Memorandum from the Secretary of State
for International Development
1. BACKGROUND
Sudan has some of the worst social indicators in
Africa. It has endured a civil war in the south for 30 out of
the past 40 years. More than 2 million people are estimated to
have died. The country is also vulnerable to periodic droughts,
common in the Horn of Africa. Because of the Government of Sudan's
policies towards human rights, the civil war in the south, the
economy and other international issues, almost all donors have
cut off development assistance. Sudan has nonetheless been a major
recipient of assistance from the international community (about
£1,176.5 million since 1992 most of which has been emergency
assistance). It is also the beneficiary of a UN relief operation
(Operation Lifeline Sudan—OLS) which since its inception
in 1989 has secured access to over 120 locations for aid delivery.
2. The current Government in Khartoum came to power
in 1989. We are concerned about the Government's attitude towards
the Sudanese from the south most affected by the war, including
the displaced settled around urban centres in the north, and northern
Sudanese who are most vulnerable to drought and food shortages
eg in Darfur and Kordofan. Despite recent indications of greater
flexibility on the Sudanese Government's part in handling the
economy and a desire to improve their relationship with the international
community, there are a number of areas where we continue to look
for improvements in the Government's performance. We continue
to press for progress in Sudan's human rights policy and moves
towards a more pluralist political system. We continue to encounter
problems with the Government of Sudan and the rebel movements
over the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the regime's
attitude to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is unhelpful.
Civil War
3. The latest phase of the civil war started in 1983
after 11 years of truce. The conflict has been complicated by
the southern rebels becoming increasingly fragmented as a result
of differences in aims (e.g full independence versus federalism)
and along tribal lines and also by the coup which brought the
current regime to power in 1989. All areas of the south have been
directly affected by fighting over the past 5 years.
The Peace Process
4. In order to find longer term solutions to Sudan's
problems the international community has supported regional peace
efforts by the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD),
made up of Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and
Eritrea. Under its auspices, meetings have been held between the
Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM) most recently from 2-6 May. These have made little headway.
The next round is due to take place in Addis Ababa in August,
although this may be affected by the dispute between two of the
members—Ethiopia and Eritrea.
5. There have been attempts to broker ceasefires
in the past. In 1995, ex President Carter mediated a 4 month cease
fire which was used to accelerate health programmes, particularly
for guinea worm eradication. The cease fire was effective but
was seen as of dubious lasting worth since both sides took the
opportunity to re arm and re-organise.
The Economy
6. The Sudanese economy is essentially agricultural.
It is in serious difficulty with high inflation, current account
deficits and falling GDP. The war remains the major drain on Government
resources. Sudan has hovered on the brink of expulsion from the
IMF for 4 years.
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)
7. OLS is a unique operation. It was brokered by
UNICEF in 1989. It involves the GOS and the various rebel movements
as well as the donor and the NGO communities in agreeing a framework
for the provision of emergency assistance. It operates cross-border
aid delivery to both sides in the war. The current agreement allows
the delivery of relief assistance to all needy populations regardless
of their locations, for the benefit of civilians and with complete
transparency. In reality, none of these conditions have been fully
honoured. Nonetheless, since 1993 the number of locations in southern
Sudan served by OLS has increased from 20 to over 120.
8. OLS uses mostly air access which is very expensive.
It currently costs more than $1,000 to deliver one tonne of food
by air. Because of the cost, donors have sought, with limited
success, to increase access from the north and south by road,
rail and barge.
9. There are about 35 NGOs operating under the OLS
umbrella. This enables them to make use of OLS air and surface
capacity and security facilities in southern Sudan, but it also
ties them to accessing only those locations approved by the Government
of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA).
10. Since its establishment, OLS has developed an
increasing interest in capacity building of local institutions
and structures outside those controlled or run by the Government
of Sudan. This has created tensions between the OLS and the Government.
These have been exacerbated because donors have found it easier
to support OLS activities in the southern sector, whose operations
are run out of northern Kenya (Lokichokio) rather than the northern
sector, which is managed from Khartoum. There has been a disparity
in the amount of assistance allocated between the northern and
southern sectors, which has led to a greater investment in human
and physical resources in Kenya than in Khartoum.
11. A number of agencies are operating in OLS areas
but outside the OLS agreement. HMG will work with partners outside
OLS structures if we have confidence that they have the experience
to ~provide relief in a neutral and impartial manner. In these
circumstance, we take advice from OLS before funding interventions
because we are conscious that the GOS could regard them as illegal
actions, which could, in turn, jeopardise the whole OLS operation.
