Examination of Witnesses (Questions 580 - 599)
THURSDAY 16 JULY 1998
RT
HON ROBIN
COOK, MP,
MR MICHAEL
ARTHUR, CMG
and MR ROBERT
MACAIRE
Sir Peter Emery
580. Sir John Kerr, I am sorry. Do you consider
that reply when he said that he did not consider that Sir Thomas
Legg's inquiry was more important than this Committee was a correct
reply?
(Mr Cook) First of all, Sir Peter, can I thank
you for your gracious welcome. For the record, I will have appeared
this year at the close of the parliamentary session six times
before this Committee by the end of the month. That is double
the number of times that any of my predecessors in the recent
past under the Government you supported ever appeared before the
Select Committee. I think it will be recognised by all the Members
that I have sought hard to respond to the invitations of the Committee
and to build a constructive relationship with the Committee. On
the question you ask, I am accountable to Parliament and this
Committee reports to Parliament. It is Parliament that is the
supreme body and I am gratified that Parliament, by a very large
majority, has recorded its view that it is important that the
Legg Report should not be prejudiced by premature disclosure and
that they support my offer to make available to the Committee
the summary of the telegrams in confidence.
581. I congratulate you for the number of
times you have appeared and we give credit where credit is due.
(Mr Cook) Thank you.
582. But nonetheless are you agreeing with
what Sir John Kerr said to this Committee or are you disagreeing
with it?
(Mr Cook) The Permanent Secretary and I always
work in the closest possible harmony. The work of the Select Committee
and the Legg investigation is surely complementary, you are not
rivals. There may well be policy questions that arise from the
Legg Report that the Committee may wish to continue and on which
I would value their comments.
Sir Peter Emery: I
will not pursue that. There appear to be some differences between
the work of this Committee taking precedence over that of an internal
inquiry. The second question is this: since way back in May I
have asked for the minutes and the notes that were made by the
five members of your Department, the five members of the Foreign
Office, who saw certain Sandline representatives. If those notes
and minutes exist they would clear up absolutely whether, in fact,
any information was given by these five people that would indicate
that there was to be a military operation of any nature. Those
notes and minutes have not been passed to us. We have requested
them permanently. Can you now ensure that the Committee can have
them, I say immediately, I think it is not unreasonable to ask
immediately.
Mr Ross: Chairman,
I object to this line of questioning. I am going to object to
this line of questioning. I think it is completely wrong.
Chairman: This is
the last question which is being put by Sir Peter, let the Foreign
Secretary reply.
Mr Ross
583. I object to this line of questioning.
(Mr Cook) Can I intercede, Mr Ross, and will you
allow me to make a comment in response. I do understand the point
you are making. If I can just respond and hopefully we can leave
it at that. First of all, Sir Peter has very generously said we
should give credit where credit is due, I hope he will also give
credit to the fact that I have been more open in internal documents
than any previous Foreign Secretary. At no point during the previous
18 years of the Conservative Government were any telegrams of
the Foreign Office submitted in evidence to this Committee or
any other Committee. I have offered to make available to the Committee
summaries of 190 telegrams.
Chairman
584. 190?
(Mr Cook) Yes. I have invited the Chairman and
others to come and study them. I should say that you will need
to set aside some six hours to read through the telegrams in full.
I have been more open and more forthcoming to this Committee than
any of my predecessors. I have also said that when the Legg Report
is completed I am willing to consider applications from the Committee
for any documents which they feel it will be important for them
to have access to in order to further illuminate what will be
in the Legg Report. On the precise point that you raise, I expect
the Legg Report to deal with it in full. Those documents have
been available to him and I am sure that he will be wishing to
found conclusions on it.
Sir Peter Emery
585. The answer is no.
(Mr Cook) I can say now that there is no prospect
of those minutes or anything other in the Foreign Office supporting
the contention that the Foreign Office planned military intervention.
Sir John Stanley
586. Foreign Secretary, would you agree
that during the period in which the Junta was in power in Sierra
Leone the answers to Parliament given by the various members of
your ministerial team as to what was the British Government's
policy towards Sierra Leone, namely one of resolving the Sierra
Leone crisis by peaceful means, were entirely consistent and clear
in expressing that policy?
(Mr Cook) The policy was entirely consistent and
clear and I have no reason to believe that any statement on it
departed from that.
587. Thank you. Against that background
have you, as of today, any reason to believe that there were those
in the public service who were pursuing a policy quite contrary
to the one stated by your ministerial team to Parliament, a policy
of giving support to the military option of a counter-coup to
resolve the crisis?
(Mr Cook) I am quite clear that nobody in the
Africa Department was doing that.
588. I did not say in relation to the Africa
Department, Foreign Secretary, I said those in the public service.
