SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Current scientific
assessment of the volcano's activity can be summarised as follows:
i. The risk of a Krakatoa-like catastrophe
is virtually negligible (1:10,000).
ii. There is further risk of pyroclastic flows,
the most vulnerable area being the Belham River valley (in the
evacuated central region).
iii. There are possible explosive events falling
short of a Krakatoa-like cataclysm which could nevertheless have
catastrophic effects on such a small island. The probability
of explosive events affecting the north and causing serious injury
is between 1:30 and 1:300. This probability is significant
enough to be taken into account in any planning of the future
of the north of the island.
iv. Ash falls in the centre and south of the
island will continue posing a serious threat to health. Heavier
and more sustained ash falls in the north and other Caribbean
islands are possible and would result in an increased risk of
silicosis.
v. Volcanic activity will very probably continue
for at least a few more years.
vi. It will be years, perhaps decades, before
the south of Montserrat is safe enough to be redeveloped and re-inhabited.
vii. Volcanology is an inexact science and
the volcano in the Soufrière Hills is not typical of volcanos
previously studied, for instance in the escalation in the severity
of its activity over time. Consideration of scientific advice
must always bear this in mind (Paragraph 14).
2. Contradictions
in evidence occurred on a number of occasions during the course
of this inquiry. The number of such disagreements is a cause
for concern, suggesting a less than happy relationship between
the United Kingdom Government and the Government of Montserrat.
It is not the purpose of this Report to adjudicate on every such
dispute and distribute blame. We are more concerned with recommendations
for the future (Paragraph 19).
3 We are amazed that a comprehensive
survey of Montserrat's population has yet to be undertaken. In
the weekend before the Chief Minister gave evidence to the Committee
the Government of Montserrat was able to organise a count of residents
in the north with the help of teachers, the total being 4,008.
It is a clear responsibility of the Government of Montserrat
to know the population which it is there to serve. Even without
the assistance of consultants from the United Kingdom we are surprised,
given the seriousness of the situation, that no provisional analysis
was attempted. We believe that the recommendation in the Calman
Report of a comprehensive needs assessment should take place without
delay and that the number of those on Montserrat be updated each
day on the basis of arrival and departure information. If the
Government of Montserrat is unable to complete such a survey in
the near future, we recommend that HMG undertake it (Paragraph
20).
4 We note that HMG retains a responsibility
for the welfare of Montserratians as Dependent Territory citizens.
We are appalled that vulnerable persons should be found in such
poor and degrading condition over two years after volcanic activity
began. We recommend that HMG find out what happened to the equipment
from the new hospital and use as much of it as possible in the
temporary hospital on the north of Montserrat. We also recommend
that there be an urgent provision by HMG of resources which can
be immediately used to upgrade the standard of the temporary hospital's
care and environment (Paragraph 21).
5 The north of Montserrat, though at
present relatively safe, could rapidly become more dangerous.
All planning in both short and long term in Montserrat must take
account of the fact that there is a possibility, given certain
scenarios, that the north also would have to be evacuated (Paragraph
22).
6 This sort of disagreement [on the appointment
of a programme manager for healthcare] is all too typical of recent
events in Montserrat. We presume Sir Kenneth Calman made his
recommendation advisedly, no doubt hoping that the programme manager
would have the power to take prompt and effective action without
political interference. We recommend that the Government of Montserrat
accept the recommendation of the Calman Report on the appointment
of a programme manager and end this unacceptable delay (Paragraph
25).
7 We were told when at the Emergency
Operations Centre in Montserrat, that if there were an emergency
evacuation Montserratians would not know what to do (Paragraph
26).
8 We recommend that a document making
clear what to do in the event of such an evacuation be distributed
as a matter of urgency to all Montserratians on the island. Similarly,
not only HMG and the Government of Montserrat but all neighbouring
islands should know of the evacuation plan. We recommend that
there be a single evacuation plan providing for a coordinated
regional response (Paragraph 30).
9 We conclude that in the unlikely event
of a serious explosion affecting the north it could well be impossible
at present to evacuate the population in time. This is particularly
true for those vulnerable groups mentioned earlier. We recommend
that a simulated exercise take place to ensure that the current
evacuation plan is adequate (Paragraph 31).
