Memorandum submitted by Mr Craig Murray
1. In his letter to you of 25 October the Foreign
and Commonwealth Secretary conveyed to you his decision that FCO
officials giving evidence to your Committee should not give to
the Committee the written statements they made to the Sierra Leone
Arms Investigation conducted by Sir Thomas Legg and Sir Robin
Ibbs. Mr Cook also set out in that letter the reasons for this
decision, and his preference that my colleague Ann Grant, now
Director (Africa) in the FCO, should give evidence on behalf of
the three members of the FCO's Africa Command whose attendance
you had requested.
2. In view of accusations made against me by
Mr T Spicer in evidence given to the Committee on Tuesday 3 November,
and in memoranda submitted to the Committee by him and his solicitors,
Mr Cook has now agreed to my request that I appear before the
Committee on 10 November with Ann Grant. He has also agreed that
I may address a written memorandum to you in advance of the session,
and may quote in it the passages relating to the substance of
the Spicer accusations which were contained in my written statement
to the Legg Investigation, dated 3 June 1998, and my subsequent
letter to the Secretary to the Investigation, dated 17 July.
3. I shall of course be appearing, like Ms Grant,
on behalf of the Foreign Secretary and under his direction; and
shall be glad when I appear to assist the Committee on any other
aspects of its current deliberations which are within my knowledge.
4. In my statement of 3 June, after describing
my position and role as Deputy Head of the FCO's Africa Department
(Equatorial), a post I had taken up on 5 January 1998, I noted
that on that date "I had never heard of Sandline, Branch
Energy, Tim Spicer or Tony Buckingham. I knew that Executive Outcomes
was a mercenary outfit, but knew absolutely nothing of their operations
or personnel. Information on Sandline given in the following account
is intended to refer to the first moment at which I knew it."
5. The parts of my statement relating to my
contacts with Sandline are reproduced below. I wish to emphasise
that these passages were written before I had seen any detailed
account of Mr Spicer's version of what had happened at the meeting
of 19 January.
Extracts from Craig Murray's written statement
to Sir T Legg, 3 June 1998
"I had a one week handover period with John
Everard. On my very first morning he mentioned that he was writing
a minute for Ann Grant, at her request, detailing his contacts
with Sandline. He warned me that Tim Spicer was likely to want
to make early contact with me, and that these contacts were sensitive.
I do not recall that he gave me any further background details.
"Tim Spicer phoned as advertised, I believe
the following week (around 13 January 1998). He said that he wished
to see me to introduce himself and give me a few facts on the
situation on the ground in Sierra Leone. I agreed and we set a
date for 19 January.
"In the interim I looked up the minute Mr
Everard had sent Ms Grant on 5 January. I believe this was the
first I knew of an Executive Outcomes/Sandline link. Mr Andrews
referred me to the record of Mr Buckingham's call of 10 December
on Mr Everard, which I also read. I noted from Mr Everard's minute
that he had not met Spicer face to face. I considered cancelling
the meeting, but decided I saw no moral difference between talking
over the telephone, as Mr Everard used to, or face to face. A
meeting in person would give me a better chance of assessing Spicer
and whether we should be talking to him. I asked Mr Andrews to
sit in and take a note. Mr Andrews briefed me on rumours of a
major ECOMOG attack, and that Spicer may have details.
"At the meeting Spicer said that Sandline
expected a major contract with President Kabbah to train and advise
he Kamajors to fight alongside ECOMOG, including help with non-lethal
equipment and logistic support. He expected the contract to last
eight weeks. My understanding at the time was that this indicated
an assault eight weeks later, after the training period. I distinctly
recall that he used the phrase "non-lethal" several
times. My understanding was that he was aware of the arms embargo
and was seeking to stress to me that he was observing it. He asked
me how I believed the international community would in practice
react to a Nigerian attack which removed the military junta. I
replied that I could not predict, but use of minimal force and
avoidance of civilian casualties must be key factors. Tim Andrews
then discussed at some length with Spicer whether the Sandline
contact might be stretched to include public relations advice
to Kabbah. Kabbah's fading image in the region and international
community was a major concern to the Department at the time.
"I questioned Spicer closely about the ownership
of Sandline, its links to other companies, and how the contract
with Kabbah was being funded. Who stood to gain by it, and how?
He was extremely evasive on these points and appeared uncomfortable.
He gave no real answers, but I recall that he denied Sandline
was related to Executive Outcomes and said the deal was funded
by "legitimate business interests" in Canada.
