Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of witnesses (Questions 1 - 19)

THURSDAY 19 MARCH 1998

MR TONY LLOYD, MP and MR PETER RICKETTS

Mr Ross

  1.  Minister, Mr Ricketts, we are very pleased to welcome you to the Committee. On behalf of the Chairman can I give his apologies because he is in Paris today with the North Atlantic Assembly. When we were on our visit to Washington and New York we took advantage of discussing with the State Department, the Pentagon and others the very serious situation that was developing in Kosovo and they shared with us and we shared with them our concerns. Could you start off by telling the Committee how active you have been since the tragic events occurred and what you yourself and the Foreign Secretary are doing on our behalf. We would be concerned also to have from you, if it is possible, a detailed and as factual a description as you could give us of the abuse that has occurred that you are aware of throughout this period from 2nd March onwards.

  (Mr Lloyd)  Thank you, Mr Ross. Perhaps I could introduce Peter Ricketts who is Deputy Political Director within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Peter has a unique role in that he appeared before the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday and I think he is perhaps now almost above and beyond the call of duty.

Sir Peter Emery

  2.  I am glad he is coming to the more superior place!

  (Mr Lloyd)  Sir Peter, I am also glad he has come to the superior place. I have no doubt as to where our priorities lie, this is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The situation in Kosovo, as I think everyone understands, is now of the utmost seriousness. The sequence of events effectively was this: that on the weekend of 28th February/1st March there was an attack, we understand, on a Serbian special police force patrol in Kosovo. This attack led to four deaths. The response of the police was to attack the homes of a number of ethnic Albanian families leaving initially over 20 people dead. Amongst those, while it was the claim of the authorities in Belgrade that these were all people actually involved in terrorism, there is no doubt the dead numbered women, children and people too elderly to be seriously classified as combatants and so we had no doubt that the reaction was excessive and the level of violence was out of all proportion and in simple terms was unacceptable. It is also a matter of concern that there were reports raised that amongst those who died were people where there was evidence of summary execution and not simply of death during the course of exchange of fire. We believe that the full death toll over the following week is something of the order of over 80 people. There are still some doubts about people whose deaths were simply not marked. The response of the British Government in particular, but also the response of the international community, was rapid, and I think decisive. If I have the opportunity, Mr Ross, I would like to return to why I say that made a difference. On 2nd March as President of the European Union we triggered a tough declaration condemning the violence. On 5th March the Foreign Secretary flew to Belgrade and met with President Milosevic, the Federal President and also with Foreign Minister Jovanovic where he delivered a tough message about the unacceptability of what had taken place. However, I have to record the response at that time from President Milosevic was not one that gave any comfort that the authorities in Belgrade recognised the concerns that existed within the United Kingdom and within the European Union. On 9th March the UK organised and chaired a meeting of the Contact Group ministerial meeting at Lancaster House. Whilst this was widely trailed in the press, it is worth me spending just a few moments in saying what the Contact Group proposed. I think the most interesting feature first of all, and it is a very important point, is that the Contact Group, all six members, agreed a common statement at the end of that, a common statement which condemned the violence, a common statement which amongst other things for example drew to the attention of the International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia what had taken place in Kosovo and asked that they investigate those events with a view to seeing whether those were actions that came under the definition of war crimes for the Tribunal. As an addendum to that, since that time Judge Arbour, the Prosecutor, has confirmed that it is her belief that it is within the mandate of the Tribunal to investigate precisely these incidents. The Contact Group also asked that the International Committee of the Red Cross be allowed access to Kosovo and be given necessary assistance in order to undertake their own role particularly in respect of not simply observing but also investigating the pattern of human rights abuse and of course in particular the deaths that had taken place. There are a number of other things and I am sure they will come out in questions later on. I would as well like to highlight the request by the Contact Group that a new mission should take place by Felipe Gonzalez as the special representative of the Chairman in office of the OSCE. Specifically that would give a new and specific mandate to Felipe Gonzalez to look at the problems in Kosovo. We think that is particularly important and since that time the European Union has also appointed Felipe Gonzalez as the European Union representative in Kosovo. Mr Gonzalez now carries that double mandate and I think that is important in itself. The Contact Group also came through with some immediate courses of action, specifically a package which included the following: consideration at the Security Council level, and that is now being proceeded with; a comprehensive arms embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; a refusal to supply equipment to Yugoslavia which might be used for internal repression, or for terrorism; a denial of visas for senior Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian representatives responsible for repressive action by the security forces in Kosovo; and a moratorium on government financed export credit support for trade and investment including government financing for privatisation in Serbia, the impact of which I think the Committee will realise. I have to add the rider that the Russian Federation took the position that it could not support the last two measures for immediate imposition, but they made it clear if there was no real progress towards the steps called by the Contact Group the Russian Federation itself would then be willing to discuss those measures. And the importance and significance of that is that it meant that the authorities in Belgrade had to recognise they were totally isolated and had no support in the Contact Group specifically in the sense (and this is a compliment to the Russian Federation) of no support from the Russian Federation where Belgrade may historically have hoped for some kind of active endorsement. So the Contact Group's action, as I have said, was swift and decisive. The Contact Group was informed by the Foreign Secretary that he was asking me to go to the region to represent the EU Presidency. I travelled on 11th and 12th March to Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), through to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, then on the following day to Bulgaria. I can go into details of those visits but if I can just say briefly that it may be important for the Committee to discuss a little bit the reaction in Belgrade and that may be a set of questions in its own right. Simply if I can record this; there is no doubt in my mind that the authorities in Belgrade were shocked by the speed and by the severity of the action of the Contact Group and that in itself was a measure of the importance of that decisive action on behalf of this Government but on behalf of the international community as well. The European Conference was held in London on the 12th and the European Conference itself issued a firm declaration firmly supporting the Contact Group's approach and then the meeting of the European Foreign Ministers took place in Edinburgh over the weekend. That is an informal meeting, it has no formal status, but informally the Ministers supported and endorsed the Contact Group's statement. Within that there has been a series of activities which have taken us forward to where we are now. Specifically within the Contact Group's statement of course there was a ten-day timeframe for action by the authorities in Belgrade. That ten days will be up today. The political directors of the Contact Group will meet tomorrow to assess progress and Contact Group Ministers will assemble in the United States——I am sorry in Bonn—I am a little out-of-date having been away myself—on 25th March where clearly both the political directors' report and progress to that time will be assessed with a view to further action at that ministerial level. Mr Ross, I hope that is a helpful summary.

