Select Committee on Home Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 340 - 353)

TUESDAY 16 JUNE 1998

MR JOHN TURNER, MR COLIN MARSHALL AND MR JOHN BAMBROOK MR DAVID MONKS AND MR ROGER MORRIS

Mr Linton

  340. If it became the law that people could use only the names in which they registered and could use party names only if those names were registered, would that not help returning officers? Would it not avoid the kinds of situations that you have experienced in the past?
  (Mr Monks) In the obvious cases, yes. I would cross out the Literal Democrats, the Conversatives and the Unofficial and Independent Conservative and Labour candidates. A colleague told me the other day that there had been a split in a well-known national political party and he was unsure which was the official part. He intended to apply the somewhat unscientific test that the first one to get to him would be the official party. They both had claims on the official party name. What is one to do in those situations? It is immensely unscientific. I can see us walking down the Strand and straight into the High Court.
  (Mr Turner) I had a telephone call from a journalist who said, "If under this new law I put in the nomination paper `Independent Unofficial Conservative candidate' what would you do?" I said, "I won't tell you." He said that the candidate had made absolutely clear to the electorate that he was independent and had nothing to do with any party. He was unofficial and no one had adopted him. He just happened to believe in Conservative principles and so used the word "Conservative". Any number of people will want to argue that before the courts. One then builds that very unsatisfactory delay into the election process which existed at the time of the last general election. There were about 10 or 12 cases in which one could not get on with the job of running the election because the matter was before the court. I think that that is where we will end up as the law is currently framed.
  (Mr Morris) There are matters of principle here which perhaps are not for us. When one looks at this draft legislation one wonders what Parliament wishes to achieve by registering parties in the local election context. It is clear what it wants to achieve in the European context and perhaps in the context of the referendums in Scotland and Wales. In that respect perhaps there is a different reason for promoting this Bill. But it is difficult to see what gain will flow from some of these measures. There are considerable doubts about the interpretation of some of the provisions. If it was obvious that a greater good would be achieved that price would be worth paying. It is not clear what the benefit is in the local context. We do not have proportional representation in local government although we are about to have it in the European elections. That is the kind of issue to which a good deal of further thought has to be given.

Ms Hughes

  341. The evidence to date is that in general in England, Wales and Scotland there is little anxiety about widespread fraud, although we understand that presiding officers have very little power to check the identity of those who come to vote. Do you believe that there is a need to improve the powers of presiding officers to check the identity of a person who claims to be on the register?
  (Mr Morris) For the most part, this is not a practical problem. Most of us can think back to one or two cases but we have not experienced widespread difficulty. Therefore, it must be kept in proportion. There is a statutory requirement—in theory it must be put to every elector—to ask standard questions and if you get the right replies the elector can vote. Nevertheless, there are one or two celebrated cases where it is clear to the presiding officer that the person before him is not whoever he or she claims to be. One knows of cases where obviously children have gone on the register by mistake. They can answer the questions correctly but self-evidently they are only 10 or whatever. There are one or two absurdities that can be corrected by a greater power of discretion. But one must be careful about it. When one is dealing with an 80 per cent turnout on a very busy general election day and dozens of people wish to vote between six and seven in the evening one cannot make the process of cross-examination too elaborate, granted that the great majority of people come with their poll cards and there is no practical difficulty in identifying who they are and no expectation of fraud in the overwhelming majority of cases. We must ensure that we do not make the procedures so secure that it is impossible to run the election on the day. One is not talking about bank cards and getting money out of slot machines but a process that must be quick and effective.

  342. Another point that has been put to us is that the provision for the counterfoil to the ballot paper being marked with the voter's electoral number to allow votes to be traced compromises the principle of ballot secrecy. How often has that mechanism been adopted?
  (Mr Marshall) Winchester was the last case. That is the only way that it will ever come out.

  343. Obviously, because it was used beneficially in that instance you see it as an argument for retaining the ability to trace where necessary, albeit in principle it compromises ballot secrecy?
  (Mr Monks) There is something in the guidance given to all presiding officers which states that the principle of secrecy is not compromised because that check can be made only by order of the court. It is not being done by people in a back room. Once one gets to that stage one is well down the line to trouble.
  (Mr Morris) The Winchester case was almost unique. The returning officer said that there had not been a similar case of its kind for about three-quarters of a century. One must keep a sense of proportion. I believe that there is a high degree of public confidence in the integrity and secrecy of the voting system. While the point about theoretical capability of matching people to names is literally true, I do not think that most of the public have any doubt about the secrecy of the ballot, nor would it be helpful to encourage them to have any.

  344. Let us turn to the significant issue of the continued practice of franking and the fact that a result could be affected by the number of votes discounted, largely because of human error. There is a view, which I share, that with modern printing techniques it should be possible to devise a ballot paper which cannot easily be reproduced so that forgery takes place. Do you agree that perhaps franking should be abandoned and something else should be introduced?
  (Mr Monks) Yes. It is a very archaic idea. One can easily have a ballot paper with a watermark or agreements under which certain printers are approved and a certain number of ballot papers are delivered under seal. If the seal is broken they are not accepted. Having said that, we are at the end of the 20th century and we still use bits of paper. Why can we not go to a touchpad on which to register the vote? The ballot box at the other end is represented by a little chip. Fifty or sixty of them are then taken to the town hall and 20 minutes later the result is declared.

