Examination of Witnesses (Questions 620 - 639)
THURSDAY 16 JULY 1998
RT
HON ROBIN
COOK, MP,
MR MICHAEL
ARTHUR, CMG
and MR ROBERT
MACAIRE
620. Foreign Secretary,
you will be aware that the letter of 24 April that you received
from Sandline's solicitors says that: "Mr Penfold himself
called at our client's office premises on 28 January 1998 just
three weeks before the equipment now in issue was delivered and
was given full details of the arrangements, including the number
of personnel involved and the nature of military equipment that
was to be provided. He was also given a copy of Sandline International's
strategic and tactical plan, its concept of operations for its
involvement in the Sierra Leone arena". Would you not expect
that meeting to have been reported fully to your Department, if
it was not?
(Mr Cook) The answer is yes.
I think Mr Penfold would maintain that it was reported
in his minute of 2 February. May I caution Members against taking
as gospel what is set out in the Berwin letter. The Berwin letter
is the act of a lawyer putting the best colourful defence on their
client's case and I have no problem with that, that is their job.
Many parts of that letter are inconsistent with what I know to
be the facts. I was not present at that meeting myself but I am
prepared to suspect that it is no more accurate than their accounts
of meetings with officials who I myself have interviewed.
Chairman
621. Does Mr Penfold accept that the meeting
took place?
(Mr Cook) The meeting took place. There is no
dispute that the meeting took place. In itself I would not find
the fact of the meeting a matter of criticism or of suspicion.
622. Or the site of the hearing, on the
premises of Sandline?
(Mr Cook) *** Do remember that I encourage my
Ambassadors and High Commissioners to have contact with commercial
companies operating in their territories and Sandline is one of
a group of companies, all I think in the same premises, who have
very major commercial interests in Sierra Leone, mainly diamonds.
623. ***
(Mr Cook) *** If I could say that one should not
necessarily extrapolate from Mr Penfold's meeting with Sandline
to a broader policy on the part of my officials towards Sandline.
The behaviour of the officials in Papua New Guinea was exemplary
in that they did make it clear to the government of Papua New
Guinea that the Government's policy was not to support intervention
by Sandline and we have acted in a similar way in another part
of the world where we are concerned by Sandline's activities.
Sir John Stanley
624. Purely as a matter of fact, the solicitor's
letter, as I quoted, does clearly state that Mr Penfold was also
given a copy of Sandline International's strategic and tactical
plan, its concept of operations for its involvement in the Sierra
Leone arena. As far as you are aware, Foreign Secretary, is it
factually correct that the High Commissioner was given that copy?
(Mr Cook) I have no idea whether he was given
such a copy, that would be a question you had better address to
Mr Penfold not to me. Certainly I have not seen it.
Mr Wilshire
625. I believe I heard you say, Foreign
Secretary, that Mr Penfold made a report on 2nd January.
(Mr Cook) 2nd February.
626. Sorry. It still raises the same point
though. It was not in the telegram list.
(Mr Cook) One should bear in mind Mr Penfold spent
quite a bit of the period under discussion actually in England
not in Africa and indeed he then spent six weeks, I think, in
Canada. During the period after his meeting with Kabbah on 19
December, up until I think his report of 2nd February, he was
in England and indeed he did visit Sandline in England.
627. There are other reports as well as
this?
(Mr Cook) I am responding to the question of telegrams,
there are other reports. To be fair, I think I would say, from
Mr Penfold, certainly single figure numbers.
Mr Wilshire: That
is all, Chairman, thank you.
Dr Godman
628. When we questioned Sir John Kerr on
one occasion, I was looking through the notes, I suggested to
him that the Legg Inquiry has nowhere near the legal status of,
say, Lord Savile's Inquiry into Bloody Sunday. It is an internal
inquiry. May I ask if Mr Penfold and others involved in this affair
have been advised to obtain legal representation vis á
vis their meetings with Sir Thomas Legg? Do you have any evidence
of this?
(Mr Cook) Can I just respond, first of all, Dr
Godman, by saying that one should not down play the Legg Inquiry
simply as a sort of internal inquiry. It is not internal. It is
perhaps helpful to the Committee if I briefly describe the procedures.
It is being run by two distinguished gentlemen who have no connection
themselves with the Foreign Office and in the case of Sir Robin
Ibbs no connection with Government Departments, past or present.
We have provided independent premises for them in Queen Anne's
Gate where they have a terraced house which is fully occupied
by the inquiry team. It is well resourced in terms of clerical
and other support. The chief assistant to it is from another department
than the Foreign Office. We have worked hard to make sure that
it is independent of the Foreign Office and is operated under
its own authority. Sir Thomas Legg has set out in considerable
detail the basis on which he will take evidence from those who
come before him. One of those is that they can be accompanied
by a friend or a professional representative if they wish. Mr
Penfold, when he attended, was accompanied by a lawyer.