Mr Ross

  3.  Absolutely. Can I just say from the outset that obviously the Foreign Affairs Select Committee is willing to help in any way they possibly can. Apart from our Chairman we have Sir Peter Emery involved in OSCE. Whatever we can do to help we are obviously prepared to do as well. Can I just say to you the reports this morning from the Security Council are that the Russian Federation are proving difficult. Could you just clarify for the Committee whether or not they are simply trying to delay the imposition of sanctions or are they trying to block them outright, as is our impression?

  (Mr Lloyd)  I am not sure that I can give a definitive answer to all that has taken place in New York. The resolution was drawn up by the United Kingdom and it is now open for discussion with a view to resolution today I think. I look to Mr Ricketts for guidance on this.

  (Mr Ricketts)  Chairman, the position in New York is that a draft resolution has been circulated informally for discussion amongst members of the Security Council and yesterday the Russian representative reported that Mr Primakov had been in Belgrade and had been having discussions with the federal authorities and wanted to digest the results of that and consider them further and therefore did not want work to go ahead on the resolution for the moment. That is the position in New York. As the Minister said, we have circulated a draft resolution for discussion.

Mr Ross:   Before we open it up could we just go back to the actual abuses that have occurred. If we were to suggest to you it had been suggested to us as a Committee that massacres have occurred and that daily abuse is occurring, for instance snipers are targeting in various parts of Kosovo individuals, men, women and children, do you have any information to either disagree with that or support that?

