Examination of Witness (Questions 1360
- 1379)
TUESDAY 10 NOVEMBER 1998
VICE ADMIRAL
ALAN WEST
1360. If there was evidence of other than
peaceful means being set out, he would have considered it important?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) Yes. His role was to
report on anything of significance that would affect the stability
of the country and particularly that would have any impact if
the United Nations were deployed there or, even more so, if any
British forces were deployed there. ***
1361. "Sending back to the UK",
what were the means of communication available to him?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) ***
1362. ***
(Vice Admiral Alan West) ***
1363. What were the means of communication
available to him?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) ***
1364. That could have been made available
to the High Commissioner?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) I see no reason why it
could not have been available to him. If he had asked, I am sure
the arrangements—
1365. I am sure my colleagues will wish
to pursue some of those questions. I would just like to raise
another area of questions, and that is, in our discussions and
evidence sessions we have come across this rather murky world
of the private security organisations, privatised warfare—mercenaries
in the old days—many of whom rely on personnel from former
defence and intelligence areas. There is a freemasonry, if you
will, of contact. Is there any concern in your department about
such contacts?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) I think I will put that
a different way. ***
1366. Sorry, I am not posing the question
correctly. Are you concerned at the possible conflict of interest
of those who immediately leave your own service giving the impression
they are acting with official encouragement? What are the safeguards?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) I see that as being extremely
dangerous. Within the MoD, and it is not directly my area of responsibility,
I do not think there were precise enough guidelines in terms of
exactly how any contacts should be dealt with, and I think that
has now been resolved[2];
there has been a statement as exactly how, when one is dealing
with——
1367. It has been resolved?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) There are now very specific
guidelines in terms of dealing with somebody in one of those organisations.
It was not as clear-cut.
1368. Subsequent to the Sierra Leone matter?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) Yes, because I do not
think it was as clearly articulated as it should have been.
Dr Godman
1369. Have you caught sight of the guidelines
given to Foreign Office officials in relation to dealings with
mercenaries?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) No, I have not. I just
do not know.
Sir John Stanley
1370. Admiral West, will you tell us what
were the intelligence assets available to the DIS for their coverage
of Sierra Leone at the end of November last year?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) ***
1371. Would you like to explain those?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) *** There is open source
material. All of this is pulled together by our analysts in the
DIS who look at the overall picture. I am just thinking if there
are any that I have particularly missed. *** At worker bee level,
the desk officer level, there is constant contact, more than on
a daily basis across Whitehall.
Mr Wilshire
1372. Can I stop you there? ***
(Vice Admiral Alan West) *** Sorry, we are very
bad on acronyms.
Sir John Stanley
1373. Thank you for confirming that ***
you still had available from the various sources you described
a pretty good handle in intelligence terms as to what was going
on in Sierra Leone. Against that background, of course, there
took place the meeting in the Foreign Office on December 3rd in
which most of the key officials involved in Sierra Leone were
present from the Foreign Office and also from the DIS. At that
meeting, as is made clear in the Legg Report, your DIS officer
present reported that Executive Outcomes, which I think for this
purpose we can take as being synonymous with Sandline, were arming
and supplying the Kamajors. It is also reported in the Legg Report
that the senior AD Equatorial official present chose not to forward
this very important information, effectively the first piece of
intelligence information passed to the Foreign Office that Executive
Outcomes were in the arms supply business. Obviously that is not
the DIS's responsibility but I would like to ask you this wider
question. In your experience, Admiral West, is it relatively common
place that Foreign Office officials choose to ignore DIS reports?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) I am not aware of lots
of examples where that has happened. Indeed this is the only one
I am specifically aware of, but that does not mean it might not
have happened on other occasions. Basically, I am content the
advice my man gave was based on a whole raft of little tiny bits
of intelligence, ***. I am convinced that he was correct in what
he said. However, as I think you alluded to, our job is to make
sure we just push this out to the relevant areas, and in the final
analysis I can do no more than that, and it is up to them to either
accept it or not accept it.
1374. Your DIS man was proved to be wholly
correct and the Foreign Office official concerned made a serious
misjudgment in discounting the information, as is evident. Could
you please take us through what further intelligence about Sandline,
arms contracts involving Sandline, were passed by the DIS to the
Foreign Office between the meeting on December 3rd and the meeting
that took place on February 15th? Sorry, I should not say "meeting",
the report that was submitted on February 15th. Between those
two dates, do you have any information you can give to the Committee
as to any further information that was passed by the DIS to the
Foreign Office in relation to arms supplies involving Sandline
or the contracts between Sandline and President Kabbah?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) It is difficult for me
to be able to extract which ones were directly involved in that.
***
1375. Can you highlight anything else in
relation to Sandline and the arms contract post-December 3rd and
prior to Major Hicks' report on February 15th?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) I cannot do that. Could
I come back and answer that one, because I cannot easily drag
that out, I am afraid?
Sir John Stanley: Could
you come back to the Committee on that? The Committee is particularly
interested in any of that information which was passed to the
Foreign Office.
Sir Peter Emery
1376. On that, may I ask one question? Did
the Legg Inquiry ask to see any of that information?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) The Legg Inquiry was
given access to a whole list of all the various reports.
1377. So they had it?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) Yes, they had pretty
well everything.
Sir Peter Emery: Thank
you.
Sir John Stanley
1378. On January 28th, Mr Penfold was handed
by Sandline their entire strategic/tactical operational plan and
the following day it was given by Mr Penfold to Mr Andrews in
the Foreign Office. In turn, Mr Andrews passed it on to the DIS,
amongst others. Subsequently, as the Legg Report recounts, the
DIS desk officer concerned telephoned Mr Andrews to discuss this
very important document, though Mr Andrews somewhat extraordinarily,
according to paragraph 6.38 of the Legg Report, does not recall
anything of significance being said. Can you tell us, did your
DIS desk officer, having with his professional eye gone through
the entire strategic/tactical plan document which the DIS now
had, conclude that this must surely involve a significant contribution
by Sandline by way of arms supplies?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) I have to say that I
do not know the answer exactly to that. I do know that he phoned
up and spoke at length with him on the phone, *** I know he discussed
that matter with him on the phone.
1379. Are you saying that the DIS desk officer
in this telephone conversation made it clear that the Sandline
plans must involve a supply of arms?
(Vice Admiral Alan West) I do not know what was
said in that conversation, ***
2 Note by Witness: The new detailed guidelines
are still being discussed between Whitehall Departments. Back
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