Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120 - 143)

WEDNESDAY 24 JUNE 1998

Mr Will Day and Mr David Bryer, Mr Robert Smith, Director, Ms Marie Staunton, and Ms R Boycott.

120. Is that when it came to Ms Boycott's attention?

 (Ms Boycott) No, we went to UNICEF ourselves. We went at the beginning of May after having been exposed to the media images by that point and then we made the horrific discovery that this appeal had been launched in February and they were still way short of funds. We were assured from lots of conversations with Marie and with other people that there was access, the funds would get through, the money would be used and actually the money could make a difference and so you could do a lot of things simultaneously, ie, raise the profile of what was going on, apply political pressure through the media, keep the story on the front page (and I am glad the Secretary of State said it should be on the front page) and at the same time actually be in the hands of an agency so that the money that our readers (which came up to £400,000 of what was raised in England) gave did go to children and did go to starving people and we needed to do it fast. There was no point in talking at that point about long-term education which is what we want because these children were going to be dead.

Ann Clwyd

121. I still think you have not got across the urgency of the situation that people are faced with. We had a report from our Ambassador in Khartoum who was there at the end of May and he said: "The situation in Bahr El Ghazal was worse than he had anticipated. Infants and adults (mainly women) were near death in the six places visited. Partial rations were inadequate and widely shared; other food sources had failed, so supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes, for which the admission criteria had been unacceptably tightened, were not working; distribution of seeds, training programmes and schools were suspended because of the lack of food." This is already a tragedy. Do you feel that you have got across fully the urgency of the situation, 2.2 million people faced with famine?

 (Mr Smith) I think we did do everything that we could the moment we became aware of it, that is here at the UK Committee for UNICEF in London, because we had the visit that Marie mentioned a little earlier by a couple of our staff in late March and then Marie herself visited with Lord Deedes in April and then with Oona King in May to see government held areas as well. The moment we had the visit and had direct evidence ourselves we launched an appeal on 25 April because we saw the things that children were facing immediately. Separately and independently, of course, we did advertise for funds for children in need in Sudan and we were able to transfer money on 7 May, 22 May, 28 May, 11 June and then 23 June, totalling £2 million from private donations, including £400,000 from The Express appeal. So within 10-12 days of the first visit we were transferring our first funds and we have had funds from the British government as well totalling £900,000. I think we have done a great deal both in the media, through the very high profile visits of Lord Deedes, of Oona King and Marie's own work in the media. I think we feel that we have done all that we could so far, but we need to keep it in the public eye and I think this debate, as was said earlier, is one of the ways in which it can be kept in the public eye.

Mrs Kingham

122. I want to come on to this issue about keeping it in the public eye. Both Rosie Boycott and Mr Day have mentioned about this appeal being a way of generating public awareness and public action. In the same breath you said that in your fundraising material as a follow-up you would not have anything so-called political in there. I suspect that is because from past experience within fundraising literature you do not want to do anything too political because it reduces the level of your donations and that is quite factual. When you have campaigning-type information going out to donors it reduces the level of income. What I would really like to ask you is just where is your long-term commitment to ensure that the British public really get a grip of what is causing these famines and disasters because they are not acts of God, they are political, they are political causes, they need political actions? I feel it is the responsibility, as I think a lot of people do, of aid agencies like yourselves to ensure that when disasters happen you take those opportunities to tell people "These are the campaigning actions you should be taking". And to then put it in your newsletters in future and not have a twin track will I know most agencies operate, of your campaign supporters and donors and your fund-raising supporters and donors in case the idea of politics turns off your fund-raising supporters. It is political. Where is your commitment to following that up and making sure we get a grip on this debate? I think it is fundamental to all this. I do not want to be sitting around in five years' time (if we are still here) looking at yet more examples of disaster appeals when there is another famine somewhere. Are you going to start from now to make a pledge that you will be educating your donors and supporters to be doing political type work? I particularly address that to Care actually.

 (Mr Day) The DEC appeal itself made an absolute point of saying that the problem with Sudan is basically a problem of war and what is needed in Sudan is peace.

123. With respect, that is now. What about the interim years between them? What are you doing in the interim years to get people into lobby about the importance of these issues?

 (Mr Day) Care International and Care in the UK joins the kinds of groups like the landmine campaign and international campaigns which are trying to promote change. We are regularly in contact with DFID, ODA before that, to discuss the kinds of issues that we are discussing round this table now to press for change.

