House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development First Special Report

APPENDIX

THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE'S FIRST REPORT OF 1997-98: MONTSERRAT

MEMORANDUM FROM HMG

1. The Government is grateful to the Committee for acknowledging the enormous efforts that have been made by public servants, officials and volunteers to respond speedily and effectively to the emergency in Montserrat. We endorse most of the Committee's findings and recognise that there have been some failures and mistakes. Most of the Committee's recommendations are either being implemented or are under consideration. Our response sets out a number of the actions being taken to enable Montserratians, both those on the island and evacuees elsewhere, to improve their well-being. We stand fully behind our commitment to make it possible for those Montserratians who want to do so to remain on the island, as long as the scientists advise that it is relatively safe for them to be there.

The Volcano and Disaster Preparedness

Volcanic Activity (Conclusions and Recommendations 1 and 2)

2. The Committee provides an accurate summary of the scientific advice available to it (paragraph 14). Subsequently a scientific reappraisal of the Soufriére Hills eruption, and the resulting hazards, took place at a meeting in Antigua from 2 to 5 December 1997. The findings were used to undertake a risk assessment, intended to inform those remaining on the island, and assist decision-making and planning for Montserrat. This assessment provides probabilities of fatalities directly from volcanic activity and from the effects of long-term exposure to ash, and considers factors that affect risk, including public response and mitigation measures.

3. HMG's Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Robert May, validated the assessment on 30 December 1997. Sir Robert recognised that there was an inherent uncertainty in the analysis reflecting the nature of the science of volcanology, and that there were greater uncertainties on the health hazards posed by the silicosis-causing particles in the ash. He noted the reports suggested that the individual risk of fatality on an annual basis in less than one in 100,000 for anyone living in northern Montserrat (Areas 1 and 2 - see map) but that the risk rises significantly nearer the volcano.

4. Sir Robert May concluded that levels of risk, and even more the uncertainties in the analyses, are such that HMG should recommend in the strongest terms that people should leave Area 3 (the area of Woodlands currently known as the Central or Buffer Zone), as well as Area 4 which is already in the Exclusion Zone. His summary of conclusions of scientific advice and risk assessment is attached (Annex 1).

5. All three reports (which have been placed in the libraries of both Houses) have been made available on request to the Montserratian public and copies circulated, inter alia, to all members of Montserrat Legislative Council, government departments, private sector groupings and non-governmental organisations. The Directors of Health and Education have been tasked with ensuring that all health workers, teachers and students are aware of the reports and their implications. Ministers and heads of all government departments have been briefed on the report and asked to cascade the information to their staff. A leaflet summarising the advice in layman's terms is being distributed to everyone on island and published in the local newspaper (a copy is attached as Annex 2). A special radio programme on the reports by three Chief Scientists has already been broadcast and others are in preparation. A series of community meetings are planned.

6. Dome growth is currently in the south-western part of the crater and any activity in the immediate future is likely to be in that area, as was the case on Boxing Day, 1997, when a large pyroclastic flow occurred in White's river. This flow, the largest yet seen on Montserrat, also cleared away much of the unstable dome material.

7. We recognise that HMG needs to provide alternative accommodation and services in the north of the island if people are to act on the scientists' advice. The Department for International Development (DFID) will fund the accelerated provision on serviced land for housing in the north to encourage people in Area 3 to move. We will seek to agree with the Government of Montserrat that priority be given to people in Area 3 in allocating new housing in the north. A phased withdrawal of remaining Government Offices in Area 3 is underway and is expected to be complete by April once new facilities are complete in the north. The Governor's Office is contacting businesses in Area 3 concerning their plans to relocate to the north of the island. The Governor is considering what further steps might be taken to move the population from Area 3.

8. The Committee expresses its concern about the apparent number of disagreements on evidence between HMG and the Government of Montserrat (paragraph 19). HMG continues to work closely with the democratically-elected Government of Montserrat and recognises that good communication is essential. During the production of the latest scientific report the Government of Montserrat were given papers as they were produced; this was also a demonstration of transparency. The Chief Minister of Montserrat has ready access to Ministers and has spoken by telephone to both George Foulkes and Baroness Symons in recent months. He is likely to see both Ministers on his next visit to London for the Dependent Territories Association Conference on 4 February. The Foreign Secretary will visit Montserrat on 14 February.

