ELECTORAL MALPRACTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
On notification by the Registrar of Births, Deaths
and Marriages of a person's death, the Chief Electoral Officer
should have the power to remove their name from the Electoral
Register immediately (paragraph 19).
Cross-checking with information from the Planning
Service and local authorities is a useful way of combating organised
fraud, especially when inappropriate numbers of occupants are
shown in relation to small flats or even when derelict properties
are used as accommodation addresses. The present arrangements
for doing this should be formalised. The registration form could
usefully include a section for the householder to include details
of the number of bedrooms in the property (paragraph 20).
The evidence indicates that there may be a serious
level of multiple registration, at least in some parts of Northern
Ireland (paragraph 23).
We acknowledge that registration in more than
one place is a useful right for students and others. Those who
have a legitimate reason to register in two or more places should
be allowed to do so, but should be under a duty to indicate that
they are doing so and where the other registered addresses are
(paragraph 24).
The medical card is not a sufficiently protected
document to provide safe identification and it should no longer
be included in the list of accepted identifiers for polling purposes
(paragraph 29).
The present system of relying on party agents
to challenge in cases of personation is unrealistic and provides
inadequate protection (paragraph 31).
Absent voting provides a serious threat to the
integrity of the electoral system in Northern Ireland - a view
with which the Interim Review agrees (paragraph 38).
Those attesting absent voting applications should
be required to declare that they are treating the applicant for
the physical incapacity which prevents them from voting or, in
cases where there is no continuing treatment, that they are the
applicant's medical practitioner (paragraph 39).
We recognise the value to political parties -
and to the electoral process as a whole - of keeping marked-up
Registers in the public domain. Nonetheless, because of the ease
of voting fraud, the Chief Electoral Officer should examine experience
in the next five years and report on whether the problem continues
(paragraph 41).
We do not recommend that there be an exclusion
zone for canvassers outside polling stations (paragraph 45).
There is sufficient evidence of organised voting
theft to indicate that the problem of electoral malpractice in
Northern Ireland is serious (paragraph 49).
An essential component of checking should be the
inclusion of every elector's signature on the Register and on
an application for absent voting. The signatures collected should
be digitised and accessible in polling stations. When voters
apply for a ballot paper, subsequent to the presentation of personal
identification documentation, they should sign for it; their signature
as a matter of course should be compared with the copy on the
Register. The signature should be the basis of the decision,
to be taken by the presiding officer, whether a ballot paper should
be issued. In cases of doubt, the elector could fill in a tendered
ballot paper (paragraph 58).
Registration forms should contain more identifying
details to overcome the problem of illicit multiple registration
and to make fraudulent applications in another's name harder.
These should include date of birth, a signature and the National
Insurance number of the voter.
Where possible, applications for postal votes
should include a telephone number to allow verification either
on a routine basis or as spot checks (paragraph 58).
Where possible, all registration should be carried
out by door to door canvassers. In cases involving absent voting
applications, the voter should be required to fill in a card with
their signature, which can then be sent to the Chief Electoral
Officer (paragraph 59).
If the Committee's recommendations are put into
effect the need for a reliable Register to be compiled will be
even greater, since the registration process will in practical
terms be starting afresh. The Chief Electoral Officer's duty
to compile a trustworthy Register, especially on the first occasion
after implementing our recommendations, should require him as
a matter of universal practice in Northern Ireland to ensure that
canvassers deliver forms to each household. Where the householder
is absent, the canvasser should call again, leaving a card if
there is still no one at home which will say when the canvasser
will call again. The canvasser should call a third time and if
no one is still at home, leave a copy of Form A to be returned
(paragraph 60).
It is essential that the Chief Electoral Officer
be given the technology he needs to collate useful corroborative
information for checking details on the Register and applications
for absent voting (paragraph 61).
We recommend that the option of setting up a rolling
Register in Northern Ireland be considered (paragraph 62).
The present list of identification documents which
entitle a voter to a ballot paper must be replaced (paragraph
63).
The present list of documents which prove identity
should be replaced by a new, universally issued electoral card.
This card would be read electronically and if a valid vote had
already been cast in that election then the presiding officer
would be required not to issue a ballot paper (paragraph 64).
It follows that possession without lawful excuse
of more than one such card should be an offence (paragraph 65).
It is unacceptable that there should be both untraced
vote stealing on a wide scale and, when electoral theft is uncovered,
that there should be such a poor record of successful prosecutions
(paragraph 66).
Although the present rate of prosecutions for
vote stealing show a serious ineffectiveness in the system of
enforcement of the law, we do not recommend that the RUC should
take on an increased role in challenging suspect voters in polling
stations (paragraph 67).
In circumstances where a party agent does draw
the attention of the presiding officer to a suspected irregularity,
there should be no liability resting on the agent for such a challenge
- except in cases where the challenge is proved to be malicious
(paragraph 68).
We note that the Secretary of State did leave
open the possibility that change might be effected in time for
the European elections in 1999: we expect that any recommendations
that we have made, if acceptable, should be implemented at the
earliest possible date. The public in Northern Ireland deserve
nothing less than the confident assurance that, whatever the result
of their votes, the outcome will have been fairly reached and
will reflect their true opinion (paragraph 71).
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