Memorandum from the Ambassador of the
Republic of Sudan
DEVELOPMENT ON THE CURRENT CRISIS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN
BACKGROUND
Political life in the Sudan has been characterised,
since independence in 1956, by a lack of stability and continuity.
Sudan has experienced three elected governments, dominated by
sectarian parties, dictatorships, and three military governments.
Before the present government came to power in 1989, the country
was in the grip of an unprecedented state of chaos, insecurity,
economic failure and corruption. The civil war in the south had escalated
dramatically. The situation was further compounded and exacerbated
by acute shortages of food and petrol, problems of drought,
famine, and the influx of millions of refugees from neighbouring
countries. In the light of this and aware of the need to
secure stability and wide popular participation in the decision making
process, the government initiated National Dialogue Conferences
in all issues of public interest, in particular the issues
of peace in the south, the economy, women, legal system, education,
youth, social development and the political system.
Among the important political decisions adopted was the introduction
of a federal system_26 federal states, each with full autonomous
jurisdictions, governors and cabinet ministers have been created.
Furthermore a new constitution has recently been adopted
through a national referendum. The constitution provides, inter
alia, for a presidential system, federal and state government,
independence of the judiciary, freedom of political organisation,
activity and parties, freedom of expression and all fundamental
and human rights that exist in any liberal constitution.
PEACE PROCESS
Another important political development to have come
out of the 1989 national dialogue conferences was the programme
for a peaceful negotiated settlement to the conflict in the southern
Sudan. This programme is based on the following:
- political participation and power sharing;
- fair distribution of the national wealth;
- expression of cultural diversity; and
- relation between state and religion.
Accordingly, the government has unilaterally declared
cease-fires on several occasions, coupled by similar declarations
of general amnesty. This has gone hand in hand with up to 20 rounds
of peace negotiations held in Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia
and Germany. A negotiated settlement with the rebels has, however,
been complicated by the fragmentation of the Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLA) in 1991. Within the context of the
1989 peace programme, and after long discussions, both inside
and outside of Sudan, the Khartoum Peace Agreement was signed
on 21 April 1997 between the government and seven factions of
the rebels. The Agreement provides for a free and fair and internationally
monitored referendum in southern Sudan, after four years,
to determine whether the people of the south desire unity or independence.
It has been this government, which since 1989 has sought
to address every issue of concern to the southern Sudanese since independence.
Southern Sudanese calls for a federal system, decentralisation
of power, redistribution of national wealth and a referendum
on the political status of the South have all been agreed on by
the present government. This addressed the issue for other
parts of Sudan, Nuba Mountains and other regions. At the
same time the government gave its full support to the efforts
of the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) and to the IGAD Declaration of Principles (DOP). In this
regard this government has also welcomed the efforts of IGAD
Partners Forum (IGPF). The Sudanese conflict has been about
the political status on southern Sudan and is not a religious
conflict. Indeed, the Sudanese civil war predates the present
government by 44 years. It was the present government which
in 1991 exempted southern Sudan from Islamic Sharia Law. Southern
Sudan is governed by its own laws as set out by the individual
states. It is regrettable that sections of the British media have
been responsive to a significant degree to those within Britain
who have attempted to distort the issue of religion in Sudan in furtherance
of their own political and religious agenda. The significance
of the Khartoum Peace Agreement is that it represents perhaps
the boldest and most sustained effort to bring about a just
and lasting settlement to the civil war in the South. The only
obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the war is the continuation
of violence by the faction of the SPLA Movement led by Colonel
John Garang. Regrettably it is now clear that he is militarily
supported and encouraged in the continuation of the war by
some regional and super powers.
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
The government of the Sudan has adopted a 10 Year
Comprehensive National Strategy (1992^2002) plan. It is based
on the free market economy and the principle of self-reliance.
On the basis of these policies the government has succeeded
in achieving a sustained economic rate of growth from 0.2 per
cent in 1988^89 to an average of 6 per cent. Inflation has
been reduced from 162 per cent to 13 per cent, and the structural
capacity of the country in highway roads, electrical power
supply, bridges, railways, telecommunications, airways and airport
facilities has been doubled. Livestock export has increased from
450,000 to 1.2 million head. The number of universities has
increased from 5 to 26. By June 1999 the country will achieve
self-sufficiency in oil and start exporting its oil through
a pipeline of 1,600 kilometres. This has been achieved in
spite of the war in the South and in the face of the unilateral
sanctions imposed by the United States and others. The
government has made strenuous efforts to assist through its own
relief programmes those of its people within the affected
areas. In addition to the four million Sudanese who have been
internally displaced by the war, Sudan is also host to approximately
one million refugees from neighbouring countries, refugees who
share Sudan's limited resources, services, facilities and
infrastructure. Sudan receives very little support from the international
community to assist with these refugees. The government is obviously
hampered by a lack of resources and is appreciative of the
continuing interest and efforts of the international community
in providing humanitarian assistance for those Sudanese affected
by the war. As part of its attempts to assist with the recent
crisis the Government of Sudan has provided Operation Lifeline
Sudan with 10,000 metric tons of food aid for the affected populations.