"Spicer said that he understood the junta
was attempting to get arms supplies from Eastern Europe delivered
via Nigeria. I replied that, given details, we could probably
get the Nigerians to intercept under SCR 1132. I asked Tim Andrews
to show the appropriate paragraph of SCRs 1132. Tim went to his
own (connecting) room and returned with the text, which he read
to Spicer. Spicer asked whether this applied to supply to all
parties in Sierra Leone. I replied that it did; the scope was
geographic.
"Spicer then said that Sandline themselves
might wish to bring in to Sierra Leone night vision equipment
that was employed both in mining and helicopters (sic). How could
such dual-use equipment be exported to Sierra Leone? I said it
couldn't. He asked if it could be exported to Guinea. I said he
would need to apply to the DTI for an export licence. He asked
how long this would take. I said we were under a general instruction
to give an answer in two weeks. There were other Whitehall departments
involved, for which I could not answer.
"Finally Spicer asked whether we could give
Sandline detailed maps of Sierra Leone for distribution to pro-Kabbah
forces. I said that we could not give them to Sandline, but that
I would certainly incline to look favourably on any request from
President Kabbah himself for maps of his own country.
"The discussion on the arms embargo took
up perhaps three minutes of a forty minute meeting. I should explain
why my recollection of this part is especially clear. During the
Gulf Crisis I worked for eight months as Head of the FCO section
of the Embargo Surveillance Centre. Tracking suspect arms shipments
and getting them intercepted in third countries was precisely
my job. I therefore perked up when Spicer mentioned the possible
shipment to the junta through Nigeria. Unlike the rest of the
conversation, on subjects I was just beginning to understand,
this was an area where I really knew what I was talking about.
It therefore stuck in my mind. (With hindsight, I believe Spicer
was sounding out the safety of his own proposed trafficking route.
I am also sure that Spicer talked of the contract with Kabbah
as prospective, whereas I now know it had been finalised a month
earlier.)
"The meeting was professionally cordial,
perhaps except when I was pressing on finances. On leaving I walked
Spicer to the exit. He shook my hand and said he hoped I would
not deny the meeting had taken place. This struck me as odd. I
replied I would of course tell the truth, if asked.
"I was not satisfied by Spicer, especially
his failure to give details on who was financing and benefitting
from the deal. I decided in these circumstances it was wrong to
have contact with Sandline, particularly as his parting comment
had led me to think he might want to exploit the fact in some
public manner. I therefore went to Ann Grant, I believe almost
immediately, and said I had determined to instruct my Sections
not to speak to Spicer."
6. At this meeting with Ann Grant, I suggested
further action to monitor Sandline's activities. She agreed to
this.
7. In my letter of 17 July to the Secretary
to the Legg Investigation, I took issue with certain passages
in the extracts from the draft Report of the Investigation which
had been sent to me under the Salmon Rules to give me the opportunity
to comment on passages affecting me. Parts of the draft as it
stood seemed unfair to me. Conclusions were reached which reflected
adversely on me or differed from my own. I of course accepted
that Sir T Legg and Sir R Ibbs must reach the conclusions they
thought justified by the evidence they had seen and heard, of
which my own was only a small part. But I felt that in fairness
to me, where adverse judgments were reached, my version of the
events in question should also be stated, so that readers could
to some extent form their own views as to the Report's conclusions.
There was little of this in the draft.
8. I should say at this point that my observations
were reflected to some extent in the final version of the Report.
But I would like to record here in their entirety (except for
repetitions of quotations from the earlier statement quoted above)
the parts of my letter dealing with the passages in the draft
addressing the meeting on 19 January between Mr Spicer, Mr Andrews
and me. I do this to show that my own account of what happened
at that meeting has throughout been firm and detailed. It is also
corroborated by Tim Andrews. I should note here that the paragraph
numbers used in my letter are those of the preliminary draft of
the Legg Report; the numbering in the final version is different.
Extracts from Craig Murray's letter of 17 July
to the Secretary to the Sierra Leone Arms Investigation
"I will now deal with chapter 6 in order.
My first point is at 6.22, which brings us to the meeting with
Spicer. At 6.22 you correctly record that a large part of my motive
in agreeing to see Spicer was to weigh him up and decide whether,
in view of Mr Everard's cautions, this was a contact which the
department should be continuing. It would, I think, be just if
you recorded the conclusion. Again, this was given in my written
statement:
`I was not satisfied by Spicer . . . I therefore
went to Ann Grant . . . and said I had determined to instruct
my Sections not to speak to Spicer . . . '
"I know that you asked Ann Grant if this
account were true, and she replied to you, in writing, that it
was. It seems to me vital information to include in the report,
especially as it has been cited as the motive for my decision
to hold the meeting, which you criticise. In these circumstances
not to mention my conclusion, against Spicer, is plain unfair
to me. I would suggest a new paragraph on this point at 6.30.