10 We recommend that it be made clear to Montserratians
on the island what the risks are in staying there at the moment
so that they can make a fully informed choice as to whether or
not to relocate elsewhere. We are particularly concerned
for those vulnerable groups who in an evacuation would be difficult
to move quickly and safely from the island. We recommend that
these risks be made clear to them, and where appropriate to their
relatives, that arrangements be made and assistance given to neighbouring
islands to provide the necessary care, and that they be advised
to leave Montserrat for their own safety. We do not recommend
forcible evacuation but it is clear that there are and probably
will continue to be no proper facilities in Montserrat for such
vulnerable groups or qualified persons to look after them (Paragraph
32).
11 It is clear that Montserrat would have
been immeasurably more prepared for the crisis which has come
upon it if the Wadge and Isaacs Report had been carefully read
and digested. That far from being read it was hastily forgotten
is an opportunity tragically lost. This sorry account must be
a signal example of failure in communication, political leadership
and responsibility (Paragraph 39).
12 The United Kingdom Government must address
this problem [of unequal choices being offered to Montserratians]
by improving opportunities for people who choose to stay on the
island. This can only be done by the effective delivery of relevant
aid (Paragraph 45).
13 It is clear prima facie from the
above account that there have been too many parties involved in
the delivery of aid without discrete and clear areas of responsibility.
The confusion and frustration in aid provision was a constant
theme amongst those we met in Montserrat and Antigua and from
our witnesses in London. Ms Short regretfully commented, "we
had to work within the existing machinery. You cannot change
the machinery of government or its budget in the middle of an
emergency". She later added, "there are so many players
in this thing that it is very difficult to have authority over
people who make the decisions or know the answers". Mr Brandt
complained of the bureaucracy and number of layers involved in
the decision-making process, as did Mr Savage and Professor Sparks.
Baroness Symons at the end of our inquiry admitted "this
is a piece of machinery that we have inherited which I think is
not working in the way that a reasonable person would expect it
to work". Their lack of coordination was one thing on which
all our witnesses agreed. (Paragraph 48).
14 The decision of the Government of Montserrat
in August 1996 not to apply for aid to construct housing is a
significant cause of the delay in the provision of adequate accommodation
(Paragraph 53).
15 Between November 1996 and July 1997 it
is clear that discussion of housing projects took place within
overly bureaucratic procedures and with little sense of urgency.
Responsibility for this must be shared between HMG and the Government
of Montserrat. It was no doubt hoped by all involved that Salem
and the central area of the island would remain safe. This was
in accord with scientific advice at the time. All such advice
was, however, on the understanding that volcanology is not an
exact science and the volcano in the Soufrière Hills is
an atypical volcano. Greater and more urgent contingency planning
was called for from the early stages of the volcano's activity,
as the Governor had attempted to make clear (Paragraph 58).
16. There does not seem on the basis of this
evidence to be any appreciable or culpable delay since the announcement
of the £6.5 million in July this year. Since the
authorisation of funds by the Secretary of State in July, fifty
houses have been completed and a further fifty are under construction
(Paragraph 59).
17. We recommend that all possible assistance
be given at the earliest opportunity to the CARICOM project and
that a decision on the extension of the Davy Hill infrastructure
be made and communicated without further delay (Paragraph 61).
18. We recommend urgent action to ensure that
the schools are properly supplied with resources and equipment.
We also recommend that once emergency housing is available the
Government of Montserrat make it their priority to return the
school buildings to their intended use. Before July 1995 Montserrat
had an enviable reputation for the quality of its education system
and, despite obvious difficulties since then, great effort has
been made by teachers and pupils to maintain such high standards.
That tradition must not be threatened by a lack of government
support (Paragraph 63).
19. It will of course be the case in emergency
aid that equipment is bought which is not up to the standard of
fully considered development projects. There must, however, be
some minimum standards even for the provision of immediate assistance.
We criticise DFID for the fact that these purchases fell below
such a minimum. We recommend that EMAD consider how emergency
purchasing of equipment might be improved on the basis of their
experience in Montserrat and report their conclusions to the Committee
(Paragraph 67).
20. We have come to the following conclusions
on the delivery of aid to Montserrat:
i. There were too many decision makers
involved in the delivery of aid to Montserrat. ODA/DFID attempted
to combine emergency and development aid in its response to events.
This was a mistake. The volcano had not ceased to be active.
