Future Developments
90. A continuing theme throughout the inquiry was
the sense of separateness in the RUC. This has its origin in the
considerable pressure under which officers have served over the
past thirty years. Interpol figures, published in the International
Criminal Police Review in 1983, showed that Northern Ireland
was the most dangerous place in the world to be a police officer.
The risk factor was twice as high as in El Salvador, the second
most dangerous. The danger was worsened by the fact that the murder
of a police officer was not incidental to crime — as is
usual elsewhere — but was the objective of the crime.[126]
The numbers of deaths and a list of the injuries sustained by
RUC officers[127] does
not give full weight to the oppressive effect of the constant
threat under which the RUC has had to operate.
91. The inquiry raised a number of significant issues
which lead on from composition, recruitment and training of the
RUC and involve the policing system for Northern Ireland. These
issues will be heavily influenced by political developments and
form the remit of the Independent Commission established under
the Belfast Agreement. It is, however, hard to avoid all mention
of matters connected with this since they affect the public view
of the RUC and the practical limits placed on the RUC's scope
for reforming its recruitment and training procedures.
92. There is a serious doubt whether the roles of
security police and other, more normal police duties, are compatible.
Under present arrangements, there will be a significant security
role for the RUC in Northern Ireland until the last terrorist
group hands in its weapons. Whatever efforts the RUC makes to
improve its composition, recruitment and training, performing
a security police role does distance officers from the public.
The Independent Commission will no doubt consider carefully whether
the security role can or should be separated from the rest of
policing.
93. Because of the difficulties of uniting a security
function with more normal policing duties, some commentators have
proposed a multi-tiered structure, one example of which is a model
which restricts the RUC to handling security matters and any major
crime which requires an all-Northern Ireland response. An additional,
local police force would deal with all other police matters. The
Committee received a number of written submissions on this.[128]
Such a structure might introduce new flexibility in staffing for
those carrying out or assisting in police duties. It might also
encourage a greater sense of participation among a wide range
of communities. During visits to Spain and the Netherlands the
Committee examined arrangements which involved a sharing of policing
responsibilities.
94. In Spain, the Committee looked at the practical
effects of several different police forces co-existing within
the same jurisdiction, although with different powers and responsibilities.
As part of the new, democratic political settlement in Spain the
regions have acquired devolved power including, in the case of
the Basque Country and Catalonia, a local police force. The Guardia
Civil, the National Police and the Ertzaintza (the Basque Police
force) have different, but overlapping, areas of activity. The
first two forces operate all over Spain, but the Ertzaintza deals
with matters relating exclusively to the Basque Country. The existence
of these police forces, along with several small municipal police
forces and the regional police in Catalonia, has led to a high
proportion of police officers to the population in Spain.
95. There is a continuing problem with the system
of communication between the various forces. To some extent this
can be ascribed to the inevitable difficulties of passing information
between different organisations which are busily pursuing similar
objectives, but part of the problem also lies in the history of
policing in the Basque Country, where there is a separatist movement
which has strong political support. The forces of the Spanish
Crown are regarded by some with dislike, or even as an alien occupying
force. We were told that the relationship between the police forces
which operate in the Basque Country is not always built on a solid
foundation of trust and cooperation.
96. The Netherlands has established a system of Town
Wardens which is designed to act as an aid to the police. Wardens
act as eyes and ears for the police and serve as a line of communication
between the public and the police. Wardens are able to supplement
the role of community officers, frequently by bringing to officers'
attention matters which may seem trivial to the police but which
are of great concern to inhabitants of a particular neighbourhood:
the main example of this quoted to the Committee was the problem
of dogs fouling pavements. In the Hague, which is where the Committee
visited, Wardens are not given any special powers of arrest or
investigation. Overall, the system is regarded as successful by
the Dutch public and has the support of the police. An integral
part of the arrangement is the close cooperation between the Wardens
and the police. The Committee visited an office staffed by Wardens
which was run by the local beat officers in conjunction with representatives
of the local authority. There was an evidently harmonious and
successful working relationship between the officers and Wardens.
97. The system of Town Wardens in the Netherlands
is locally based and not uniform in the way in which it is organised.
It is important to note that the Warden system was not originally
based on a policing need, but as a way of establishing a framework
for local initiatives for finding public service for the unemployed.
The Wardens accordingly are of a wide range of background and
many have few formal qualifications. The training which Wardens
receive is varied according to each local authority, but the general
level of training for Wardens is low. This sets limits on what
they can be asked to do.
