Examination of Witnesses (Questions 600 - 619)
THURSDAY 16 JULY 1998
RT
HON ROBIN
COOK, MP,
MR MICHAEL
ARTHUR, CMG
and MR ROBERT
MACAIRE
600. I did not actually
say should the Committee come to conclusions, I was concerned
whether anybody should come to conclusions, including yourself.
(Mr Cook) I have been pressed on this matter three
times on the floor of the House, twice by PNQ and once in debate.
It plainly was incumbent upon me in the course of answering questions
in the House to express what I believed in good faith to be my
view, and I did so. What I have done since those three events
in the House is to robustly defend that view. I do not know that
the Legg Report is going to find that much more in terms of facts
than I have already deployed in the House. After all, I have sought
to be open with the House. What I would expect when I have looked
at the Legg Report is as to whether or not they can confirm those
facts that I have already given and made available to the House,
namely that there was no ministerial involvement and that there
was no connivance.
601. But in view of your rightly referring
to the fact that premature disclosure would be unhelpful, do you
regret your letter to us dated 30 June in which you had come to
a conclusion in effect when you said there was no ministerial
conspiracy to breach the arms embargo. Is that not prejudging
Legg?
(Mr Cook) Not at all. I would expect Legg, I must
say, to confirm what I know to be the matter of fact, there was
no ministerial involvement. If I may say so that is not something
that I paraded for the first time in the letter to this Committee,
it is something that I have said robustly on every occasion that
I have been asked, including three times on the floor of the House
and it happens to be the truth of the matter and Legg will confirm
that.
Mr Wilshire: Just
one more question, Chairman. When Mr Lloyd appeared before us
on Tuesday 5 May, at Q475 of the record of that he said in reply
to a question from me: "The Committee will forgive me, I
have not had an opportunity to speak to the Foreign Secretary",
that was over that weekend. A couple of sentences later he said:
"I spoke briefly to the Foreign Secretary over the weekend
on this". Which of those two statements was correct?
Chairman: Mr Wilshire,
I do not think that is an appropriate question, it is not one
for the Foreign Secretary, it is one for Mr Lloyd himself. He
corrected it in a letter which followed. I am not allowing that
question. I now turn to Mr Rowlands for the last question in this
session.
Mr Rowlands
602. On a slightly broader issue, before
we move into the private session, Foreign Secretary. Did we at
any time have any worries or concerns about the way President
Kabbah had behaved? We have received evidence about his action
in setting up local defence militias that had an ethnic base and
were a cause in themselves of part of the problem of internal
strife. I have no evidence of that. At any time did the mission
or the Department have a view that President Kabbah himself had
created some problems?
(Mr Cook) President Kabbah is the legitimate head
of a sovereign country and remains such. The Committee will understand
therefore one has to respect the decisions that he comes to even
if we may ourselves express views. On the background that you
referred to, I think what is perhaps not always sufficiently appreciated
in relation to Sierra Leone is that it is not a straight forward
conflict with one side against the other. In the case of Sierra
Leone there had been a long period of military confrontation and
unrest involving more than two actors. Indeed, at one stage it
is fair to say there was something approaching a breakdown of
law and order in Sierra Leone and no effective central government.
As part of that civil war there was an army of tribal militias
known as Kamajors. Other names applied to other militias attached
to other tribes. Primarily there was a reaction by the tribes
in the southern part of Sierra Leone to the military activities
of the RUF who were predominantly based in the north and who emerged
from the north after the military junta formed a common government
with the mutinous elements of the Sierra Leone army. It is perfectly
fair to say that there was a number of groups who were armed who
were participating in fighting, some of whom did not have a clear
military structure or a clear political objective programme. It
was because of that that the Abidjan Agreement was negotiated
towards the end of 1996 which provided for disarming and demobilising
of the various different military factions who were taking part
in a near anarchy situation, and that included the Kamajors who
were to be disarmed under the Abidjan Agreement. Scholars, when
they write the history of Sierra Leone in ten or 15 years from
now, will speculate as to whether or not the Abidjan Agreement
did not confer a partial advantage on the RUF who did not disarm
at the rate at which the Kamajors did. It is relevant to say that
very complex and that very multi-polar military confrontation
in Sierra Leone was part of the background to SCR 1132 which provided
for a comprehensive arms embargo because since the Abidjan Agreement,
which had preceded it to provide for the disarming of many of
these elements, it was therefore appropriate that there should
be a general arms embargo to prevent groups that were supposed
to be disarming from re-arming.