124. What about with the public?

 (Mr Day) Like any charity we build relationships with our supporters, I would like to call them, and you start effectively by attracting them to the cause. You are trying to persuade them that your particular organisation is one which they would like to support in the longer term. The clear balance of our portfolio, like any other charity, is for long-term development and the key message we are trying to promote with our supporters is that the long term is vital investment. The humanitarian disasters that occur from time to time in many of the countries in which we work are not quite distractions but necessary evils that we feel we have to work with and do our best with. In terms of political lobbying CARE's position and the position of its board of trustees is always that when situations occur in front of and which get in the way of CARE's long-term work where change is needed then it is right and proper for Care to take a position on it and to lobby appropriately.

125. With respect, I have been there on a fund-raising level and done it so I know about building up donors and support. Jubilee 2000 knocked a lot of those arguments on the head. People were willing to take up the issue of national debt and get on the streets and do something about it. You do not see it as a matter of course that the fundamental causes of what you are actually working on, poverty, deprivation, conflict, are political and therefore you should have a duty as an agency to ensure that all of your donors are engaged in that political process from day one?

 (Mr Day) All of our donors should be informed about the issues that lie behind the problems—

 Mrs Kingham: Not lobbying and engaging politically in the debate.

 Chairman: I think you have got as much of an answer as you are going to get. Andrew Robathan?

Mr Robathan

126. I would like to pursue a different tack more on the politics of the issue. You mentioned that conflict and war is at the heart of this. We understand that. Maybe it is a forlorn hope but one might hope that the Government and other governments would have some impact on the war and perhaps attempt a ceasefire and indeed there has been talk of a ceasefire from the Secretary of State. I have not been to the Sudan. We are getting very conflicting messages. On the one hand the Secretary of State particularly said your appeal had reduced pressure on the SPLA to agree to a ceasefire. I received some information from an organisation on behalf of the Sudanese government yesterday which said there was a perfectly good ceasefire on the table but the SPLA would not take it up. On the other hand, newspaper clips suggest that talk of any ceasefire is very one-sided and not just not to the advantage of the SPLA but might be very much to their detriment. I do understand the sensitivities under which you have to work in both areas. Could you tell us, perhaps Ms Boycott, what sort of co-operation you receive from the warring factions in the delivery of aid. Are you receiving the assistance of the government? Are they letting you fly? Are you receiving the assistance of the SPLA which some people are suggesting you are helping? I do not know.

 (Mr Day) Can I say from the DEC point of view that many non-government agencies working in Sudan are doing so under the umbrella of Operation Lifeline Sudan and the reason they do so is because the needs are not on one side or other of this conflict, they are on both sides. Operation Lifeline Sudan under a United Nations umbrella has negotiated access on both sides of this conflict which is vital because the front line, if such a thing exists, is a moveable feast. So in that respect there are rules of engagement that both government and non-government sides have signed up to which effectively gives OLS free access to the area which means that the supplies that are delivered are not available to forces on either side; they are available to the people of Sudan whether they happen to be in areas controlled by the government or controlled by the opposition. That is the way in which organisations which are choosing to work on both sides of this conflict operate under the umbrella of the UN which provides a degree of neutrality in terms of access.

127. Is that generally what has happened?

 (Mr Day) In our experience we could not work without it.

128. If I might say so we have heard a lot about the disagreements between the United Kingdom Government's position on this, indeed the Secretary of State mentioned that your disaster appeal reduced pressure on the SPLA to agree to a ceasefire for instance and the position of the aid agencies and indeed Operation Lifeline Sudan, I believe. Why have you not stressed that? You seem to be rather less critical of the United Kingdom Government than other people have been recently, I will not name names, but other people.

 (Mr Bryer) As I said right at the beginning we are not critical of the UK Government or particularly of the Secretary of State. There are a couple of things on which we do strongly disagree. The first point is the one you have just raised. We cannot see any possibility of British agencies raising money from the public influencing the SPLA in its decision to establish or not establish corridors of tranquillity, ceasefires or anything else. We do not see the connection and the timing suggests that there can be no connection. The other one is we feel it is appropriate and indeed right that agencies raise money from the general public and allow the general public to show that particular type of interest and concern and not to rely solely on governments. Those are the two issues on which I think we have a difference of opinion. Then one needs to stress the issue of peace, the way the Secretary of State is describing the problems of access and what we need to do now on which we would have pretty strong agreement.