(Mr Cook) I have to say that I must myself be
careful as to the extent to which I make statements that I am
not in a position to sustain. The only people I have been able
to interview are those in the Africa Department and I am therefore
not in a position to answer for others.
Sir John Stanley: I
think you would agree, Foreign Secretary, that if such a policy
of giving support to the military counter-coup option was in progress
it would only have been in progress with the knowledge of members
of your Department?
Mr Ross: Chairman,
I am sorry. I am really sorry but I am going to officially object
to this line of questioning. I am objecting.
Chairman: Sir John
will repeat the question. I fear we will have to go into private
session.
Mr Wilshire: Another
crude attempt to gag public discussion.
Sir Peter Emery: To
gag the Committee by the Labour Party.
Mr Heath: The Foreign
Secretary looks happy.
Chairman: Sir John,
would you repeat the question and then I fear if the objection
continues we will have to go into private session.
Sir John Stanley: I
do not wish to repeat my question, it is on the record and it
stands unchanged.
Mr Ross: I wish to
object.
Mr Rowlands: Maybe
the witness wishes to answer.
Ms Abbott: Maybe the
witness does not need protection in this way.
Sir Peter Emery: Are
you happy to answer the question?
Chairman: A Member
has objected. According to the procedural rules if that objection
continues the Committee has to consider it in private session
and vote as a Committee as to whether that is a proper question.
Mr Wilshire: Point
of order, Chairman.
Chairman: That is
the procedural rules. We have to follow the procedure, Mr Wilshire.
Mr Wilshire: So we
can gag public discussion.
Chairman: Mr Wilshire,
I am not going to have statements of that sort. We will follow
the procedural rules. I fear the Committee room will have to be
cleared while the Committee resolves this point.
Sir Peter Emery: We
hope quickly.
Mr Wilshire: I doubt
it. Apologies to the Foreign Secretary.
Chairman: This will
be done as expeditiously as possible.
Sir Peter Emery: May
I apologise as well, Foreign Secretary.
(The Chairman then ordered that the room be cleared)
(After a short time the proceedings were resumed)
Chairman: Sir John
Stanley can put his question.
Sir John Stanley
589. Foreign Secretary, can I make it clear
that my question was not in relation to Sandline or the terms
of the Legg Inquiry about the supply of arms to Sierra Leone,
my question was whether you had any reason to believe that there
were those in the public service who were giving support in ways
other than the supply of arms to the removal of the Junta by means
of a military counter-coup?
(Mr Cook) I think the answer to that is no. I
can give you chapter and verse from the telegrams. I cannot do
that, as you will understand, in open session. There was nobody
anywhere in the public service—I suppose I should add to
my knowledge, I have researched this with some interest over the
last few months—as far as I am aware there was nobody in
the public service who was adopting a policy which was deliberately
aimed at undermining or contradicting the official policy of Her
Majesty's Government.
Mr Heath
590. Foreign Secretary, can I take you back
to the circumstances before the Sandline issue and the immediate
aftermath of the coup. The High Commissioner moved to Conakry.
Then he established, rather unusually in my view, and maybe you
can tell me otherwise, a High Commission in exile in Conakry.
I believe that was after direct communication between yourself
and Mr Penfold, is that right?
(Mr Cook) I spoke to Mr Penfold by phone shortly
after he arrived in Conakry and congratulated him on the great
heroism and dedication he had shown during the military coup.
Whatever the events of the last few months nothing can take away
from Mr Penfold the fact that he showed immense courage, operating
at times in a building which was on fire. The rest of his staff
and also his family showed the same courage in manning the post.
Indeed it was his daughter who actually operated the internal
tannoy system during what was effectively a siege of the mission.
A military officer was, if I remember rightly, shot in the leg
trying to cross the compound. He stood by his post to the very
last possible minute in very great circumstances of danger and
in the course of which he maintained constant information to London
and as best as he could very real support for the British expatriate
community.
591. When he established a temporary mission
from a hotel room in Conakry in close proximity to President Kabbah
was that on your instructions, Foreign Secretary, and what instructions,
if so, did you give?
