Examination of witnesses (Questions 1 - 19)
THURSDAY 19 MARCH 1998
MR TONY
LLOYD, MP and MR
PETER RICKETTS
Mr Ross
1. Minister, Mr Ricketts, we are very pleased
to welcome you to the Committee. On behalf of the Chairman can
I give his apologies because he is in Paris today with the North
Atlantic Assembly. When we were on our visit to Washington and
New York we took advantage of discussing with the State Department,
the Pentagon and others the very serious situation that was developing
in Kosovo and they shared with us and we shared with them our
concerns. Could you start off by telling the Committee how active
you have been since the tragic events occurred and what you yourself
and the Foreign Secretary are doing on our behalf. We would be
concerned also to have from you, if it is possible, a detailed
and as factual a description as you could give us of the abuse
that has occurred that you are aware of throughout this period
from 2nd March onwards.
(Mr Lloyd) Thank you, Mr Ross. Perhaps
I could introduce Peter Ricketts who is Deputy Political Director
within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Peter has a unique
role in that he appeared before the European Parliament's Foreign
Affairs Committee yesterday and I think he is perhaps now almost
above and beyond the call of duty.
Sir Peter Emery
2. I am glad he is coming to the more superior
place!
(Mr Lloyd) Sir
Peter, I am also glad he has come to the superior place. I have
no doubt as to where our priorities lie, this is the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office. The situation in Kosovo, as I think everyone
understands, is now of the utmost seriousness. The sequence of
events effectively was this: that on the weekend of 28th February/1st
March there was an attack, we understand, on a Serbian special
police force patrol in Kosovo. This attack led to four deaths.
The response of the police was to attack the homes of a number
of ethnic Albanian families leaving initially over 20 people dead.
Amongst those, while it was the claim of the authorities in Belgrade
that these were all people actually involved in terrorism, there
is no doubt the dead numbered women, children and people too elderly
to be seriously classified as combatants and so we had no doubt
that the reaction was excessive and the level of violence was
out of all proportion and in simple terms was unacceptable. It
is also a matter of concern that there were reports raised that
amongst those who died were people where there was evidence of
summary execution and not simply of death during the course of
exchange of fire. We believe that the full death toll over the
following week is something of the order of over 80 people. There
are still some doubts about people whose deaths were simply not
marked. The response of the British Government in particular,
but also the response of the international community, was rapid,
and I think decisive. If I have the opportunity, Mr Ross, I would
like to return to why I say that made a difference. On 2nd March
as President of the European Union we triggered a tough declaration
condemning the violence. On 5th March the Foreign Secretary flew
to Belgrade and met with President Milosevic, the Federal President
and also with Foreign Minister Jovanovic where he delivered a
tough message about the unacceptability of what had taken place.
However, I have to record the response at that time from President
Milosevic was not one that gave any comfort that the authorities
in Belgrade recognised the concerns that existed within the United
Kingdom and within the European Union. On 9th March the UK organised
and chaired a meeting of the Contact Group ministerial meeting
at Lancaster House. Whilst this was widely trailed in the press,
it is worth me spending just a few moments in saying what the
Contact Group proposed. I think the most interesting feature first
of all, and it is a very important point, is that the Contact
Group, all six members, agreed a common statement at the end of
that, a common statement which condemned the violence, a common
statement which amongst other things for example drew to the attention
of the International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia
what had taken place in Kosovo and asked that they investigate
those events with a view to seeing whether those were actions
that came under the definition of war crimes for the Tribunal.