Health and Population (Conclusions and Recommendations 3, 4 and 6)

9. The Committee expresses surprise that neither a comprehensive survey of Montserrat's population nor a provisional analysis had been undertaken by mid November 1997 and recommends that a comprehensive survey be undertaken without delay (paragraph 20). A comprehensive social survey has now been undertaken and its results are expected next month. A provisional population count was, however, undertaken in October 1997 and the estimate of the number on-island has been adjusted regularly ever since on the basis of arrival and departure information.

10. The Committee recommends the immediate appointment of the health programme manager (paragraph 25). A Senior Health Programme Manager was appointed by DFID in November 1997 to carry forward the recommendations of HMG's Chief Medical Officer. His preliminary findings were submitted to the Government of Montserrat and HMG in December and he is now developing and overseeing the implementation of a Health Action Plan.

11. Hospital Equipment: The Committee recommends that HMG find out what happened to the equipment from Glendon Hospital (paragraph 21). When Plymouth was evacuated, health staff, with assistance from DFID emergency personnel, moved as much equipment as possible out of the Glendon Hospital. Space in the new hospital at St John's is limited and some of the equipment is in storage pending the completion of building works. The medical equipment at the St John's Hospital is sufficient to meet present needs. Some equipment which could not be moved was lost in the August 1997 pyroclastic flows into Plymouth.

12. Upgrading of the St John's Hospital: The Committee recommends that HMG fund the urgent upgrading of St John's Hospital (paragraph 21). Major building works to upgrade the facilities there commenced in June 1997. Most of this work is being funded by DFID at a cost of £1 million. A modest contribution of just under £40,000 has been made by the European Commission. Progress in construction work has to be carefully phased in order to ensure that patient care and services can continue to be offered at the site. The target completion date for all works is now 1 September 1998. Phase 1 of the project was completed on 17 January 1998 and provides new, and vastly improved, accommodation for up to 52 elderly and disabled residents previously housed in unsatisfactory temporary shelters at the rear of the hospital.

Safety and Evacuation Plans (Conclusions and Recommendations 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 20(iv))

13. The Committee recommends that planning in Montserrat must take account of the possibility that the north might have to be evacuated (paragraph 22). HMG continues to act on the basis of the scientific advice. The advice at present is that the likelihood of eruptive events large enough to affect the north of the island is very low and the individual risk of a fatality there is minimal. We continue to provide appropriate support for the people who wish to remain there. The Prime Minister has made it clear that in the light of the latest advice from the scientists we must maintain our commitment to those who choose to remain on Montserrat.

14. The Committee recommends that a document be distributed on-island to make clear what Montserratians need to do in an emergency and that a simulated exercise be undertaken (paragraphs 26, 30 and 31). Emergency Evacuation Plans, which have been written with the assistance of experts funded by DFID on behalf of the Government of Montserrat, are being re-examined in the light of the latest scientific report and ways of strengthening them are under consideration. These include: further assistance to the Emergency Department on Montserrat to update on-island plans; enhancement of the island's emergency response capacity, including the ability to handle mass casualties; better publicity and education, including advice on action to be taken in the event of a major eruption; and the need to improve the ability of the population to survive an eruption until evacuation is complete.

15. A leaflet will be distributed to everyone on island, with clear advice on action to be taken in the event of a major eruption. The plans will then be tested and reviewed regularly and modified to respond to any weaknesses or changes in volcanic activity.

16. The Committee recommends that all neighbouring islands should know of the evacuation plan. The existing off-island plans, including those for assistance from within the region, will also be revised to reflect the new advice. Measures to improve regional co-ordination will also be put in place.

17. The Committee recommends that it be made clear to Montserratians on the island what are the risks of staying so that they can make an informed choice and that vulnerable groups be advised to leave and arrangements made for care to be provided on neighbouring islands (paragraph 32). HMG strongly endorses the importance of Montserratians being able to make informed choices. As indicated above, the findings of the latest scientific reports have been distributed widely on Montserrat to inform those remaining on the island, including vulnerable groups. About 150 people with special needs (ranging from persons requiring regular medication, such as diabetics, to the severely disabled) have voluntarily relocated to the UK - 35 of them by a DFID-funded special chartered flight in November 1997. Others have relocated in the region. It is estimated that 185 special needs cases have registered for possible future evacuation. Arrangements are in place to facilitate their relocation needs - a nurse is on-island to assess their needs and co-ordinate any special travel requirements with the relevant airlines. The Health Action Plan will seek to improve the conditions of those that choose to remain.

