Select Committee on International Development Fourth Report


TRADE

52. One of the development aims of the European Union as found in Article 130u of the Maastricht Treaty is the `smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy'. The Lomé Convention provides particular trade preferences for the ACP countries with the aim of developing their trade and integrating them into the world economy. ACP countries "have duty-free access to the EU for all industrial goods and a wide range of agricultural products. They also have preferential access for a number of more sensitive products covered by the Common Agricultural Policy"[94] . In addition to these arrangements there are four special protocols which allow special market access terms for sugar, bananas, beef and veal, and rum. The four protocols are discussed separately below [see paras 125-138]. A number of witnesses identified as one of the benefits of the Lomé Convention its unique combination of aid and trade in a development agreement. Trade was a vital source of wealth creation and growth for a developing economy.

53. It is important to place Lomé preferences in the context of the more general European Union trade regime. Dr Stevens spoke of a 'pyramid of privileges' in his explanation of the current system. In his view the Lomé Convention could be considered to be at the apex of the pyramid, since

    (a)  "it provides the most extensive set of trade preferences, covering all industrial products that meet the rules of origin as well as most tropical and mineral products and some CAP items;

    (b)  the coverage of CAP products includes (but is not limited to) very deep, albeit quota-limited, preferences on items covered by special protocols, providing access (at high prices) for items that are suffocated, by EU protectionism, from other sources;

    (c)  the tariff reductions and relief from non-tariff barriers tend to be particularly deep, e.g, duty-free access for all industrial products and also full relief from the Multifibre Agreement [MFA];

    (d)  it contains a built-in mechanism to negotiate extensions to the coverage of the most sensitive items;

    (e)  unlike the GSP (but like the bilateral agreements) it has provided a high degree of certainty".[95]

These tariff preferences are designed to give the ACP countries a trading advantage over competitors and so secure markets for ACP exports. The Lomé Convention is not, however, the only system of preferences in the EU system. There are also bilateral accords with the EU's geographical neighbours to the south and east. They also provide substantial preferences although on a more limited number of products than those covered by the Lomé Convention. Below these bilateral accords is the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) which is available to almost all developing countries. The "product coverage of the GSP tends to be more limited than under the other agreements, and often the cuts in ... tariffs or relief from non-tariff barriers are less generous"[96] . Finally, those countries, such as the United States and Japan, which have to pay the full tariff on exports to the EU are described, somewhat perversely, as enjoying `Most Favoured Nation' (MFN) status.

How effective have Lomé preferences been?

54. In considering the future trade relationship between the EU and the ACP countries it is of course necessary to determine how effective past and present preferences have been in improving ACP trade and contributing to the elimination of poverty. There was considerable agreement in evidence as to the figures though more doubt as to their interpretation. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office memorandum stated that "Trade performance has ... been poor overall and the ACP share of the EU market is declining, from 4.7 per cent to 2.8 per cent between 1990 and 1994"[97].

55. Dr Stevens pointed out[98] that in 1976 the ACP countries were the second most important source of EU imports from the five developing country regions. In contrast, by 1995 the ACP were the second least important source of EU imports from these country groups and the only one to witness a declining share. A similar picture was found in the share of EU exports to the five regions. Again, the ACP had moved in the period 1976-95 from being the second most important destination for EU exports to the second least important. What is clear, then, from these bare statistics is that the trade preferences granted to the ACP have not prevented a serious decline in the trading position of ACP countries relative to the European Union.

56. One purpose of the trade preferences was to grant the ACP developing countries a period in which the economies might diversify out of their traditional dependence on a few primary products. Evidence from the University of Reading gave details of the ACP performance in this area, "One or two ACP countries very often account for a large proportion of `ACP' exports of any given non-traditional export and there are substantial annual variations in export volumes. Overall product concentration ratios of exports are substantially higher than in comparable developing countries, only a few countries have seen a significant decline in their concentration ratios, and in a sample of 39 ACP countries for which there is adequate data, only 8 countries increased the number of products ... exported over the last 25 years"[99] . According to the European Commission, traditional commodities still account for around 80 per cent of ACP total export earnings. Exports to the EU are heavily concentrated among a few products. Manufactures account for a relatively small share of ACP exports, and in a number of cases, this has fallen over time[100].