603. That is why it was a comprehensive
resolution, because there had been even within the Kabbah Government
units being armed and not necessarily under control?
(Mr Cook) Yes. I think one should also bear in
mind that Sierra Leone has some very real assets. Part of the
military confrontation was as much over the control and access
to the diamond fields as it was about the political programme
for Freetown.
Chairman: Foreign
Secretary, I am obliged for the progress thus far in public. It
is now appropriate that we move to private session and that we
view the summary of the telegrams prepared by the Foreign Office.
Asterisks in the following evidence denote that
all or part of a question, or answer thereto, has not been reported,
at the request of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and with
the agreement of the Committee.
Chairman: Now, can
I give the conditions of the release of these telegrams. That
when made available in the Committee they do not leave the room
and are returned to the Clerk at the end of the private session.
Thereafter they will be available under secure conditions in the
Clerk's office during office hours. Members will be asked to sign
for them when they are handed out in these secure conditions and
their return at the end of the meeting likewise will be formally
acknowledged. Then those who go to the Foreign Office—presumably
some time next week—will have the job of reading over the
period of six hours, I think, Foreign Secretary you mentioned—I
had not quite bargained for that—six hours the 190 telegrams
to ensure that they are indeed a true and accurate summary.
Dr Godman: Is it the
case that the Clerk will have the responsibility to ensure that
notes are not taken.
Chairman
604. Indeed. May I just say to colleagues
that as Members of Parliament we are indeed on trial to ensure
that the confidentiality is maintained. If that is breached not
only are there sanctions available in the House but it is bound
adversely to affect our relationship with the Foreign Office over
the lifetime of this Parliament.
(Mr Cook) Can I just make one observation of procedure,
Chair. There was a request that we should admit three not two
Members of the Committee in order that all the parties may be
represented, I have no problem with that.
Chairman: So, Mr Heath,
six hours of your life is going to be taken.
Mr Heath
605. Thank you very much.
(Mr Cook) We will provide coffee!
Chairman: You saw
the enthusiasm with which Mr Heath greeted that news.
Sir Peter Emery: Can
we thank you for that, Foreign Secretary.
Chairman: Now, Foreign
Secretary, what we have in front of us, for which we have all
signed, is the covering letter from John Grant, who is the Principal
Private Secretary; there is a second document, Terms and Abbreviations
used; there is then marked "In confidence" a document
headed "Telegram summaries". Also, there is a further
bundle of documents, faxes from Conakry retransmitted as FCO telegrams.
Clearly time is short, it would be helpful for the Committee if
you make a preliminary statement or perhaps draw out some of the
salient parts of these bundles. Sir John Stanley, have you a comment?
Sir John Stanley: I
thought the purpose of the private session was to enable Members
to put questions to the Foreign Secretary.
Chairman
606. I think it will be helpful for the
Foreign Secretary to make just a brief synopsis of the telegrams.
(Mr Cook) I am happy to do as the Committee wishes.
