FOURTH REPORT
The Northern Ireland Affairs Committee has agreed to the following Report:—
PRISON SERVICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
INTRODUCTION
1. Over the past year, prisons in Northern Ireland
have rarely been out of the news. The escape of the prisoner Liam
Averill from Her Majesty's
Prison (HMP) Maze on 10 December 1997, closely followed by the
murder of the prisoner Billy Wright in the same prison on 27 December
1997, were inquired into by Mr Martin Narey, now Director of Regimes
in HM Prison Service in England and Wales. He reported on 2 April
1998.[1]
A further murder of an unsentenced prisoner, Mr David Keys, came
to light when his body was found on the morning of Sunday 15 March
in accommodation set aside for LVF prisoners at the Maze. Sir
David Ramsbotham, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and
Wales, was commissioned by the Secretary of State to investigate
conditions in the Maze prison generally.[2]
2. The political background in Northern Ireland affects
the running of the Prison Service to a much greater degree than
other Prison Services in the rest of the United Kingdom. This
has been even more pronounced in the past year than usual. A reflection
of this is that the Belfast Agreement[3]
involves the progressive release of almost all the offenders held
for committing "scheduled"[4]
offences. This process has been put into legislative effect by
the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. Within a very short
space of time, a Service that has been expected to deal with some
of the most formidable terrorists held anywhere in the world will
be the custodian of a relatively small prison population with
significantly fewer serious offenders.
3. Partly because of public disquiet over the events
surrounding the escape and the first murder and partly because
of the importance of the prison system in providing proper security
cover for Northern Ireland, we decided to inquire into the Northern
Ireland Prison Service. The inquiry was not aimed at specific
breaches of security, but was an attempt to gain a picture of
the state of the Service at present. As the inquiry progressed
and it became clear that there would be substantial changes affecting
the Service, a vital part of our discussions centred on the Service's
ability to respond to the probable changes in its work.
4. In response to the Secretary of State's
request referred to above, Sir David Ramsbotham carried out a
full inspection of HMP Maze from 23 March to 3 April 1998. His
report[5]
was published on 11 November, just as we were finalising this
report. We are pleased to note that many of Sir David's
detailed conclusions regarding the Maze are quite similar to our
own more general conclusions on the Northern Ireland Prison Service
as a whole.
The Enquiry
5. The general remit for the inquiry was to examine
the efficiency and effectiveness of the Northern Ireland Prison
Service. The inquiry examined management issues, such as the effects
of Agency status, the structure of the service and the thinking
behind the definition of the set aims, objectives and key targets,
and the particular problems facing the prison service. We focused
on internal management changes and, flowing from that, staff morale.
We asked about the effects of the Belfast Agreement, how early
releases will be managed and possible reduction in size of the
Prison Service.
6. The enquiry involved oral evidence from: Mr Alan
Shannon, the then Chief Executive of the Northern Ireland Prison
Service; [6]
the Prison Officers'
Association; the Prison Governors'
Association; Mr Martin Narey; Sir David Ramsbotham; the Northern
Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders
(NIACRO); the Probation Board for Northern Ireland; and the Secretary
of State with Mr Adam Ingram MP, the Northern Ireland Minister
for prisons.
7. We visited HMP Maghaberry, HMP Maze and HM Young
Offenders Centre (YOC) Hydebank Wood, three of the four establishments
where the Service holds prisoners or inmates. These visits were
an invaluable opportunity to assess the views of staff who are
in direct contact with prisoners; the conversations which we held
with staff singly and collectively did much to build up a consistent
picture of the state of the Service.
8. We received helpful written evidence, which is
listed in the contents pages of the Report.[7]
We thank all those who assisted us during the inquiry by providing
formal or informal evidence.
9. We are grateful to our two advisers for their
able assistance: Professor Anthony Bottoms, Wolfson Professor
of Criminology and Director of the Institute of Criminology, University
of Cambridge; and Dr Andrew Coyle, Director, International Centre
for Prison Studies, School of Law, King's
College London (a former Governor in both the English and Scottish
Prison Services).
Background
10. Northern Ireland is a separate jurisdiction from
the rest of the UK and, as such, has its own Prison Service. The
Northern Ireland Prison Service was a much smaller service until
the late 1960s than it is today. The Service expanded very rapidly
in the 1970s as a reaction to the onset of terrorist violence
in Northern Ireland.[8]
Its number of staff leapt from about 300 to over 3,000. When the
level of violence started to reduce in 1994 there was a change
in the expected staffing needs of the Service and the Service
made efforts to reduce its staff. There are now over 500 fewer
prison officers, 30 per cent fewer Governors and a reduction in
the working week from 46 hours to 39 hours, which is the equivalent
of over 500 posts, compared to 1994-95.[9]
Despite this recent reduction in posts, the Service is still heavily
over-staffed
in comparison to the other Prison Services in the United Kingdom.
Uniquely in the United Kingdom, the Northern Ireland Service has
more staff than prisoners, even in the less politically sensitive
environment of the HM Young Offenders'
Centre, Hydebank.[10]
In late July 1998 there were 2,214 prison officers looking after
1,368 prisoners and 198 young persons in custody. Of those in
custody, 359 were remand prisoners and, of those, 103 were being
held in connection with the allegations of scheduled (ie principally
terrorist) offences.[11]
11. As a result of the large staff numbers, the cost
of maintaining a prisoner in Northern Ireland is much higher than
in the rest of the UK. The planned budget for 1997-98
was £142.223
million with a target cost per prisoner place of £76,252.