Sir Peter Emery

  4.  Plus torture.

  (Mr Lloyd)  As I have said already, what we do know with a degree of certainty is that amongst those who have been killed are numbered women, children and the elderly who are clearly not combatants so the fiction that this was simply activity of a military kind by the security forces in response to action by terrorist groups does not hold up. We must also be concerned about reports circulated widely that amongst those who died were those who bore the marks of summary execution. In other words, they were simply shot at close range and not in an act of combat. The difficulty has been that the situation in Kosovo is so turbulent that there simply is not the level of reporting that would allow for us to know what has taken place. And in particular the Red Cross who would normally provide a reliable reporting system have withdrawn all of their personnel not simply because of the disarray in the region but because they have received specific death threats to their personnel. Within that context it means that the level of information we have got simply is not adequate to confirm the kinds of things that you are saying to us. We had yesterday or the day before yesterday the Ambassador in Belgrade was in Kosovo himself but clearly Kosovo is a very large area—I think it is about the size of Wales—and to be in Pristina does not give a real account of what is taking place in more remote areas. Again I am going to invite Mr Ricketts to make any comment he wants on this. I think I have to say we are simply not in a position to confirm or deny the kinds of reports you have had mentioned to you this week.

  (Mr Ricketts)  As the Minister says, there have been widespread reports. We have been pressing hard, we pressed in the Contact Group statement for access to Kosovo by international forensic experts precisely to produce objective evidence of the kind you are seeking. So far that access has been denied and victims have been buried before proper forensic tests were possible. So there is no objective data but we are continuing to press hard to get forensic experts into Kosovo.

  5.  The Yugoslavian Ambassador to the United Kingdom has supplied us with information to suggest they are prepared to accept the International Red Cross. Do you know whether the International Red Cross has accepted this invitation?

  (Mr Lloyd)  I spoke in fact to Mr Sommaruga, who is the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, on Tuesday and I discussed the situation at some length with him. He made the point very forcefully that the Red Cross has to protect its own integrity, its freedom of operation and it has to be seen to be independent not simply of the authorities in Belgrade but actually of all governments, ours as well as any others. We not only respect, we support him in that desire. He told me they had to take seriously the threats to their personnel. What they wanted was not protection from the authorities in Belgrade to undertake their work, what they wanted was simply a recognition by the authorities in Belgrade that that work had to go ahead and a spirit of cooperation in allowing them to operate as an independent humanitarian organisation. The Red Cross, I understand, are now preparing to go back into the area but, of course, Mr Ricketts' point is still a valid point that the process of physical decay and the fact that bodies were buried very quickly means that evidence may no longer exist for some aspects. I did raise the specific action with the Serbian President, President Milutinovic, in Belgrade last week. He said that they were committed to allow that forensic testing to take place. He said to me for example it would be possible to even exhume bodies that had been buried. Clearly we want to see delivery of those promises, not simply a verbal commitment.

Mr Rowlands

  6.  You mentioned earlier on, Minister, that you were awaiting the outcome of decisions between the Russian Foreign Minister and the authorities in Belgrade. Is it your opinion that the greatest single influence on the Belgrade government is the Russians?

  (Mr Lloyd)  I think the greatest single influence, if I can put it in these terms, is that the international community acted quickly, decisively and unanimously. It is that sense of common purpose that is important. Obviously within that I must say in terms of reaching unanimity the role of the Russian Federation must be important.

  7.  We understand that the Russian Government actually has ambivalent or indeed has objections to certain actions of the Contact Group and certainly have not come fully on board. Do we know what they are pressing on the Belgrade authorities to be a solution? Are they fully on board with the idea of a high degree of autonomy for Kosovo?

  (Mr Lloyd)  Can I make it very clear that the Committee ought to have before it the statement of the Contact Group and certainly we will make sure it has. The important point I think to recognise is that the only area where the Russian Federation dissented from the actions of the other five was in respect to two items of the sanctions package. The importance of that is that it meant that the Russian Federation was totally signed up to all of the other things, the criticism of the excessive violence, the demand that Belgrade move to the negotiating table, the demand that the Education Agreement should be implemented, and most importantly in the context of Mr Rowlands' question, the demand for autonomy for the Kosovar Albanians. There was no disagreement between the Russian Federation and anybody else on the political steps that are needed that will begin to transform the situation.