As an addendum to that, since that time Judge Arbour, the Prosecutor,
has confirmed that it is her belief that it is within the mandate
of the Tribunal to investigate precisely these incidents. The
Contact Group also asked that the International Committee of the
Red Cross be allowed access to Kosovo and be given necessary assistance
in order to undertake their own role particularly in respect of
not simply observing but also investigating the pattern of human
rights abuse and of course in particular the deaths that had taken
place. There are a number of other things and I am sure they will
come out in questions later on. I would as well like to highlight
the request by the Contact Group that a new mission should take
place by Felipe Gonzalez as the special representative of the
Chairman in office of the OSCE. Specifically that would give a
new and specific mandate to Felipe Gonzalez to look at the problems
in Kosovo. We think that is particularly important and since that
time the European Union has also appointed Felipe Gonzalez as
the European Union representative in Kosovo. Mr Gonzalez now carries
that double mandate and I think that is important in itself. The
Contact Group also came through with some immediate courses of
action, specifically a package which included the following: consideration
at the Security Council level, and that is now being proceeded
with; a comprehensive arms embargo against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia; a refusal to supply equipment to Yugoslavia which
might be used for internal repression, or for terrorism; a denial
of visas for senior Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian
representatives responsible for repressive action by the security
forces in Kosovo; and a moratorium on government financed export
credit support for trade and investment including government financing
for privatisation in Serbia, the impact of which I think the Committee
will realise. I have to add the rider that the Russian Federation
took the position that it could not support the last two measures
for immediate imposition, but they made it clear if there was
no real progress towards the steps called by the Contact Group
the Russian Federation itself would then be willing to discuss
those measures. And the importance and significance of that is
that it meant that the authorities in Belgrade had to recognise
they were totally isolated and had no support in the Contact Group
specifically in the sense (and this is a compliment to the Russian
Federation) of no support from the Russian Federation where Belgrade
may historically have hoped for some kind of active endorsement.
So the Contact Group's action, as I have said, was swift and decisive.
The Contact Group was informed by the Foreign Secretary that he
was asking me to go to the region to represent the EU Presidency.
I travelled on 11th and 12th March to Albania, Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), through to the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, then on the following day to Bulgaria. I can go
into details of those visits but if I can just say briefly that
it may be important for the Committee to discuss a little bit
the reaction in Belgrade and that may be a set of questions in
its own right. Simply if I can record this; there is no doubt
in my mind that the authorities in Belgrade were shocked by the
speed and by the severity of the action of the Contact Group and
that in itself was a measure of the importance of that decisive
action on behalf of this Government but on behalf of the international
community as well. The European Conference was held in London
on the 12th and the European Conference itself issued a firm declaration
firmly supporting the Contact Group's approach and then the meeting
of the European Foreign Ministers took place in Edinburgh over
the weekend. That is an informal meeting, it has no formal status,
but informally the Ministers supported and endorsed the Contact
Group's statement. Within that there has been a series of activities
which have taken us forward to where we are now. Specifically
within the Contact Group's statement of course there was a ten-day
timeframe for action by the authorities in Belgrade. That ten
days will be up today. The political directors of the Contact
Group will meet tomorrow to assess progress and Contact Group
Ministers will assemble in the United States——I am
sorry in Bonn—I am a little out-of-date having been away
myself—on 25th March where clearly both the political directors'
report and progress to that time will be assessed with a view
to further action at that ministerial level. Mr Ross, I hope that
is a helpful summary.
Mr Ross
3. Absolutely. Can I just say from the outset
that obviously the Foreign Affairs Select Committee is willing
to help in any way they possibly can. Apart from our Chairman
we have Sir Peter Emery involved in OSCE. Whatever we can do to
help we are obviously prepared to do as well. Can I just say to
you the reports this morning from the Security Council are that
the Russian Federation are proving difficult. Could you just clarify
for the Committee whether or not they are simply trying to delay
the imposition of sanctions or are they trying to block them outright,
as is our impression?
(Mr Lloyd) I
am not sure that I can give a definitive answer to all that has
taken place in New York. The resolution was drawn up by the United
Kingdom and it is now open for discussion with a view to resolution
today I think. I look to Mr Ricketts for guidance on this.
(Mr Ricketts) Chairman, the position
in New York is that a draft resolution has been circulated informally
for discussion amongst members of the Security Council and yesterday
the Russian representative reported that Mr Primakov had been
in Belgrade and had been having discussions with the federal authorities
and wanted to digest the results of that and consider them further
and therefore did not want work to go ahead on the resolution
for the moment. That is the position in New York. As the Minister
said, we have circulated a draft resolution for discussion.
Mr Ross: Before we
open it up could we just go back to the actual abuses that have
occurred. If we were to suggest to you it had been suggested to
us as a Committee that massacres have occurred and that daily
abuse is occurring, for instance snipers are targeting in various
parts of Kosovo individuals, men, women and children, do you have
any information to either disagree with that or support that?