  345. Perhaps there is a need to explore the potential for error in those systems and the ability to check it if there is a claim about the result?
  (Mr Monks) I think that that is a matter on which the Committee should take evidence from specialists. The companies who manufacture this equipment which is in use on the Continent would convince you that the margin for error for fraud was infinitesimal. It is not my role to speak up for them, but the equipment that I have seen is very good.
  (Mr Morris) I am not an expert in this matter, but in Northampton is the headquarters of Barclaycard. I visited its new building recently. That has an area where they demonstrate the state-of-the-art procedures that they are now using in the banking industry where standards have to be of the highest. It seems to me that technology has already reached a point where these things are well within the capability of certain organisations. Perhaps public confidence and motivation to use this equipment lag behind. I believe that in a few years' time this will be beyond dispute. Tomorrow's voters will expect to access the democratic system through the Internet and touchpad, just as they expect to do everything else in life.

Mr Linton

  346. I want to ask some questions relating to the count. As I understand it, the situation in Winchester related to unfranked papers. There was no recourse to the counterfoils?
  (Mr Turner) Yes, there was. There were two prosecutions for personation. It was a side issue to do with the petition, but it became clear from investigation that certain people had voted in other people's names. There was certainly one prosecution, if not two, in which a considerable fine was imposed for personation arising from the Winchester by-election. It was a side issue but one that came to light as a result of the investigation.

  347. But a check was not made of the counterfoils of all the unfranked ballot papers.
  (Mr Turner) That occurred only where there were allegations that personation had taken place.

  348. Should there be legislation to regularise the position of tellers at the count?
  (Mr Marshall) Do you mean counting agents at the count? Tellers are outside.
  (Mr Bambrook) There is already legislative provision for counting agents at the count which I would have thought was quite adequate. Tellers are another matter; they stand outside polling stations.
  (Mr Monks) My experience is that generally this is not a problem. Returning officers must make sure that they are in charge of the count and that what they lay down is done. My experience is that scrutineers and those who attend the count, whether they be candidates or agents, are immensely co-operative.

  349. Reference was made to this in the Hansard Society report. Given the time, I shall not pursue it. You support electronic counting. Do you mean the counting of ballot papers by a scanning process or electronic voting?
  (Mr Morris) We mean paperless voting, not trying to count pieces of paper by another means. I suppose that in theory that could be done, but the issue is electronic voting per se rather than handling the current votes differently.
  (Mr Bambrook) It is possible to do both. If you wish to retain a paper ballot but nevertheless speed up the counting process you have to consider some form of scanning or electronic counting. My authority has pioneered a method of electronic vote counting for multiple choice elections, for example in parish council, town council-type elections.

Mr Winnick

  351. It takes such a long time. Sunderland is always quoted as an example. When I mentioned that to the returning officer at the last count he said that in Sunderland there was no difficulty about large majorities but in other places on occasions the margin between the two main parties was very slight. Nevertheless, in this day and age it is rather odd that the count should go on for five or six hours.
  (Mr Marshall) The last parliamentary election was combined in many cases with county elections. That is the reason for the time taken. Normally, in my area, which is a mixture of urban and rural, I expect to finish the count at about 12 o'clock, assuming that polling finishes at 10 o'clock. That election was an exception in that one had to separate the ballot papers before one could get on with the parliamentary election. Normally, people would finish in two or three hours.
  (Mr Monks) I have served in more rural districts and my experience there is that it takes a while for the boxes to come in. In a general election there is usually a good turnout. When I was chief at North Warwickshire the count went on until a quarter totwo in the morning, and in Huntingdonshire it was well after three. As a general principle, I prefer to stay another couple of hours and get an accurate result with which everyone is happy rather than charge at it and end up in court.
  (Mr Morris) The current rules require us to use a stamping instrument, pieces of paper and counting agents. Those counting agents at least have the right to stand there and have the opportunity to oversee the counting operation that goes on on the other side of the table. All Members will be familiar with that kind of process and atmosphere. If one is to allow the counting agents to operate properly it will take a minimum amount of time. Hopefully, it will not take several hours other than in circumstances where there is a very narrow result. In the majority of cases, as one sees from national television, the result is declared probably within two or three hours of the poll closing.

Mr Linton

  351. Should it be possible to break down the results by ward for European and parliamentary elections? It is suggested that that is possible under the current legislation simply by treating one count as a separate count. Would you welcome legislation to clarify that?
  (Mr Bambrook) There is no reason at all why it should not be done. It is already done in most European Union countries. Why should we not do the same? The only difficulty arises where there are very, very small wards. It may be possible then to make a determination as to how individual voters had voted. For instance, one may wish to employ a device such as a satellite count where one brings together a number of wards but one does not need to bring every ballot box to one central location.

  352. Presumably, that is something that can be done in the European elections next year?
  (Mr Bambrook) It would provide the opportunity to try out those arrangements.

Chairman

  353. Are there any examples of good practice overseas to which you would like to draw our attention?
  (Mr Marshall) Over the years we have observed many overseas elections. There are areas where we can suggest various good practices. Something that we would like to get rid of is the official mark. However, we will still have an official mark at the European parliamentary elections in 1999. In Lesotho a couple of weeks ago where I was an observer, apart from the queues of people waiting to vote, the ballot paper had a box at the top on which the official mark was to be placed. It may well be that if we are to have a revised ballot paper for the European election it should have a box for the official mark. It would not necessarily avoid the possibility of papers being left unstamped, but it would be another reminder to presiding officers as to what they should do.
  (Mr Morris) The only suggestion I make is that sealing wax should finally be abolished by law!

  Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you very much.





 
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