The emergency was, and is, cumulative. Thus the use of accounting
procedures and administrative structures designed for other circumstances
was cumbersome and resulted in some delay and confusion. The
recent removal of DTRS and BDDC from the decision-making process
is a tacit admission of former errors.
ii. The Government of Montserrat has consistently
acted, with the admirable intention of preserving the community
on Montserrat, to minimise disruption and project as optimistic
a view of Montserrat's future as possible. This is evident even
if we confine ourselves to two undisputed facts-that the Government
of Montserrat opposed for some time an assisted passage scheme
and a relocation grant to assist Montserratians who wished to
leave the island, and that until November 1996 the provision of
emergency housing in the north was not a priority. Conversely,
when assistance was obviously necessary the Government of Montserrat
has tended to use discussions with DFID to pursue longer term
developmental goals rather than deal immediately and provisionally
with urgent needs.
iii. The constitutional arrangements for Montserrat
did not lend themselves to an effective response to the crisis.
Throughout this crisis power, responsibility and resources have
rarely been found in the same pair of hands. We consider it would
have been more effective to have used the Treasury's Contingency
Reserve to respond to the emergency, placing the allocation of
resources and the development of policy under a single minister
and team of officials. Even now DFID has the money, but responsibility
is divided between the Government of Montserrat, the Governor,
the FCO and EMAD. The result is that action is delayed.
iv. Many of the imperfections and difficulties
in the delivery of aid are simply due to the complicated, ongoing
and unpredictable nature of the volcanic activity. Professor
Sparks has made clear that there will be future volcanic eruptions
elsewhere in the Caribbean. There are numerous lessons to be
learned from events in Montserrat both from the viewpoint of science
and emergency planning. We recommend that a frank and impartial
report be prepared by HMG on the basis of experience in Montserrat
which can enable not only HMG but other governments in the area
to be prepared for such emergencies in the future (Paragraph 69).
21. We urge the Bank of England and Treasury
to intervene to ensure that Montserratians have access to the
remainder of their savings as soon as possible (Paragraph 72).
22. We recommend that the FCO, in conjunction
with the DTI, make efforts to discover definitively what insurance
cover has been withdrawn since the crisis began, what increases
there have been in premiums since July 1995, whether there have
been any reductions in liabilities, and use the High Commissions
in the Caribbean and Montserratian welfare societies in the United
Kingdom to invite Montserratians to give details of delays and
difficulties in receiving payments. We expect this information
to be included in the Government response to this Report. (Paragraph
73).
23. If HMG is genuinely committed to the viability
and prosperity of the north of Montserrat, the Treasury must offer
suitable guarantees which will enable current insurance cover
to be maintained, and insurance companies to secure reinsurance
and thus provide renewal of cover (Paragraph 75).
24. We recommend in the first instance that
the current aid to Antigua be fully allocated to specific projects.
There should then be a survey conducted on behalf of the British
and Antiguan Governments of the continuing needs of Montserratians
in Antigua and their effect on the economy and social services
of the country. This should establish the case for any further
assistance. The grant for Montserratians who have relocated elsewhere
in the Caribbean was calculated on the basis of six months' average
Montserratian income. Should Montserratians not have found employment
after this period, consideration must be given to further support.
(Paragraph 79).
25. We are most grateful to the Government
and people of Antigua for their generosity to Montserratians in
this difficult time. We trust that HMG does not forget that it
retains a real responsibility for Montserratians who have relocated
to Antigua and elsewhere in the Caribbean. This means HMG should
respond readily and promptly to reasonable requests for assistance
from Caribbean governments, including further provision for the
elderly and the mentally and physically disabled in suitable and
properly staffed sheltered accommodation (Paragraph 80).
26. We consider the abatement for those who
relocated before 16 August 1997 and who are employed to be unnecessary
and unfair. We believe it should end immediately. We recommend
that all Montserratians who have relocated to the Caribbean region,
and whose savings and assets outside Montserrat are less than
EC$42,000 (about £9,190 at current exchange rates) receive
the same relocation grant on the same terms, whenever they left
the island from the start of volcanic activity in July 1995.
(Paragraph 84).
27. No formal meeting has taken place to our
knowledge at either Ministerial or official level between HMG
and all the member countries of CARICOM to discuss HMG's current
policy on Montserrat, the future of the island, assitance to Montserratians
elsewhere in the Caribbean and on possible involvement of other
islands in the event of an emergency evacuation. We recommend
that such a meeting take place. We also recommend that the High
Commissioners and other FCO representatives take a much more active
role in explaining HMG's actions in Montserrat, in providing
essential information and in overseeing the welfare of Montserratians
who have relocated to other islands in the Caribbean (Paragraph
85).