Sir Peter Emery
4. Plus torture.
(Mr Lloyd) As I have said already,
what we do know with a degree of certainty is that amongst those
who have been killed are numbered women, children and the elderly
who are clearly not combatants so the fiction that this was simply
activity of a military kind by the security forces in response
to action by terrorist groups does not hold up. We must also be
concerned about reports circulated widely that amongst those who
died were those who bore the marks of summary execution. In other
words, they were simply shot at close range and not in an act
of combat. The difficulty has been that the situation in Kosovo
is so turbulent that there simply is not the level of reporting
that would allow for us to know what has taken place. And in particular
the Red Cross who would normally provide a reliable reporting
system have withdrawn all of their personnel not simply because
of the disarray in the region but because they have received specific
death threats to their personnel. Within that context it means
that the level of information we have got simply is not adequate
to confirm the kinds of things that you are saying to us. We had
yesterday or the day before yesterday the Ambassador in Belgrade
was in Kosovo himself but clearly Kosovo is a very large area—I
think it is about the size of Wales—and to be in Pristina
does not give a real account of what is taking place in more remote
areas. Again I am going to invite Mr Ricketts to make any comment
he wants on this. I think I have to say we are simply not in a
position to confirm or deny the kinds of reports you have had
mentioned to you this week.
(Mr Ricketts) As the Minister says,
there have been widespread reports. We have been pressing hard,
we pressed in the Contact Group statement for access to Kosovo
by international forensic experts precisely to produce objective
evidence of the kind you are seeking. So far that access has been
denied and victims have been buried before proper forensic tests
were possible. So there is no objective data but we are continuing
to press hard to get forensic experts into Kosovo.
5. The Yugoslavian Ambassador to the United
Kingdom has supplied us with information to suggest they are prepared
to accept the International Red Cross. Do you know whether the
International Red Cross has accepted this invitation?
(Mr Lloyd) I
spoke in fact to Mr Sommaruga, who is the President of the International
Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, on Tuesday and I discussed
the situation at some length with him. He made the point very
forcefully that the Red Cross has to protect its own integrity,
its freedom of operation and it has to be seen to be independent
not simply of the authorities in Belgrade but actually of all
governments, ours as well as any others. We not only respect,
we support him in that desire. He told me they had to take seriously
the threats to their personnel. What they wanted was not protection
from the authorities in Belgrade to undertake their work, what
they wanted was simply a recognition by the authorities in Belgrade
that that work had to go ahead and a spirit of cooperation in
allowing them to operate as an independent humanitarian organisation.
The Red Cross, I understand, are now preparing to go back into
the area but, of course, Mr Ricketts' point is still a valid point
that the process of physical decay and the fact that bodies were
buried very quickly means that evidence may no longer exist for
some aspects. I did raise the specific action with the Serbian
President, President Milutinovic, in Belgrade last week. He said
that they were committed to allow that forensic testing to take
place. He said to me for example it would be possible to even
exhume bodies that had been buried. Clearly we want to see delivery
of those promises, not simply a verbal commitment.
Mr Rowlands
6. You mentioned earlier on, Minister, that
you were awaiting the outcome of decisions between the Russian
Foreign Minister and the authorities in Belgrade. Is it your opinion
that the greatest single influence on the Belgrade government
is the Russians?
(Mr Lloyd) I
think the greatest single influence, if I can put it in these
terms, is that the international community acted quickly, decisively
and unanimously. It is that sense of common purpose that is important.
Obviously within that I must say in terms of reaching unanimity
the role of the Russian Federation must be important.
7. We understand that the Russian Government
actually has ambivalent or indeed has objections to certain actions
of the Contact Group and certainly have not come fully on board.
Do we know what they are pressing on the Belgrade authorities
to be a solution? Are they fully on board with the idea of a high
degree of autonomy for Kosovo?
(Mr Lloyd) Can
I make it very clear that the Committee ought to have before it
the statement of the Contact Group and certainly we will make
sure it has. The important point I think to recognise is that
the only area where the Russian Federation dissented from the
actions of the other five was in respect to two items of the sanctions
package. The importance of that is that it meant that the Russian
Federation was totally signed up to all of the other things, the
criticism of the excessive violence, the demand that Belgrade
move to the negotiating table, the demand that the Education Agreement
should be implemented, and most importantly in the context of
Mr Rowlands' question, the demand for autonomy for the Kosovar
Albanians. There was no disagreement between the Russian Federation
and anybody else on the political steps that are needed that will
begin to transform the situation.