The Humanitarian Situation
12. In recent years, the case for emergency assistance
to Sudan has diminished as climatic conditions and food security
have improved. However, pockets of need have remained and the
major humanitarian challenges have been:
(a) Delivery of assistance to remoter drought
affected regions in the north like Darfur and Kordofan, which
are the most vulnerable to wide scale famine and where internal
transport problems are often been exacerbated by intermittent
violence and banditry.
(b) Delivery to the south where, in the absence
of a peace settlement, the priority for many years has been to
secure and maintain safe delivery routes for humanitarian assistance.
The civil war, made worse by splits within the SPLA, has disrupted
Operation Lifeline Sudan. Attempts to negotiate land routes have
been unsuccessful because of lack of co-operation by both the
Government of Sudan and the SPLA. Relief flights into the south
by UN, ICRC and often NGOs have been sporadic and there have been
incidents that have resulted in fatalities.
(c) The plight of about 800,000 displaced persons
encamped around Khartoum, the majority having fled the civil war
in the south. Many have been living in conditions of great squalor
for a number of years. Government of Sudan policy has been forcibly
to relocate the displaced to new camps in remoter areas, with
even less adequate facilities.
UN Appeal
13. The 1998 UN Inter-Agency Appeal for Sudan was
launched in February this year. It was the first time the UN had
issued an overall appeal for Sudan, which covers those areas served
by OLS—i.e. areas affected by fighting between Government
of Sudan forces and the SPLA and its collaborators—and non-OLS
areas—i.e. those under the control of the Government of
Khartoum. The appeal totalled $109 million. It is for the whole
of 1998 and although its title is an emergency appeal it includes
a substantial amount of longer term rehabilitation and development
work. The humanitarian needs in Bhar el Ghazal are part of the
appeal, although they are undoubtedly underestimated because,
as we know, the situation in that region has deteriorated very
substantially as the result of events that have occurred since
the appeal was launched.
14. The situation on support for the appeal is not
clear. As at the end of May, the UN said that only some $30 million
had been committed to it. But because of inadequacies in the way
the UN records pledges (they do not regard them as commitments
until they are allocated to specific projects or activities) we
know that at least $20 million of additional pledges (including
the commitment we made on 18 May of £5 million) have not
been included in the UN's calculations. Britain's latest pledge
of £15 million must also now be added. This less than transparent
practice is unsatisfactory. I have discussed it with the Head
of the UN Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
and we shall pursue it further in Geneva and New York. As in previous
years, we expect donors to continue to contribute to the UN appeal
as the year progresses.
1997-98 Crop Assessment and Total Food Situation
15. FAO's crop assessment report published in March
indicated that the overall food outlook for Sudan for 1997-98
was favourable as a result of high carryover stocks from last
years harvest. But they identified local food deficits in North
Darfur and North Kordofan and the South due to civil war.
2. THE CURRENT CRISIS
Background
16. The Dinka people in Bahr el Ghazal are among
the most vulnerable in Sudan. Politically and geographically isolated,
they have been badly affected by the continuing conflict in Sudan.
The effects have been both direct, with killings and abuse by
all sides and indirect, often leading to starvation. Bhar el Ghazal
is already one of the more densely populated areas of the south
and northern Bhar el Ghazal has been the most densely populated
part of the region.
17. The northern part of Bahr el Ghazal is agriculturally
productive. The normal production system of livestock, fishing,
agriculture and the collection of wild foods is adequate to meet
needs. It is however a complex system of time-tabled movements
from village to toic (dry season grazing areas), of claims and
obligations between family groups and clans, and of trading and
grazing arrangements with other tribes. These are easily disrupted
by the predatory behaviour of various militias, who support the
Government, and rebel groups and by the direct effects of the
civil war. This disruption has led to migration to the north and
an unpredictable and dangerous life of hardship for those left
behind. This has been the backdrop for the situation of widespread
starvation that has emerged in 1998.
18. The immediate causes of the crisis are three
distinct waves of displacement. The first related to a call, in
November 1997, by Joseph Kerubino, the leader of a militia at
that time allied to the GOS, for civilians to return to Northern
Bhar el Ghazal. The area had become depopulated because of raiding
by Kerubino during 1996 and 1997. Kerubino then returned to the
SPLA and the second displacement occurred, when the Kerubino forces
were driven out of Wau by GOS forces, together with some 80,000
to 150,000 Dinka and Jur people. Because of the conflict, the
Government suspended relief flights in February resulting in limited
quantities of food reaching the affected populations. The suspension
was partially lifted three weeks later following the intervention
of the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs
in the Sudan, Ambassador Robert van Schaik. The suspension was
further eased in mid-March when eight locations were cleared for
relief flights. This limited number of sites quickly attracted
large numbers of people creating a third wave of displacement.