The comparable target in England and Wales for 1997-98
was £24,473
and in Scotland it was £28,317.[12]
Running costs have reduced by 15 per cent in real terms over the
last four years, but the Chief Executive recognised that they
are still too high, compared with the two other United Kingdom
Services. The Service is implementing business plans to improve
management and service provision further to reduce costs.[13]
12. The Northern Ireland Prison Service is a relatively
small, separately run Service. It has only four establishments
holding prisoners:
HMP Maghaberry, a high security prison for male remand
and long-term
sentenced prisoners and, in a separate house within the prison
complex, all Northern Ireland's
female prisoners;
HMP Magilligan, a medium security establishment for
male prisoners. It includes low security accommodation for selected
prisoners nearing the end of their sentences;
HMP Maze, a high security prison for sentenced and,
since July 1994, unsentenced male paramilitary prisoners (and
a small workforce of sentenced male non-paramilitary
prisoners);
HM YOC Hydebank Wood, a young offenders'
centre for male remand and sentenced inmates.[14]
The prison estate is relatively modern. An older
prison, HMP Belfast, was closed on 1 April 1996. An additional
two house blocks have been recently built in Maghaberry.[15]
Except for Magilligan, which is in County Londonderry near Lough
Foyle, the establishments are centred around Belfast.
13. The threat of terrorist violence continues to
be a permanent feature of life for members of the Northern Ireland
Prison Service. During the troubles 29 members of the Northern
Ireland Prison Service staff have been killed, including the Deputy
Governor of HMP Maze, and many have been injured. Even in the
recent period of relative peace prison officers have been attacked
in their homes.[16]
In 1996/97 alone there were 122 reported threats against staff
and 50 officers were admitted to the special protection scheme.[17]
14. One of the benefits of the visit to HMP Maze
was that we were able to gain a first-hand
impression of the considerable psychological pressures which are
placed on prison officers and Governors. In Northern Ireland personal
information about prison staff, including where they live and
family details such as where their children go to school, is regularly
gathered by members of terrorist groups. This intelligence can
be used to great effect by prisoners who remain in close contact
with active paramilitary units outside jail. In such circumstances,
casual references by prisoners to officers'
personal lives involve a sense of menace which is consciously
played on by many prisoners, particularly in the Maze. The normally
expected balance of control within a prison is substantially reversed,
with prisoners able to influence, and in some cases even control,
staff through intimidation. The constant pressure on staff was,
rightly, emphasised both by Mr Narey and by Sir David Ramsbotham
in their respective reports.[18]
15. The political developments which culminated in
the Belfast Agreement have brought the Northern Ireland Prison
Service to a turning point in its history. If the political background
remains promising the Service will necessarily change in the face
of new requirements. It has already started to organise the process
of change and Ministers have recognised the need to think afresh
about the role of the Service. To this end, there will be a formal,
in-service,
major seminar, involving senior management, which will take place
once this Report is published.[19]
With that in mind, we have divided our Report into two sections:
one deals with the problems associated with managing change; the
second deals with certain specific matters which in our view demand
attention.
1 Report of an inquiry into the escape of a prisoner
from HMP Maze on 10 December 1997 and the shooting of a prisoner
on 27 December 1997 [HC 658] (The Narey Report); and see H. C.
Deb. 2 April, Vol 309, Cols. 1413-1423, for the Statement to the
House by the Secretary of State in response to the Report. Back
2 See H.C. Deb. 2 April 1998, Vol. 309, Cols. 1413-1423. Back
3 Cm 3883. Back
4 Within the meaning of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
Act 1973, 1978, 1991 or 1996 (see Northern Ireland (Sentences)
Act 1998, section 3 (7)). The Agreement also provides likewise
for the release of prisoners serving sentences in Northern Ireland
who were sentenced in England and Wales or Scotland for equivalent
offences (see Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, Schedule
3). Back
5 Referred to in this Report as the Ramsbotham Report. Back
6 Mr Shannon was appointed Principal Establishment and Finance Officer
in the Northern Ireland Office with effect from October 1998;
he has been replaced by Mr Robin Halward, latterly Head of the
Secretariat to the Metropolitan Police Committee , Home Office,
and a former Governor of HMP Leeds and HMP Manchester. Back
7 See page Ref. Back
8 Q.1. and see Q. 223. Back
9 Ev. p. 7. Back
10 Ev. p. 6. Back
11 H. C. Deb. 22 July 1998, Vol. 316, Col. 535w, and 21 July 1998, Vol. 316, Col. 440/441w; Ev. p. 4. And see HM Inspectors's comments Q. 229, 242.etc. Back
12 Ev. p. 6: cost per prisoner place is based on net operating costs divided by staffed prison places (1,776 at the start of 1997-98). Back
13 Q.1. Back
14 Ev. p. 3. Back
15 Ev. p.3. Back
16 Q.1. Back
17 See Narey Report, paragraph 1.7. Back
18 See Narey Report, passim and Ramsbotham Report, Chapter 5. Back
19 Q. 402. Back
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