Select Committee on International Development First Report




CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

The Volcano

6.  Any discussion of the situation in Montserrat must begin with the scientific advice on the current state of the volcano and its future activity, and effects on the health and safety of the remaining population. We took evidence from Professor Stephen Sparks, Professor of Geology at Bristol University and one of the five Chief Scientists of the Montserrat Volcano Observatory. He made clear that eruptions of this kind could go on for many years. Any long-term planning for Montserrat would have to take this into account.[3] The volcano in the Soufrière Hills was unusual because volcanos are usually "very violent and active in the beginning ... gradually slowing down and going to sleep. This volcano has done the exact opposite. It started out very slowly and has gradually built up and I think everyone involved in Montserrat, including the scientists, have always been running to keep up with the volcano...and how it has escalated and developed".[4] Having mentioned estimates of a further two to four years of activity he went on to say that one volcano in Chile started erupting in 1984 but had its biggest explosion in 1993, nine years later.[5]

7.  There has been speculation as to whether there will be a cataclysmic eruption on Montserrat, similar to volcanos such as Krakatoa and Mont Pelée. Professor Sparks made clear that the probability was negligible.[6] He added, however, that there were possible explosive events falling short of such a cataclysm which could nevertheless have catastrophic effects on such a small island. The more pertinent question therefore was "is the north safe, and the answer to that is that the north is definitely the safest part of the island by a long way, but one cannot rule out events in the future which could be large enough to affect the north seriously".[7]

8.  The dangers posed by the volcano were explained by Professor Sparks in his memorandum, "if the volcanic magma (molten rock) rises slowly enough then it loses its dissolved volcanic gas and so erupts as lava. If the magma rises faster it has less time to lose the dissolved gas and can become highly explosive. This is what happened in August [1997] when there was a series of strong explosions. Another major factor in the eruption is that the pile of lava that is growing into a new mountain is very unstable. Large pieces of the dome involving millions of tons of rock at 850 degrees C avalanche down the volcano at speeds of 100 kph. The avalanches (known as pyroclastic flows) destroy everything in their way and were responsible for the deaths on June 25th 1997".[8] The pyroclastic flows include solids, gas and ash. The heavier material is at ground level but above there are pyroclastic surges of ash and gas. It is these surges which have done the most damage.

9.   Should there be further pyroclastic flows, they will go down the Belham River Valley, destroying the central area of Montserrat and leaving only a small proportion of the island's infrastructure intact.[9] Evidence suggested that the north of the island where Montserratians remain is relatively safe from the threat of pyroclastic flows.[10] There remains, however, the danger of explosive events. Professor Sparks, having spoken of the negligible risk of a Krakatoa-like event, went on to explain, "The best estimate of an event which could, for example, put fairly large rock fragments in the north is something between 1:30 and 1:300, and that is a much higher risk ... it is a huge eruption from the point of view of a modest-sized island".[11] The probability of such an event was not high "but it is sufficiently high to be concerned about it and keep a very close watch on the volcano".[12] Professor Sparks was confident that scientists could spot the approach of such an explosion. Montserratians might, however, have only a few hours in which to evacuate since escalation can be very quick.[13]

10.  In addition to the risk of injury from explosions, there are also more long-term dangers, in particular the risk of silicosis from sustained exposure to the ash. There have been three reports published in 1997 which discuss the dangers from the ash falls, those of Peter Baxter from Addenbrooke's Hospital in Cambridge (27 August 1997), from Alison Searl and Andrew Nicholl of the Institute of Occupational Medicine (September 1997) and from Sir Kenneth Calman, the Chief Medical Officer (27 September 1997). The Calman Report concluded that there was a serious risk of silicosis from exposure to ash south of the Nantes River (this area is now evacuated). In the northern zone, the Report stated that, "ash falls have been light and there is currently no risk of silicosis from past exposures in this area".[14] Persons with respiratory problems and children were, however, special risk groups.

11.  The Calman Report recommended regular monitoring of dust and that a system of air quality advice be established. Winds normally blow out to sea, the result being that whilst areas such as Salem are vulnerable to dusting the north of the island is much less so.[15] The wind can, however, blow to the north. A few days before the Committee's visit to Montserrat and Antigua both the north of Montserrat and Antigua had experienced heavy ash falls. The Antiguan Government expressed serious concern at the fact that ash falls were resulting in disruptions to the airport and threats to health. The pH level of water in Montserrat was also now deteriorating as a result of the ash.[16] The Calman Report written in September this year, concludes that there is "currently" no risk of silicosis from past exposures to ash in the north. We are concerned, however, that continuing and heavier ash falls in the north will seriously increase that risk. We were told that the silica in the ash "is about twice as toxic as the type of silica you get in coalmines or quarries".[17] HMG must give urgent consideration to their liability in the event of Montserratians developing silicosis from exposure to the ash. We believe that the risk of silicosis from ash falls casts doubt on the safety of the north of Montserrat.

12.  Professor Sparks was asked when he thought the south of the island would be habitable again. He referred to a volcano in Papua New Guinea, in a similar climate, which erupted in 1951, destroying the surrounding rain forest. It took 15 to 20 years for the rainforest substantially to recover. He concluded "It will probably be many years, if not a couple of decades before ... there is complete recovery...it would seem to me that it would be a long time before one would redevelop Plymouth".[18] We have heard other evidence suggesting a return in ten years.