Mr Heath
8. Can I just return to the atrocities that
have taken place, Minister. You talked earlier about the International
Criminal Tribunal investigation. It is accepted that it falls
within the remit of the Tribunal but has the Tribunal taken any
action to commence investigations?
(Mr Lloyd) The
remit of the Tribunal specifically was cast round the parts of
the Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia before break up and
since that the Tribunal's mandate was without time. That is effectively
the legal basis that we always believed existed and has been confirmed
by Judge Arbour. I am going to have to refer the second part of
your question specifically about the investigations to Mr Ricketts.
(Mr Ricketts) The answer is that
the prosecutor, Judge Arbour has begun the process of assembling
a team to investigate Kosovo. She has appealed to nations to make
available investigators to take on a mission in Kosovo when the
Federal authorities allow that to happen.
(Mr Lloyd) We are still dealing with
an area where unrest and the kind of things that have been reported
to your Committee are going to make investigation itself problematic
in the short run. That is not an argument for investigation not
taking place. It is a recognition of the practical difficulties
that exist in these days, although we must continue to press Belgrade
to facilitate the prosecutor's role.
9. I wanted to be assured that the prosecutor
was taking steps to collect information. It seems to me there
are investigations that can be carried out outside Kosovo at the
present time which should be taking place because clearly crimes
have been committed. The other point I wanted pick up at this
point is whether Felipe Gonzalez has been given admission to Kosovo
at all?
(Mr Lloyd) No.
Mr Godman
10. May I say, Minister, looking at this
dreadful affair from afar from London and Scotland I am reminded
of what an American international affairs expert, Professor Jack
Donald, said recently: "Those who violate human rights norms
rarely face coercive international enforcement." I would
have thought, you mentioned this, if the international community
is to act decisively in order to bring to an end dreadful affairs
like this that action has to be coherent, comprehensive and cohesive.
What we have here is Felipe Gonzalez who is the OSCE envoy. Mention
is made of the European Union envoy. Why Gonzalez cannot perform
both roles is beyond me. Oh, he is. Then you talk about investigations
being conducted into these violations of human rights on behalf
of the International War Crimes Tribunal. Who will carry out that
police work is a question I would like to ask. If the UN passes
this resolution that you said is being passed around informally,
that brings the United Nations into the arena as well. Which element
of the international community will take the lead in order to
bring force to bear on Milosevic and his henchmen?
(Mr Lloyd) Whilst
I understand the spirit of Mr Godman's question, I think what
I have to say is this: the actions of the international community
over the days since violence broke out in Kosovo actually have
been remarkably consistent and I think in every way they have
been mutually reinforcing. So, for example, the European Union
sought to endorse the actions of the Contact Group. The regional
states, the neighbouring countries to Yugoslavia themselves issued
a joint statement again designed to support the Contact Group
action, so there has been a consistency of approach and a determination—a
hackneyed phrase—to sing from the same hymnsheet but specifically
to make sure there can be no doubt in the minds of those in Belgrade
that they face a united and determined international community.
That is one. The second thing is obviously there are different
agencies that do have legitimately different roles. Obviously
an arms embargo under international law ought to be done with
the authority of the United Nations. We can have an agreed arms
embargo, in fact we do have a European Union arms embargo already
in existence and we stick to that very literally and have done
since it was brought in some years ago. For there to be an international
and an internationally binding arms embargo that must be done
by the United Nations which is why we put our efforts in that
direction. In terms of criminal investigation it actually is appropriate
that the tribunal, which is of course set up under an EU mandate,
should be the body that is the prosecuting authority, that they
are empowered to do that under international law and have the
expertise that is not available to others. Mr Gonzalez' role is
in one sense, I suppose you could say, a more informal role although
it is fairly formal, in the sense that clearly in fact he has
the mandate both from the European Union as the special representative
on Kosovo as well as the mandate from the OSCE Chairman in office
to represent the OSCE. That is important because of your point
that we do not have a multiplicity of people performing the same
purpose. What is clear is that outside the things the United Nations
is able to do, outside what the Red Cross can do, outside what
the International Criminal Tribunal can do, we do need someone
who is able to act as negotiator who can bring the different parties
together to narrow the gaps that most certainly do exist in the
formal positions of both Belgrade and the representatives of the
Albanians in Pristina. What I would urge on this Committee is
recognition that it is almost a fundamental role for Mr Gonzalez
to play. The difficulty at the moment is getting President Milosevic
to accept that if Felipe Gonzalez plays this role it is inconsistent
with the claim from Belgrade that this is a totally internal matter.