19. The 1997 OLS food needs assessment of Bahr el
Ghazal calculated that there would be a 50-60 per cent food gap
in certain areas of Bahr el Ghazal in 1998, mainly due to the
poor rains and harvest. lt was predicted that the hunger season
between April and September, when crops are cultivated and the
farmers await the harvest, would be a particularly difficult time
in terms of food security.
Numbers of People Affected
20. The UN appeal published in February identified
485,000 displaced and war affected people in need of assistance
in Bhar el Ghazal from April to July. When the OLS International
Advisory Committee (IAC) met on 18 May, WFP estimated the vulnerable
population at 350,000. When my Relief and Rehabilitation Field
Manager visited the area in May he saw that this was an underestimate.
The figure was revised later in May to around 595,000 and on 11
June the WFP published new figures which indicate that more than
1.2 million people are now in need of relief in southern Sudan,
including 701,000 in Bhar el Ghazal.
3. THE RELIEF OPERATION
21. An effective relief operation requires an up
to date assessment of need, competent means of targeting beneficiaries,
adequate access and transport, sufficient supplies of food and
non-food items, and a capacity to deliver and monitor the relief
operation. At various times, Some of these elements have been
missing throughout the Bhar el Ghazal crisis. Access has been
the most difficult issue. This has limited both accurate assessments
of need and the ability of agencies to reach those in need with
supplies.
Access
22. On 3 February, the Government of Sudan imposed
a flight ban on the Bhar el Ghazal region which was not restored
until 1 April, although limited access was granted on 25 February.
The loss of two months of access was crucial, because it was not
possible to deliver a general ration to people who we knew would
be in great need from April. After pressure from donors, agreement
was given on 23 April for the relief operation to be augmented
with an additional C-130 aircraft. In mid-May, again as a result
of donor pressure, the UN was granted permission to fly four additional
aircraft. This brought the WFP's operational capacity to 5 C-130s
(the capacity for each C-130 rotation is 16 tonnes) and 1 Buffalo
(capacity 6-7 tonnes per rotation). Only two to three rotations
are possible a day. There is some access over land but it is severely
constrained by security and logistical considerations.
Food Supplies
23. The World Food Programme (WFP) purchase food
either locally (in country), regionally, or on the international
market to supply its operations in southern Sudan. Where necessary,
and as co-ordinated by the WFP regional office, food may also
be borrowed from other programmes. At the International Advisory
Committee meeting on 18 May, WFP announced that it had 15,518
tonnes of food available for southern Sudan. They indicated this
would last until the end of July but there was some concern that
this would only be possible if substantially reduced rations were
delivered. When WFP revised their estimates of need on 11 June
they indicated that 29,600 tonnes more food would be required
until the end of October.
Transport
24. For the current south Sudan feeding operation
food is transported by road from Mombassa to Lokichokio (Kenya)
and then by air, by road to Uganda and then by road (subject to
the rains), and by truck to El Obeid (northern Sudan) and then
by air.
25. When agreement was given to expand the relief
operation's capacity in May, WFP indicated that their aim was
to deliver 6,500 tonnes a month. This has now been raised to 9,576
tonnes to feed more than 1 million people. The current fleet of
5 C-130s and 1 Buffalo can handle 5,084 tonnes out of Lokichokio
and 2000 tonnes out of El Obeid, leaving a transport deficit of
2,500 tonnes. This will be met by hiring two llyusians to be operated
out of Khartoum.
4. UK RESPONSE
The Relief Operation
26. Britain has committed over £160 million
to Sudan since January 1991, including our contribution to EU
programmes. In November 1997, the UN and NGOs warned of possible
food shortages in Bahr el Ghazal in April to September. This was
taken account of in deciding our contribution to the UN Consolidated
Appeal, when it was launched in February 1998. We were the first
donor to respond to the appeal and our pledge of £4 million
was targeted on needs in Bahr el Ghazal because we were aware
that an already vulnerable situation had been exacerbated by the
Government's flight ban in February and March.
27. Adequate resources to support the relief effort
in Bhar el Ghazal have been available from DFID and other aid
agencies. But we have not been able to reach many of those in
need. This has been because of the civil war. I have wanted the
public to understand this and not be misled into thinking that,
if more money could be found, the women, children and old people
we have seen starving on our television screens would necessarily
be saved. That is simply not the case. The problem is much more
difficult than has been portrayed by the media and I believe the
public deserves to know this. I also believe that accurate reporting
of the cause of the crisis and the pressure of informed public
opinion could probably help us obtain more co-operation, particularly
from the rebel factions, and therefore save more lives. The amount
of relief cargo (food, medicines, seeds and tools, shelter) which
can be transported is seriously constrained by the fact that we
have to rely mainly on air access. The numbers of flights possible
is governed by aircraft availability operating restrictions (fuel
availability and flight clearances). If we could secure the agreement
of both sides to stop fighting it would allow the international
community to step up the air operation and possibly also use the
railway to transport much greater amounts. This would greatly
increase the prospects of saving more than 1 million vulnerable
people.