OPERATION LIFELINE
SUDAN (OLS)
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) is a unique operation
which brings together the government, the rebel movement,
the United Nations and 35 non-Governmental Organisations. It is
unprecedented. The OLS Agreement was signed in April 1989,
and provides, inter alia, the following principles:
- Neutrality and honesty.
- Transparency.
- National Sovereignty.
- Accountability.
The Agreement stipulated that the government and the UN represented
by its specialised agencies, shall follow the following procedures
in execution of Operation Lifeline:
(a) - Joint surveys in order to determine
the quantity of actual needs.
(b) - Joint planning of transportation and
storage of the relief items.
(c) - Joint planning in the allocation and
distribution of relief items.
(d) - Joint follow-up and evaluation of work
done.
All these provisions as well as subsequent UN General Assembly
resolutions emphasised the participation and the role of
the Sudan Government in OLS. Despite the shortcomings and
some negative aspects of the OLS during the past nine years, the
Sudan Government has continued and shall continue to provide
all the necessary assistance to deliver relief items to the
affected population regardless of the areas in which they are
found. The UN General Assembly has commended on a regular
basis the excellent co-operation of the Sudan Government with
the OLS. The Government of the Sudan continues to lend full
support to Operation Lifeline Sudan in the full knowledge that
substantial amounts, some independent sources say up to 50 per
cent, of the food aid supplied to affected areas in southern
Sudan is diverted to the rebel movement. Independent sources have
also stated that this diversion of food aid can be seen as
indirectly prolonging the conflict.
THE PRESENT
CRISIS
The present famine situation in Bahr El Ghazal and
other regions in the south is very critical. An estimated 2.6
million people are at risk from famine. It needs urgent measures
and long term solutions. The problem has been exacerbated
by the drought and a rebel SPLA offensive in Bahr El Ghazal itself.
In early 1998, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, a SPLA Commander who
had previously supported the Government's internal peace process,
led a rebel attack on the city of Wau, the second largest
city in Southern Sudan. This attack led to a drastic deterioration
of the security in the region.
For obvious security reasons, on 4 February 1998 the government
restricted air flights going into parts of the area. Two
points about this partial restriction must be made very clearly.
Firstly, it would have been irresponsible for the government
of the Sudan not to have at least partially restricted flights
into what was an active war zone. Any responsible government
would have done so, at least until the situation had stabilised.
This is exactly what the government did. It must be noted
that the SPLA has previously shot down, and attempted to shoot
down, several civilian aircraft, including relief flights,
in the course of the Sudanese war. The downing of these aircraft has
resulted in considerable civilian loss of life and had previously
led to air-delivered relief aid within Southern Sudan being
suspended by aid agencies for two years. The second point
is that it must be noted that not all flights into Bahr El Ghazal
were restricted. Additionally, while flights into areas of
combat within parts of Bahr El Ghazal were temporarily restricted,
aid flights to other regions in Southern Sudan were not. It
is also significant that, in spite of the limited restrictions,
approval was given to 14 flights by the World Food Programme
(WFP) and 20 flights by UNICEF, during February 1998. It is a
matter of record that despite having received authorisation
for 34 flights, the United Nations agencies only flew five flights.
Obviously the reason was not a matter of access. This issue
was raised in a letter from the Minister of State for Social Planning to
the Resident United Nations Co-ordinator of Relief Emergency Operations,
a copy of which is enclosed to this memorandum (Annex A).
The decision by Operation Lifeline Sudan not to use those flights
into the affected areas of Bahr El Ghazal that had been authorised
by the government might have been for two reasons. One is that
there were insufficient funds or resources available to mount
such flights, and the second reason may have been that Operation
Lifeline Sudan may have imposed its own security restrictions,
itself a reflection of concern about the safety of the flights
concerned. The partial security restrictions were lifted
in March, once the situation had stabilised. That decision was conveyed
to the UN Secretary General on 2 April 1998. The UN Security Council
and UN Secretary expressed appreciation for the co-operation
of the Sudan government. Mr Ross Mountain UN Assistant Emergency
Relief Co-ordinator, stated on 3 May 1998 the following:
- ªOn the issue of access, after a two month
flight suspension imposed by the GOS after the outbreak of
hostilities in January, the GOS granted clearance to Bahr El Ghazal
on 31 March and clearance to all of the south with the exception
of five site¾.