If I could make this point: we accept that this is an internal
matter in the sense that the problem is one defined within the
boundaries of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. What we do not
accept is that this is an internal matter that is only the affair
of Yugoslavia. It is a very obvious fact that ethnic Albanians
in neighbouring countries and in FYROM and Albania itself must
be affected by, for example, any large movement of refugees which
means immediately that we cannot treat this as an internal affair
and therefore not the responsibility of anybody else. So our view
is that outside agencies, Mr Gonzalez specifically, can be a constructive
part in breaking the negotiating deadlock that is there and there
is no other agency that anybody within the international community
is asking to perform that particular and specific role. I hope
I can persuade Mr Godman and the Committee that there is consistency
and that there is no duplication or inefficiency in this process.
It is literally those agencies which have specific mandates performing
within their own competence.
Mr Ross: We want
to talk about the international response but Sir Peter Emery has
a quick question and then we want to move on to Contact Group
proposals themselves. We want to look systematically at the things
we are doing so we can move forward.
Sir Peter Emery
11. As a matter of record, when the Foreign
Affairs Committee was in the United Nations in New York on Tuesday
I spoke with Sergei Laurov, the Russian Ambassador to the United
Nations on Kosovo, and his reply to me was that the Russians were
highly worried about the situation in Kosovo. They realised that
this if not contained could spark into problems in the whole of
Bulgaria. Number one. Secondly, he said the Russians were attempting
to take action which would lower the tension rather than heighten
it which he felt certain action by the Contact Group might do.
I record that as background. As far as the Contact Group is concerned
we have been sent, dated today, from Milos Radulovic claiming
to be the Ambassador for the Embassy in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia a statement made supposedly yesterday in Belgrade on
18 March which was a declaration from the President of the Republic
of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, and this is a statement which is
pressing for discussion and for greater reliability for human
rights and everything else. Has the Foreign Office seen this?
Has this been looked at or taken up or is there anything meaningful
in it?
(Mr Lloyd) Can
Mr Ricketts clarify that for the Committee? But he also might
in passing want to tell the Committee whether this differs from
what the Serbian authorities produced last year.
(Mr Ricketts) The Ambassador of the
Federal Republic has an appointment with me this afternoon which
I am sure is to deliver the same statement and it was put off
until this afternoon in deference to this meeting with the Committee
this morning. We have seen that informally. We have not had time
to study it in detail. One point I might just make about it at
this stage is it is a statement from the Serbian Republic President
and therefore it implies that the solution to the Kosovo problem
should take place within the Serbian constitution and that in
itself precludes some other possible options for solutions for
Kosovo within the Federal Republic constitution. Obviously the
statement merits further study than we have yet had time to give
it.
Sir Peter Emery: He
gives an absolute guarantee for the right of the International
Red Cross to return under his protection, etcetera. Now that may
be a step forward. One cannot know. Can I just then progress on
this. What does the British Government see and what would we be
advocating as a long-term solution to this problem? It is not
new. I was out there three and a half years ago and it has not
altered much since then. I do not think we can just stand by and
let this die down and then recreate again in a number of years.
What is the British Government's view of the way in the long term
we would like to see this come to some conclusion?
Mr Ross: Can I just
say we want to get some information from you initially to build
up to that so if I can ask Sir Peter to keep that question on
hold at the moment. We would really like to come to the statement
made by the Contact Group which is quite important. It is a very
important statement taken very quickly and we want to examine
that process to see whether or not the actual process had any
sense of direction where it was going. Mr Illsley?
