Examination of witnesses (Questions 100
- 119)
TUESDAY 2 JUNE 1998
THE RT
HON ROBIN
COOK, MP,
MR EMYR
JONES PARRY,
CMG
and MR SIMON
GASS
100. On the economic reforms that you have
referred to, to what extent have you been able to incorporate
in the discussions the principal applicant countries?
(Mr Cook) They are not included in the economic
reform agenda that will be discussed at Cardiff in that that is
very much focused on the micro-economic measures necessary to
make our own single market more competitive and to advance our
own economies, but economic reform is the core of the accession
partnerships we are building with these countries and it is very
much supported by the transfer of funds to those countries. They
fully understand that progress on economic reform is the central
question they have to address if they are going to make successful
progress with their membership. I am pleased to say that a number
of them, notably Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, are doing
very well in that regard.
Ms Abbott
101. I was interested in your reply on Turkey
because I have a very large Turkish and Kurdish population in
my part of north London. I am very well aware, from the cases
I deal with, about Turkey's failure in parliamentary democracy.
I wonder if I might just press you further on your response to
the Chairman's opening question about those areas in which the
UK presidency is seen as not 100 per cent successful. I just wanted
to ask you a little bit more about our handling of the appointment
of the President of the European Central Bank because that did
attract some unfavourable attention. It is unfortunate, is it
not, that we appointed a President who, although technically is
going to do the full term, actually has said he is going to resign
half-way through?
(Mr Cook) First of all, can I say that I do not
think I at any stage promised that we would be 100 per cent successful.
To promise that is to invite accusations of failure. We have,
on the whole, scored successes and I am very happy to rest on
that claim. On the question of the presidency of the Central Bank,
I think that squarely falls within what I have just said, in that
the outcome is one that was a success, first of all, in that it
gives confidence that the Central Bank will be presided over by
one or other of two impeccable, independent central bankers. The
confidence that that has brought to the euro in the financial
markets was reflected over the next few days' trading when there
was none of the lack of confidence in the euro that was predicted
during the discussions that Saturday. Secondly, the technical
basis of the appointment of Mr Duisenberg is quite clear. Legally,
he is appointed for eight years. It is up to him to decide whether
he wishes to retire early. He has indicated that, for his own
personal reasons, he may choose to do so. That does not leave
us in any difficulty of uncertainty, confusion or doubt as to
what happens next because it is already clearly established that,
should Mr Duisenberg choose to exercise his own personal right
to retire early, Mr Trichet will be available to take over and
there will be that continuity of independent central banks. There
was considerable discussion around finding the right form of words
at that long day in Brussels. To be frank, part of the negotiations
was going on not between delegations, which is something with
which the presidency can assist, but was going on within delegations,
which is not a matter in which the presidency can intervene.
102. You would accept that the matter of
the eight year tenure, which is specified in the Treaty, is not
just a technical matter. The eight year tenure is one of the things
which secures the complete independence of the governor. The fact
that this eight year tenure is not an eight year tenure at all
may not have immediate effects on the markets but it is problematic,
is it not?
(Mr Cook) No. The length of tenure—and I
am bound to say eight years is an awfully long period of tenure——
103. He is meant to be awfully independent.
(Mr Cook) I note that you attach importance to
the independence of the Central Bank, but the point of the length
of tenure reinforcing his independence is that nobody can then
dismiss the President of the Central Bank. Therefore, he is not
himself beholden in what he does to people who can sack him. Mr
Duisenberg is in that happy position. The fact that, for his own
personal reasons of retirement, he may not wish to go the full
eight years in no way compromises his independence because, if
he goes in those four years, he is going of his own volition;
he is not going because any external force forced him to do so.
Therefore, his independence is entirely guaranteed.
104. Finally, the argument has been put
that the very strong, close working relationship between the Prime
Minister and President Clinton, yourself and Madeleine Albright,
particularly when it came to the situation in the Gulf, undermined
the cohesiveness of European foreign policy. It was more important
to us to stand with our friends in the United States than to actually
lead a coherent European foreign policy. What would you say to
that criticism?
(Mr Cook) I would say it is wrong. You are positing
a false antithesis between the American position and the European
position. It is the case that the countries of the European Union
were not entirely eye to eye on the approach to the Iraqi confrontation.
Notably, France took a rather different approach during the crisis
to ourselves in terms of the use of firmness as a response to
Saddam Hussein's activities, but the bulk of the countries of
the European Union were nearer our position than that of France.
