Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1540
- 1559)
TUESDAY 10 NOVEMBER 1998
MS ANN
GRANT and MR
CRAIG MURRAY
1540. Well, might I infer from this that
he is a liar?
(Mr Murray) You can certainly infer that he is
not telling the truth.
1541. Well, I am not going to engage in
a debate on semantics with you, but, as I said, there is a profound
contradiction there and it does seem to me, coming back to what
you said about being set up, that given your knowledge at the
time and the lack of training and guidance you had been given
in terms of dealing with these characters, he took you and your
colleagues to the cleaners. He also claims that his version of
the 19th January meeting is accurate because first of all he carried
on with the operation and he telephoned you at some length after
the Customs investigation began and he openly discussed these
matters with the High Commissioner. You still say that he is telling
lies or he was telling lies?
(Mr Murray) He did telephone me after the Customs
investigation began. He telephoned me to say that, I believe to
say that Customs had been to Sandline's premises or he had had
some indication of the start of the Customs investigation and
he then said that he had the understanding that he had been working
with Foreign Office approval and he particularly asked whether
I would object to his giving my name and telephone number to Customs.
I told him that I had no objection to his giving my name and telephone
number to Customs at all. He asked something to the effect of
whether he thought that if I told Customs about the extent of
Foreign Office relationships with Sandline, that would be the
end of the matter and I replied to him that that depended on whether
or not what his firm had done went beyond what he had told us
he was going to do.
Chairman: Was it wise
for you to discuss matters of that nature with a man who was under
investigation for a criminal prosecution? I am sorry if I stole
your thunder, Dr Godman.
Dr Godman: That was
the question I was going to ask.
Chairman: Well, let
us let Dr Godman put it in his own way.
Dr Godman
1542. You have been asked the question,
so can you answer it, Mr Murray?
(Mr Murray) I will. I do not think anything I
said was unwise. I think for me to have attempted to contact someone
under criminal investigation would be extremely unwise. The man
`phoned me up and he asked me if he could give Customs my `phone
number and I had no objection to that whatsoever and he asked
if I would give them an account of his dealings with the Foreign
Office and I had no objection to doing that either. I did not
hide the fact of his `phone call from Customs and in fact I told
them about it and I immediately minuted the `phone call. I do
not think I said anything to him that was out of order at all.
1543. Could I ask, and I may have to ask
this question because of my own faulty research and my apologies
to you, but were you interviewed under caution by Customs officers?
(Mr Murray) No, I was not. Nobody in the Africa
Command was interviewed under caution. Several of us gave voluntary
statements as potential prosecution witnesses.
1544. In your memorandum further on, I think
it is page 4 or 5, paragraph 4, you claim that you cannot have
identical false memories and you say, "...my account is corroborated
by another witness...", someone who was cautioned by HM Customs
and Excise, "and was making the denial whilst acting under
the guidance of criminal lawyers". Was that Mr Penfold?
(Mr Murray) I am sorry, but could you refer me
to the point?
Chairman: It is in
the memorandum.
Dr Godman
1545. It is in your memorandum and it is
paragraph 4. I have the impression by this paragraph that what
you are saying here is that your view of Mr Spicer's evasiveness
and conduct in his dealings with you, his shifty conduct in his
dealings with you, has in fact been corroborated by Mr Penfold
when he gave evidence.
(Mr Murray) Sorry, that is a slight mislead. I
am saying that my account is corroborated by another witness,
which refers to Tim Andrews, and then I say that it is denied
by a single interlocutor who had been cautioned by HM Customs
& Excise, and that is not Penfold, that is Spicer.
1546. That is Spicer again. Yes, sorry,
I could not figure that out. I thought it must be Mr Spicer or
Mr Penfold because both of course were interviewed under caution
by Customs officers.
(Mr Murray) They were both interviewed under caution.
1547. So, on reflection then, in your dealings
with mercenaries such as Mr Spicer, you admit that you were set
up and you do not disagree with what the Foreign Secretary said
in the House of Commons, that Sandline took advantage of you and
your colleagues?