Mr Heath

  8.  Can I just return to the atrocities that have taken place, Minister. You talked earlier about the International Criminal Tribunal investigation. It is accepted that it falls within the remit of the Tribunal but has the Tribunal taken any action to commence investigations?

  (Mr Lloyd)  The remit of the Tribunal specifically was cast round the parts of the Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia before break up and since that the Tribunal's mandate was without time. That is effectively the legal basis that we always believed existed and has been confirmed by Judge Arbour. I am going to have to refer the second part of your question specifically about the investigations to Mr Ricketts.

  (Mr Ricketts)  The answer is that the prosecutor, Judge Arbour has begun the process of assembling a team to investigate Kosovo. She has appealed to nations to make available investigators to take on a mission in Kosovo when the Federal authorities allow that to happen.

  (Mr Lloyd)  We are still dealing with an area where unrest and the kind of things that have been reported to your Committee are going to make investigation itself problematic in the short run. That is not an argument for investigation not taking place. It is a recognition of the practical difficulties that exist in these days, although we must continue to press Belgrade to facilitate the prosecutor's role.

  9.  I wanted to be assured that the prosecutor was taking steps to collect information. It seems to me there are investigations that can be carried out outside Kosovo at the present time which should be taking place because clearly crimes have been committed. The other point I wanted pick up at this point is whether Felipe Gonzalez has been given admission to Kosovo at all?

  (Mr Lloyd)  No.

Mr Godman

  10.  May I say, Minister, looking at this dreadful affair from afar from London and Scotland I am reminded of what an American international affairs expert, Professor Jack Donald, said recently: "Those who violate human rights norms rarely face coercive international enforcement." I would have thought, you mentioned this, if the international community is to act decisively in order to bring to an end dreadful affairs like this that action has to be coherent, comprehensive and cohesive. What we have here is Felipe Gonzalez who is the OSCE envoy. Mention is made of the European Union envoy. Why Gonzalez cannot perform both roles is beyond me. Oh, he is. Then you talk about investigations being conducted into these violations of human rights on behalf of the International War Crimes Tribunal. Who will carry out that police work is a question I would like to ask. If the UN passes this resolution that you said is being passed around informally, that brings the United Nations into the arena as well. Which element of the international community will take the lead in order to bring force to bear on Milosevic and his henchmen?

  (Mr Lloyd)  Whilst I understand the spirit of Mr Godman's question, I think what I have to say is this: the actions of the international community over the days since violence broke out in Kosovo actually have been remarkably consistent and I think in every way they have been mutually reinforcing. So, for example, the European Union sought to endorse the actions of the Contact Group. The regional states, the neighbouring countries to Yugoslavia themselves issued a joint statement again designed to support the Contact Group action, so there has been a consistency of approach and a determination—a hackneyed phrase—to sing from the same hymnsheet but specifically to make sure there can be no doubt in the minds of those in Belgrade that they face a united and determined international community. That is one. The second thing is obviously there are different agencies that do have legitimately different roles. Obviously an arms embargo under international law ought to be done with the authority of the United Nations. We can have an agreed arms embargo, in fact we do have a European Union arms embargo already in existence and we stick to that very literally and have done since it was brought in some years ago. For there to be an international and an internationally binding arms embargo that must be done by the United Nations which is why we put our efforts in that direction. In terms of criminal investigation it actually is appropriate that the tribunal, which is of course set up under an EU mandate, should be the body that is the prosecuting authority, that they are empowered to do that under international law and have the expertise that is not available to others. Mr Gonzalez' role is in one sense, I suppose you could say, a more informal role although it is fairly formal, in the sense that clearly in fact he has the mandate both from the European Union as the special representative on Kosovo as well as the mandate from the OSCE Chairman in office to represent the OSCE. That is important because of your point that we do not have a multiplicity of people performing the same purpose. What is clear is that outside the things the United Nations is able to do, outside what the Red Cross can do, outside what the International Criminal Tribunal can do, we do need someone who is able to act as negotiator who can bring the different parties together to narrow the gaps that most certainly do exist in the formal positions of both Belgrade and the representatives of the Albanians in Pristina. What I would urge on this Committee is recognition that it is almost a fundamental role for Mr Gonzalez to play. The difficulty at the moment is getting President Milosevic to accept that if Felipe Gonzalez plays this role it is inconsistent with the claim from Belgrade that this is a totally internal matter. If I could make this point: we accept that this is an internal matter in the sense that the problem is one defined within the boundaries of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. What we do not accept is that this is an internal matter that is only the affair of Yugoslavia. It is a very obvious fact that ethnic Albanians in neighbouring countries and in FYROM and Albania itself must be affected by, for example, any large movement of refugees which means immediately that we cannot treat this as an internal affair and therefore not the responsibility of anybody else. So our view is that outside agencies, Mr Gonzalez specifically, can be a constructive part in breaking the negotiating deadlock that is there and there is no other agency that anybody within the international community is asking to perform that particular and specific role. I hope I can persuade Mr Godman and the Committee that there is consistency and that there is no duplication or inefficiency in this process. It is literally those agencies which have specific mandates performing within their own competence.