Mr Grant

129. Maybe Ms Boycott would like to try answering this. I might get a straighter answer than we are getting from the NGOs. The war in Sudan has been going for 30 years or more. It is very difficult to resolve. I myself have been there. In fact I am a Nubian chief. I was a made a Nubian chief when I went to Kadugli a few years ago. The Secretary of State comes fresh on the scene and she is on about corridors of tranquillity and the need to resolve this matter and have a ceasefire and so on. People have been trying to do this for 30 years. The Organisation of African Union, the Pan-African Congress. I remember in Kampala there were disagreements among the anti-government forces let alone between anti-government forces and government forces. It is hugely complex. There is the race questions and the question of Arabism. Do you think that the Secretary of State should concern herself with the aid issues and leave the political issues to maybe the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Foreign Secretary? Do you think that she is straying too far into trying to resolve the conflict rather than concentrate on the aid issues which she has responsibility for? Do you not think there is a danger that the Secretary of State is trying to recruit the NGOs into a political campaign which could be against your charitable position which could prevent you from doing it?

 (Ms Boycott) I think she has certainly massively confused the issue by talking about people having compassion fatigue and criticising the press for endlessly publishing pictures of famine when famine was and still is at crisis point and people were responding to a crisis. Obviously she is right about long-term development and obviously we all go along with that. But yes, I think she threw a tremendous spanner in the works and she made people feel very confused about whether the money they were giving was going to get there or was it all being swallowed up and taken away by the wrong people and she complicated things when things did not need to be complicated because in fact the issue is terribly simple: there are a lot of people who are still facing starvation and we are rich country who can help. That was it and she got in the middle of it.

Ms King

130. I wanted to look at the recent history of the crisis. Shortly before I went there was an estimate of 320,000 people facing starvation. When I got there it had already gone up to 920,000. Three days later it was 980,000. When I returned it was 1.2 million and now I see that it is between 1.3 million in the Northern sector and 1.2 in the Southern sector. I asked the Secretary of State about the mechanisms by which this situation on the ground is relayed from the ground to DFID. Do you feel that you have the necessary access as NGOs and that you are able to sufficiently relay what we have seen here to be an astonishingly escalating crisis?

 (Ms Staunton) I think communication has got to be two way. Yes, we do regularly talk to officials in London, in Nairobi, in Khartoum. There is a lot of communication. Perhaps one of the things we have learned is the systemic weekly communication you need to track a situation like this as it is developing very fast.

131. Is there any specific way you feel it could be improved?

 (Ms Staunton) That is one of the things that we have decided that we need to talk to DFID about and other agencies to see how we could improve what it is that we are doing.

Dr Tonge

132. I asked a Parliamentary Question in November 1997 about whether DFID would extend relief to Southern Sudan. This was after the early warning in October. Her reply was there were not any plans but she would consider proposals from the NGOs. Did anything happen in November? Did the NGOs put forward projects at that time? We were asking questions in the House at that time just after the warning in October which DFID denies receiving. We really did not see things going in until there was the crisis you told us about in January. I think three months is a long time in terms of famine.

 (Mr Bryer) I am not aware of any particular rise in the discussion between DFID and the NGOs at that time. I have to say, there is a lot of communication between most NGOs on Sudan with DFID and the Foreign Office as well. Those relations are good and easy and open. I think it also goes back to the curious nature of famine. It is very unclear when large groups of people will suddenly run out of their normal coping mechanisms. I think there was a very strong argument that that would have happened the year before. We wrote about it in a book in 1995, published in 1996, when we were certainly feeling this going over the edge might happen. But I think the experience in famine across most parts of the world is you do not actually know when it will go. It is a curious mix. There are a whole range of things that happen that suddenly cause much larger numbers to run out of all their normal coping mechanisms. Obviously you cannot forecast two of them, which is whether a drought will come from the next harvest and whether the war will spring up at a certain time. What you do know is you see people running out of their normal ways of getting access to food. They run out of cash. If you had drought over several years you would probably run out of wild foods. There are lots of things that will happen and probably people will sell off their possessions. So year after year it is more difficult for them. I do think, though, you touch on an issue which is important for us and clear to us. There is a wariness in saying a famine is actually going to happen because we can very well be proved wrong. So there is always a balance as to how sure are we that this is going to happen in six months time.

