Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1480
- 1499)
TUESDAY 10 NOVEMBER 1998
MS ANN
GRANT and MR
CRAIG MURRAY
Chairman
1480. These criticisms you make are of things
which you personally might have done rather more fully at the
time. Are there any structural failures which you believe have
been revealed by the Sierra Leone matters?
(Ms Grant) I think the two important ones have
been identified both by Legg and by Robin Cook in his own statements
to the House and to this Committee. The first one is the withdrawal
of any clear responsibility for one person or one unit for the
enforcement of sanctions within the Foreign Office. That has now
been remedied. We have now a purpose built sanctions unit where
the primary responsibility for enforcing sanctions and for spotting
breaches of arms embargoes is now clearly logged. I think the
second important point is the need to promulgate and to inform
actively all members of the Service at home and abroad about the
implications and the details of Orders in Council. That was not
done in the case of Sierra Leone and I think it is very important
that that need is clearly met in future. Again steps have been
taken to make sure that that happens from now on. So I think those
are two systemic points that are very important and have been
tackled.
1481. Do the two personal matters you have
raised encompass the whole of the lessons which you think can
properly be drawn from this?
(Ms Grant) The first two were the main lessons
I have learned personally. The second are the two most important
for the Office. I think there are a series of lessons in Legg,
for example on the improvement of management, the reduction in
hierarchy, the introduction of a more modern system, which I have
always supported and am very pleased to see reinforced.
Mr Illsley
1482. Ms Grant, do you think there was some
confusion within Foreign Office personnel as to the exact policy
of the British Government towards Sierra Leone?
(Ms Grant) I do not think there was.
1483. Even bearing in mind the difference
of opinion perhaps that Mr Dales had in response to Mr Murray's
paper when he actually said that the policy was implementation
of the UN Resolution, if necessary with a limited amount of force,
whereas in a lot of the statements which have been made over this
period the policy was described as one of restoration by peaceful
means?
(Ms Grant) I think the UN Resolution makes it
clear that we are talking about the resolution of the crisis,
whether by ECOWAS or anybody else, by peaceful means. What we
were considering and what never became the subject of a second
UN Resolution was the possible further use of force if the policy
of enforcement of sanctions and diplomatic initiatives did not
work, but we never got to that point. One of our policy difficulties
was that we were trying to engage the ECOWAS countries who had
the forces on the ground with the United Nations so that whatever
action they took would be legal and would be blessed under international
law. The forces moved first and on 5 February ECOMOG moved without
the benefit of support from the UN Resolution or indeed the British
government. That was a dilemma for us, but it was a dilemma that
came after the resolution. I think the resolution which was on
the table was clearly in support of peaceful means.
1484. Would you agree with Peter Penfold's
evidence to us last week when he said that he looked upon the
policy as being a three-pronged approach, the last prong being
military intervention?
(Ms Grant) The three-pronged approach was an ECOWAS
policy. ECOWAS had a three-pronged policy of diplomatic negotiation,
economic sanctions and the use of force. The UN Resolution very
carefully only endorsed the first two and we were very clear that
if there was any question of moving onto the third a further resolution
would be required.
1485. Do you think you should have referred
any suspicions of arms sales into Sierra Leone to Ministers at
an earlier date? Bearing in mind that Mr Penfold's minute was
very early February and there should have been the letter which
mysteriously disappeared, do you think you could have informed
Ministers earlier as to military intervention, or did you not
regard that as important enough to pass on?
(Ms Grant) I did regard it as important and, as
I have explained, I suppose my failing was in trying to get more
information and a more solid case before I shared it with Ministers.
I think my discussion with Mr Lloyd makes clear that I certainly
shared my concerns with him. My regret was I did not share the
paper. So, yes, I could have referred that to him at an earlier
stage, but there was no misunderstanding of the principle or the
policy between me and Mr Lloyd.
1486. Do you find anything strange about
the fact that Mr Penfold wrote a letter to you the day that he
left for a four-week holiday? Is it unusual to have letters posted
in those circumstances?