(Mr Murray) I think that is true. It seems to
me interesting that they chose to make a call on me after I had
only been with the Department, or it was two weeks to the day
since I had first set foot in my office and there were many colleagues,
both above and below me, with more experience that they could
have chosen as the target of their call. I find that an interesting
fact. I would also like perhaps to explain something of my deep
regret that I did not ask for a more detailed minute of the 19th
January meeting, which is the one thing I feel which I clearly
made a mistake on during this. The record was produced by Tim
Andrews. It is completely accurate in what it says, but not full
and particularly he does note, and it is a note made the same
day, that Spicer only referred to non-lethal equipment, and it
is my fault that that record is too short and inadequate, not
Mr Andrews', because he showed it to me in draft and gave me the
opportunity to ask him to change it or lengthen it, so it was
my responsibility that that was not done. I decided not to do
so because I did realise and when I looked at it at the time,
I thought, "This is a pity that it is not a very adequate
record", but I had only taken over my position in the Department
on promotion for about a fortnight and I did not want to ask Mr
Andrews to rewrite his record because I was thinking of my relationship
as his manager and establishing a good relationship with him.
I did actively consider asking him to rewrite it and then decided
against it and I now acknowledge that that was a profound mistake.
I recollect all of that very vividly.
Dr Godman: Well, everybody
makes mistakes, especially in dealing with shifty characters like
mercenaries who are after the big money and maybe the diamonds
as well, but it does seem to me, and I hope we are going to catch
sight of these guidelines, Mr Chairman, that you said were now
in operation or being acted upon—
Chairman: We do in
fact have copies of them.
Dr Godman
1548. —because, with respect to you,
you were a fairly junior official dealing with this professional
soldier-cum-mercenary. Who do you go to for advice when dealing
with matters of this kind? You decided when you were in a meeting
that this man was evasive when you questioned him about the ownership
of the company and you had a distrust of the man almost as soon
as you met him, but who could you have gone to for advice on this
matter because I believe the intervention of Spicer exacerbated
this whole sorry affair?
(Mr Murray) I did go to Ann immediately after
the meeting to convey my unease and my feeling that we should
not have any further contact with him and to seek her approval
of that as a course of action.
1549. And who did you take it to?
(Ms Grant) Could I say on the level at which Mr
Spicer was seen, and I again thought about this subsequently because
it has got people who work for me into a lot of trouble, I decided
not to see Mr Spicer, and I think he had asked to see me soon
after I took over as Head of Department, quite deliberately because
I did not want him to be able to say that he had got a friend
as a Head of Department in the Foreign Office. I think Mr Murray
and I, there was no difference between us, our instinctive suspicion
and our awareness of the need for caution was something we shared,
so when he came to me with his worries having met Spicer, which
I had never done, I was extremely supportive of his wish to regularise
this relationship and to not see him in future, so, as I say,
I think that was—
1550. But how far up the line did that go?
(Ms Grant) Again I think I reported that to my
boss, Richard Dales.
1551. Would that have been brought to the
attention of Ministers that you had got this shady outfit trying
to come in on this affair?
(Ms Grant) Could I say that I think that if we
go to the conversation I had with Mr Lloyd in March, again I found
he saw things very much the same way. He was also concerned about
Sandline and what they might be up to and I was able, as I say,
to share some of my concern, so I think the fact that we were
dealing with shady customers was common knowledge between us.
What we did about it again I think was overtaken by events.
1552. It has been put to me that other Members
States of the European Union have much tougher rules in terms
of engaging with these so-called private military companies and
so too has the State Department. Do you think that what has now
been introduced brings us into line with those other countries
or are we going to have more scandals of this kind?