"At paragraph 6.26 the report gives in detail
Spicer's claim not to use the term non-lethal because it has a
specific professional context for him. You will recall that when
I gave evidence to you on 9 and 24 June we too went over this
ground. I told you that `non-lethal' was not an FCO term of art
or one I would have initiated; it meant nothing much in the context
of sanctions. Some embargoed items were `non-lethal'. It seems
unfair that you give at length Spicer's denial of initiating the
phrase `non-lethal', and do not give my version on the same point.
I would submit you give both explanations or neither.
"The following key elements of my evidence
on the meeting with Spicer are missing entirely from the draft
Report:
I questioned Spicer closely about the ownership of
Sandline . . . He was extremely evasive . . . appeared uncomfortable
. . . said the deal was funded by "legitimate business interests"
in Canada.'
"Following the reading of paragraph 6 of
SCR 1132 to Spicer, and its explanation:
"Spicer asked whether this applied to supply
to all parties in Sierra Leone. I replied that it did . . . I
should explain why my recollection of this part is especially
clear. During the Gulf Crisis . . . this was an area where I really
knew what I was talking about."
"I see no flavour of the detail of discussion
on licenses in the draft report. It does not indicate that this
is a subject in which I have an expertise. Both facts tell heavily
against the report's conclusion, to me astonishing, that the meeting
was a misunderstanding and failure of communication. UNSCR 1132
was read to Spicer. Its scope was explained. Licenses were discussed.
There can have been no misunderstanding.
"I believe that the Report could legitimately
refer to context. You endeavour to decide on `the balance of probabilities'
whether on 19 January I gave Sandline `encouragement or approval'
to supply arms. I believe you accept that I fully understood that
to do so would be in breach of UK law, international law and HMG
policy. Why would I do it? You have seen numerous policy documents
written by me. I repeatedly argue against a military solution
without UN authority. Your Report states correctly that on 2 February
I proposed Penfold be recalled because he was pushing a military
solution. At 6.34 the Report says on 29 January Penfold even felt
on meeting me I was against Kabbah's restoration per se.
If on 19 January I had encouraged Spicer to supply arms to Kabbah,
it would have been contrary to the stance which your Investigation
has confirmed I adopted throughout. Surely this fact must be stated
in the Report and weighed in the balance of probabilities? Is
it not relevant it was I who without hesitation instructed the
Avebury allegation be referred to Customs?
"I cannot understand your failure to accept
the word of Tim Andrews and myself against Spicer. Again, it cannot
be a failure of recollection on our part. We both distinctly recall
that Tim Andrews fetched the Resolution, read the relevant parts
and that they were explained. We cannot have identical false memory
. . . my account is corroborated by another witness, in detail
. . . it is denied by a single interlocutor who had both been
cautioned by HM Customs and Excise and was making the denial whilst
acting under the guidance of criminal lawyers . . . I [do not]
find the explanation given in the draft Report of difference of
recollection, misunderstanding or failure of communication possible.
"If the Report is not to judge who is telling
the truth about the meeting of 19 January, it is essential that
a much fuller account of the different versions be given. I should
like at this stage formally to request that paragraphs 1 to 15
of my written statement be appended as a document to the Report."
. . .
"On 6.31, I re-iterate my certainty that
Spicer cannot have left the meeting not understanding the position
that arms could not legally be shipped to Kabbah. Finding 10.16
is not tenable."
9. I am conscious as I reproduce this extract
from my letter of 17 July that it may in the present context seem
excessively detailed. The explanation for this is, of course,
that it was written in response to a first draft of the Legg Report
which was even more unfair in the judgments it expressed about
me than the final version, and made even less reference than the
final version to my own account of events. I found some of the
conclusions of the draft report unjust, inexplicable in terms
of the evidence given, and deeply offensive and depressing.
10. I have found it a particularly trying experience
to live through the last six months, with damaging accusations
against me being circulated widely in the media, while I have
been unable, because of my position as a serving officer of the
Diplomatic Service, to say anything publicly about the truth of
what happened in the FCO during the Sandline affair. My health
was affected. It is therefore a considerable relief to me to be
able to give you my account of these events. I am grateful to
you and to the Foreign Secretary for giving me this opportunity.
November 1998
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