Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witness (Questions 1860 - 1879)

TUESDAY 17 NOVEMBER 1998

SIR JOHN KERR
Dr Godman

  1860.  Sir John, you have acknowledged that serious mistakes were made and errors of judgment were committed. Could I ask you a couple of questions relating to chapter 4 of the Legg report? I want to ask you a couple of questions on the relationship between your officials and mercenaries. Sir John calls them "British companies"—I call them mercenaries. Earlier in your examination, you said that Mr Penfold's relationship with the President was "unusually close" and that there were risks in such a close relationship and I also believe you went on to say that you told Mr Penfold to draw that relationship to an end. Could not the same observations be made of Mr Penfold's relationship with the mercenary Spicer? They had lunch together; Mr Penfold, a senior official of the Foreign Office, visited Mr Spicer in his office in the King's Road; Mr Spicer spoke to Mr Penfold when he visited Freetown over the Easter weekend; I think at that point Mr Spicer was deeply concerned over the Customs & Excise investigation. Was that not an over close relationship between a high commissioner and this mercenary?
  (Sir John Kerr)  I think one has to disaggregate a little bit. Calling on Branch Energy before going to take up his job seems to me to be, as he said to the Committee in evidence, not unreasonable. Going to have lunch on 23 December unaccompanied was a bit rash. It is a very serious offence or mistake that he did not report clearly and immediately on what he had seen at that lunch, where he appears to have been shown a contract. The meeting at the end of January, again unaccompanied, was a bit rash. In April, when Mr Spicer is in Freetown, I do not think they meet. If I recall correctly Mr Spicer asked that they should meet and Mr Penfold, quite properly, says he does not think that would be right. I think it might have been better if the penny had dropped a little earlier, but it clearly had by 30 April.

  1861.  I am tempted to suggest to you that this affair is characterised more by the ineptitude of some of your officials than by collusion with these mercenaries in deliberately seeking to ignore this arms embargo.
  (Sir John Kerr)  Are you inviting me to choose?

  1862.  Just for the moment.
  (Sir John Kerr)  Between the—

  1863.  —ineptitude and, if you like, deliberate malpractice.
  (Sir John Kerr)  I have to take my stand with Legg who believes that "There was no connivance; that the High Commissioner gave a degree of approval which he had no authority to do but he did not know the shipment would be illegal, and no other official gave any encouragement or approval. All concerned were working to fulfil government policy and there was no attempt to hide information from ministers". I have no reason to disagree with Sir Thomas Legg.

  1864.  Do you disagree with the view that your officials were outwitted by these mercenaries and taken advantage of by these mercenaries?
  (Sir John Kerr)  I saw that the Committee asked Mr Murray if he thought he had been set up. I do not know; I have not met Mr Spicer so I would not wish to hazard a view.

  1865.  These guidelines that have now been produced relating to the dealings with mercenaries. Since they were introduced, have any dealings with such people been brought to your attention?
  (Sir John Kerr)  Yes, most recently the murders in Angola of expatriate staff employed by Diamond Works, which is a company based in Vancouver and comes into this story. There has been contact with Mr Spicer over the fate of the missing British citizen—two British citizens were murdered and a third is missing. Mr Spicer is in touch with the office about rumours that he hears; the office were in touch with his company about making sure that the families were aware of the deaths before confirming the names in what our news department put out. So, yes, there has been that contact. There has also been another contact in July which was to warn that a particular business man in a particular country seemed to us to be not a good person to do business with of any kind.

  1866.  Who gave you the warning?
  (Sir John Kerr)  That was a warning that we gave. It was a warning that was given on instructions. There was a third meeting, I believe, where a director in the Foreign Office, on instructions, made quite sure that Mr Spicer was aware of the exact scope and meaning of the sanctions resolutions in respect of Yugoslavia.

  1867.  When was that given to him? Did you say July?
  (Sir John Kerr)  I think that was September. Perhaps I will be corrected from behind, if that is not the case. The meeting about the particular individual who seemed an undesirable contact was in July. Third, and just the other day, we had, alas, the Angola murder. These contacts are taking place specifically with ministerial authority in a properly controlled environment with witnesses and records.

  1868.  And documentary records?
  (Sir John Kerr)  Yes.

  1869.  Because it has been suggested that these killings at the mine run by Branch Energy, it was claimed at the weekend, were a revenge attack upon Sandline. When we talk about guidelines, you seem to be hinting—well, more than hinting—that you are attempting to monitor the activities of these outfits such as Spicer's.
  (Sir John Kerr)  No. I am extremely anxious to monitor any contacts between our people and these people—private military companies in general. Because you ask, Dr Godman, I recall, since I promulgated new instructions formalising the need for caution and laying down ground rules, I think three such meetings have taken place or three such contacts. In the case of Angola I do not think it is meetings but telephone calls.