Indeed, if you go round the countries of the European Union, the
great majority in one way or another were willing to participate
in the force projected in the Gulf. Germany, Portugal, Spain all
allowed bases to be used for planes flying on to the Gulf. Belgium
sent a frigate. The Finns, if I remember rightly, or one of the
Nordic countries, sent a medical team. You can go round all those
countries of the European Union and most of them participated
either in a support capacity or by directly sending some contribution
to the Gulf forces. Britain did actually have a majority support
within the European Union for the position that we took. Secondly,
on the wider question, I actually think one of the great successes
of our presidency was the text of the European Union/US Summit,
which was held in London last month. That text has defused what
was potentially a major source of friction between Europe and
the United States, namely the extraterritorial character of the
sanctions which America applies to Iran, to Libya and to Cuba.
We now have waivers for the projects in which major European companies
are involved in Iran. We have a commitment from the United States
administration that it will resist extraterritorial application
of sanctions legislation and we have a basis on which both Europe
and America can forge a common approach towards Iran, rather than
Iran becoming a source of division between those two blocks in
the west. I do not think that it would have been possible for
a presidency other than Britain to achieve such a successful outcome.
Mr Heath
105. Foreign Secretary, the burden of what
you were saying earlier about the agenda for Cardiff and the experiences
over the last six months of the presidency: do not all of those
put together underline how little was achieved at the Amsterdam
Summit?
(Mr Cook) No. A great deal was achieved at the
Amsterdam Summit; achieved for Britain in the sense of our border
controls—and I touched on that earlier—achieved also
in some very sensible progress that was made on a range of issues
about the future of business of the European Union. If I can take
two particular illustrations that feed into Cardiff, first of
all, we did at Amsterdam write sustainable development into the
Treaty. We have during our presidency integrated the environment
into the work of all aspects of the European Union. Historically,
we have called the first ever joint meeting of the Environment
and Transport Councils. It is remarkable that that should never
have happened before but we have done that. That is a reflection
of the additional impetus given to environment at Amsterdam. Secondly,
the national action plans which we will be discussing flow from
the Luxembourg Special Summit, but they also reflect the new employment
chapter that was agreed to at Amsterdam. There was much good achieved
at Amsterdam which has fed into the work of our presidency. On
one point, we did not get agreement at Amsterdam. We have already
discussed it. It is the question of the institutional reform before
enlargement. There are some years before that becomes urgent and
I suspect Europe is more likely to take that decision as the urgency
increases.
106. Let me deal with that, if I may, because
it is really the reform of the structures of the European Union
and the policies of the European Union that I am interested in
and where I think we should have made more progress. We have the
Common Agricultural Policy reform; we have the institutional reform,
structural fund reforms. All of those are now tabled to an extent
but very little progress has been made. Are you confident that,
at Cardiff, you will be able to establish firm timetables for
each of those processes? I agree with you that decisions are not
taken until a deadline is reached. Therefore, it is essential
to put those deadlines in place. Otherwise, the discussions on
enlargement are basically on a false premise.
(Mr Cook) I would dissent from the idea that little
progress has been made. This is a major project. We are overhauling
most of the major agriculture portfolios. We are revising in a
fairly dramatic way the structural funds and we are making decisions
about the budget of the European Union through to most of the
first decade of the next century. These are not decisions that
are going to be taken overnight; nor should they be, but we have
made very considerable progress in identifying the areas in which
agreement is possible. That area of agreement is much larger than
one might have anticipated. In particular, there has been work
in the Agriculture Council which has revealed a degree of recognition
of the need for reform of the CAP that I think would have been
difficult to envisage four or five years ago. On the question
of timetable, there will be text at Cardiff which will provide
pointers to a decision early in 1999, which I think is a feasible
timetable and a realistic timetable. It is also one that needs
to be kept for two reasons. First of all, there is an institutional
one, which is that the European Parliament, quite properly, has
sought assurances about their own involvement. They want to have
effectively a first and second reading debate and vote on some
of these issues and they need to conclude this by May of next
year if they are to have it out of the way for their European
elections which they wish to achieve. Secondly, the reality is
some of these portfolios run out of authority and money by the
end of 1999. For instance, the structural funds at the moment
have no legal basis to continue.