Mr Illsley
12. You said a few minutes ago that the
Contact Group acted quickly, decisively and unanimously. I would
like to press you on the Contact Group proposals. How far forward
is the implementation of the action plan? Is it likely that President
Milosevic will have done enough or done anything by March 25th
to satisfy the Contact Group? Is it likely you will have taken
measures that will satisfy the Russian Federation? You mentioned
"unanimously" but it would appear that the Russian Federation
opposes the measures on visas and credit. Now there appears to
be some prevarication on the question of the arms embargo. Could
you give us more information about the actual implementation of
the action plan?
(Mr Lloyd) Specifically
can I make this point: the Russian Federation certainly did not
oppose the adoption of a visa ban and a moratorium on export credit
by others. That would be one. Secondly, they did not say that
they themselves would not apply those. They said they could not
support those measures for immediate imposition. They went on
to say that the Russian Federation would be willing to discuss
all the above measures if there was not adequate progress towards
what the Contact Group stipulates. I think it is important, Mr
Ross, to establish that because we welcomed the very supportive
role played by the Russian Federation in London last week. We
do place great store by the fact that Belgrade recognising that
the condemnation is universal places extra pressure on Belgrade
to make the kind of moves we all think are important. That would
be the first thing I would want to say. In terms of where we are
at now, clearly the political directors of the Contact Group will
meet tomorrow. They are charged with examining precisely what
progress has been made in the ten days that finish today. I must
say that our initial reaction is to view with some concern the
lack of progress that has been made. We are not aware for example
that special police units have been withdrawn from Kosovo. We
are at least concerned that the commitments on paper that seem
to move in the direction of the Contact Group may in practice
not amount to what the Contact Group must demand. We do need—and
this is not prevarication on my part—to make that assessment
of what has gone on and we do need to make sure Belgrade is firmly
of the view if they have not honoured the spirit of the Contact
Group's message they will face continuation of not only the measures
there but in fact increased pressure. That was implicit in the
Contact Group's statement when it said that if the Contact Group
were not satisfied with progress they would look for further measures
and we can discuss those. I would in particular draw your attention
to the fact that Belgrade was given in paragraph 8 of the Contact
Group's statement both an opportunity but also, if you like, a
sober assessment of failure to take that opportunity when the
Contact Group said: "Belgrade's own actions have seriously
set back the process of normalisation of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia's relations with the international community. Unless
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia takes steps to resolve the
serious political and human rights issues in Kosovo, there is
no prospect of any improvement in its international standing.
On the other hand, concrete progress to resolve the serious political
and human rights issues in Kosovo will improve the international
position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and prospects for
normalisation of its international relationships and full rehabilitation
in international institutions." The point I would want to
make in response to Mr Illsley is we are very much apprised of
the fact that if we do not carry this process through with determination
then we simply put off resolution of the situation indefinitely.
Actually in putting it off we may be at least participants in
a deterioration of the situation into something considerably worse
than we are seeing now. Certainly the view of the British Government
is the process begun a little more than ten days ago is a process
that we will continue now until it does produce the results that
we all need.
13. Are you confident of retaining the unanimity
from within the Contact Group? Is there any time-scale you can
indicate to us after the 25th as to when further action might
be required?
(Mr Lloyd) Clearly
I cannot anticipate the results of the meeting on the 25th. The
Contact Group through its Ministers clearly is empowered to take
the agenda forward in whatever direction is appropriate at that
time. Clearly we have got to travel in hope. We have got to travel
with the view that by keeping the pressure on we make a material
difference for the position in Kosovo. It is not the position
we are saying that things cannot change and cannot improve. This
whole exercise would be pointless if we took that view. I do not
think it is helpful to the Committee to try and anticipate what
will take place on the 25th before it actually does take place.
Mr Illsley raised another point—
14. Are you confident of the unanimity?
(Mr Lloyd) It
is our position, as I have already said to the Committee, that
the unanimity of purpose and the unanimity that existed in London
last week was something that we thought was significant and important.
We will work hard to maintain that unanimity. Principally, the
Committee does not need me to remind you, our ambitions are very
straight forward and we will pursue our ambition to bring, if
not resolution of the position in Kosovo, at least to bring progress
that the resolution of the problems of Kosovo is properly on to
the agenda. That is our primary ambition and unanimity by the
international community would be a significant part in making
that process more straight forward.
Mr Ross: Can we move
on now to the international response, Minister, and I will ask
Sir Peter Emery and when he has finished David Heath has a specific
question to ask about another group in the area. Sir Peter?
