Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of witnesses (205 - 219) 

THURSDAY 16 JULY 1998 

MR STEPHEN BAKK and MR BONA MALWAL

 Chairman

  205.  Mr Bakk and Mr Malwal, thank you for coming this morning. I am sorry that we are running behind time but you will be aware of the reason: you were in the room when the previous evidence was given. I understand that both of you wish to make a statement. I urge you to make it as brief as possible because we are short of time and we have a number of questions to put to you.
  (Mr Malwal)  Mr Chairman, I know that you are keen to get on to your questions which will help your work. One filibuster in one day is enough. I shall not read my prepared statement. I only ask that it be part of your record. I thank the Committee for asking me and my colleague for this opportunity to take part in your discussions. If there is anything that we can do to clarify the situation and help your work we would very much like to do so. I stop there and make this statement available for your record.

Ann Clwyd

  206.  I should like to begin by asking a question that I asked of the Government of Sudan. I refer to the statement made by the Secretary of State for International Development: ªThe current crisis in Sudan was made even worse because the Government of Sudan would not allow humanitarian flights to the region from the UN base in northern Kenya for fully two months. The problem was one of access, not resources. We asked both sides to agree a ceasefire so that food could be moved in. The Government of Sudan was willing to discuss this. The southern factions said no.¾ Is that right?
  (Mr Malwal)  That statement is not entirely correct. We have already heard this morning that the SPLA has accepted the ceasefire. Whether the existence of a ceasefire facilitates relief to the areas of need will be tested. I believe that if people wanted to go to the area of need, most of which are under the control of the SPLA, the SPLA would facilitate that. I do not agree that the lack of a ceasefire was an impediment to the relief. I was rather astonished by some of the records sent by the Committee in preparation for this meeting, in particular the statement by the Secretary of State about access being the only issue. I think that resources are an issue. Even as we speak, in spite of the smaller numbers accepted by all parties, insufficient food is going to these people. It is not a question of access alone; it is a question of resources. Resources are very much in short supply.

Mrs Kingham

  207.  We have heard that there were ample food resources in Sudan in the run-up to the famine. We tend to look at this case at the present time when it has reached extreme proportions. But food resources were available in Sudan that could have prevented this famine from happening if people had had access to them. Perhaps that is the interpretation of ªaccess¾ that we should be looking at. Do you agree that food resources were available in the country and that it is the conflict that has caused the famine?
  (Mr Malwal)  I agree and go further and say that the famine was deliberately manipulated by the Government of Sudan as a weapon of war. It is ironic that at the time the international media were talking about starvation in southern Sudan the President of the Sudan announced that the country would donate one million tonnes of food to Niger, which is not even a neighbour of Sudan. Obviously, if at least one million tonnes of food could have been made available to the starving people of southern Sudan it would have made a great dent in that famine, if not halted it altogether. We are talking of tens of thousands of tonnes and the Government donate a million tonnes to an African country. That says a lot about the attitude of the Government to their own people.

  208.  We are becoming slightly obsessed by the word ªaccess¾. People are interpreting it to mean ªlogistics¾, ie the movement of food within the area of conflict. Access is a crucial issue. Is food manipulated for political ends? Can people get access to food, and can that food prevent famine? We have seen it in Ethiopia and in Ireland in the previous century when grain was exported.
  (Mr Malwal)  I think that it is manipulated. There is evidence, which unfortunately did not come before this Committee, that the food that the OLS has sent to areas within the south has been destroyed. In the past two months I have been to southern Sudan four times. I have witnessed government forces burning OLS food on runways to prevent it being given to the people.  Not only is it manipulated but the Government destroy  supplies that come from outside the country.

