Resources
28. Clare Short told the Committee that it was access,
not resources, which was the problem in Sudan. There is no disagreement
with her conviction that access is a serious problem exacerbated
by the civil war, and that the conflict itself has been the major
cause of the famine now devastating the country. This does not,
of course, preclude there also being difficulties in raising the
necessary funds.
29. So confident is the Secretary of State in her
analysis, we found it strange that neither she nor her colleagues
knew whether there had ever been an occasion when there was spare
transport capacity but no food supplies to send.[52]
We have yet to receive a clear answer to this question although
the supplementary memorandum from DFID did say that in May "Poor
weather conditions and lead time necessary for hiring, training
and positioning of additional Food Monitors ... further hampered
air operations resulting in actual deliveries reaching only 3,800
Mts in May against the 6,500 Mts targeted".[53]
30. The Secretary of State also told the Committee
in evidence that "we had a problem with the World Food Programme's
estimates of need, which were too low. So we went through a little
phase where they were saying we now have enough flights and we
now have enough food and our official went there and said "That
is not true".[54]
This raises the important issue of the changing assessment of
the extent of the needs in Sudan. Judgement as to whether resources
are adequate depends crucially on an accurate assessment of need.
31. An examination of the chronology included above
reveals this changing assessment of need. In late 1997 the OLS
assessment said that about 250,000 people in Bahr el Ghazal would
need food and non-food support in 1998. The situation was seriously
worsened by the fighting around Wau in January 1998 which displaced
about 100,000 people and resulted in an increased estimate of
350,000 in need. The UN Consolidated Appeal for Bahr el Ghazal
in February estimated those in need in Bahr el Ghazal at 485,000.
The WFP estimate in early May of 350,000 in need was revised upwards
by the end of the month to 595,000 and in June the WFP published
new figures indicating more than 1.2 million were in need in southern
Sudan. By the time we took evidence at the end of June the UK
Committee for UNICEF were telling us that in total 2.5 million
people in Sudan were at risk of famine.[55]
32. Mrs Kelly explained the changing WFP estimates,
"As new areas open up undoubtedly they will find more people.
That has been the pattern all through May. When you get access
you find you have got a bigger problem".[56]
The consequence of such underestimates was that the basic food
distribution strategy of the WFP was initially inadequate, with
too few distribution centres and standards arbitrarily lowered
for therapeutic feeding in order to conserve supplies. In one
area of Bahr el Ghazal therapeutic feeding was being provided
for children below 60 per cent weight for height (the accepted
OLS standard is 70 per cent). The consequence was that severely
malnourished children were fed UNIMIX inappropriately and a number
died.
33. It is hard to unravel the system of communication
over the situation in Sudan. Dr Al Haj told us that as early as
May 1997 the Government of Sudan was warning of severe famine
in certain areas.[57]
In late 1997 OLS was warning in its Annual Needs Assessment for
1998 that "the only way to prevent the onset of the scale
of humanitarian disaster that spawned the creation of OLS in 1989
is to increase urgently the levels of relief assistance so that
OLS is able to respond rapidly to life-threatening emergencies
in southern Sudan".[58]
It also stated "Increased military conflict is predicted
by many in the early part of 1998, leading to displacement of
large civilian populations escaping conflict".[59]
Ms Staunton told us that OLS were warning of famine in October/November
1997.[60]
34. Despite the clear statement quoted from the Annual
Needs Assessment there does not appear to have been any concerted
international action in 1997 in response to this warning. Mr Day
admitted that the Assessment "was not ringing the big famine
bell effectively".[61]
DFID admits to receiving the draft UN Appeal in December 1997
but no warning of severe famine before that date. Given the claim
of a monthly biefing in October/November there is, as Ms Staunton
put it, "certainly a lesson there".[62]
In such circumstances even a month of failed communication can
be time crucially lost. It was only in May that DFID decided to
send an official to Sudan and no longer rely solely on the reports
of WFP.