In a letter to the Minister of Foreign Relations, Mr Mountain
said on 4 May 1998: ªWe also gratefully acknowledge
that since the lifting of flight suspension on Bahr El Ghazal
on 31 March, the GOS has consistently responded positively
to all of the UN requests for additional air craft¾. The
government of the Sudan has continued to allow and encourage access
to the affected areas. On 12 July, for example, at a press
conference in Bahrain Dr Mustapha Osman Ismail said that: ªSudan
has unconditionally opened the southern region to international
relief agencies to send food to all the victims of famine¾.
LACK OF
RESOURCES
It has become apparent that a lack of resources for
the OLS has been the main obstacle to the provision of humanitarian
relief assistance. The UN and NGOs have expressed serious concern
about the lack of resources. In 1997 the UN received only
40 per cent of the US$ 120 million it sought. In 1998 the UN appealed
to donors for US$ 109 million but the UN received so far
less than 40 per cent of resources required. In a press release,
the World Food Programme stated on the 26 June 1998: ªWith
the crisis mounting in Sudan, WFP needs 99,579 metric tons
or US$ 137.6 million to feed 2.6 million Sudanese in dire need
of food aid from July 1998 to April 1999. So far, donors
have confirmed pledges totalling 37,081 metric tons valued at US$
58.7 million, leaving a shortfall of 62,498 metric tons valued
at US$ 78.9 million¾.
EL OBEID
AIRPORT
The Sudanese Government has long realised that a
vast amount of the resources made available to Operation Lifeline
Sudan is spent on the air transportation of relief supplies from
Lochichokio in Kenya to the areas controlled by rebels. It
is for this reason that the government has stressed the need to
use the facilities at El Obeid and Malakal airports within
the Sudan to transport supplies to the affected population. This
is because those airports are very close to the affected
areas and secondly because of availability of food at low cost
prices. We are pleased that OLS has at last started using
El Obeid airport to transport relief supplies to affected areas. We
hope that the use of these facilities can be further intensified
as they will provide more assistance and a better utilisation
of the limited resources available. Moreover, the Government
stressed the importance of using river and railway transportation,
and land surface corridors from inside and outside the Sudan
in conformity with the provisions of the OLS Agreement.
CEASE-FIRE
In addition to the aforesaid, from 1997 onwards the
government has consistently emphasised and re-emphasised
the need for a cease-fire, with a view to facilitating the delivery
of humanitarian relief assistance as well as helping to create
a conducive environment for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.
For this reason the Government of Sudan has responded positively
to the appeal by IGAD, the IGAD Partners Forum, the European
Union and the UN Security Council for a cease-fire. The government's
acceptance of a cease-fire is genuine and has not been proposed
for tactical reasons. We are convinced that this conflict cannot
be resolved militarily. Peace can only be achieved by dialogue
and not war. Regrettably, the appeal of the international
community for a cease-fire has been adamantly rejected by Colonel John
Garang of the SPLA. Therefore, it is important for the international
community to bring pressure to bear on the SPLA to accept
such a cease-fire.
REHABILITATION AND
DEVELOPMENT
We are most grateful for the humanitarian relief
assistance extended by Britain and other donor countries to the
Sudan. However, durable solutions can only be attained through
a peaceful settlement of the conflict and through rehabilitation
and development support. This concept was clearly outlined by
Mr Pronk, the Dutch Minister of International Development,
when he said before the UN General Assembly in October 1996, that the
concept of development for peace is a pre-requisite in war torn
countries, to achieving stability and security. He went on
to say: ªIn such pockets longer term development assistance
can be provided to education, health care, and water sanitation
sectors, not only does such assistance contribute to stabilise
the particular area, but it may also have a peace making
effect on neighbouring regions¾. Mr Boutros Ghali, the
former UN Secretary General, has emphasised the same concept in
the following words when he said: ªDevelopment is a
fundamental human right which should not be undermined or subjected
to other rights. The most important contribution the UN can
make to the achievement of peace is through development¾. Given
the above widely respected and generally accepted use and since
Britain together with its European partners have withheld
development assistance to Sudan since 1991, including some US$
500 million in European Union assistance through the Lome
Convention, the Government of Sudan feels that it may be appropriate
for these decisions to be reviewed in the light of the political
constitutional and economic reforms and progress over the
past years.
In conclusion, one can only but agree with the Secretary
of State, for International Development, the British Government,
and most members of the International Community that the war itself
must end. In introducing a federal system, a new liberal
constitution entrenching and securing political pluralism, and
in agreeing to an internationally supervised referendum whereby
the southern Sudanese can decide once and for all the political status
of southern Sudan, the Government believes that it has addressed
the root causes of the conflict. The Government of Sudan
believes that the United Kingdom and the European Union have a
pivotal role to play in helping to resolve this long running
conflict, and we are very grateful for their continuing interest
and concern.
HE Mr Omer Bireedo
Ambassador of the Republic of Sudan
15 July 1998
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