Impersonation
and vote tracing
99. Anecdotal evidence also exists that there is
a certain measure of fraud in the form of impersonation[220]
of registered voters at polling stations. In Great Britain, prospective
voters are not required to provide proof of identity to establish
that they are in reality the person listed on the register they
are claiming to be. The presiding officer may, if doubtful about
the person's identity or if requested to do so by a candidate's
agents, only put two specific questions, set out in the Election
Rules, asking the person to confirm that s/he is the person registered
and to confirm that s/he has not already voted,[221]
though we understand that no record is kept as to how frequently
such questions are in fact asked.[222]
100. The position is different in Northern Ireland,
where traditionally there has been greater evidence of impersonation
at elections. Voters there have to provide one of a number of
specified documents in order to establish their identity before
being given a ballot paper. This does not solve all the problems
which can arise and there are calls both for additional measures
to be taken and for the list of permissible documents to be revised.[223]
101. Clearly there are a number of measures which
could be taken, including those in operation in Northern Ireland,
if impersonation were thought to be a serious problem. Most witnesses
however did not think this was the case. Neither Dr Butler nor
Professor Blackburn had evidence that impersonation was a major
issue in elections in Great Britain (though Professor Blackburn
appeared less opposed to requiring voters to provide identification
than Dr Butler).[224]
SOLACE noted that proven instances of impersonation were rare,
and that "recent incidents in England have almost entirely
related to people who moved into an area after the effective date
for electoral registration ... and tried to vote in the name of
the previous occupant of their property".[225]
They took the view that—although some potential absurdities
might be avoided if presiding officers had greater powers[226]—"...
one cannot make the process of cross-examination too elaborate,
granted that the majority of people come with their poll cards
and there is no practical difficulty in identifying who they are
and no expectation of fraud in the overwhelming majority of cases.
We must ensure that we do not make the procedures so secure that
it is impossible to run the election on the day".[227]
102. We broadly agree that there is at present
no great problem with impersonation in British elections outside
Northern Ireland, and we do not see a need to introduce any additional
requirements to prove identity before being given a ballot paper.
We note a suggestion made by the Electoral Reform Society and
Liberty that returning officers, since they are familiar with
local circumstances and the actual conduct of elections, might
have a power to initiate an election petition; at present only
aggrieved candidates or electors may do so, and it may be unrealistic
to expect such people to risk the costs involved solely out of
a sense of public duty.[228]
103. One of the existing measures in place to discourage
and to address impersonation is the vote tracing mechanism. Because
the mechanism to some extent breaches the principle of ballot
secrecy, and because the problem it seeks to address is—as
we have seen—generally thought to be very minor, it has
been argued by some that it should be discontinued.
104. The system is designed to enable a fraudulently
cast ballot paper to be identified and discounted and, if appropriate,
to be replaced by a valid vote. To achieve this, the electoral
registration number of the voter is noted on the counterfoil of
the ballot paper. Since the ballot paper number is recorded both
on the paper itself and the counterfoil, it becomes possible to
trace the ballot paper submitted by a particular voter by locating
the counterfoil on which the voter's registration number has been
written, from which the number of the ballot paper issued to that
person can be found and thus the ballot paper itself identified.
The counterfoils and ballot papers are secured and stored after
the close of the ballot and may by law only be opened, so as to
enable the vote tracing to be operated, pursuant to an order from
an electoral court pursuant to a complaint. A court may order
this if it is satisfied that a vote has been fraudulently cast
(whether because of a case of impersonation or, potentially, because
of bribery), and if it thinks appropriate because the result of
the election could be affected. The vote, once identified, can
then be subtracted from the declared total. In certain circumstances
it is also possible for the discounted vote to be replaced by
a valid vote. If a registered voter has found, on attempting to
cast a vote, that a vote has already been cast in their name,
the presiding officer may give to him or her a fresh ballot paper
of a different colour, which is stored separately (a 'tendered'
vote). It is not counted in the main count, but if an election
court so orders, it may be subsequently counted in place of a
disallowed vote.
105. A recent report on this issue by the Electoral
Reform Society and Liberty indicated no case of the full vote
tracing procedure being used since 1911 at a national election,
though it has occasionally come into play at local elections because
the majorities at such elections are very much smaller.[229]
This lack of use is not surprising; vote tracing is likely to
arise only in a rare combination of circumstances, namely where
the result of an election is extremely close, a case of impersonation
(or bribery) can be proved, and one of the parties to the election
is prepared to risk the expense of an election court to challenge
the result.
106. The issue is consistently raised—often
following a General Election—as to whether this system is
an unreasonable breach of the fundamental principle that the ballot
should be secret. It has been alleged, although without hard evidence,
that the process has been abused by the security services in order
to identify potential subversives.[230]
In written evidence to the Committee, the Minister has stated
"In practice, there are stringent statutory controls on the
sealing and storage of ballot papers and counterfoils after the
election and I am not aware of any proven cases of unauthorised
search of the stored documents. I know of course of the claims
that have been made of systematic abuse on the part of the security
services, but no evidence has been produced to support these claims,
which have been made in various books produced by former security
officers and where it could be thought there was a commercial
incentive to embroider the truth, or even to lie outright".[231]
107. Of course this statement by the Minister does
not rule out the possibility that the system has been abused.
