Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of witness (Questions 80 - 99)

TUESDAY 9 DECEMBER 1997

MR RICHARD EGLIN

  80.  You said earlier that all waivers were subject to annual review.
  (Mr Eglin)  Yes.

  81.  Does the review include the possibility of revoking the waiver, or is it just some form of continuous assessment, as it were?
  (Mr Eglin)  No. It is a continuous assessment. The waiver cannot be revoked once granted[1]. The waiver is given for a specific period of time. It is subject to annual review. Now, I say the situation has never arisen where any waiver has been revoked. I suppose some catastrophic scenario could be put forward where something like that would happen. It would imply that you would make such fundamental changes in the middle of the new Lomé, that the basis upon which the waiver had been originally granted would be considered as no longer to prevail. The waiver, as such, cannot be revoked. What could go wrong is that you may change the Lomé in a way that is no longer covered by the existing waiver. I am sorry, I may be obscure, but if you do not get the waiver right the first time and then stick to it, there is always the possibility of it starting to unravel. That is why it is so important to get the waiver right to begin with.

Mr Grant

  82.  How long has the WTO been going?
  (Mr Eglin)  It started in January 1995.

  83.  A couple of years.
  (Mr Eglin)  Yes.

  84.  How many waivers have been granted?
  (Mr Eglin)  That is a good question. I do not know the answer, to be specific[2]. Lomé is certainly not the only one, if that is what is of interest to you. Let me make the point. There are two other very important and very similar waivers which have been granted for Canada and the United States, covering the Caribbean Basin Initiative and Canada's relations with the Caribbean too. So this is not an unusual route to go. If one goes back and asks: why is the waiver necessary? It is necessary because you are discriminating between developing countries. I guess you are familiar with the basis for that. Other countries do that too. The United States does it. Canada does it. They have found it necessary to go and apply for a waiver to cover their own preferential trade arrangements. Those waivers certainly have both been granted since the WTO came into effect, but one reason why it is a bit complicated to answer your question is that when the WTO came into effect, all existing waivers were rolled over. They needed to be reapproved but they were approved in a job lot. So there are a lot of waivers there. How many I do not know. Again, it is information that I can provide.

  85.  Yes, that would be very helpful to us.

Mr Robathan

  86.  Is there any evidence and are you collecting it, (or is it not your business), that these waivers actually achieve the object for which they are sought? Also, are countries that have benefited from such waivers, making progress to a position where they do not need them any more, somewhere down the track?
  (Mr Eglin)  Yes. It is tempting to say it is none of our business. We certainly have not tracked the Lomé Convention to see whether the trade preferences within the Lomé Convention have brought the trade benefits that were envisaged at the beginning for the ACP countries.

  87.  It is for the EU to do?
  (Mr Eglin)  Absolutely. It is not for us to do. Is that good enough? I mean, when you mention this business about waivers, there must be a presumption because of the rule-based trading system, that the waiver will eventually cease to be required. Eventually. That does not mean in three years or five years. It could be 20, 30, 40 years, it depends what you are talking about and how long is a transition period. They are viewed as exceptional. Therefore, they are not a matter of course. It would be very damaging to the trading system to introduce endless permanent waivers, particularly from Article 1 which is the bedrock of non-discrimination. In the end, you would not have a rule-based trading system. You would have a spaghetti bowl of waivers. So there is a presumption that the waivers eventually will no longer be required and this is a transition period.

  88.  But, presumably, somebody somewhere is doing work on whether these waivers actually achieve the objective for which they are sought? You do not know who that is but we will find out.
  (Mr Eglin)  Well, I can tell you. The waiver is doing its job in the sense that it has waived these obligations. Therefore, we can apply Lomé. Whether the trade preferences are doing their job, there is some very good work that has been done, both by the EU Commission and also by the World Bank. We have not done any. We were thinking of doing some. I am not sure we have the resources to do that. The evidence would tend to suggest, so far, that preferences are very important if they can be accessed properly. A very large part of the problem is either the conditions attached to the preferences— rules of origin, for example—or the fact that it is not market access which is the developing or especially the least developed country's real problem. The problem is being able to supply the goods in the first place. Produce something which somebody wants to buy; not that there are barriers to selling the products they can produce into the industrialised country markets. Now, that is a very general statement. In the area of textiles and in the area of agriculture, quite clearly, there are still very significant trade barriers to exports from least developed countries and developing countries, more broadly, which are maintained and which are very harmful. Those are areas in which they can produce and they can sell, yet they are finding they are meeting barriers. We had a conference for the least developed countries at the end of October and in the context of that we looked at the market access barriers facing 48 least developed countries, that is, all of the least developed countries, not only the ACP but the others as well. We came to the conclusion that around 85 per cent of the imports from the least developed countries into the industrialised countries are absolutely free of border restrictions. The residual is very largely textiles and clothing and agriculture, and footwear to some extent, but 85 per cent of their trade is unencumbered by border restrictions into either the EU or the US or Japan and yet their trade share continues to shrink. The answer to that, I think we concluded anyway, is that it is less to do with market access and more to do with assisting the developing countries and the least developed countries to produce higher quality goods, goods to an international standard, to diversify their exports, to produce higher value added goods, in other words, to help them in situ rather than to continue to rely only on getting rid of the trade barriers. That is important, it is a contribution, and it certainly cannot help for their exports to be restricted, but we came to the conclusion that it really was not the primary problem for most least developed countries. Again it is a very general statement because you will give me Bangladesh and you will say, "Well, all of their exports are textiles and clothing, so there is one which is very significantly affected", and yes, you are right, but overall it is not really market access.