(Mr Cook) It was with our agreement. He took the
view himself that it was a correct step and we concurred with
it. He was in Conakry but, of course, in effect the only reason
why he was in Conakry was because Kabbah was in Conakry. The view
was taken that since he had a strong relationship with President
Kabbah—which is an asset to the British Government—he
should remain in Conakry in close contact with Kabbah. You are
right that it is unusual to have a High Commissioner or an Ambassador
to the Government in Exile. This reflects, of course, the very
unusual circumstances we found ourselves in after the Junta took
over in May of last year. Kabbah represented a legitimate and
recognised regime of Sierra Leone. The Junta was a fairly disorganised
group who had come to power more by accident than by design and
had no clear political programme. As the Committee will see from
the telegrams pretty well every week for the next two or three
months they were imminently expected to depart from power. It
was not perceived at the time as any kind of permanent change
to the Government position. I think also it should be recognised
that the Junta itself only had relatively narrow control within
Sierra Leone, it controlled the capital, it controlled some of
the other parts, particularly the northern sectors but throughout
the whole period the Junta was in power in Freetown large parts
of territory of Sierra Leone remained under control of forces
that were loyal to President Kabbah. So he was not entirely in
exile in that sense even if he himself was not in the territory
of Sierra Leone. Our reluctance therefore to de-recognise Kabbah
as the legitimate regime was reflected also in our decision in
October that Kabbah and his Ministers should be received as the
delegation representing Sierra Leone at the Commonwealth Heads
of Government Meeting. I think in retrospect our decision was
the right one. In the event the Junta only managed to remain in
power until the subsequent February and that we were right both
to continue to deal with Kabbah as the legitimate Government and
to continue to deal with Kabbah as the man most likely, as indeed
he was, to return to full power in Freetown.
592. One more question, Foreign Secretary,
I am most grateful to you. You have said that your conversation
with Mr Penfold was essentially congratulatory.
(Mr Cook) Yes.
593. In your recollection was there anything
in that conversation that could have been misinterpreted as suggesting
an alternative policy to be pursued in Sierra Leone which involved
military action? Should Mr Penfold's actions prove to be, in the
light of the Legg Inquiry, critical to events later on, presumably
you would have no problem to establish the instructions which
Mr Penfold felt that he was under and, to clarify that, to release
a transcript of that conversation for the benefit of the Committee?
(Mr Cook) I would have no problem myself producing
a transcript if one exists, I am not sure a transcript as such
exists. There may be a record, if notetaking was going on in the
other room. The Committee will be aware I am never clear how many
officials are listening in to the phone calls I make and maybe
somebody has made a note of it and then I would have no problem
producing it. I would say, Mr Heath, there really can be no possible
relevance of that conversation to the events which are under consideration
by the Legg Inquiry. At this moment Kabbah had only freshly left
Freetown. There was no Security Council Resolution 1132. There
was no arms embargo. Certainly there had been no discussion on
next steps. I would be absolutely confident there was nothing
in that conversation that could be capable of misrepresentation
at the time.
594. I am very grateful, Chairman. I am
very grateful to the Foreign Secretary to have said something
which clearly is outside the scope of the terms of the Committee
inquiry.
(Mr Cook) I may need to go and consult my lawyers.
Ms Abbott
595. Two brief questions, Foreign Secretary.
First of all, will you undertake to provide to the Committee all
the documents which were made available to Sir Thomas Legg's inquiry
as soon as possible after the publication of his report, obviously
under secure conditions for classified material.
(Mr Cook) I have already made an offer to the
Committee that I will consider any request from the Committee
to name documents that will be in the annex to the Legg Inquiry.
596. Would you as a matter of course expect
all ministers in your Department to read all the papers submitted
to them by their officials? Would you expect them to differentiate
between the original document and copies of the document? Would
you expect them to make a mark on each document to show that it
had been read?
(Mr Cook) First of all, of course I would expect
ministers to read all documents submitted to them, as indeed I
do myself. I am quite confident that everybody in the Foreign
Office does so. Of course, it does not follow from that that ministers
see every document that comes into the private office. The whole
point of the private office is to filter those documents into
those which the minister must see and protect him from those that
interfere with him carrying out his duties efficiently. Those
documents that are submitted by private secretaries to ministers
I would expect them to read and I am confident that they do.
597. Only a minor point, but would you expect
them to mark them to show that they have read them?
(Mr Cook) It is plainly sensible and I try religiously
to mark every paper that I see myself, either to tick it where
it is given to me for information or to say "okay" if
it is going to be agreed although sometimes of course I say things
other than okay. I would hope that all documents that come back
from me have a mark on them. As a matter of simple human failing
if you are going through 200 papers in one evening you cannot
guarantee that you have marked all of them but that is the objective.
Mr Wilshire
598. Two questions, if I may, Chairman.
Firstly, Foreign Secretary, before your coffee break you rightly
pointed out that last week the House voted by a big majority that
premature disclosure would prejudice the Legg Inquiry.
(Mr Cook) 166 majority.
599. Exactly so. That is what the House
did decide. Would you actually agree that publishing conclusions
of what actually happened would be premature disclosure before
Legg has actually had a chance to say what his conclusions are?
(Mr Cook) I think it would be premature of the
Committee to draw conclusions before it has had an opportunity
to consider the Legg Report. It would be rather curious for the
Select Committee to continue in that way but that is a matter
within the gift of the Select Committee and not I.
| 