57. Not only does there remain a worrying dependence on a few exported products, there is also a significant dependence on the EU as an export market for ACP products. The EU accounts for 58 per cent of total merchandise exports. This compares with Latin American and South East Asian dependence on the US market of 23 per cent and 25 per cent respectively[101]

58. Whilst there was agreement on the bare facts of ACP performance there was some variation in the analysis of what these facts implied. Some of the evidence received saw the trade preferences as one reason for the failure to diversify. This was certainly the view of MAFF with regard to the four commodity protocols, "Although the ACP have benefited from this resource transfer, the presence of a guaranteed high price market has reduced the incentive for diversification and, in some cases, helped to maintain high cost production"[102] It was also suggested that the non-reciprocal preferences offered under Lomé encouraged the ACP economies to remain highly protected and thus unintegrated into the world economy. Thus the United Kingdom Government's position paper stated, "the current trade relationship does not encourage any of the ACP to start opening up their own markets as part of their gradual integration into the world economy and a liberalised trade environment"[103]. Mr Richard Eglin from the World Trade Organisation (WTO) considered preferences to be damaging when "they conceal from the least developed and developing countries market signals that in the long term these countries have to integrate into the world economy"[104].

59. A closer look at the figures, however, suggested to some that it is too simplistic to brand the Lomé trade preferences a failure. Dr Stevens said that the data do not necessarily support the "piece of conventional wisdom" that there is an inverse relationship between preferences and trade performance. He pointed to the performance of the Mediterranean countries (high preferences) in comparison to South Asia/Latin America (low preferences) in their exports to the EU.[105]

60. Mr Bloomer thought that "as trade instruments" the Lomé preferences had been a success, "There is only 7 per cent of the Lomé preferences which actually have a differential preference of more than 5 per cent over the other countries outside the ACP group, so where there is a significant preference for the ACP group of more than 5 per cent the preferences have worked considerably well and the ACP countries that have diversified into those areas, particularly Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Jamaica, for instance, have seen their own share of the European Union market grow and in fact grow faster than other countries outside the ACP group who did not have those similar preferences".[106] According to this argument the limited impact of the preferences is in part due to the fact that they are not generous enough to give much advantage in most products.

61. Evidence from the University of Reading[107] pointed to changes in the structure of ACP merchandise exports. Non-traditional products had increased as a share of ACP non-oil exports from 7.9 per cent in 1988 to 13.5 per cent in 1994, with a value of ecu 1856 million (£1,259 million). There had been some successes in export diversification, for instance in Mauritius. With regard to ACP dependence on the EU market they emphasised that it was important to differentiate among ACP countries. Of the 33 African ACP countries 19 depended on the EU for more than 50 per cent of their merchandise exports but only 10 of them increased their dependence over the period 1970-1993. Of the remaining 14 only four increased their dependence over that period. In other words, though ACP dependence is high and trade preferences have had little impact on it, the degree of dependence has not been increasing. This is, however, of somewhat limited comfort. Similarly, when the University of Reading points out that the decline in ACP market share is due to the fact that twenty-six products account for 70 per cent of non-oil exports to the EU with a consequent vulnerability to the commodity markets, this merely underlines the failure of these economies to diversify.

62. Dr Stevens gave a more detailed account of the nature of the ACPs' trading difficulties, "The deep-seated element is that the nature of the European economy has changed (and will continue to change) in ways that affect its relative demand for the types of goods that the ACP are currently able to produce. Such changes are manifest in other OECD countries as well with the result that the foreign exchange earnings of ACP states are falling and, hence, so is their capacity to import".[108] There was a decline in the relative importance of merchandise trade and, within that trade, a decline in the value of primary products and an increase in the share of manufactures. Thus the ACP countries, particularly dependent on primary products, have seen the value of their exports suffer.[109]