18. The Committee recommends that HMG prepare a frank and impartial report on the lessons to be learnt from the Montserrat crisis (paragraph 69iv). The Government accepts that there are important lessons to be learnt from the Montserrat volcanic emergency and will commission a report on these. In 1998 we also intend to review the state of disaster preparedness against all possible contingencies in the Caribbean Dependent Territories, to establish what improvement are necessary and the requirements for further training and assistance. This will complement the review of the particular circumstances of the Montserrat volcanic crisis.

Emergency and Development Aid On-Island

Population on Montserrat (Recommendation 12)

19. The Committee recommends that HMG must improve the opportunities for people who choose to stay on the island by effectively delivering relevant aid (paragraph 45). Conditions for Montserratians remaining in the north of the island have improved substantially. DFID has provided essential infrastructure including transport links, a jetty, power, fuel, water, road rehabilitation, housing and health and education facilities. A total of £51 million has been allocated for Montserrat from the aid programme since the onset of the volcanic emergency in July 1995.

Organisation and Delivery (Conclusions and Recommendations 20i, 20iii, 36 and 37)

20. The Committee comments that there were too many decision-makers involved in the delivery of aid. It recommends that responsibility and resources should go together and that the current review of the administration of the Dependent Territories should consider whether the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) or another specified department for Dependent Territories should take over responsibility for funding for the development of Montserrat (paragraphs 69i, 100 and 101). HMG is looking carefully at ways to improve current arrangements for the delivery of aid. As noted by the Committee, changes have been made to procedures. Since the establishment of the Aid Management Office (AMO), immediate responsibility for the implementation of the development programme and co-ordination of emergency aid activity was transferred to the island. The AMO now reports directly to the recently established Montserrat Unit in DFID set up to streamline the decision making process.

21. HMG's overall policy on Montserrat is being co-ordinated by the Montserrat Action Group (MAG) which meets regularly and is chaired by Baroness Symons. Officials from all the major government departments involved in co-ordinating action to deal with the crisis are represented on the MAG, including DFID.

22. The relationship between the FCO and Overseas Development Administration/Department for International Development (ODA/DFID) since volcanic activity began has been close and has sought to overcome difficulties caused by the division of political responsibilities for the Dependent Territories, which has rested with the FCO, from responsibility for development and emergency aid, which has rested with ODA/DFID.

23. The future responsibility for the provision of aid to Montserrat is being addressed within the context of the review of the Dependent Territories.

24. The Committee considers that it would have been more effective to have used the Treasury's Contingency reserve to respond to the emergency (paragraph 69iii). At the time that the crisis began, the ODA was the Aid Wing of the FCO and the primary source of the expertise required. The term "Treasury Contingency Reserve" might be a reference either to the Contingencies Fund or to the Public Expenditure Reserve. The Reserve is one of the main instruments for protecting the public expenditure Control Total. It is designed to absorb unforeseen and irresistible demands for extra resources which cannot be contained within existing Departmental Votes by a supplementary Estimate. The Contingencies Fund enables the Treasury to make repayable advances to departments for urgent services, generally in anticipation of provision for those services by Parliament or to meet temporary shortfalls in cash-flow in-year. It was not necessary for DFID to seek a Contingencies Fund advance or claim on the Reserve because DFID Votes already carried this service and DFID had sufficient Voted provision to cover the crisis.

Emergency Aid Equipment Procurement (Recommendation 19)

25. The Committee recommends that DFID consider how emergency equipment provision be improved and report their conclusions (paragraph 67). The Committee acknowledges that it is frequently impossible to await the delivery of brand new equipment in response to emergencies. For the purchase of used equipment, checks for quality and appropriateness are routinely carried out in the country of origin. This was the case for all items purchased for Montserrat since July 1995, including the sludge wagons and buses which met the required minimum standards. The exception was the tents which were issues from US military stocks and which could not be inspected beforehand. Having considered this question we have concluded that there is no need for a review of procedures.

Housing (Conclusions and Recommendations 15 and 17)