107. You said "pointers towards a decision",
which is rather a vague term and one rather uncharacteristic of
you, Foreign Secretary. Should we not have precise dates for a
timetable which you can establish in your presidency, which you
can bequeath to the Austrian and German presidencies, so that
we have a clear process ahead of us which will actually create
its own momentum for these reforms to be put in place?
(Mr Cook) It will be a clear process. I am a little
bit hesitant about setting a specific time and a specific date
because the work will be completed when the work is done and when
we have the agreement. I would not wish to back Europe into the
rather fatuous position it has been in in the past in which somebody
stops the clock so that we remain within the terms of this requirement.
Yes, there will be pretty precise guidance as to the timetable
in front of us. In particular at Cardiff, it is likely we will
accept a commitment that we will complete this work before the
European Parliament dissolves and that does give you a timetable
to work to.
108. Lastly, you mentioned again the European
Parliament and its importance in this process. Earlier, in reply
to the Chairman, you rather swatted aside the views of the European
Parliament. You do not seem to share the rather rosy view expressed
by the British Government on its performance in the presidency.
Would you care to reconsider that?
(Mr Cook) No, not at all. The fact is I did not
write the resolution. Indeed, I must confess that I have read
more about the resolution since the vote than I was aware of beforehand.
I spoke to the European Parliament last week. I was well received.
There were a lot of people who recognised what we had done. There
was a broad recognition of the success that we had made on issues
such as enlargement. The fact is the European Parliament, like
I am bound to say most parliaments in Europe, votes on party lines
and on this particular occasion the parties coalesced in a way
to give the results we have got. I do not read anything great
into that.
109. Without wishing to be offensive, could
it not be that the sort of sense of self-satisfaction and the
degree of spin that is applied to the British presidency perhaps
may get up some people's noses?
(Mr Cook) I would resist any idea that there is
a degree of spin or smugness being attached here. If I may say
so, I thought I had spoken frankly throughout this morning about
what we have done—I think we are entitled to credit for
what we have done—and also I have quoted the limitations
and what it is feasible to achieve in the six months. If you had
started out last January and looked ahead, you would not necessarily
have predicted that enlargement would have proceeded so smoothly
and that the Cyprus problem was one on which it could have foundered.
You would not necessarily have predicted that we could have had
that European conference with so many heads of government and
with such unanimity and practical progress. You would not necessarily
have predicted the very substantial progress we have made, for
instance, in the environmental portfolio with the decisions on
vehicle emissions, on industrial solvents and the forthcoming
decision on the drift nets. Nor would you necessarily have seen
that the meeting of the Council to approve EMU stage three would
pass without controversy as to who was in and who was out. All
of that represents a solid success. We have still to get to Cardiff
and approve those many items on the economic reform agenda I have
outlined. I would stoutly maintain that this has been a practical,
hard headed presidency which has made real gains. I do not think
that is spin; I think that stands up on the record of our presidency.
Mr Rowlands
110. To complete the account we have had
of the potential changes, the British budgetary contribution:
is it now on a steeply rising path again and, if so, how do we
intend to cut it?
(Mr Cook) Not a steeply rising path. We of course
are a major contributor and we therefore have a big incentive
to make sure that the budget itself does not go on a steeply rising
path because that would take our contributions up. The mechanism
by which Britain obtains a rebate is one that can only be changed
by unanimity and it is therefore one that we intend to preserve.
We are likely to find some increase but I would not describe it
as steeply rising.
111. Do you have the figures of what it
has been, what it is and what it is likely to be next year?
(Mr Cook) I can happily write to the Committee
on the figures. Mr Parry, have we got the figures to hand?
(Mr Jones Parry) A statement was recently made
to the House that the latest figure, I believe the net deficit,
is about £3.4 billion, but it is also a matter of record
that the net contribution is subject to cyclical variations. It
depends on the particular time of year that various payments are
made so that you have to average it out, and it averages out I
think at something of the order of 2.5. It is also the case that,
with the projected pattern of expenditure following enlargement,
we do expect an increase in net contributions and that will apply
to a number of Member States. Equally, some of the existing Member
States who are net recipients will be receiving less on the same
basis. That is brought out in Agenda 2000 in the proposal.
(Mr Cook) Perhaps, Chair, I could suggest that
we send a note because these are very complex matters capable
of multiple interpretation. The short answer to your question
is yes, one expects an increase, but not a steeply rising increase.