98. We acknowledge that there are those who argue
the case for a two-tier policing service and this issue will undoubtedly
be further considered by the Independent Commission. However,
whilst accepting that no options should be completely ruled out,
it was clear from our evidence that two-tier policing arrangements
present significant practical problems.
99. The security role of the RUC, as we have seen,
profoundly affects the way the force operates and how it sees
itself. It governs public opinion about the police and limits
the extent to which its activities can be subject to public scrutiny.
The RUC, because of its special security role, has not been subjected
to many of the pressures which are placed on other forces. Concurrent
with the advent of a more settled political life in Northern Ireland
the need for reform will become manifest. The progress in creating
a police service fully representative of and accountable to the
whole of the population of Northern Ireland will significantly
aid the creation of a political culture in which all sections
of the community have confidence that their legitimate concerns
and grievances can be resolved through the democratic political
process. An example of the RUC's special position is its relationship
with Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary. He inspects the
RUC by invitation on an informal basis and his findings are recommendations
only.[129] Inspection
of the RUC should be regularised to put the RUC's relationship
with Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary on the same statutory
footing as elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
100. The Secretary of State and the Chief Constable
look forward to evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, change.
If gradual change is possible, any transition towards a more
universally accepted police service will need to be seen to be
effective and as fast as the situation allows. A significant area
where change could be achieved early is the structure of accountability
of the RUC and, in particular, of the Chief Constable. There are
strong arguments in favour of a move away from direct control
of the police by the Secretary of State towards a structure more
closely akin to those in other parts of the United Kingdom in
non-metropolitan areas as soon as possible.
101. The Committee has already commented on the need
to include more civilians in the recruitment and training process.
It is also true that the RUC itself needs to be more open to civilians
joining it as full time employees to carry out specific tasks
for which they are better equipped than police officers. Mr Smith
thought that recruitment of skilled professional civilians, such
as personnel officers, would be useful as an improvement in the
efficiency of the force.[130]
To some extent the Police (Northern Ireland) Bill, when law, will
make this approach easier by putting all civilian staff under
the control of the Chief Constable, rather than under the Police
Authority, as now. Skilled professional personnel officers
from outside the RUC could enable the force to move towards a
more inclusive and modern system of personnel management.[131]
102. The present arrangements for accountability
of the RUC are unique in the United Kingdom. Under the existing
system of police administration the Chief Constable is directly
responsible to the Secretary of State. The Police Authority for
Northern Ireland has only a small role. It has never been what
Lord Hunt envisaged when he recommended a body to which the Chief
Constable could be accountable.[132]
It is questionable whether a Police Authority in the form recommended,
or with powers similar to other Police Authorities in the United
Kingdom, could ever have worked in Northern Ireland while terrorist
violence continued. Over the past 30 years the Police Authority's
role in holding the Chief Constable to account has been symbolic
rather than real.
103. The Police Authority, which was established
in 1970, has a very limited remit. It is part of the tripartite
structure for policing Northern Ireland. The other parts of this
structure are the Secretary of State and the Chief Constable.
The Chief Constable has operational independence. The Police Authority
is supposed to reflect the views of the community in relation
to policing, both to the Northern Ireland Office and to the RUC.[133]
It was established as a buffer between (local) politicians and
the police.[134] Unlike
other police forces in the United Kingdom the RUC does not rely
on local government, and therefore a local Police Authority which
is linked to local authorities, for any of its funding. This means
that the role of the Police Authority of Northern Ireland is quite
different from most other police authorities.
104. The Police Authority takes a very restricted
view about what duties it does have. Its failure to evaluate the
Community Awareness Programme except in the most amateurish way
was noted above (see paragraph 85). This reluctance to take a
more active role in scrutiny of the work of the RUC had contributed
to a view of the Police Authority as being ineffective or even
partisan, despite the relatively high proportion of Roman Catholic
members. Dr Maurice Hayes gave an example of this when commenting
on the Authority's actions in monitoring complaints against the
police. He did not think that the Police Authority had been effective
in the past and had not met anybody who disagreed. The Authority's
oversight was limited to receiving statistics about complaints
every month without any query.[135]
105. The Authority has attempted to enlarge its consultative
role by way of developing Community Police Liaison Committees.
There has been a considerable increase in the number of these
in Northern Ireland, although opinion about their success is mixed.