63. The Department of Trade and Industry admits in its memorandum that "It is of course possible, perhaps likely, that the ACPs' trade performance would have been even worse in the absence of preferences. Moreover, except in cases where tariff reductions are fully passed on to EU consumers or distributors, preferences will increase the profitability of ACP export sales to the EU"[110]. This argument must, of course, remain hypothetical. If we grant that without trade preferences the ACP performance would have been worse, we can at least conclude that, to quote again from the DTI memorandum, "the solution to under-development does not rest with market access alone. Developing countries need to be able to build the necessary supply capacity to enable them to take advantage of the trade opportunities that exist".[111]

64. All witnesses were agreed that, whatever the value of trade preferences, they were certainly inadequate to develop the trading performance of the ACP countries. The problem was rather that of supply-side constraints. Mr Bloomer made clear that the trade instruments had "failed to overcome the multiple factors which are acting against the development of trade in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific".[112] In addition to such external problems as the debt burden and weak foreign direct investment there were internal problems including an "unreliable institutional environment" and crony-ism, a lack of production and communication infrastructure, a lack of human capital in terms of investment in health and education.[113] The Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) also mentioned a "lack of information about opportunities for producers..low investment and skill levels...[and] national policy frameworks discouraging exports".[114]

65. Similar evidence came from Mr Eglin of the WTO, "it is less to do with market access and more to do with assisting the developing countries and the least developed countries to produce higher quality goods, goods to an international standard, to diversify their exports, to produce higher value added goods, in other words to help them in situ rather than to continue to rely only on getting rid of the trade barriers".[115] The British African Business Association (BABA) commented that ACP trade difficulties were "much more to do with a lack of competitiveness than with a lack of adequate preferential margins".[116]

66. The argument as to the relative importance of market access and supply-side constraints is not, perhaps, one which can be resolved except by the ideologically enlightened. Some consensus, however, emerges from the evidence - that Lomé trade preferences have failed to stem a decline in the ACP's trading position with the EU; that such trade preferences, however generous, will in any event be ineffective if no action is taken to deal with the supply-side constraints which hinder the ACP economies from producing competitive goods. There is, moreover, a practical point which means that any discussion about Lomé V must concentrate on remedying supply side weaknesses. This is the fact that the value of Lomé trade preferences is being steadily eroded with the gradual liberalisation of the world trading system. This is no doubt a further reason for the failure of ACP countries to benefit greatly from the preferences.

67. The average tariff rate for industrial goods has declined as the momentum accelerates towards multilateral trade liberalisation. The FCO memorandum added, "The lowering of barriers and resulting liberalisation of trade has increased trade opportunities worldwide and the value of world trade has increased by 49 per cent".[117] In addition there was the prospect of agricultural liberalisation being discussed at the next trade round of the WTO and the future reform of the EU's own Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This raised the prospect of a decrease in tariffs on agricultural products both from the EU and globally which would further affect the benefits accruing from the Lomé preferences. The Secretary of State was convinced that "The status quo is not an option. Trade preferences are becoming less and less useful because the international system is reducing barriers. Over time they become less and less valuable because the barriers are eroding".[118]

68. The University of Reading gave further detail of the ways that the Uruguay Round had "substantially lowered the margin of trade preferences available to the ACP countries under the Convention. Most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs on traditional tropical products such as coffee and cocoa beans have been reduced to zero, and the tariffs on industrial products reduced on average by 38 per cent to an average of 4 per cent, although tariffs on some `sensitive' products such as footwear, clothing and some simple manufactures have been decreased by a smaller proportion. Tariff escalation (increased rates of duty at higher levels of processing) has also been reduced...further decreasing the effective degree of tariff preferences available to the ACP on EU imports of processed and manufactured goods".[119] Quotas on the imports of clothing under the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) were also due to expire in December 2004, removing another current advantage for the ACP (ACP countries being legally exempt from the quotas) over their competitors.