28. Since we first became aware of the growing problem
in Bahr el Ghazal we have pressed both sides to the conflict bilaterally
and in our role as EU Presidency to respect humanitarian principles
and allow relief to be delivered to those in need. As a result
of international pressure, the Government of Sudan has gradually
improved access. As it has become possible to deliver more relief
I have approved new tranches of assistance. In May, I sent my
Relief and Rehabilitation Field Manager to Bahr el Ghazal. He
reported that the situation was much worse than we had been led
to believe. On 15 May, when the WFP stepped up their transport
operation by expanding their aircraft fleet, I approved a further
£5 million to help. The WFP revised their estimates of need
on 11 June. On 16 June I approved a further £15 million.
£10 million of this will be available immediately for Bhar
el Ghazal to buy food and expand transport capacity. The remaining
£5 million will be available to support NGO and UN agencies'
relief work in OLS north and south, which we expect will expand
as access to the vulnerable increases, and to support selected
operations in non-OLS areas, where needs are emerging related
to the displacement of populations from the south.
29. Since February, we have committed £25.23
million to the Sudan crisis. The funds have been allocated as
follows:
£16 million to WFP
£1.83 million to NGOs (including SCF, MSF,
World Vision and Care)
£1.0 million to ICRC
£0.8 million to UNICEF
£0.4 million to OLS Logistics
£0.2 million to the UN Humanitarian Co-ordination
Unit in Khartoum
£5 million still to be allocated as new
needs emerge in the north and south.
The Peace Process
30. Throughout this crisis, because of the civil
war, the aid agencies on the ground have faced enormous difficulties
in reaching many of the most vulnerable people. A cease-fire is
needed so that food deliveries can be significantly increased
by cross-line deliveries from the north by road and train—and
a peace settlement to enable people to rebuild their lives, not
just in Bahr el Ghazal but all over Sudan. That is what the British
Government has been pressing for. We have pressed regional members
of IGAD to step up their efforts to secure peace. We initiated
a discussion of Sudan in the Security Council on 5 May. Sudan
was discussed by EU Development Ministers at the Development Council
which I chaired on 18 May and in the EU General Affairs Council
on 25 May. We will play an active part in discussions at the IGAD
Partners Forum chaired by the Dutch, on 17-18 June. This will
be attended by donor Governments, the GOS, and the SPLA. The intention
is to explore ways in which the international community can support
and accelerate the IGAD process. We have asked WFP to give a full
and up to date assessment of the situation in Bahr el Ghazal to
the meeting.
DEC Appeal
31. The appeal has raised over £6 million. 12
out of the 15 DEC member agencies will share this in proportion
to the size of their operations in the UK. Some of the agencies
which will benefit are not currently working in Bhar el Ghazal.
Preliminary information suggests that substantial! funds could
be spent outside of the area of the current crisis. Some may be
used as start up funds for agencies which have not worked in Sudan
or in Bahr el Ghazal before.
5. EU ASSISTANCE
32. ECHO have allocated 11.8 million ecu (£7.78
million) for Sudan, which will be spent this year. 1.54 million
ecu (£1.02 million) is for the current crisis in Bahr-el-Ghazal.
In addition, we understand DGVIII are about to allocate 20,000
tonnes of food aid to WFP for South Sudan.
6. THE FUTURE
33. We welcome the OLS' decision to increase the
relief effort. Britain's recent contribution of £15 million
will enable food to be purchased and new aircraft to be hired.
We have also told WFP that we are prepared to install night landing
lights at Lokichokio to enable more rotations to be flown. But
this expansion may not be enough to meet immediate needs.
34. The numbers of vulnerable people are increasing.
Because of insecurity and internal displacement the majority of
these people need a full ration of food. At present many of them
are receiving half rations, which are then being shared widely.
This means the most vulnerable, particularly children, are at
even greater risk of starvation. We shall continue to press for
adequate rations to be provided to reduce the severity of the
crisis.
35. Unless people can plant before the rainy season
sets in food security will again be critical in 1998-99. We will
press WFP to deliver more stocks of seeds and tools into the region.
Again this will mean expanding the transport capacity.
36. Bhar el Ghazal is not the only part of southern
Sudan affected by food shortages. We are aware that Western Upper
Nile also has serious problems. £5 million from our new pledge
will be available to help meet needs elsewhere in the south and
in the north where new needs are emerging.
Department for International Development
18 June 1998
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