It might also be argued that, given how rarely the vote tracing
mechanism appears to have been used, it is anyway unnecessary
and could profitably be ended. Nevertheless, it is likely that
it forms at least a small deterrent to would-be impersonators.[232]
The joint study of the issue by the Electoral Reform Society and
by Liberty failed to produce an agreed view on the issue. Liberty
argued that the system played little part in the prevention of
impersonation, which should be addressed by other means, and that
concerns about possible abuse of the system by state agencies
outweighed the other considerations; they therefore concluded
that the system should be abandoned. We concur with Liberty's
view.[233]
108. The possibility has been suggested that 'tendered'
votes should be counted, since otherwise genuine voters—assuming
the second person to present themselves as the person named on
the register is the more likely to be the real one—become
effectively disenfranchised.[234]
We see some merit in this idea but there is clearly the danger
that it could lead to greater abuse: persons could be tempted
to encourage friends intending to vote the same way to impersonate
them in the knowledge that they could still vote themselves, thereby
casting two effective votes for their chosen candidate. Indeed
such a system could allow a person who had already validly voted
to present him or herself again later in the day and to obtain
a second vote by claiming that the first voter had been an impostor.
Ballot papers
109. A further security mechanism currently in place,
dating from the Ballot Act 1872, is designed to prevent a different
form of fraud, namely counterfeit ballot papers.[235]
To prevent a ballot box being filled with votes marked on apparently
genuine—but in fact fraudulent—ballot papers, each
ballot paper is perforated with an 'official mark' as it is handed
to an elector by the polling clerk. The official mark is kept
secret until polling day. Any ballot paper identified at the count
as not having the official mark will be rejected. In practice,
between two and three thousand ballot papers have not been counted
for this reason at recent General Elections.[236]
110. In modern circumstances it is generally thought
that a failure by a ballot paper to carry the official mark will
reflect human error by the polling staff rather than any deliberate
attempt at fraud.[237]
The principal effect of not counting unmarked ballot papers thus
becomes the effective disenfranchisement of genuine voters. Furthermore,
the benefits may be illusory, since with modern printing technology
it would probably be relatively straightforward for would-be fraudsters—having
learned the nature of the official mark early on polling day—to
reproduce the mark on quickly printed ballot papers for use later
in the day. The non-counting of a number of ballot papers could
affect the result of a contest and thereby cause an expensive
re-run of the election.[238]
Suggestions have therefore been made that the official marking
of ballot papers under this system should be ended.[239]
111. The main objection to ending the marking system
is that it could reduce the safeguards against fraud. While there
may be very little or no evidence of this kind of fraud at present,
this may in part be precisely because the system is effective
and a deterrent. Alternative suggestions made to us have been
that the official ballot papers should be watermarked or laser
coded in some way to show their genuine status, though we were
also told that one of the advantages of the present system is
that it is very easy, and therefore a quick process, to spot an
unmarked paper, which might not be the case with some of the alternative
methods.[240] The Conservative
and Liberal Democrats in their written submissions were broadly
sympathetic to modernisation in this area, provided the system
remained reliable.[241]
We consider that there should continue to be some form of mark
or identifier on ballot papers to enable a false paper to be readily
identified. However, we regard the physical application
of a mark to each such paper at the polling station as unsatisfactory,
given how easily it can be accidentally omitted, leading to the
effective deprivation of a valid vote. We therefore recommend
that the Home Office and the electoral administrators identify
and introduce a more up to date and simpler method than the present
official mark.
215 King-Hall Paper No. 5, p. 6. Back
216 Appendix
8, section 5. Back
217 Official
Report 21 May 1997 col. 671. Back
218 Q
303; Mr Robert McCartney MP referred to cases in Northern Ireland
of people who had died or moved being left on the register and
applications being made for absent votes in their name, and to
cases involving regular non-voters having applications for a postal
vote sent in without their knowledge, with the ballot paper being
sent to a different address (see List of unprinted memoranda). Back
219 Official
Report 21 May 1997, cols
675-6. Back
220 The
offence of voting in the name of another person is technically,
for historical reasons, known as 'personation' rather than the
rather clearer description 'impersonation' used in this Report. Back
221 Representation
of the People Act 1983, Schedule 1 paragraph 35(i)(a). Back
222 Information
supplied by the AEA. Back
223 See
submission by Mr Robert McCartney MP (United Kingdom Unionist
Party) to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's review
of electoral fraud) (see List of unprinted memoranda). Back
224 QQ
134-136 and 145. Back
225 Appendix
6. Back
226 An
instance given was where the person asking for a vote was clearly
under age; see Q 341. Back
227 Q
341. Back
228 Ballot
Secrecy (ERS/Liberty, 1997)
para 6.4. Back
229 Ballot
Secrecy (ERS/Liberty, 1997)
paras 3.2.9-3.2.12. Back
230 See
QQ 126-128 and Appendix 2, section 8; and (appendices 4 and 5)
to the Electoral Reform Society/Liberty report Ballot Secrecy
(1997). Back
231 See
footnote to Q 590. Back
232 Though
it should be noted that the mechanism can only lead to a vote
cast by an impersonator being disallowed-it does not help to identify
the impersonator. Back
233 Ballot
Secrecy (Electoral Reform
Society/Liberty, 1997) section 8. Back
234 Appendix
1 para 8.43; see also Ballot Secrecy (ERS/Liberty, 1997)
para 7.17. Back
235 Home
Office memorandum (Appendix 1 para 8.32f.). Back
236 Ibid.,
Table 9. Back
237 See
SOLACE, Appendix 6; Home Office, Appendix 1 para 8.41. Back
238 This
happened at the Winchester result in the 1997 General Election. Back
239 AEA
manifesto and Q 353. Back
240 Appendix
1 para 8.42. Back
241 Appendix
8 (Conservative Party); Appendix 9 (Liberal Democrats). Back