  1870.  There are some of us who believe that perhaps more than guidelines are needed. On the 9 June, Andrew Mackinlay at Question 350 asked you to look ahead and "open up Parliament to revisit the legislation on mercenaries of these armies" and went on: "The way I understand it, for a company based in the United Kingdom, there is nothing unlawful for them to actually organise an army or a mercenary army, call it what you like, but there is grey legislation saying that you cannot recruit people within the United Kingdom, or something like that", and he pursued this in question 351. Your answer was, "I do think that is an interesting question and it is one which we in the Foreign Office are reflecting quite seriously on now. It is a very serious point". Miss Grant said in answer to question 1552: "There is a case for more regulation, particularly for more transparency about how these companies operate and are set up". Have you given any advice to the Foreign Secretary concerning the need to examine legislation in this field and to control these mercenaries?
  (Sir John Kerr)  Yes. Mr Mackinlay raised the point and I remember telling him I thought it was a very serious point and we would look very seriously at it. There is a process of Whitehall consultation going on now. The existing situation is that—

Chairman

  1871.  Whitehall consultation regarding the updating of the Foreign Enlistment Act?
  (Sir John Kerr)  Yes. Whether it would be updating the 1870 Act or producing some new piece of legislation; whether it would have the same effect—a ban; or whether it would be a regulatory piece of legislation designed to impose requirements on companies operating out of the UK, are open questions to which we still have no answer. I must say I think what Mr Mackinlay was asking about, and what I think I was answering him about, in the spring was regulation of the companies rather more than creating a new offence for a British citizen to enlist in any foreign or private army. That is the area of the 1870 Act. I do not think there has ever been a successful prosecution under the 1870 Act for an offence in connection with illegal enlistment or recruitment and, in 1976, the Diplock Committee concluded that the standard of proof required in a court of law would probably be unattainable. I am not ruling out the possibility of looking at the 1870 legislation; my own personal view is that we need to look very closely at efforts by other governments, including establishing a regulatory structure, efforts by other Governments to curb mercenary activity based in their countries. It seems to me it is quite a difficult issue; no decision has been taken at this stage to introduce any new measure—either an amendment of the 1870 Act or some new regulation in this country. Personally, I hope we shall, but this clearly is a matter that involves not just the Foreign Office but also a range of other Departments, and it is a matter on which we have not yet reached a conclusion.

Dr Godman

  1872.  So you are confident that the Government is not ducking this issue of enforcing tougher rules and regulations on these—
  (Sir John Kerr)  I was going to say it is being actively explored. I am afraid you might think that sounds like an admission that we are ducking it. We are not. We are actively exploring it.

  1873.  And you have examined the extant legislation in other, say, European Union countries?
  (Sir John Kerr)  I have not myself but I think that is being done. We also, of course, are looking closely at the regulatory structure introduced by the South African government which is perhaps particularly relevant.

Mr Heath

  1874.  Obviously you take this matter of mercenaries seriously and the Government does yet, when we had the 5 August article in the Toronto Globe and Mail, nobody even sent that to the High Commissioner in the country to which you referred for corroboration or otherwise. Is that the case?
  (Sir John Kerr)  Yes. I think that is right.

  1875.  Can you equate the seriousness with which you are suggesting the Government takes the problem with that action by your department?
  (Sir John Kerr)  This puts us back to unique circumstances again. There clearly was very little material sent to Mr Penfold in Conakry. You are right: the letter from Ottowa and the reply are not copied to Conakry. Had there been a real working High Commission, then they certainly would have been. It is obvious that that is what would have happened. This is a little straw which goes in the same direction for me as a number of bigger ones, suggesting that we ought to think very hard before we repeat the experiment of having a High Commissioner accredited to a government in exile.

Mr Wilshire

  1876.  Sir John, when Mr Penfold appeared before us I asked him about the conclusions that he had drawn from discovering that a $10 million contract had been agreed. The full references are questions 1223 to 1227 but the really important bit is where Mr Penfold explained to us that he had come to the conclusion that that was bound to include arms and ammunition. I asked him: "You would not hold yourself out as the only person in the FCO who would reasonably come to that conclusion?" Mr Penfold said, "No, there is nothing special about me." I continued: "So you would presume anybody else given that information would come to the same conclusions? (Mr Penfold)  I would have thought others would, yes." Do you agree with Mr Penfold's conclusion?
  (Sir John Kerr)  I also read Mr Murray's evidence, which, I must say, told me things that were new to me about the huge amount of money being paid to other companies for training and logistic support. I confess that I think if I saw the number 10 million I would want to ask a lot of questions about what it was being spent on. I do not know that I would have assumed it must be arms but I think I would have wished to establish by a series of questions that it was not, because it does seem a lot of money.

  1877.  So that from the moment that piece of information came into the Foreign Office, anybody who came across even that bit of information should at least have asked questions if not arrived at the conclusion that Mr Penfold arrived at?
  (Sir John Kerr)  Yes, I think $10 million justifies asking questions, I agree.

  1878.  So is it not the case then that to try to fall back upon saying he did not actually know until 2 February is quite an unrealistic defence because this information was known much sooner?
  (Sir John Kerr)  I am not sure that is right. For example, the Everard minute of 5 January, which struck you as very significant, I agree it is significant, but according to Everard, the money was to be spent on "training and medical supplies, no high-profile stuff", or words to that effect. I have forgotten the exact wording; you have the minute. Mr Everard clearly was led to assume, or led to expect, that it was not arms. I think Sir Thomas Legg is right. I think the moment when it is crystal clear that it has to be arms—it is crystal clear to the Department that it has to be arms—is the 2 February Penfold minute.

  1879.  Very well. Sir John, when you appeared before us on this matter you explained to us how much paperwork you have to read every week. You put a figure on it. Can you recall that particular bit of evidence?
  (Sir John Kerr)  No, I do not think I can.


 
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