Ann Clwyd

  209.  An alternative point of view is that the SPLA uses food as a weapon. Can both sides be saying that of each other?
  (Mr Malwal)  The only assumption made by Dr Al Haj who was sitting in this place a short while ago_ or was it the Ambassador_was that the SPLA gets 50 per cent of the food. I do not think that is true. That the SPLA gained access to the food for itself is debatable. But it is not debatable that the SPLA would prevent food from going to the people of southern Sudan. They are the people for whom the SPLA is fighting; they are the source of its strength. That is where the SPLA gets its political support. I do not think that it makes much sense for the SPLA to turn on itself and prevent food from getting to the people on whom it counts for support. That cannot be said of the Sudan Government who are engaged in a war of genocide. If you want to commit genocide it is much easier to induce a famine so that if people die off you do not have to use bullets and weapons against them.

  210.  There was a Disasters Emergency Committee appeal in this country for additional funds for Sudan. The Secretary of State said: ª. . . the agencies were wrong to make an appeal because . . . it reduced the pressure on the SPLA to create a ceasefire.¾ Do you accept that?
  (Mr Malwal)  No, I do not. It is one of the astonishing statements coming from the Secretary of State that I have read. I cannot see the logic of that statement. Up to this minute, even accepting the £25 million which is quoted as the sum being donated by the British Government, there is still a very serious need for resources. I think that the appeal was important. Whatever was raised by the appeal is an addition to the resources to meet a need that is not yet fulfilled.

Mr Robathan

  211.  Mr Malwal, we know that Mr Bakk represents the SPLA in the UK. You are editor of the Sudan Democratic Gazette. Where are you based?
  (Mr Malwal)  In London.

  212.  Are you a member of the SPLA?
  (Mr Malwal)  No, I am not.

  213.  But you were a Minister in a previous government?
  (Mr Malwal)  Yes.

  214.  Which government was that?
  (Mr Malwal)  Nimeri's government. I became a member of the government after the 1972 agreement. It was the first ever agreement between southern Sudan and northern Sudan.

  215.  You see yourself as an independent in exile?
  (Mr Malwal)  Yes.

  216.  You could not go back to Khartoum?
  (Mr Malwal)  I could not go back to Khartoum because when the present regime seized power they saw in me an eponymous opponent, which I do not understand. I was an editor who published a personal newspaper called The Sudan Times at that time. They went to my offices and home and ransacked the whole place. It would be very foolhardy for me to engage in situations like that.

Chairman

  217.  Where is your home in Sudan?
  (Mr Malwal)  I come from Bahr El Ghazal, the unfortunate province that you are concerned with. I go there three or four times a year because of the famine and because I want to look at the situation there. In the past two months I have been there four times.

Ms King

  218.  We have heard from various sources that atrocities have taken place on both sides. What responsibility is accepted by the SPLA for the security and survival of those living in the area that you control?
  (Mr Bakk)  We have civil responsibility for southern Sudan; it is run mainly by civilians and a department for humanitarian affairs. These people are responsible for looking after the civilian population in the areas that we control. It is responsible for distributing food that is provided by NGOs. The security we provide is for the people who are delivering aid to the population. They also guard the airstrips from attack by the Sudan Government.

Mr Robathan

  219.  Now that the SPLA has called a ceasefire and the Government have responded why can you not proceed on the basis of a referendum in the southern states as to what those people wish?
  (Mr Malwal)  First, we cannot proceed on the basis of a referendum until we agree the modalities of the referendum. That is important. We believe in two things. If this is to be a comprehensive peace it must be an all-Sudan peace. The present regime, which has a hidden agenda in relation to the referendum, does not want the democratic political parties of Sudan which have been overthrown to be part of this. I came into the government in 1972 as a result of an agreement reached with the government at that time, which happened to be a military one like this one. Ten years later they changed their mind. The people who were left in the cold included the present Government. It was said that there was an agreement between the government of the day and the south and it could not be recognised. In order for northern Sudan to reach its own agreement the agreement with the South was abrogated. We are asking for a comprehensive peace. Let there be a comprehensive Sudanese discussion. We want whatever agreement is reached and any referendum to be internationally monitored. The Government are not forthcoming on that. Until we agree on the political modalities it is not easy to talk of an agreement in the way that Dr Al Haj spoke to you this morning. 


 
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