629. May I say, in no way do I seek to diminish
the status of this inquiry. As you know, all along I have argued
that he should come here to be cross-examined by us on the Legg
findings and I think we have got an agreement on that. So I am
not in any way trying to diminish Sir Thomas Legg.
(Mr Cook) Thank you.
630. What I am saying is that there are
different types of inquiries and what you have said has been very
helpful, that it is an independent inquiry and that Mr Penfold
was accompanied by his solicitor. Can I shift, because I do not
want to take up too much time from the other side, what role did
the Americans play in this affair? Was it largely confined to
ensuring that their nationals were evacuated safely from Sierra
Leone? There is mention of 150 US nationals.
(Mr Cook) Yes.
631. Was the American Government's role
confined to protecting the safety of their citizens?
(Mr Cook) Not confined. We have maintained close
dialogue with the United States and Mr John Flynn, our special
representative, went in the first instance to Washington and had
useful discussions with opposite numbers in the State Department
there. The United States has been supportive and helpful in the
Security Council although frankly I think one could say that the
United States' involvement was not major. One issue that particularly
concerns us is that at repeated points in the history of Sierra
Leone funds have been opened for the cost of reconstruction and
demilitarisation. So far the only people who have donated to such
funds have been Britain and Japan. The United States, although
it has promised a donation, has yet to make payment and that could
be extremely helpful. ***
Dr Godman
632. ***
(Mr Cook) ***
Mr Ross
633. Foreign Secretary, the situation we
had in Sierra Leone is not too dissimilar from some of the situations
we have had in Iraq where there were companies or individuals,
organisations, who were more concerned with the raw materials
inside the country than they were with the human rights of the
individuals concerned. Sandline is not a stand alone company,
it is part of a larger group of individuals who themselves have
interests in some of the mineral wealth of the country. Would
it be reasonable for us to believe that Sandline could have two
or three agendas rather than just the restoration of human rights?
(Mr Cook) I am very, very happy to respond to
that, particularly in private. Before I do that, Chairman, can
I just say that Mr Macaire has advised me that Mr Penfold did
actually give the Sandline plan of operations to the Department.
Chairman
634. Do we know when he did that?
(Mr Cook) As we understand it, I think the meeting
was on 28 January with Sandline and I think he came into the Department
on 30 January and presumably that was when he deposited this plan.
635. And on that basis there was available
to the Foreign Office, at whatever level he put that in, the broad
strategy of Sandline including the military assistance?
(Mr Cook) I cannot confirm the latter point because
I have not seen this plan myself. I cannot say to what extent
it provided detail.
Chairman: Potentially
that could be very basic, very important evidence.
Sir John Stanley
636. The letter is quite clear: "....Sandline
International's strategic and tactical plan, its concept of operations
for its involvement in the Sierra Leone arena".
(Mr Cook) Concept of operations is not necessarily
the same as the details of the arms shipments.
Chairman
637. The answer to Mr Ross's question.
(Mr Cook) Sandline is a subsidiary—I think
that is the right term—of Executive Outcomes which is primarily
South African based. Indeed, almost without exception the personnel
on the ground in Sierra Leone deployed by Sandline were South
African. There are a large number of people with military experience
and training in South Africa currently looking for an outlet for
that experience and that training and they do provide the backbone
of much of the, if I can use the term, mercenary activities around
Africa and elsewhere. Executive Outcomes is a sister company to
a number of other companies, including Branch Energy. Branch Energy
has significant interests in diamond mines in Sierra Leone. In
one of the telegrams Mr Penfold himself does say that one of the
difficulties with this whole saga is the confusion between these
overlapping companies and, quite perceptively, he says that it
is a confusion fostered by the companies themselves by their interlinking
operations.
Sir Peter Emery
638. Foreign Secretary, the one thing I
find so difficult to understand is that when there has been an
FCO inquiry to Customs and Excise about a breach of British law,
notions on the export of arms, and that has only happened three
times in the last two years, including this one reference on the
export of arms against British law or against United Nation regulations,
I find it unbelievable that was not referred by the Office to
ministers soon after that reference. It runs so contrary to the
sort of foreign policy that you were trying to set up. I know
in retrospect, it is not trying to do other than examine the operation
I am afraid of the Foreign Office, not your fault, do you not
find that a rather strange situation?
(Mr Cook) First of all, I am motivated to dispute
your figure, I do not dispute the central thrust of your question.
My understanding is that during the preceding two years of this
administration there were 17 occasions when breaches of UN embargoes
were referred to the REU. I doubt, frankly, whether any of those
17 actually went up to Ministers
639. We were told it was three.
(Mr Cook) I can check the figure.
(Mr Macaire) I think it is 17 embargoes, three
of the UN embargoes.
(Mr Cook) 17 of embargoes, three of UN.
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