You are quite right about the description of the summaries in
front of you. Basically they fall into two different groups. First
of all, those that came from Freetown itself, and you will see
that during May there was very busy traffic, and indeed I think
a third of the total telegrams relate to that period during the
mutiny and the overthrow of the Kabbah regime. They make quite
graphic reading and they underline the point I made earlier about
the courage and commitment of Mr Penfold. The telegrams from Freetown
then pick up again with the displacement of the Junta by ECOMOG
forces in the very early spring of 1998 and there they record
the return of Kabbah and the challenging problems of re-establishing
the legitimate Government. Some of the later ones deal with the
continuing fighting in Sierra Leone. What one should stress perhaps
is that the fighting is not over by any means. The RUF remains
very strong in the north and until the onset of the rainy season
did show signs of expanding rather than contracting its territory
and still controls a number of the diamond field areas which is
the main motivation for much of its leadership. There is another
set of telegrams which come from Conakry during the period when
Mr Penfold was in a hotel when he had no access himself directly
to telegram correspondence. These were faxed to neighbouring embassies,
primarily Nigeria, and were then transmitted from there as telegrams
back to the Foreign Office. They are much more infrequent than
the ones from Freetown when he had direct access to telegram traffic
itself and therefore they are slightly more frustrating if you
are reading them to find a consecutive story. Basically they set
out the negotiations to try and achieve a negotiated withdrawal
of the Junta from Freetown and the return of Kabbah, particularly
focusing on the Conakry agreement of October 1997 which did actually
get agreement of the Junta that they would voluntarily relinquish
power by April of this year. ***
607. With that helpful summary——
(Mr Cook) There is one other point I must make,
Chair, if you will allow me. There is no reference whatsoever
to Sandline in these telegrams until you hit March when there
are telegrams coming back from Freetown in response to anguished
enquiries coming from London as to what is this about. You will
be aware that this was the point at which the Customs and Excise
inquiry had started. It is at that point that the telegrams start
to return from Freetown. Sir John Stanley asked me earlier——
Sir Peter Emery
608. I am sorry, I do not mean to interrupt,
do you mean to say that there was no telegram to or from Freetown
or Conakry about the inquiry which was drawn on the 18th February,
I think, until actually some time in March?
(Mr Cook) I would need to take advice as to what
the first telegram was. I think March was the first time there
was reference to Sandline, yes.
609. I am sorry to interrupt. It is quite
important to get that clear.
(Mr Cook) Whether it was in February or whether
it was in March, the point I make would be that the first reference
in telegrams comes in response to inquiries from London.
610. From the Foreign Office.
(Mr Cook) Yes, exactly. For completeness, I must
add one other point. I would stress this is going to be covered
by Legg and in fairness to the various officials involved who
have different versions of the event I think we have to wait for
Sir Thomas Legg's considered view. Mr Penfold claims that he sent
a letter while he was in England on 30 December to the Foreign
Office which does indeed contain a reference to Sandline. The
Foreign Office officials in the Africa Department maintain that
this letter was never received from the Foreign Office. Now whether
or not it was sent, whether or not it was received is a matter
frankly that I think is better adjudicated by Sir Thomas Legg
who is interviewing both parties. ***
Chairman
611. Did Mr Penfold keep a copy of that
letter he says he sent?
(Mr Cook) Yes, he has. There is a copy.
Mr Rowlands
612. In this context I assume, flicking
through briefly, it is the telegram of 30 March 1998 where this
matter seems to have some area of concern. Page 17. 30 March.
(Mr Cook) I am ready.
613. Just casting the thing, this is the
High Commissioner, Mr Penfold, recording a discussion, he thought
he would provide a memo on this. That is what the letter is, the
letter is a memo?
(Mr Cook) Yes.
614. He says it was clear from discussions
with Kabbah before Christmas that he and Jonah did not believe
the UN sanctions order applied to their Government or to ECOMOG
in terms of supplying equipment.
(Mr Cook) Yes.
615. So in other words Kabbah thought that
any detail that might or might not be able to be done with Sandline
or any other source of weapons to restore himself was not covered
by the UN resolution?
(Mr Cook) I understand that has been President
Kabbah's position throughout. Of course he is not an official
of my Department and I am not responsible for his interpretation
of the law. That has always been his position.
616. Do you believe from all the evidence
you have received that the High Commissioner, plus any other Commissioner,
was in touch with Kabbah and indeed at various times before Kabbah
came to the Commonwealth Conference and elsewhere that it was
made very clear to him that the British Government and British
officials could never be party to or would not be party to any
form of military intervention of the kind that subsequently occurred?
(Mr Cook) I was not present at those conversations
but I do have one of the telegrams which is summarised here.
617. Which one is that?
(Mr Cook) It is the telegram of 1 April which
follows shortly after the one you are referring to.
Chairman
618. That is on page 18.
(Mr Cook) In that telegram Mr Penfold says: "It
is totally wrong to infer that I had given any prior approval
for the delivery of arms to Sierra Leone". I can only rest
on what we were advised by Mr Penfold.
Sir John Stanley
619. ***
(Mr Cook) ***
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