Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1580 - 1599)

TUESDAY 10 NOVEMBER 1998

MS ANN GRANT and MR CRAIG MURRAY

  1580.  But, nevertheless, if there was one person in the Foreign Office who ought to have seen the Order in Council and read it and understood it, it was in fact Mr Penfold.
  (Ms Grant)  Indeed.

  1581.  So for you to say that the problem was promulgating the implications and details is a gloss; the problem was that he never saw it at all.
  (Ms Grant)  Exactly, but all I can say is that the Order in Council, the handling of the Order of the Council, the circulation of the Order in Council was not the responsibility of my Department. We were not consulted and we did not see the Order in Council either.

Mr Rowlands

  1582.  Just for clarification's sake, you have mentioned, you have referred again, it is in paragraph 5.33, to the fact that at the meeting on 30th January there was no mention of arms in the discussion between you and Mr Penfold.
  (Ms Grant)  That is right.

  1583.  But on the day before, Mr Penfold had handed to Mr Andrews a copy of the whole of the Sandline plan which was about arms.
  (Mr Murray)  He handed me a copy of the Project Python plan which I do not believe that either Ann or I, he handed it to Tim Andrews, and I do not believe that either of us had actually seen it before the meeting with Penfold on the 30th, but the plan itself, that Project Python plan does not detail any arms supplies. I believe it is one of the documents which is available to this Committee in Annex D which you have available to you and it is a document which is frankly rather difficult to decipher, but it did not immediately to me on reading it, and I do not think it does, state that it involves any arms supply.

  1584.  But after all that had gone on before, you have a meeting on the 30th January and you were not there, Mr Murray—
  (Ms Grant)  We were both there.

  1585.  That is on the 30th January and you have a discussion with Penfold and there is no mention of arms in this conversation at all between you and him?
  (Ms Grant)  That is correct.

  1586.  Although he had in fact handed all this information in previously?
  (Mr Murray)  He had not handed in any information that indicated arms supplies.

Ms Abbott

  1587.  Just finally on the delay of the referral to Customs, Ms Grant, we are very glad to see Mr Murray and we are very glad that he has been let out of whatever cupboard in the Foreign Office to come and give his version of events, but one of the things which certainly concerns me is if you read the Legg Report, if you read paragraph 6.50 where Mr Murray says he saw Mr Penfold's minute, he was very alarmed, but because nobody accepted his earlier advice to recall Mr Penfold, he let the matter rest, so why had a culture developed which prevented Mr Murray from raising his concern about an illegality with his managers? I am asking you.
  (Ms Grant)  No, I understand why because it is my Department and the tone it set is very much mine and I hope and I think, because, as I say, I know Mr Murray quite well particularly after this experience, that I do not set the kind of tone which makes it difficult for him to discuss issues with me.

  1588.  Why did he feel that at the time, Ms Grant?
  (Ms Grant)  My assumption is a little bit following on from his own explanation, that because he had had a previous conversation with Richard Dales about the respective responsibilities for handling Penfold, he felt inhibited in that respect, not because there was a culture of intimidation or there was a particularly difficult communication inside the Department, but because of that specific conversation.