(Ms Grant) I think, as the Report makes clear
and as everyone is aware, normal communications were very difficult
in the situation that Mr Penfold and we found ourselves in. Some
of the time he was in Abingdon, some of his papers were there,
some of the time he was in Conakry, some of the time he was travelling.
So I find it less surprising than I would if I was dealing with
another head of mission, their own communications system and staff
and their own office.
1487. Would it have been unusual for Mr
Penfold to have faxed a letter in to the department? Could he
have used the fax machine?
(Ms Grant) He certainly communicated with us by
fax in the past.
1488. Would that fax have been delivered
to you in a reasonable time?
(Ms Grant) I am pretty confident it would. We
have a good registry system.
1489. So there was nothing to stop Mr Penfold
faxing his letter of 30 January.
(Ms Grant) December.
1490. There was nothing to stop him faxing
that letter to you.
(Ms Grant) No.
1491. Mr Murray, could I turn to you now.
The key to a lot of this is the meeting of 19 January when the
version of events provided by yourself and Mr Andrews is at total
variance with the version of events provided by Colonel Spicer.
Would you like to elaborate on why you see there is such a wide
difference between the versions of events?
(Mr Murray) There are two things about what Mr
Spicer says which strike me as strange. The first thing is that
at the meeting he talked about the prospect of a contract with
President Kabbah and that he expected to get a contract with President
Kabbah. We now know that at that time the contract had actually
already been signed on 23 December. It is very difficult to put
any construction on that other than that it was deliberately misleading.
After the meeting he was given an account of it in which partly
he grossly distorts things that were said to give an indication
of an approval that was not given. For example, he states that
it was said that it was alright to send night vision equipment
as long as it ended up with the mining company with an inference
that that meant it did not matter what happened to that equipment
before. There was, in fact, discussion of night vision equipment.
He asked whether he could send dual use equipment, specifically
night vision equipment, to Sierra Leone. He was told that he could
not send it to Sierra Leone and he then asked if he could send
it to Guinea and he was told that for that purpose he would need
to apply to the Department of Trade and Industry for an export
licence. It was him who said that it was for Guinea, for a mining
company. He was not given any indication at all that such a licence
would be granted or any indication that he could use the equipment
in Sierra Leone before it being sent on to a mining company. That
is an example of part of the conversation which does appear to
refer to something that actually took place in the conversation
but which just cannot be made to carry the meaning which he is
trying to give it. On the other side there are things which are
simple fabrication. I see from his memorandum last week that he
claims that he discussed a specific gun for use in helicopters.
That is simply untrue; it was never said. I am afraid to say that
I really find it difficult to reconcile his version of events
with the truth at all and that is also the view of Tim Andrews.
1492. According to the Legg Report, it is
suggested that in Tim Andrews' report of that meeting there is
no reference to you laying the law down to Mr Spicer in terms
of the UN Resolution or the Order in Council. You then explained
that was for three minutes out of a 40 minute meeting. Perhaps
it did not have the importance that perhaps it should have had.
Did you actually read from the UN Resolution to Mr Spicer? In
your mind were you clear that he had been told that he could not
import weapons into Sierra Leone for either side?
(Mr Murray) It was Tim Andrews who read out the
relevant parts of the UN Resolution. He did not read out the entire
text, but he read out bits of it, including paragraph 6 which
is the key part. I then explained to Mr Spicer in simple terms
that the scope of the resolution was geographic. He asked me if
that embraced all parties—I cannot recall if he said all
parties or all sides—and I confirmed that it did. So there
is no doubt that he was informed of the scope of the UN Resolution.