13.  Professor Sparks also warned against too early an assumption that the volcano had ceased to be active, "we have heard other evidence suggesting the possibility of a return in ten years. It may not even be a sensible idea because even if the volcano stops, it can start again. A number of communities have been caught out by volcanos which have apparently stopped and then start a few months or years later. So one would need to be very cautious about development in the south".[19]

14.  Current scientific assessment of the volcano's activity can be summarised as follows:

    i.  The risk of a Krakatoa-like catastrophe is virtually negligible (1:10,000).[20]

    ii.  There is further risk of pyroclastic flows, the most vulnerable area being the Belham River valley (in the evacuated central region).

    iii.  There are possible explosive events falling short of a Krakatoa-like cataclysm which could nevertheless have catastrophic effects on such a small island. The probability of explosive events affecting the north and causing serious injury is between 1:30 and 1:300. This probability is significant enough to be taken into account in any planning of the future of the north of the island.

    iv.  Ash falls in the centre and south of the island will continue posing a serious threat to health. Heavier and more sustained ash falls in the north and other Caribbean islands are possible and would result in an increased risk of silicosis.

    v.  Volcanic activity will very probably continue for at least a few more years.

    vi.  It will be years, perhaps decades, before the south of Montserrat is safe enough to be redeveloped and re-inhabited.

    vii.  Volcanology is an inexact science and the volcano in the Soufrière Hills is not typical of volcanos previously studied, for instance in the escalation in the severity of its activity over time. Consideration of scientific advice must always bear this in mind.

Health

15.  In addition to an account of current views on the activity of the volcano, we must also describe the state of healthcare on the island. We draw both on the Calman Report and on our own observation of the hospital and shelters during our visit to Montserrat. In any discussion of the health needs of a community a precondition for effective planning is a demographic breakdown of inhabitants. Calman states,

"Details concerning the demography of the population or its health needs are unknown. However there are approximately:

250 frail elderly people requiring some level of institutional care of whom 150 are in shelters and 100 in the community;

120 people with mental illness currently requiring regular medication. Of these some 20 people have chronic illnesses not appropriately managed, which leaves them vulnerable to increased risk from the volcano;

Hypertension and diabetes mellitus and their complications are relatively common".[21]

16.  The Committee observed a high proportion of the elderly, disabled, mentally ill and other vulnerable groups in the shelters visited. We understand that many are determined to stay in Montserrat, the upheaval of relocation being too great for them to contemplate. There is no doubt that others are simply left behind.

17.  An urgent priority is a demographic breakdown and survey of the health needs of Montserratians remaining on the island. Sir Kenneth Calman recommended to this effect in his Report.[22] The Secretary of State said she was frustrated at the lack of detailed information on the current population of Montserrat. She related this to the unwillingness of the Government of Montserrat to respond to her desire to conduct a social survey of the character and wishes of the remaining population. She suggested that "one of the problems has been the fear of the Government of Montserrat that people would choose to leave and, therefore, my desire to consult them all and give them choices and tell them what the practicalities were was seen as threatening large numbers into leaving, so the desire was that they should not leave". [23]

18.  Mr Brandt stated that the Government of Montserrat did not have the expertise to conduct a social survey. Two consultants from the British Government were involved in conducting such a survey, assisted by the chief statistician of the Government of Montserrat, but the survey was interrupted by evacuation plans in August 1997.[24]

19.  Such contradictions in evidence occurred on a number of occasions during the course of this inquiry. The number of such disagreements is a cause for concern, suggesting a less than happy relationship between the United Kingdom Government and the Government of Montserrat. It is not the purpose of this Report to adjudicate on every such dispute and distribute blame. We are more concerned with recommendations for the future.

20.  We are, however, amazed that a comprehensive survey of Montserrat's population has yet to be undertaken. In the weekend before the Chief Minister gave evidence to the Committee the Government of Montserrat was able to organise a count of residents in the north with the help of teachers, the total being 4,008. It is a clear responsibility of the Government of Montserrat to know the population which it is there to serve. Even without the assistance of consultants from the United Kingdom we are surprised, given the seriousness of the situation, that no provisional analysis was attempted. We believe that the recommendation in the Calman Report of a comprehensive needs assessment should take place without delay and that the number of those on Montserrat be updated each day on the basis of arrival and departure information. If the Government of Montserrat is unable to complete such a survey in the near future, we recommend that HMG undertake it.

21.   Montserrat's hospital was originally sited in Plymouth (Glendon Hospital). Indeed after Hurricane Hugo a new extension was built with United Kingdom aid. It was about to be commissioned when volcanic activity started on 18 July 1995.[25] There appeared some uncertainty among our witnesses as to where the new hospital's equipment had gone. Equipment at the temporary hospital in the north was almost non-existent and, to quote Sir Kenneth Calman, "the hospital premises are grossly substandard; there is no adequate sanitation system to dispose of waste from the hospital; the wards and operating theatre are separated by a mile".[26] We note here that HMG retains a responsibility for the welfare of Montserratians as Dependent Territory citizens. We are appalled that vulnerable persons should be found in such poor and degrading conditions over two years after volcanic activity began. We recommend that HMG find out what happened to the equipment from the new hospital and use as much of it as possible in the temporary hospital on the north of Montserrat. We also recommend that there be an urgent provision by HMG of resources which can be immediately used to upgrade the standard of the temporary hospital's care and environment.


3   Q.488. Back

4   Q.521. Back

5   Q.522. Back

6   Q.500. Back

7   Q.498. Back

8   Evidence p.103. Back

9   Q.502. Back

10   Q.178. Back

11   Q.500. Back

12   Q.523. Back

13   QQ.503-4. Back

14  Calman Report para. 6.3.2. Back

15   Q.508. Back

16   Q.506. Back

17   Q. 508. Back

18   Q.513. Back

19   Q.513. Back

20   Q. 500. Back

21   Calman Report para. 5. Back

22   Calman Report para. 8.4.2.. Back

23   Q.73. Back

24   Q.292. Back

25   Evidence p.2. Back

26   Calman Report paras. 6.2.2 7-9. Back


 
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Prepared 27 November 1997