Mr Ross
112. Foreign Secretary, I wonder if we could
turn to the areas you identify as external issues. You say that
the discussions on the CFSP at Cardiff are likely to focus on
the Western Balkans and the Middle East. On the 19 March we had
a session with your Minister of State with regard to the very
serious situation in Kosovo. At that time the Committee congratulated
yourself and your Ministers on the speed with which the contact
group moved on that issue. Could you tell us what has happened
since then, particularly with regard to Felipe Gonzales and his
responsibility to report to the European Union and what contact
he has had in the area since then?
(Mr Cook) Can I, before I respond (which I am
very happy to do) to your particular concerns about Kosovo, put
the context of the Western Balkans (the former Yugoslavia) where
I think we can say that we have taken two steps forward, although
Kosovo represents one step back. The situation in Bosnia is encouraging.
It has an extremely long way to go before we can recreate that
as a functioning economy with an integrated society and multi-ethnic
politics. But the progress towards Dayton has been encouraging
over the last year as a result of the robust approach which the
international community has been taking. I think Europe can take
particular credit for the way it has helped to encourage the transition
in the Republika Srpska where we now have for the first time an
administration which is committed to the Dayton process. That
is partly because of the work we did through the office of the
high representative particularly in freer access to television
which had an effect on the way in which the elections were run,
and since the election of Mr Dodik we have moved fast to release
additional European resources to the Republika Srpska which were
previously not there and that has helped to provide a strength
for him in what is a very fragile political position which he
is in, and as Presidency I was the first Foreign Minister ever
from the West to address the Assembly of the Republika Srpska.
In Montenegro we have acted to try and give support to the existing
reformist President in Montenegro. He was in London last month
when I received him as the Presidency. We have provided resources
from the Commission to Montenegro which we put in with some speed
in order that the people of Montenegro could see the confidence
in the present administration of the European Union and I am very
pleased with the very positive election results that occurred
in Montenegro at the weekend in which the reformist President
has been re-elected. That is very important for the overall balance
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In those areas there
has been progress and that has partly been because of the active
interest and support of the European Union. In Kosovo you are
right that we did move fast to put in place all the decisions
that were taken by the contact group. Indeed, within 10 days we
had carried through the instruments necessary to give effect to
the sanctions requested by the contact group. We also appointed
Felipe Gonzales as the European Union's Special Representative,
which made him double-hatted since he was already the Special
Representative of the OSCE Chairman in office. It is a matter
of great regret that we have not been able to establish with President
Milosevic the modalities by which Gonzales can start on his mission
and can visit Belgrade and start his work. President Milosevic
continues to resist anything which suggests that Gonzales will
have competence on Kosovo. In the meantime there have been discussions
started between Belgrade and Pristina, brokered by the Americans
with whom we have remained in close contact. That is welcome but
I have to be frank with the Committee and say that the problem
we are now in is that the strategy of the contact group was to
try and secure two urgent developments in respect of Kosovo. One
was meaningful dialogue but the other was a stabilisation period
in which there was a cessation of violence on the ground. We are
now in a position in which the dialogue has commenced but the
violence is escalating. I personally find it very difficult to
be confident that dialogue can prosper in those circumstances.
Milosevic is conducting a strategy which is counter productive
in that he has engaged Dr Rugova in dialogue whilst acting on
the ground in a way that undermines the authority of Dr Rugova
to maintain that dialogue.
113. On the Middle East, Foreign Secretary,
I was certainly amongst those who were urging that Britain should
not make any big pronouncements at the start of our Presidency
because the Middle East was rather fed up with hearing big pronouncements
followed by nothing. The countries in the Middle East are certainly
much more conscious of the efforts that have been put in following
your own visit, the Prime Minister's visit and the attempts to
re-start the dialogue in the Middle East. Nevertheless we are
in the present impasse that we are in. I wonder whether there
is anything you think you will be able usefully to suggest at
Cardiff that might help both the Americans and ourselves to bring
the parties back to the negotiating table.
(Mr Cook) The first thing I would have to say
is that if the parties are not back at the negotiating table by
Cardiff we do have a very serious situation because there is a
limit to how long the American proposals can lie on the table
without being taken up by both parties and not just by one party.