At the time that that passage of the conversation took place he
had referred to what he claimed was information about the possible
supply by a third party, not by him, to the other side, to Sierra
Leone. The reason at that point we were quoting to him the Security
Council Resolution and not the Order in Council was he was talking
about supply not by British nationals but from a third country,
so it was the position in international law that was relevant
and not the position in British law. He then went on to ask, after
he had been told that the supply of arms to all parties in Sierra
Leone was illegal, about this night vision equipment, dual use
equipment. He was told in straight terms, I believe very bluntly,
that he could not send it to Sierra Leone. He asked about supply
to a mining company in Conakry and was told that he would have
to apply for a licence to the Department of Trade and Industry
which is a straight reflection of the legal position. All that
was perfectly plain and both Tim Andrews and myself are completely
confident that this was not capable of misunderstanding.
Mr Rowlands
1493. Why was none of this recorded in the
minute of the ninth?
(Mr Murray) I now obviously regret that it was
not. The minute of the meeting is accurate but not full. It is
a very short minute of the meeting and it would obviously have
been better if it were longer.
Mr Illsley
1494. Mr Everard's ground rules made the
point that "it is important that our contacts with Mr Spicer
are not used by his organisation to claim that HMG has legitimised
any activity by him and his associates in Sierra Leone".
That was well before your meeting with him. That has come to pass,
has it not, because according to you this is exactly what Colonel
Spicer has done, he has used that meeting as a way of legitimising
Sandline's actions?
(Mr Murray) I would agree with you, I am afraid
that is true. My view was that the department should not be continuing
this rather hole in the corner method of continual telephone communication
with Mr Spicer but not speaking to him. I wanted to meet him,
look him in the eye, see if he was the sort of person we should
have contact with or not and, if I decided that he was the sort
of person we should not have contact with, discontinue the contact.
That was my intention on meeting him. I concluded on meeting him
that this was not a contact we should be continuing with. I found
him extremely difficult to pin down and shifty, particularly in
pressing him on who was financing this deal and who owned Sandline,
who was going to benefit from it, what was in it. That was actually
the bulk of the meeting, me trying to get answers out of him on
this question because he would not give me an answer to this question.
Immediately after the meeting I went and saw Ann Grant, fairly
well immediately, within 15 minutes of the end of the meeting.
I told her that I had had this meeting with Spicer, that I had
found him not a trustworthy interlocutor and I was going to inform
my sections not to keep contact with him and I asked Ann for her
approval of that decision.
Sir Peter Emery
1495. What was the date of that?
(Mr Murray) 19 January.
(Ms Grant) The ground rules that Mr Everard was
following are in fact mine and not his and, as you will see from
his minute, he says, as you pointed out at our meeting, "it
is important that our contacts are not used by our organisation
to claim that HMG has legitimised any activity". So it is
my very strong steer also that you dealt with Sandline with a
very long spoon. The importance of it is obviously they survived
after Mr Everard left and they represented the very strong steer
I had given to the department with which I know Mr Murray very
much agreed and it helps to explain why there was no difference
between us.
Mr Illsley
1496. Why do you think Mr Dales refused
your request that Mr Penfold be recalled?
(Mr Murray) Mr Dales minuted back and his minute
back to me, which I believe the Committee has access to, said
that there was "... no dichotomy in our policy". I had
said there seemed to be a dichotomy between the official policy
which was that any move to military action must be preceded by
a Security Council Resolution and any forces undertaking such
action must be accompanied by UN personnel wearing blue hats,
as we put it, but that I was very worried that Mr Penfold and
our special representative, Mr Flynn, seemed to be following a
different policy. I was worried about a distinct dichotomy. Mr
Dales minuted back, saying, "There is no dichotomy in our
policy. Our problem is in getting Messrs Penfold and Flynn to
pursue it." That was what I had picked up. I had been in
the department for about three weeks and it seemed to me that
we had an official policy which our agents in the field were not
following.
1497. Do you feel that you were taken advantage
of by Sandline? Do you feel that you have been scapegoated by
the Legg Inquiry?
(Mr Murray) I think I was set up.
Dr Godman
1498. By whom?
(Mr Murray) By Sandline.
Sir Peter Emery
1499. May I go, Ms Grant, to the meeting
on 3 December. I believe this was a fairly large meeting. Was
it a fairly large meeting?
(Ms Grant) I do not think I was there but I am
just checking. I was not present.
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