133. There is lots of food in the world. The pharaohs in Egypt thousands of years ago knew about famine and storing it up for the mean years.   (Mr Bryer) Absolutely. I think what is coming out of this is that if there is not an interest in a country, if there is not long-term development in a country, if you are not building up the contingency stocks and so on at the appropriate time, then this sort of thing will happen, but that needs a lot of forethought over time. Those people in South Sudan and not only in Northern Bahr El Ghazal, pretty well everywhere and also in Northern Sudan, Darfour and Kordofan are right on the brink all the time. We have seen since the war started in 1983 that people keep getting onto the brink. Sometimes they can get back. Sometimes they can rely on their relatives or go somewhere else. Sometimes they do not and they die.

 (Mr Smith) I think the conflict complicates the situation, because the appeal itself contained requests for prepositioning supplies, but then you very often find that when the actual time arrives you do not have the access.

 Chairman: I think we should give great credit to the people who live in these drought areas because they do, as Mr Bryer has been describing, actually cope extremely well most of the time and they know about drought and they know how to keep their water supplies through these difficult periods. They are nonetheless right on the edge at all times. The question is one of judgment as to when it is going to become impossible. They are generally speaking extremely good at it. I am going to ask the Committee to cooperate with me. We have had a big question and answer session and we have not covered the ground of our questions, some of which have been answered. Our witnesses will excuse us for asking some of the questions again but I just want to make certain we cover the ground. Mr Grant, question one, please.

Mr Grant

134. Does access remain a problem in the delivery of aid to the Southern Sudan? How is aid delivered? Is it getting through to all the needy areas and those in need?

 (Mr Bryer) I think UNICEF has given a very good picture of the access problems, but we do need to recognise we are just pushing at the boundaries of what is possible. You have seen in the trip you have just had, Ann, that one Hercules is off for repair, one has not flown in yet, the Belgians may produce something, but the Sudan government has not yet given permission and so on and so on. There is a real problem there. There is the problem of fuel, ie, getting enough fuel stocked in El Obeid and Lokichokio to run these planes. Lochichokio is in the north of Kenya, right on the border. It has one road up from Nairobi, one road which at the moment is badly broken down. If that road collapses you will not get the fuel up. In El Obeid in Northern Sudan they have only got one forklift. Some of these things can be dealt with fairly easily, but it needs a very quick, very efficient response. At the same time WFP is constantly trying to raise the amount of food they are putting in. Last month they failed to put in the amount they hoped. They have now raised their target. That is going to be an even bigger problem and as one of our members, Médecins Sans Frontières, has pointed out, the rations are still quite small. The amount of food going in is enough for slightly more than half a ration. That is still assuming that people will have considerable coping mechanisms which they may not. I think one has to stress that yes, access has improved a lot, since the Secretary General made his remarks in early May there has been a lot of effort, it has allowed a lot of us to work more effectively, but it is pretty on the edge and anything could go wrong in these coming months. The first possible extra food grown from the harvest would be late August. We need to give a picture which is pretty dicey.

135. Are people moving to the feeding centres?

 (Mr Bryer) Yes, which is another worry, of course, because I think the thing one always tries to prevent is people moving into feeding centres because we know from the Ethiopian famine in the mid-80s, for example, that you can get disease and so on because of the clusters. One of the things we are doing is putting water and sanitation around those feeding centres. It is not ideal but it just shows the level of problems people are having that they are prepared to up sticks and go to feeding centres.

 Ann Clwyd: Can I just ask you this question because from the reports in the press which have be running over a number of weeks now you seem to have had a real ding dong with the Department for International Development. I notice that you are particularly careful in choosing your words today and you are much milder than you have been in print and that you are also dependent on DFID for money from time to time. Do you feel you have been leaned on in any way to alter what you said originally?

Chairman

136. Have you been nobbled is the question?

 (Mr Day) Can I say we do not feel nobbled.

Ann Clwyd

137. Can you answer individually as well.

 (Mr Day) In our written submissions we did make made a point of listing those issues where the Secretary of State has been reported as saying one thing and we, I hope, have clearly reported clearly to the Committee the position of the DEC appeal and we have clearly indicated where we feel we do disagree. David Bryer said there were significant disagreements with her but also the fact that the basis on which peace is an absolute priority for Sudan, there is absolutely no conflict. The fact remains we do feel it was absolutely correct to launch a public appeal. United Kingdom NGOs working in Sudan felt there was a combination of a critical problem and an opportunity to support to do practical things with the money that was raised and the perception was that the British public were looking to support that work. We have our own constituencies and they are those people who support us and with whom we are in regular contact. I think we would disagree with the Secretary of State if she feels it is not appropriate for those people to support good responses in such a case. As I say, I hope that the written information we provided to you does clearly list areas where we have chosen to disagree. We disagree with some of the pronouncements of the Secretary of State.