  1589.  Why did you feel that at the time, Mr Murray?
  (Mr Murray)  Well, actually it is a very difficult question because my worry was that the only thing I believed was added by Mr Penfold's minute of 2nd February was that it potentially implicated him in a criminal offence. The Order in Council states that it is an offence not just to supply arms, but to promote the supply of arms; it is quite wide. When I had seen Mr Penfold, the first day I met him on the 29th January, he had told me very plainly that he had advised President Kabbah to sign the Sandline contract. That was what led to the meeting on the 30th January because I then relayed back that information. Now then, when we then had the meeting with him on the 30th January, he did not tell us that that contract included arms. When I saw his minute of the 2nd February, which I saw on the 23rd February, that was the first that I knew that the contract he had advised President Kabbah to sign included the illegal supply of arms and it seemed to me that technically Mr Penfold had put himself at risk of the criminal law. I then was in a dilemma as to just what to do because a colleague whom I had been warned to leave alone looked as though he may have got himself mixed up in something which was criminal. I should have had the courage of my convictions and simply put it on a fax machine to Customs. I know that, and I regret that I did not have the courage of my convictions. My view was that having already informed Customs and their own investigation was going on, it would not be very long at all before Sandline indicated to Customs their efforts to get Foreign Office approval and Customs would come to me, at which stage I felt that Customs would come across this minute without my having directly to shop a colleague, to put it bluntly, and, for that reason, I did not act, but I was expecting Customs to get in touch with me fairly quickly. It seemed to me that if Customs were looking into this matter, this would not stay very, very long essentially.

Chairman

  1590.  Did I hear you say that the minute, this key minute of Mr Penfold's was not put to you until the 23rd February?
  (Mr Murray)  Yes.

  1591.  Were you on leave at the time?
  (Mr Murray)  No.

  1592.  You were the key desk officer in relation to this matter, but it had not been shown to you?
  (Mr Murray)  I was the Deputy Head of Department. It actually went to the desk officers first and to Mr Dales first.

  1593.  But there was a delay from the 2nd February to the 23rd when you, as Deputy Head of Department, did not see this key minute?
  (Mr Murray)  That is true.

  1594.  Is there any good reason for that?
  (Mr Murray)  I am sorry, I cannot answer it. It turned up with me on the 23rd.

  1595.  And the key question to Ms Grant, on the face of it, is this: that here was a possible allegation of a criminal conspiracy involving Her Majesty's High Commissioner in Sierra Leone, as revealed in that letter of the 2nd February, so did this not strike you as important?
  (Ms Grant)  It did indeed, and could I just—

  1596.  Did it not strike you as important enough to go well beyond your immediate command and higher still?
  (Ms Grant)  If I could just explain a little bit more about why perhaps there was a delay in it reaching Craig and why more immediate and effective action was not taken, the minute of the 2nd February referred to a letter of the 30th December in which Mr Penfold claimed he had already given information to the Department. He also referred to a meeting on the 23rd December at which he had relayed other information. I was unaware, previously unaware of both of those facts, if you like, and I immediately sent the minute back to Mr Andrews and said would he please get the references. The letter of the 30th December seemed to me to be very important. I had never seen it and I was concerned to have the full picture and Tim and Linda, I know, made considerable efforts to try to find that letter. We did not have it, it turned out, on our own files. We then obviously checked to see that it was not anywhere else and had not been mis-filed and the efforts to find that background did cause delay inside the Department and may help explain why it did not get seen by Mr Murray. To get back to why it did not strike me as important enough to act upon, again I can only say that I very much share the analysis of Mr Murray and I am sorry we did not discuss it at the time, but my own view too was that a process was in train and that if the 2nd February minute was an important part of the evidence, that would be considered by Customs & Excise.

Chairman:  Yes, considered technically by Customs & Excise, but, with respect, it is not every day you have an allegation that a High Commissioner may be involved in a criminal conspiracy.

Ms Abbott

  1597.  We hope.
  (Ms Grant)  That is quite right and, as I say, I did know it was important, I was concerned and I was trying to get the background. I also raised my concerns with Mr Lloyd at our meeting on the 10th March.

Mr Mackinlay

  1598.  Did Sir John Kerr know about any of this during this period we are talking about, anything about it, anything at all?
  (Ms Grant)  I think not at that point.

Mr Mackinlay:  At that point.

Mr Wilshire

  1599.  Before I move on to the questions I want to ask, taking this issue of the evidence of a criminal conspiracy, you accept that there was evidence potentially of a High Commissioner being involved?
  (Ms Grant)  I think there was evidence. It was not clear from that minute as to exactly how and when and in what respect Mr Penfold might have been involved.


 
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