I do think the European Union can take some satisfaction from
the fact that Europe was more involved in this round of the talks
than it has been for a long time. The London talks were held in
the capital of the Presidency. They took place partly because
the Prime Minister's visit to Israel persuaded Mr Netanyahu that
he had to take part in such talks and my visit was partly responsible
for persuading the Palestinian authority that they should agree
to the American proposals and come to talks with that prior agreement,
and that was helpful in increasing the pressure on the Government
of Israel that it should also agree to a package that had already
been agreed by the Palestinian authority. Both the Prime Minister
and myself met both the parties and met repeatedly during those
two days with Madeleine Albright, with whom I have remained in
close contact throughout. There is a very clear European dimension.
Europe also stands ready to take forward the interim agreements
on the economic front, particularly the Gaza industrial estate
and the Gaza airport, which we have effectively already paid for,
and is ready to start running when we can get agreement. We are
in the persuading position in that it is not possible to get an
agreement on those economic steps until the wider political question
of further redeployment has been resolved. If that can be resolved
Europe will be ready to move quickly and with very considerable
contribution to make sure those economic steps then get moving
in a way that will reflect the very substantial investment of
effort and experience we have put into them. I think it is particularly
important that we do get them going in order to restore confidence
in the peace process in Gaza. We should not forget that during
the years of the peace process the average standard of living
in Gaza has gone down by about a third and that is not going to
encourage continuous support for the peace process. As to Cardiff,
if we have not got that breakthrough in the American initiative,
I would expect certainly statements to be made at Cardiff but
we are very reluctant to float any different initiative at this
particular time since it would be seen as a distraction from the
pressure on both parties to agree with what is already on the
table.
Mr Wilshire
114. Can I go back to an answer that the
Foreign Secretary gave to Sir John Stanley when he asked about
child labour? If I heard correctly, I think I heard the Foreign
Secretary say that when seeking to end child labour in the world
we should wait until we find means to do it that do not cause
more poverty and hardship.
(Mr Cook) I did not say anything about waiting
until we find ways to do it. I do not think that I suggested at
any point we wait. What I was seeking to say to Sir John Stanley,
and I must apologise to the Committee if I failed to convey my
thoughts lucidly, is that it is not helpful in ending child labour
to deepen the poverty of the country where the child labour occurs.
Therefore, action against child labour has to have two different
approaches. One is certainly to try and make sure that the international
trade is not contaminated by the products of child labour, but
the other is to assist those countries in tackling the poverty
of those particularly depressed regions in which child labour
is seen as an option for the families.
115. So you would not see it as a sensible
policy to prohibit the import of products made by child labour?
(Mr Cook) There has been a long debate both in
this Government and elsewhere about the balance of action between
the ILO and the WTO. Action to ban products would of course need
to be WTO compatible and there has been strong resistance from
countries both in the advanced world and the developing world
to such a measure within the WTO. That is why we have been looking
for action through the ILO and coupling that action within the
ILO with our own aid programme trying to target it on tackling
child labour. We have had a degree of co-operation from the governments
where the problem is most endemic and I hope that that twin approach
of ILO standards and targeted aid would make real progress.
116. Is that not rather a pragmatic approach
for an ethical Foreign Secretary?
(Mr Cook) I have never seen any conflict between
ethics and pragmatism. The idea that ethics can only be supported
and are only worthwhile when they result in a worse outcome seems
to me a problem put forward by my critics rather than by me.
117. You said, Foreign Secretary, at the
beginning that the Cardiff Summit and your presidential achievements
were interlinked. Under your achievements you list "cutting
waste" as one ofthose achievements. Do you think you should
lead by example when it comes to cutting waste?
(Mr Cook) Yes.
118. In that case, can we talk about a table
you appear to have ordered?
(Mr Cook) By all means.
119. How much did it cost?
(Mr Cook) It cost £50,000. The table of course
is not just the table. It also includes the wiring system for
interpretation, for audio and for messaging. It is also, I am
happy to say, a table which we have designed and measured so that
it can be used in the Foreign Office thereafter and will be of
permanent use. If I can try and put in perspective the cost effectiveness
of this order, the table ordered by the previous administration
for the last European Presidency in Edinburgh cost £40,000
at today's prices. Of course, that was only a table for 27 people
present. Because of the addition of three countries and because
of the presence of Finance Ministers on this occasion, there will
be 49 people round this table. Therefore, if you look at it as
a cost per person of the table, the last Government spent £1,500
per person and we are spending £1,000. I think that is a
good example of value for money and cutting out waste.
Mr Mackinlay: Did
you plant this question?
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