The proposals of the European Commission

69. The current trade proposals of the Commission in the Draft Negotiating Mandate are found from paragraph 3.2.1 of that document where the objectives of economic and trade cooperation are defined as to:

70. The European Union proposes a process culminating in Free Trade Areas (FTAs) between the EU and each of the three ACP regions (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific). This will be achieved through "the creation of highly integrated EC-ACP economic areas. This will involve strengthening the economic partnership by introducing reciprocity into trade relations and extending cooperation to other trade-related areas". The Draft Negotiating Mandate adds, "the economic partnership will be strengthened gradually, taking account of each partner's level of development and the ACP countries' political commitment to regional integration".[121] As a stage on the road to the three FTAs agreements would be negotiated with regional sub-groups "engaged in a regional integration process".[122] These regional agreements would be negotiated in the five years after the expiry of the current Convention (2000-2005).

71. The Draft Negotiating Mandate explains that "The trade arrangements in these agreements would be aimed at gradually liberalising trade between the partners, consolidating the ACP countries' current access to the Community market and introducing reciprocity for Community exports...regional economic partnership agreements establishing free-trade areas covering essentially all trade between the parties, excluding no sector and established over an interim period. These agreements will also include greater cooperation in other trade-related areas".[123]

72. The Commission assures the reader[124] that negotiations will take account of each country's level of development and their capacity to adapt to the liberalisation process. Reciprocity would not be sought from the Least Developed Countries (LLDCs) which were not part of a regional sub-group entering into an agreement with the EU. It is envisaged that for the first five years of Lomé V, whilst the overall Convention ("global agreement") is in place but the regional agreements are still being negotiated the current Lomé trade preferences will continue. This will require a further five year waiver from the WTO.

73. The Convention will establish the procedures and approach for the eventual conclusion of economic partnership agreements (i.e FTAs) with each of the three ACP regions. It will be prepared to assist studies of the impact of such agreements on the ACP economies. Furthermore, the Convention will identify the sub-regional groups to negotiate the regional agreements with over the next five years. Special assistance will be given to LLDCs which are faced with particular adjustment efforts in being part of a regional agreement with the EU.

74. The Commission states that products originating in the LLDCs will enjoy the same access to the EU as under the current Convention. Moreover, the same access will be granted to those LLDCs outside the ACP. They will all continue to benefit from this access after the five-year period (2000-2005). Those non-LLDCs which by the year 2005 have not negotiated regional economic partnership agreements with the EU will migrate to the Community's Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), taking account of any changes to the GSP resulting from the intended revision exercise.

75. The Commission also mentions a number of trade-related areas for the negotiations, including effective protection for intellectual property, the fulfilment of obligations on standardisation and certification, the effective application of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the promotion of competition policy and consumer policy and safety, environmental and labour standards, the establishment of a regulatory framework for telecommunications infrastructure, the protection and promotion of investment, liberalising the settlement of current account transactions and ensuring the convertibility of national currencies for such transactions, and the guarantee of free repatriation of foreign direct investment.[125]


94   Evidence p.3 Back

95   Evidence pp.121-122 Back

96   Evidence p.122 Back

97   Evidence p.3 Back

98  Evidence pp.110-111 Back

99  Evidence p.249 Back

100  Evidence p.283 Back

101  Evidence p.249 Back

102   Evidence p.279 Back

103  Evidence p.8 Back

104  Q.112 Back

105   Evidence p.112 Back

106   Q.171 Back

107   Evidence p.249 Back

108   Evidence p.113 Back

109   Evidence pp.113-114 Back

110   Evidence p.283 Back

111   Evidence p.283 Back

112   Q.171 Back

113   Q.174 Back

114   Evidence p.49 Back

115   Q.88 Back

116   Q.449 Back

117   Evidence p.4 Back

118   Q.465 Back

119   Evidence p.246 Back

120   Draft Negotiating Mandate 3.2.1. Back

121   Draft Negotiating Mandate 3.2.2. Back

122   Draft Negotiating Mandate 3.2.3. Back

123   Draft Negotiating Mandate 3.2.3. Back

124   Draft Negotiating Mandate 3.2.3. Back

125   Draft Negotiating Mandate 3.2.5. Back


 
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