Sir Peter Emery
15. I think I tried earlier to ask whether
the present situation threatens the stability of peace in Bosnia.
It seems to me the answer is yes it may and we want to try and
make certain that it does not. Whether the problems will spill
over into FYROM or into Albania or into Bulgaria these are all,
one would judge, problematic areas and the Government and the
Contact Group are trying to take action to ensure that does not
happen. Would that be a correct interpretation of the situation?
(Mr Lloyd) Yes
obviously Sir Peter is right. Can I give this clarification. I
think the concern we all express perhaps ought to be placed in
this context that the situation in Bosnia is probably more hopeful
now than at any time in recent years. We as part of the international
community are receiving a level of co-operation from the Republika
Srpska which has been unknown until Prime Minister Dodic came
into power in the Republika Srpska. I think the worry about the
situation in Kosovo and the implication for Bosnia is not that
conflict will go across that border because the situation in Bosnia
is, as everybody understands, very tightly controlled because
of the international presence there. It is the more constructive
role that we saw coming from Belgrade may simply not be there.
But I would not want to over-emphasise to the Committee the problems
that will exist in Bosnia. I do want to record that significant
progress has taken place and the situation there is better than
at any time literally since conflict broke out. I think the concern
of Kosovo is beyond the boundaries of Yugoslavia and the ones
Sir Peter referred to. When I was Albania and FYROM there was
very real concern and there has been—this concern was expressed
to me months ago by the same people—that any serious conflict
in Kosovo could lead to massive movement of peoples. Inevitably
the border between Albania and Yugoslavia is a very porous border.
It would be virtually impossible to police even if the Albanian
government wanted to police it and they have expressed the view
(and it is a view that we would have to at least treat with sympathy)
that it is extremely difficult for them to turn away ethnic Albanians
if they are fleeing violence in Kosovo. In FYROM the situation
is that something like 45 per cent of the Albanian minority who
existed in FYROM have origins in Kosovo anyway. They see the large
numbers of peoples as being fundamentally destabilising in the
Macedonian context. I think we share that type of analysis. So
far I am glad to report that the present levels of violence have
led to remarkably little movement across international boundaries
although we do know there are significant numbers of displaced
people who moved into Montenegro within the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and of course others displaced within Kosovo and more
generally within Serbia. That is a pleasure to record but it is
a pleasure of a limited kind because we could not predict if the
situation got worse that we would not see those large movements
of people. It is also the case that other neighbouring countries,
Bulgaria for example, which suffered very badly during the sanctions
regime in Yugoslavia in the past, are very concerned about the
impact on their own economy. They are concerned as well and raised
specifically the corrupting influence that the sanctions regime
produces on the economic structure because of black-marketeering,
smuggling and so on. They express those concerns. I am also happy
to tell the Committee they express it in this context: they recognise
the problems it could have for their own people but they feel
it is right and are still firmly of the view that the international
community is acting in the right way by taking the action it is
taking and they are prepared, if necessary, to accept that will
cause them problems in the short run but better to have those
short run problems than a long running festering wound in the
region.
16. A last question then. Realising the
present difficulty, is the Contact Group and is the United Kingdom
willing and wishing to go further than just the settlement of
the present military or police activities in Kosovo to restore
a proper peaceful situation but to actually begin trying to set
out to find a permanent solution to the problem and not just leaving
it what I would say a third of the way?