Mr Ross:   We want to talk about the international response but Sir Peter Emery has a quick question and then we want to move on to Contact Group proposals themselves. We want to look systematically at the things we are doing so we can move forward.

Sir Peter Emery

  11.  As a matter of record, when the Foreign Affairs Committee was in the United Nations in New York on Tuesday I spoke with Sergei Laurov, the Russian Ambassador to the United Nations on Kosovo, and his reply to me was that the Russians were highly worried about the situation in Kosovo. They realised that this if not contained could spark into problems in the whole of Bulgaria. Number one. Secondly, he said the Russians were attempting to take action which would lower the tension rather than heighten it which he felt certain action by the Contact Group might do. I record that as background. As far as the Contact Group is concerned we have been sent, dated today, from Milos Radulovic claiming to be the Ambassador for the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia a statement made supposedly yesterday in Belgrade on 18 March which was a declaration from the President of the Republic of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, and this is a statement which is pressing for discussion and for greater reliability for human rights and everything else. Has the Foreign Office seen this? Has this been looked at or taken up or is there anything meaningful in it?

  (Mr Lloyd)  Can Mr Ricketts clarify that for the Committee? But he also might in passing want to tell the Committee whether this differs from what the Serbian authorities produced last year.

  (Mr Ricketts)  The Ambassador of the Federal Republic has an appointment with me this afternoon which I am sure is to deliver the same statement and it was put off until this afternoon in deference to this meeting with the Committee this morning. We have seen that informally. We have not had time to study it in detail. One point I might just make about it at this stage is it is a statement from the Serbian Republic President and therefore it implies that the solution to the Kosovo problem should take place within the Serbian constitution and that in itself precludes some other possible options for solutions for Kosovo within the Federal Republic constitution. Obviously the statement merits further study than we have yet had time to give it.

Sir Peter Emery:   He gives an absolute guarantee for the right of the International Red Cross to return under his protection, etcetera. Now that may be a step forward. One cannot know. Can I just then progress on this. What does the British Government see and what would we be advocating as a long-term solution to this problem? It is not new. I was out there three and a half years ago and it has not altered much since then. I do not think we can just stand by and let this die down and then recreate again in a number of years. What is the British Government's view of the way in the long term we would like to see this come to some conclusion?

Mr Ross:   Can I just say we want to get some information from you initially to build up to that so if I can ask Sir Peter to keep that question on hold at the moment. We would really like to come to the statement made by the Contact Group which is quite important. It is a very important statement taken very quickly and we want to examine that process to see whether or not the actual process had any sense of direction where it was going. Mr Illsley?