The Authority felt that they were improving the process of encouraging
local people to have a say in matters relating to policing.[136]
106. The Authority is required to represent all shades
of opinion within Northern Ireland, from a wide range of interests
like agriculture, commerce and industry, from the universities,
from the legal profession, from the district councils and from
voluntary organisations mainly concerned with childcare and youth
programmes.[137] Appointments
to the Police Authority are made by the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland.[138]
The present Authority has 10 Roman Catholics and 9 Protestants;
seven out of 19 members of the Authority are women.[139]
The appointments process for the Authority indicates no requirement
for any understanding of police issues to be included among the
main skills or competencies of applicants — a surprising
omission. Mr Ryder referred to a colleague during his time as
a member of the Authority who had never heard of the Authority
before being appointed to it.[140]
107. There have been moves to try to make the affairs
of the Authority much more open to the public. Because of the
security situation in the past, the names of Police Authority
members were not made public; now the names of the Authority members
have been put in the public domain.[141]
108. People are increasingly impatient of their interests
being defended or assured by people in whose selection they had
no choice at all. If there is to be real accountability there
should be some element of election. Changes to the system of
governance of the RUC are key in creating greater public confidence
in the RUC.
109. The government is aware of the weak system of
locally based public accountability of the RUC. Its paper "Your
Voice — Your Choice" referred to above (see paragraph
15) attempts to address this problem by involving the whole community
more extensively in the work of the police service and in the
fight against crime. The paper outlines three options for reform.
The first is that the Secretary of State continues to appoint
all members of the Authority, but takes into account the geographical
origin of members, ensuring that all parts of Northern Ireland
are represented. The second is more radical: it would ensure a
cross section of political allegiance of members of the Authority
either by direct election or by allocating seats on the Authority
to party representatives based on the number of seats held at
local council level or in the New Northern Ireland Assembly. The
third option is a combination of the two methods: half the Authority
to be made up of political representatives and the other half
to be appointed by the Secretary of State.[142]
The consultation paper was issued before the Belfast Agreement
and the subsequent referendum. The results of the consultation
are still awaited.
110. The Police (Northern Ireland) Bill further extends
accountability by introducing the concept of policing plans to
Northern Ireland, similar to policing plans in England and Wales
under Police and Magistrates' Court Act 1994 (see above paragraph
14). The Authority will agree performance indicators and policing
objectives with the Chief Constable and monitor performance on
how the police service is delivered. The Police Authority noted
that the Police and Magistrates' Court Act 1994 imposes a duty
on Chief Constables to have regard to the objectives in the policing
plan. It is less clear to what extent the Chief Constable of the
RUC will have to have regard to objectives in his own policing
plan and the extent to which the Chief Constable might be free
to change objectives and priorities agreed in the plan without
further consultation with the Authority.[143]
111. It would be helpful if there were a clearer
statement about the extent to which and the method by which the
Chief Constable was accountable to the Police Authority. In the
past when there have been difficulties and differences of opinion
between various Chief Constables and the Police Authorities members
have felt that their powers to obtain reports from the Chief Constable
on certain matters have not been strong or clear enough.[144]
There needs to be absolute clarity about the extent to which
the Chief Constable will be accountable to the Police Authority.
112. The RUC's system of funding and control, as
well as its paramilitary structure, training and focus, have made
it less open to public scrutiny than other United Kingdom police
forces. Dominance of the security role has created an unusually
strong link between the Chief Constable of the RUC and the Secretary
of State, to the exclusion of the Police Authority. The usual
tripartite division of power between an operationally independent
Chief Constable, the Police Authority and the relevant Secretary
of State is absent in Northern Ireland. Very careful consideration
must be given to the future of the Police Authority. Its reputation
for effectiveness has been limited and any change in its role
and composition will need to convince sceptics that it is at last
being given real powers and will represent a broad range of opinion
in Northern Ireland. As long as the RUC has a considerable security
function, this will create serious difficulties.
113. The courage which the RUC has displayed in the
face of terrorism will need to be sustained as major change affects
the force. It will be crucial that officers at every level become
committed to assisting the process of change. Mr Smith willingly
paid tribute to the current Chief Constable for his speed and
effectiveness in acting on his recommendations made as HM Inspector
of Constabulary, but noted that this openness to new ideas was
not universally held by all officers, especially some in senior
ranks. He emphasised the excessive caution in introducing change
in the RUC and said that in the higher echelons there has been
a reluctance to take brave decisions and move forward.[145]
On the other hand, we note that Dr Hayes acknowledged the openness
of senior police officers in discussing the problems of policing,
their willingness to embrace change and their commitment to provide
an even-handed professional police service.[146]
A lasting peace will offer many opportunities for Northern
Ireland, but the changes that will result will be profound. Officers
at all ranks, but especially those in senior positions, will need
to display considerable leadership in developing the role of the
RUC in the future.
104 