35. We recommend that there be consideration by
the OLS, donor governments and agencies of how to improve communication
on the needs of Sudan. In particular there should be a review
of how promptly interested parties see assessments of future needs;
what mechanisms there are for response to the assessment (beyond
waiting for the publication of the UN Appeal); and whether OLS
did enough in late 1997 to alert the international community to
the prospect of a significant deterioration of the situation in
southern Sudan. We are very aware of the considerable and
pressing demands currently placed on OLS staff. We do, however,
recommend that at the earliest opportunity a review take place
of all the events surrounding the current crisis and that this
review be published.
36. We also recommend that the United Kingdom
Government reassess its own lines of communication. Our impression
is that the Embassy in Khartoum and High Commission in Nairobi
could do more to gather information and alert Whitehall to the
changing situation on the ground. We consider that DFID could
have done more in late 1997 and early 1998 to respond to OLS warnings,
relying less on the usual OLS/WFP processes.
37. In insisting that there was no problem of resources
for Sudan, Clare Short made on a number of occasions the point
that the United Kingdom had given generously and would do so again
as further funds were needed. The United Kingdom Government was
the first to respond to the 1998 UN Appeal and had pledged by
the end of June £25 million.[63]
She was confident that other governments would also continue to
provide funds. At the time we took evidence from the DEC and the
UK Committee for UNICEF the overall UN budget for Sudan was 48
per cent "covered" (that is, pledged). The southern
sector was 54.8 per cent funded.[64]
We have quoted earlier the statement in the 1998 UN appeal that
the previous year's appeal received only 30 per cent of the funds
requested. Similarly, UNICEF's programmes received only 42 per
cent of the requested funding in 1997.[65]
The decision on whether to launch an emergency appeal has to be
seen in this context.
38. When we asked Mr Day and Mr Bryer from the DEC
whether they were confident that donor governments were going
to provide all the money necessary for Sudan they immediately
and simultaneously said "No".[66]
Clare Short has asked the agencies to come into her Department
and talk about the possibility of all funding for humanitarian
crises coming from governments. Putting aside the merits of this
as a long-term strategy, we sympathise with NGOs unwilling to
assume this will happen in the case of Sudan. After all, such
discussions at 94 Victoria Street have yet to take place. Moreover,
the recent past demonstrates a decline in the funding of UN appeals
from donor governments. There is as yet little reason for the
NGOs to assume that the position will suddenly be reversed.
39. Much of the confusion in the discussion of resources
relates to the different timescales used in discussion. When Clare
Short said that there was enough money she was speaking of immediate
needs and of the willingness of the United Kingdom Government
to provide more money should that prove necessary. When the NGOs
made clear that more money was needed they were making the point
that at the time of evidence the 1998 UN appeal was only 48 per
cent funded. The memorandum from the UK Committee for UNICEF rightly
concluded, "The situation in Sudan has been fast moving.
Statements such as 'we have resources' or 'access is the best
that we have ever had' are relative and relate to a humanitarian
and political situation that is rapidly moving. Definition of
words such as famine and resources are often very different".[67]
Given the need for significant assistance to Sudan over many
future months, the continuing uncertainty as to the extent of
the famine, and the remaining amount necessary to meet the UN
appeal, we consider it to have been premature of the Secretary
of State to announce in such bald terms that there was no lack
of money or resources for Sudan.
40. We must also address Clare Short's claim that
the DEC launched its appeal so as to catch up with the UK Committee
for UNICEF in their competition for funds. DEC denied that UNICEF
advertising had put pressure on them to launch an appeal. On 27
April, the day that the UK Committee for UNICEF decided to launch
an appeal, the DEC Executive Committee agreed unanimously not
to do so, but "By 12 May agencies agreed the situation had
changed - flight access was real, the general information picture
was clearer. WFP's food stocks seemed worse than had been thought.
OLS was only 20 per cent funded, holes were identified in WFP's
logistics, new needs were confirmed".[68]
DFID has itself stated that during May there was a significant
reassessment of the scale of needs in Sudan. This seems reason
enough for the DEC to change its mind.
36 