Chairman

  89.  When you are reviewing these waivers, do you go into whether the waiver is actually having the effect for which either the European Union or the United States of America first applied to you for a waiver? Do you review whether or not it is having the required effect?
  (Mr Eglin)  Required effect, I am not sure. I think probably the correct answer to you is no, not the required effect because the motive is not our business. What was expected is not our business either. What effect it is having is our business, well, it is the business of the other WTO members because they want to know if their trade is being affected, but they are not directly concerned with whether the ACP countries are benefiting out of these trade preferences under Lomé from the EU, no. The EU, and again you are welcome to add this to the list, but the EU submitted a paper for the review of the waiver which described what is happening and this is a public document, so if you do not have it, I can again send you that. It is a WTO document. Let me just make a list of these things.

Mr Canavan

  90.  I would like to ask you about the Ruggiero proposal. I understand that your Director General has proposed removing all tariff and non-tariff barriers for all 48 least developed countries, not just the ACP ones, but all of them, which would allow them access into the OECD markets, not just the European Union, but the OECD markets, and that this would be a right secured by a multilateral organisation like the WTO rather than just a favour granted by a regional body like the European Union. I also am informed that in the October WTO High-Level Meeting on Least Developed Countries, there seemed to be some failure to agree or at least there was no ruling on the Ruggiero proposal. Can you tell us where the proposal stands now and what response there has been from the various members of the WTO and what likelihood there is of this initiative being implemented in full?
  (Mr Eglin)  Yes, with pleasure. Mr Ruggiero made the proposal first at the G7 Summit in Lyon and the response he got from a number of the G7 Heads of State was, "Our trade is already very largely free of barriers", as I have just said, 85 per cent, or more if you take an individual country, "The remaining items where we have restrictions tend to be sensitive items from the point of view of our domestic producers. Therefore, we will not agree to a blanket zero tariff, no trade barriers in favour of the least developed collectively, but individually we will see what we can do". The only one which has really come good on that is the EU which at the High-Level Meeting announced this initiative to extend all of the trade preferences under Lomé to the remaining least developed countries who are not ACP already, and that gives the least developed countries almost unrestricted access to EU markets. The United States extended its GSP quite considerably in June, but certainly not completely and it continues to maintain restrictions on imports from least developed countries in various sectors. Japan maintains quite extensive restrictions on imports from least developed countries. Now, in October, therefore, we got very little other than the EU announcement from the OECD countries. What we did get, and where we were very pleased to see them, were announcements of improved market access for the least developed countries from the advanced developing countries, and that means Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and I am not sure I will get the list right, but there were nine in total. Mauritius also announced improvements in market access for least developed, so this genuinely was a first. Up until now preferences had been seen as something that the developed give to the developing. What we are now seeing is the developing giving to the least developed as well, so we have a new structure of preferences and that was the first thing or the main thing that came out of this meeting in October. At the meeting, Ruggiero repeated, insisted that we need to get rid of all market access restrictions for the least developed countries and we will put this back on the agenda or bring this up again at our ministerial meeting which will be held in May of next year, so Ruggiero continues to push, but it is not easy and what you are pushing on now is those particular sectors, or in many cases particular products, where the restriction is protecting somebody's job in the developed countries or in other advanced developing countries and those are always the most difficult trade restrictions to remove. There is no reason not to remove them, I agree, but, nevertheless, that is the reason why this thing is heavy going.

Mr Grant

  91.  You mentioned that the United States and Japan have restrictions on the imports from the LDCs. How could America take the European Union to the WTO on the bananas issue when they themselves have restrictions and why does the European Union not challenge the Americans in the same way as the Americans challenged Europe? How can they justify it, is what I am trying to say?
  (Mr Eglin)  How could the US justify what they did on bananas?