Mr Illsley

  12.  You said a few minutes ago that the Contact Group acted quickly, decisively and unanimously. I would like to press you on the Contact Group proposals. How far forward is the implementation of the action plan? Is it likely that President Milosevic will have done enough or done anything by March 25th to satisfy the Contact Group? Is it likely you will have taken measures that will satisfy the Russian Federation? You mentioned "unanimously" but it would appear that the Russian Federation opposes the measures on visas and credit. Now there appears to be some prevarication on the question of the arms embargo. Could you give us more information about the actual implementation of the action plan?

  (Mr Lloyd)  Specifically can I make this point: the Russian Federation certainly did not oppose the adoption of a visa ban and a moratorium on export credit by others. That would be one. Secondly, they did not say that they themselves would not apply those. They said they could not support those measures for immediate imposition. They went on to say that the Russian Federation would be willing to discuss all the above measures if there was not adequate progress towards what the Contact Group stipulates. I think it is important, Mr Ross, to establish that because we welcomed the very supportive role played by the Russian Federation in London last week. We do place great store by the fact that Belgrade recognising that the condemnation is universal places extra pressure on Belgrade to make the kind of moves we all think are important. That would be the first thing I would want to say. In terms of where we are at now, clearly the political directors of the Contact Group will meet tomorrow. They are charged with examining precisely what progress has been made in the ten days that finish today. I must say that our initial reaction is to view with some concern the lack of progress that has been made. We are not aware for example that special police units have been withdrawn from Kosovo. We are at least concerned that the commitments on paper that seem to move in the direction of the Contact Group may in practice not amount to what the Contact Group must demand. We do need—and this is not prevarication on my part—to make that assessment of what has gone on and we do need to make sure Belgrade is firmly of the view if they have not honoured the spirit of the Contact Group's message they will face continuation of not only the measures there but in fact increased pressure. That was implicit in the Contact Group's statement when it said that if the Contact Group were not satisfied with progress they would look for further measures and we can discuss those. I would in particular draw your attention to the fact that Belgrade was given in paragraph 8 of the Contact Group's statement both an opportunity but also, if you like, a sober assessment of failure to take that opportunity when the Contact Group said: "Belgrade's own actions have seriously set back the process of normalisation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's relations with the international community. Unless the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia takes steps to resolve the serious political and human rights issues in Kosovo, there is no prospect of any improvement in its international standing. On the other hand, concrete progress to resolve the serious political and human rights issues in Kosovo will improve the international position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and prospects for normalisation of its international relationships and full rehabilitation in international institutions." The point I would want to make in response to Mr Illsley is we are very much apprised of the fact that if we do not carry this process through with determination then we simply put off resolution of the situation indefinitely. Actually in putting it off we may be at least participants in a deterioration of the situation into something considerably worse than we are seeing now. Certainly the view of the British Government is the process begun a little more than ten days ago is a process that we will continue now until it does produce the results that we all need.

  13.  Are you confident of retaining the unanimity from within the Contact Group? Is there any time-scale you can indicate to us after the 25th as to when further action might be required?

  (Mr Lloyd)  Clearly I cannot anticipate the results of the meeting on the 25th. The Contact Group through its Ministers clearly is empowered to take the agenda forward in whatever direction is appropriate at that time. Clearly we have got to travel in hope. We have got to travel with the view that by keeping the pressure on we make a material difference for the position in Kosovo. It is not the position we are saying that things cannot change and cannot improve. This whole exercise would be pointless if we took that view. I do not think it is helpful to the Committee to try and anticipate what will take place on the 25th before it actually does take place. Mr Illsley raised another point—

  14.  Are you confident of the unanimity?

  (Mr Lloyd)  It is our position, as I have already said to the Committee, that the unanimity of purpose and the unanimity that existed in London last week was something that we thought was significant and important. We will work hard to maintain that unanimity. Principally, the Committee does not need me to remind you, our ambitions are very straight forward and we will pursue our ambition to bring, if not resolution of the position in Kosovo, at least to bring progress that the resolution of the problems of Kosovo is properly on to the agenda. That is our primary ambition and unanimity by the international community would be a significant part in making that process more straight forward.

Mr Ross:   Can we move on now to the international response, Minister, and I will ask Sir Peter Emery and when he has finished David Heath has a specific question to ask about another group in the area. Sir Peter?