28. We recommend that the food voucher system
end as soon as possible and be replaced by a comprehensive system
of income support (Paragraph 86).
29. We recommend urgent action from the DSS
to ensure that Montserratians relocating to the United Kingdom
receive a National Insurance number within a week of arrival,
or that the number is issued in Montserrat or Antigua before departure.
We recommend that assistance and advice be given to Montserratians
in the United Kingdom on how to claim social security benefits
and complete the necessary forms. We recommend particular attention
be paid to the situation in Hackney (Paragraph 89).
30. We recommend that a liaison officer be
established without delay to help Montserratians as they settle
in the United Kingdom and adjust to life here. From the meetings
we had with Montserratians in the Caribbean we also believe there
is a need for clear and comprehensive information to be distributed
to Montserratians there concerning their rights and entitlements
if they relocate to the United Kingdom, how to apply for accommodation
and other benefits, opportunities for education and employment,
and bodies which can be of assistance (Paragraph 90).
31. We recommend that current rules be waived
to allow Montserratian driving licences to retain their validity
(Paragraph 91).
32. We believe that it is in the best interest
of Montserratians in the UK that they be assessed for effects
of past ash exposure, that they be advised accordingly, with special
reference made to groups at particular risk, and that in areas
where there are significant Montserratian communities the Health
Authorities be advised to consider how best to meet this need
(Paragraph 91).
33. We recommend that it be made clear that
the current provision for Montserratians in the United Kingdom
will last for as long as volcanic activity continues in Montserrat.
Montserratians in the United Kingdom who wish to remain after
volcanic activity has ended should be given the permanent right
to live and work here (Paragraph 92).
34. We are not in a position to comment on
the viability of the island nor the possibilities for sustainable
development. Any Plan must, however, take account of the continuing
dangers posed by the activity of the volcano. The north of Montserrat
is not perfectly safe, merely significantly safer than elsewhere
on the island. At present all planning and commitment of funds
must take account of the possibility that the north itself might
have to be evacuated (Paragraph 93).
35. The Sustainable Development Plan will
need to take a realistic look at the prospects for the economy
of the north. The Plan should propose development which can maintain
a community on the island appropriate to current circumstances,
in other words development which is genuinely sustainable. We
have particular concerns at the prospects for employment and food
production in the north (Paragraph 94).
36. We recommend that funds for the development
of Montserrat should come from a United Kingdom government department
other than DFID. This particular recommendation is in no sense
a reflection on the quality of DFID's work. It is simply a recognition
that responsibility and resources should go together, and that
the bilateral budget should be safeguarded for its primary purpose.
(Paragraph 100).
37. We recommend that the source of future
funding be considered within the current review of the administration
of the Dependent Territories. Funds might come from the Foreign
Office or from another specified department with dependent territory
responsibilities. The important point is that responsibility
and resources for the Dependent Territories should be in the same
department. We do not believe that the reasonable assistance
needs of the Dependent Territories should be a first call on the
development programme. Our responsibilities to Dependent Territory
citizens are of a greater and different order to our more general
humanitarian responsibilities to the developing world and involve
different priorities. That should be recognised in the structure
of administration and funding (Paragraph 101).
38. Not only must the source of development
funding be reconsidered. The Constitution of Montserrat has proved
unequal to the demands of this emergency. (Paragraph 102).
39. Months have passed in which overlapping
responsibilities have frustrated an effective response to the
crisis. The delicate balance in the Constitution between Governor,
Government of Montserrat and HMG, with repeated emphasis on consultation,
has merely meant there has been no one on island with full and
untrammelled executive control. In the current review of the
Dependent Territories the Constitution of Montserrat must be thought
through from first principles, with adequate provision for decision-making
in emergencies of this kind. A concern not to offend one or
other of the parties involved in these events has too often been
of greater importance than the welfare of Montserratians themselves
(Paragraph 103).
40 This Report has inevitably pointed out
failures and mistakes. We wish to set that in the context of
the many hours of conscientious, effective and often dangerous
work done by public servants, officials and volunteers. Above
all we would praise the Montserratians themselves who have endured
great difficulty and loss with bravery and dignity. We hope that
before too long a thriving and successful society will once more
be established on the island (Paragraph 104).
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