138. Are you confident that donor governments are going to provide all the money that is necessary for Sudan?

 (Mr Bryer) No.

 (Mr Day) No.

 (Mr Bryer) I think it needs very strong pressure for that to happen. There is maybe just one thing to be said. One does note that UN appeals are getting less and less funded here. It is absolutely impossible for the UN to plan ahead if they do not have money from two or three humanitarian appeals. In situations like this good planning is absolutely essential to get landing strips and roads made up. These are things you do not do overnight. The drip feed into UN appeals is a real problem. Anything the British Government can do to put pressure on others is terribly important.

Chairman

139. When you talk about 25 per cent funded or 30 per cent funded you mean for the total appeal? You do not mean to say the British Government has given 25 per cent?

 (Mr Bryer) No the British Government has given a fair proportion of the appeal, as they have in many other appeals by the UN but that is not true of every other donor in any way which is why WFP is only 54 per cent funded.

Ms Follett

140. I am going to unpick some areas you may have disagreed with the Secretary of State. She said that the appeal reduced pressure on the SPLA to agree to a ceasefire and that some of the NGOs benefitting from the DEC appeal will use funds received as start-up funds and some NGOs benefitting from the appeal have not worked in Sudan or Bahr el Ghazal before. Can you respond to those two.

 (Mr Bryer) I think I mentioned earlier my feelings on whether or not a group of British agencies raising money would put pressure on the SPLA. Personally I do not think so. That has to be a personal view but it is one shared by all of us in the DEC. We cannot quite see that connection. The second point was?

141. Some NGOs have not worked in the Sudan before.

 (Mr Bryer) Within the DEC there are 15 members. The committee has recently reviewed itself and grown from seven to 15 members. Of those 15, three immediately withdrew from the appeal on the grounds that they did not have a major presence in Sudan and did not feel that it was appropriate, they did not have something specific to offer. In the DEC within 48 hours of an appeal being launched one has to put in a plan of what one is going to do if one is going to be a member of the appeal, so it is extremely difficult for an agency which has no presence whatever in a country to do that. Certainly what does happen, though, with a DEC appeal is that it allows agencies both to step up their work and possibly to move into different parts of the country. So there are certainly cases where agencies are working in one part of Sudan and through DEC money they can move themselves further into other areas and certainly Oxfam would be an example. We are doing water work around feeding centres run by UNICEF, among others, in Northern Bahr El Ghazal in areas where we had not worked before. I think the idea that this is a nice quick way of somebody coming off the street is pretty much protected by the DEC rules. The other thing is that after the six month period there is an evaluation of the work which is then made public and it would be very damaging to an agency if that evaluation said: "You came in merely to get some money out of the appeal. You did nothing worthwhile." I think the chances of that are extremely remote.

142. How do you react to the statement that the appeal was only launched by the DEC because UNICEF and other individual NGOs had not launched their own appeals?

 (Mr Bryer) The timing does not work out like that because UNICEF launched its appeal and it was two or three days later the committee met and decided not to. Some of our members, particularly the church agencies who have very close relations with churches in the Sudan and work through those churches outside the OLS and have access to areas, including the Nuba Mountains, launched an appeal. The other members felt that because of the access problems of the OLS that was not appropriate at the time.

143. Can I just address this one to Ms Boycott? Do you think that the appeal that your newspaper launched and the general appeal has produced compassion fatigue and cynicism among the general public?

 (Ms Boycott) No, not a bit. It has raised awareness. We have children in schools writing to children in the Sudan, sending drawings to children out there trying to create links. I think it makes people aware of the world. I think it is absolute bong to say that people have compassion fatigue. It is quite the contrary. We need to take care of each other. Just being involved in the aid industry means you see what they are up against. It is amazing what they do. It is quite wonderful. We would be in great stook without them.

 Chairman: I think that is a wonderful note to end on because we are about to have a vote in the House of Commons which will mean we will have to adjourn. I do not think we have covered the ground adequately, of course, because we could discuss this very serious issue for a much longer period and we shall be doing so and we would like to continually hear from you as this crisis develops and you help to cope with it. I know from my own experience how much you do in these very difficult circumstances and I think that it is very vital work for terribly poor and starving people and I think you deserve our great thanks for undertaking that work. Much of it is voluntary. Thank you all very much indeed. We will want to keep in touch and we will want to make certain that as far as possible the deaths and the fighting both cease as soon as possible. Can I thank you, on behalf the Committee, very much indeed for your help this afternoon.


 
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