Sir Peter Emery

  15.  I think I tried earlier to ask whether the present situation threatens the stability of peace in Bosnia. It seems to me the answer is yes it may and we want to try and make certain that it does not. Whether the problems will spill over into FYROM or into Albania or into Bulgaria these are all, one would judge, problematic areas and the Government and the Contact Group are trying to take action to ensure that does not happen. Would that be a correct interpretation of the situation?

  (Mr Lloyd)  Yes obviously Sir Peter is right. Can I give this clarification. I think the concern we all express perhaps ought to be placed in this context that the situation in Bosnia is probably more hopeful now than at any time in recent years. We as part of the international community are receiving a level of co-operation from the Republika Srpska which has been unknown until Prime Minister Dodic came into power in the Republika Srpska. I think the worry about the situation in Kosovo and the implication for Bosnia is not that conflict will go across that border because the situation in Bosnia is, as everybody understands, very tightly controlled because of the international presence there. It is the more constructive role that we saw coming from Belgrade may simply not be there. But I would not want to over-emphasise to the Committee the problems that will exist in Bosnia. I do want to record that significant progress has taken place and the situation there is better than at any time literally since conflict broke out. I think the concern of Kosovo is beyond the boundaries of Yugoslavia and the ones Sir Peter referred to. When I was Albania and FYROM there was very real concern and there has been—this concern was expressed to me months ago by the same people—that any serious conflict in Kosovo could lead to massive movement of peoples. Inevitably the border between Albania and Yugoslavia is a very porous border. It would be virtually impossible to police even if the Albanian government wanted to police it and they have expressed the view (and it is a view that we would have to at least treat with sympathy) that it is extremely difficult for them to turn away ethnic Albanians if they are fleeing violence in Kosovo. In FYROM the situation is that something like 45 per cent of the Albanian minority who existed in FYROM have origins in Kosovo anyway. They see the large numbers of peoples as being fundamentally destabilising in the Macedonian context. I think we share that type of analysis. So far I am glad to report that the present levels of violence have led to remarkably little movement across international boundaries although we do know there are significant numbers of displaced people who moved into Montenegro within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of course others displaced within Kosovo and more generally within Serbia. That is a pleasure to record but it is a pleasure of a limited kind because we could not predict if the situation got worse that we would not see those large movements of people. It is also the case that other neighbouring countries, Bulgaria for example, which suffered very badly during the sanctions regime in Yugoslavia in the past, are very concerned about the impact on their own economy. They are concerned as well and raised specifically the corrupting influence that the sanctions regime produces on the economic structure because of black-marketeering, smuggling and so on. They express those concerns. I am also happy to tell the Committee they express it in this context: they recognise the problems it could have for their own people but they feel it is right and are still firmly of the view that the international community is acting in the right way by taking the action it is taking and they are prepared, if necessary, to accept that will cause them problems in the short run but better to have those short run problems than a long running festering wound in the region.

  16.  A last question then. Realising the present difficulty, is the Contact Group and is the United Kingdom willing and wishing to go further than just the settlement of the present military or police activities in Kosovo to restore a proper peaceful situation but to actually begin trying to set out to find a permanent solution to the problem and not just leaving it what I would say a third of the way?