(Mr Lloyd) Yes,
I think we are all seriously seized with the view that it is necessary
now to bring pressure not just for a cessation of violence in
the short term but there has to be movement to provide a long-term
framework whereby the rights of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
could be properly respected. Mr Ricketts made a point before that
I would like to clarify slightly. One of our concerns about the
language that has now come from the government in Belgrade touches
on this question about whether the solution is a solution within
Serbia or a solution within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
That might seem like a semantic point at first sight but in actual
fact it is a fundamental point. It is fundamental at this level:
the offer from Belgrade so far has been a solution confined within
the Federal Republic of Serbia and we have to place on record
concern that this is knowingly a tactic to produce an offer which
seems to be an offer made in good faith but is actually an offer
they know will be rejected and the position of the international
community and certainly the position of this government is and
will continue to be that the basis for a solution has got to be
within the boundaries of the internationally agreed borders of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia otherwise we actively pre-empt
certain solutions and it is not possible to regard that as an
unconditional offer of talks on all problems. If I can then say,
Mr Ross, we are not participants to the negotiations. It is important
to make that point. We are not there to negotiate. Negotiations
must take place between the authorities in Belgrade and the representatives
of the Albanians in Kosovo. We do note, though, at least what
some of the heads of that negotiated framework must be. A renunciation
of violence by all parties. That is fundamental. An agreement
that the education agreement which has been in existence for some
time now should be brought to fruition so that education as a
flashpoint of discontent can be taken out of the equation. The
negotiated settlement has got to look at autonomy, very real autonomy
for the ethnic Albanians to give them real power over their own
futures. That autonomy has to be one defined by the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and that means specifically that there is no support
within the international community for secession, for independence
for Kosovo or concepts like, for example, a Greater Albania. Those
specific points of any agreement are those that would get support
from the international community and to go beyond those at any
point would lead to a situation where practical results from the
negotiations would be impossible. We can say what the heads of
negotiation are. Negotiations have got to take place between the
different parties.
17. I am sorry I said that was the last
question but arising out of what you said seems to me to be something
of great importance. You said we were not there to negotiate,
the negotiation must come between the Albanian representatives
in Kosovo and the Yugoslavian central federal authority. I understand
that but perhaps taking a role from what Kofi Annan has said in
his negotiations with Iraq, things become possible when you can
negotiate from a position of strength. It seems to me it will
be imperative that those negotiating for Kosovo with the Federal
Yugoslavian Republic, if we are not standing behind them then
they are going to be knocked down like little skittles and we
must ensure that does not happen.
(Mr Lloyd) I think Sir Peter touched
on an important issue. That is right. That is why we have got
to view very very cautiously the words that are coming out of
Belgrade at the moment. It is not simply enough to have a package
of words that seems to offer progress. There has got to be a practical
attempt to move forward on the fundamental issues that do exist.
We have got to look at not just the fine print but the actions
and I think the Committee would understand if I said we are still
seriously questioning the real intent coming out of Belgrade.
If we do not see that intent translated into positive action then
certainly it is Britain's position that we would want to pursue
the line that the Contact Group and the international community
has already started. That is one thing. There is an important
point to add though. It is almost a mirror of, if you like, what
this exchange has been about. The ethnic Albanians themselves
also have to recognise the support of the international community
is support for Albanians free of arbitrary violence, and that
is unconditional. It is support of autonomy for the Albanians,
but it is not a blank cheque for Albanians to move to independence.
It is very important that message is also clear because whilst
we are not parties to negotiation there is a well-defined framework
within which negotiations have got to take place and both parties
have got to understand that the support of the international community
is conditional on that framework.
Mr Ross: Still on
the international response, Mr Rowlands and Mr Heath.
Mr Rowlands
18. Reflecting on the Bosnian experience,
if we were honest with ourselves, despite the Contact Group and
efforts by the European Union special representatives it was in
the end decisive action and intervention by the United States
that brought through the logjam in Bosnia. What assessment do
we have of how far the State Department is willing to support
those issues to get the resolution through?
(Mr Lloyd) Can
I preface my remarks by saying this to Mr Rowlands: there is another
dissimilarity to the situation in Bosnia. The response of those
responding at the beginning of that conflict was slow, it was
uncertain, it was ponderous and it gave the wrong signals to all
concerned. The difference, quite frankly, is here it has not been
slow, it has not been ponderous and that is important.
19. It has not got anywhere yet.
(Mr Lloyd) May I remind the Committee
we are now on day ten, we are not in year four or whatever. We
do expect action within the time-frame written by the Contact
Group. It is the official position, and I have expressed our concerns
over our uncertainty about the honesty of intent, but it certainly
has produced movement in Belgrade, it has produced reaction in
Belgrade so we are convinced we are pursuing the right course
there. Specifically in terms of the United States we clearly are
working and will continue to work very closely with the United
States on all this. There is no doubt about the sense of purpose
within the State Department and the White House about the situation.
I understand the Committee when in the United States had some
discussions and it may well be that you have a more recent and
immediate impression in any case but we have no doubt that not
only the objectives of the United States but also the strength
of purpose of the United States is exactly at same.
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