  92.  Yes, when they had restrictions.
  (Mr Eglin)  Well, the US justified what it did on bananas taking the EU to a dispute by saying that the EU had broken the rules. If the EU can point to the US and find an area where it has broken the rules, then it can do exactly the same thing. The fact that the US maintains trade restrictions against least developed countries is not grounds in and of itself for complaining. Those restrictions were the result of the Uruguay Round negotiations and the EU maintains plenty of restrictions. Those restrictions are written into the schedules for the EU and everybody has accepted that that is the EU's trading regime, so that is accepted, you cannot challenge that. What you can challenge is if somebody breaks the rules or reneges on what they have committed themselves to. So the basis of bananas, I am not in detail briefed today on bananas, but the basis of bananas, and you did not ask me this question, but if I can make a comment back to you about it, there has been an enormous amount of publicity about it and I think it is important to repeat again what the Banana Panel did do and what it did not do. What it did do was confirm absolutely that for traditional ACP banana producers, the Lomé waiver covered the Banana Protocol. That was not at issue and that has not been overthrown by the WTO. What the WTO Panel said was that the way in which the European Union Commission distributes the licences is inconsistent with the EU's obligations. It is how the licences are distributed; it is not the fact that there are quotas on bananas or duty-free access for bananas into the EU, it is not the Banana Protocol, as such. That is why I mentioned before the importance of getting the details right. The EU in the Lomé waiver have said, "We want a waiver to allow us to discriminate" and they got it and they can and they, therefore, can treat ACP bananas preferentially under the terms of Lomé, but they did not say, "In addition, we want", in what the US saw as a highly prejudicial fashion, "to discriminate in the way we hand out licences. We will give licences to this importer, but we will not give it to that importer". You are not talking about a banana producer now; you are talking about multinational corporations. The US complaint was that the way the licences were being distributed was inconsistent with WTO rules and that is the grounds upon which the Panel and the Appellate Body found. So what the EU now needs to do, it does not need to change the Banana Protocol or Lomé, it needs to change the way that the licences are distributed. This is complicated and I am sorry.

  93.  Can I just follow up on that? Surely the distribution of the licences is the reason why there are problems because if the licences are handed out freely to the dollar banana producers, then they can flood the markets?
  (Mr Eglin)  Absolutely.

  94.  And then that would affect it, so it is a secondary effect on the Caribbean banana producers as opposed to a primary effect straight off.
  (Mr Eglin)  Well, what kind of secondary effect? What is guaranteed and is not challenged and the WTO has not overthrown it is that the ACP countries can import into the EU, and here the numbers escape me, but I think it is 890,000 tonnes, or whatever, of bananas a year and that has not been challenged. There is a tariff quota system whereby the ACP gets duty-free access up to a certain tonnage of bananas. Beyond that, there is an advantageous tariff which is applied to another chunk of the tonnage of bananas, so that you have carved out for the ACP countries under the Banana Protocol a certain tonnage of bananas which are imported into the EU for which licences are distributed, yes, but that was not what was challenged and that is guaranteed. What was challenged was the way in which the licences for the remaining countries, the non-traditional ACP and the non-ACP, were being distributed.

Mr Khabra

  95.  What sort of price mechanism is used to import raw materials from the least developed countries or the developing countries?
  (Mr Eglin)  The market prices, and I am not sure I am understanding the question properly, but the market prices would be the mechanism, or the market would be the mechanism that would set the price, the world price for raw materials or primary commodities, and that is the price at which they would be traded. Am I missing your point because I am not sure?

  96.  Is it not the case that the importing country independently negotiates with the countries exporting or has the World Trade Organisation got anything to do with price fixing?
  (Mr Eglin)  Not at all, sir, no. There are no rules on prices in the World Trade Organisation outside the area of dumping, which does not apply at all to what you are talking about, and we are not involved in any way in trading. All we do is set rules for how trade takes place, but the basis upon which trade takes place is then left entirely up to market operators or governments if it is government procurement, but we have nothing to do with price fixing, nor are we in a position to be able to improve the prices that are paid for primary commodities or to alter them in any way whatsoever. That is completely outside our mandate and competence.

Dr Tonge

  97.  Mr Eglin, I just want to pursue bananas a bit further while we are on the subject because I do not really understand. If the European Union countries had allowed licences to the big banana companies, the ACP countries' bananas would not have had a chance. Surely that was the whole essence of the waiver. The ACP countries' banana imports into the European Union are a tiny proportion anyway, is my understanding.
  (Mr Eglin)  That is right.

  98.  And yet they are those countries' total economy virtually as it is the only thing they produce.
  (Mr Eglin)  That is right.

  99.  Therefore, how else do you suggest that the European Union, having obtained the waiver on bananas from the WTO, how else could they have helped the ACP countries, except to differentiate between the licences?
  (Mr Eglin)  Well, excuse me, but let me try and explain it just to make sure I understand the question. A certain tonnage, and, as you say, it is not the majority of the EU market for bananas, but a certain tonnage of bananas, which is the 1991 level, if I am not mistaken, which was agreed and is in the Banana Protocol, those bananas come in from the ACP countries, and they continue to come in from the ACP countries because in the licence you are asked for an origin certificate and, therefore, there is a guarantee that that tonnage of bananas is coming into the EU. That has not been challenged at all in the WTO, so all those bananas will continue to come in.


1   Note by witness: Article IX:4 provides the possibility for the WTO Ministerial conference to extend, modify or terminate a waiver. however, this has not been invoked in the case of the Lomé waiver. Back

2   Note by witness: about 50 waivers have been granted or extended under Article IX of the WTO agreement since its entry into force on 1 January 1995. Back


 
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