(Ms Grant) I think there are two issues. One is
the overall policy and the regulatory framework within which the
Government deals with private military companies and I think maybe
the PUS and the Secretary of State will have views on how that
might apply to the Foreign Office more widely. My own view, my
personal view is that there is a case for more regulation and
particularly for more transparency about how these companies operate
and are set up. As I say, that is my personal view and the view
of the Foreign Secretary I am sure you can explore with him. The
second thing is how we deal with private military companies whatever
the framework and I think what matters is not the contact or even
the level of contact perhaps that we have, but how that contact
is used and what we say and what I would be very clear about is
that whenever you are dealing with a private military company,
you should be aware of their interests and of where they are coming
from and be very careful that you are absolutely to the letter
when you are talking about government policy, so I think it is
not the contact, as such, but it is the content of the contact
and how you conduct yourself when you are dealing with private
military companies that is almost as important, as I say, as what
the book says.
Ms Abbott
1553. Mr Murray, I would just like to say
how pleased the Committee is that you have been able to come and
give evidence to us. Sometimes when we have a débacle of
this nature, some very junior official ends up carrying the can
and disappears into the ether, never to be seen again, so we are
very pleased to see you and hear your evidence. In this whole
sort of débacle, you are one of only a few people whose
judgment has been proved in retrospect to be broadly correct and
I just want to go back to the minute that you sent to Ms Grant
in which you reported your concern that Mr Penfold was pushing
for a military solution without any authorisation and you recommended
that he be recalled. You said in response to earlier questioning
that you got a response from Mr Dales who said in effect that
the policy was the official policy and the problem was getting
Mr Penfold and Mr Flynn actually to implement it. Did he in the
context of that memorandum or maybe verbally indicate to you what
the Office planned to do to get them to implement the official
policy?
(Mr Murray) Yes, he did in fact. I had attached
to my minute a draft letter to John Flynn setting out the policy
in unmistakable terms and he agreed that that letter should be
sent. He also came to see me personally in my office and told
me that looking after Mr Penfold and managing Mr Penfold was his
job and not mine essentially.
1554. Let me just stop you there. When he
is saying that it is his job, does he mean that in the technical
sense, that the reporting line was through him or does he mean
that in the sense of, "Don't you worry about this. I will
look after Mr Penfold"? Do you see what I mean?
(Mr Murray) Yes. He meant both and I think it
was a gentle reminder that Mr Penfold was senior to me and also
he said that he had the matter in hand, that he was aware of Mr
Penfold's tendency to freelance.
1555. Freelance in what sense?
(Mr Murray) His precise words were, or maybe not
his precise words, but as near as I can remember, he said that
Mr Penfold had come from being a Governor of the British Virgin
Islands in which position he was constitutionally independent
of the Foreign Office and had to be and he had rather got into
that mode of operation—
1556. That is very illuminating, Mr Murray.
(Mr Murray) —and that this was an acknowledged
tendency, but that he was aware of it, he knew of the problem
and he would deal with it. He was making it perfectly plain to
me two messages: one, "You stay out"; and, two, "I
will deal with this".
1557. And, in your view, did he deal with
it?
(Mr Murray) I am sure he—
1558. You can be honest with me, Mr Murray.
(Mr Murray) I am quite sure he did take measures
to deal with it.
Chairman
1559. Ms Grant, do you want to comment on
that?
(Ms Grant) Could I comment on that, yes, because
I was actually Mr Penfold's reporting officer and Richard Dales
was his countersigning officer and I wrote a report on Mr Penfold
which I think he discussed with Mr Dales at the end of January
when he came into the Office on the 28th January, I think, in
which I know, because I discussed beforehand with Richard Dales
how he might handle that meeting just to make sure that we were
on all-fours, that he would emphasise the need to stick closely
to government policy, although we both acknowledged the enormous
difficulties of the circumstances he was in and the strain he
was under and I think that was a message we needed to get across
to him. In fact we agreed between us that Mr Dales would do the
job appraisal interview and not me—either of us could do
it, but normally it would be me—to underline the point that
it was not just my view, but one which was shared by Mr Dales.
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