  (Mr Lloyd)  Yes, I think we are all seriously seized with the view that it is necessary now to bring pressure not just for a cessation of violence in the short term but there has to be movement to provide a long-term framework whereby the rights of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo could be properly respected. Mr Ricketts made a point before that I would like to clarify slightly. One of our concerns about the language that has now come from the government in Belgrade touches on this question about whether the solution is a solution within Serbia or a solution within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That might seem like a semantic point at first sight but in actual fact it is a fundamental point. It is fundamental at this level: the offer from Belgrade so far has been a solution confined within the Federal Republic of Serbia and we have to place on record concern that this is knowingly a tactic to produce an offer which seems to be an offer made in good faith but is actually an offer they know will be rejected and the position of the international community and certainly the position of this government is and will continue to be that the basis for a solution has got to be within the boundaries of the internationally agreed borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia otherwise we actively pre-empt certain solutions and it is not possible to regard that as an unconditional offer of talks on all problems. If I can then say, Mr Ross, we are not participants to the negotiations. It is important to make that point. We are not there to negotiate. Negotiations must take place between the authorities in Belgrade and the representatives of the Albanians in Kosovo. We do note, though, at least what some of the heads of that negotiated framework must be. A renunciation of violence by all parties. That is fundamental. An agreement that the education agreement which has been in existence for some time now should be brought to fruition so that education as a flashpoint of discontent can be taken out of the equation. The negotiated settlement has got to look at autonomy, very real autonomy for the ethnic Albanians to give them real power over their own futures. That autonomy has to be one defined by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and that means specifically that there is no support within the international community for secession, for independence for Kosovo or concepts like, for example, a Greater Albania. Those specific points of any agreement are those that would get support from the international community and to go beyond those at any point would lead to a situation where practical results from the negotiations would be impossible. We can say what the heads of negotiation are. Negotiations have got to take place between the different parties.

  17.  I am sorry I said that was the last question but arising out of what you said seems to me to be something of great importance. You said we were not there to negotiate, the negotiation must come between the Albanian representatives in Kosovo and the Yugoslavian central federal authority. I understand that but perhaps taking a role from what Kofi Annan has said in his negotiations with Iraq, things become possible when you can negotiate from a position of strength. It seems to me it will be imperative that those negotiating for Kosovo with the Federal Yugoslavian Republic, if we are not standing behind them then they are going to be knocked down like little skittles and we must ensure that does not happen.

  (Mr Lloyd)  I think Sir Peter touched on an important issue. That is right. That is why we have got to view very very cautiously the words that are coming out of Belgrade at the moment. It is not simply enough to have a package of words that seems to offer progress. There has got to be a practical attempt to move forward on the fundamental issues that do exist. We have got to look at not just the fine print but the actions and I think the Committee would understand if I said we are still seriously questioning the real intent coming out of Belgrade. If we do not see that intent translated into positive action then certainly it is Britain's position that we would want to pursue the line that the Contact Group and the international community has already started. That is one thing. There is an important point to add though. It is almost a mirror of, if you like, what this exchange has been about. The ethnic Albanians themselves also have to recognise the support of the international community is support for Albanians free of arbitrary violence, and that is unconditional. It is support of autonomy for the Albanians, but it is not a blank cheque for Albanians to move to independence. It is very important that message is also clear because whilst we are not parties to negotiation there is a well-defined framework within which negotiations have got to take place and both parties have got to understand that the support of the international community is conditional on that framework.

Mr Ross:   Still on the international response, Mr Rowlands and Mr Heath.

Mr Rowlands

  18.  Reflecting on the Bosnian experience, if we were honest with ourselves, despite the Contact Group and efforts by the European Union special representatives it was in the end decisive action and intervention by the United States that brought through the logjam in Bosnia. What assessment do we have of how far the State Department is willing to support those issues to get the resolution through?

  (Mr Lloyd)  Can I preface my remarks by saying this to Mr Rowlands: there is another dissimilarity to the situation in Bosnia. The response of those responding at the beginning of that conflict was slow, it was uncertain, it was ponderous and it gave the wrong signals to all concerned. The difference, quite frankly, is here it has not been slow, it has not been ponderous and that is important.

  19.  It has not got anywhere yet.

  (Mr Lloyd)  May I remind the Committee we are now on day ten, we are not in year four or whatever. We do expect action within the time-frame written by the Contact Group. It is the official position, and I have expressed our concerns over our uncertainty about the honesty of intent, but it certainly has produced movement in Belgrade, it has produced reaction in Belgrade so we are convinced we are pursuing the right course there. Specifically in terms of the United States we clearly are working and will continue to work very closely with the United States on all this. There is no doubt about the sense of purpose within the State Department and the White House about the situation. I understand the Committee when in the United States had some discussions and it may well be that you have a more recent and immediate impression in any case but we have no doubt that not only the objectives of the United States but also the strength of purpose of the United States is exactly at same.


 
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