried that the arms were going to end up with the Nigerians?
(Mr Penfold) The Nigerians were ECOMOG as such.
I think there is an important international difference. It was
not a Nigerian force, it was an ECOMOG force which was empowered
by ECOWAS. They were the ones who were representing the force
against the junta. Quite frankly, it is probably far better that
any extra supplies of equipment went to ECOMOG rather than to
any individuals.
Mr Mackinlay
1276. While we are on this point, you knew
there were Commonwealth sanctions and European Union sanctions
against Nigeria in the arms department, were there not?
(Mr Penfold) Yes.
1277. You were fully conscious of that.
Again I find it incredible. Surely that flagged up with you the
need, one, for caution for you, and two, to express caution to
others? It seems to me as plain as a pikestaff you would say,
"We must ensure that this does not breach those embargoes,"
that if there is a separate entity called ECOMOG, you have to
somehow— How do you quarantine arms? I was going to come
to this myself. I just find that incredible that alarm bells were
not banging away.
(Mr Penfold) As I said, there is a very important
difference between Nigeria and ECOMOG. It was a multinational
force.
Chairman
1278. And it was, in effect, overwhelmingly
dominated by the Nigerians. It was officered by Nigerians and
supplied by Nigerians?
(Mr Penfold) Yes.
1279. So in effect would it not have been
surprising if HMG had allowed arms to go to President Kabbah in
the sense that they would have certainly filtered through to the
embargoed Nigerians?
(Mr Penfold) But if there had been any concern
in that light, then surely that would have come up when the UN
Resolution was passed, because in the UN Resolution itself it
refers to giving ECOMOG the responsibility for monitoring and
implementing the sanctions. Everybody knew then that ECOMOG primarily
was a Nigerian force. If the United Nations sanctions Resolution
itself was recognising the role of ECOMOG, that would be the time
when perhaps concerns like that would have been raised.
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