House of Commons - Northern Ireland Affairs

Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs Fourth Report

16. The Northern Ireland Prison Service has contributed great public service over the last 30 years in circumstances that have been difficult and dangerous. Any comments in this Report should be read within that context. This is a difficult time for the Service, which faces fundamental change. The Belfast Agreement raises questions about the future methods of coping with paramilitary prisoners and the treatment of "ordinary" non-paramilitary prisoners. In addition there is an expected reduction in the size of the Service, in part due to the implementation of an internal Review of the Service. This Review will have important effects on the conditions under which staff are employed and, related to these, staff morale.

Paramilitary prisoners

17. At present, adult male paramilitary prisoners are confined in HMP Maghaberry, unless they indicate a wish to be transferred to HMP Maze.[20] Transfer to the Maze is always voluntary; there is considerable pressure placed on paramilitary prisoners by their organisations to opt for transfer. In practice, the great majority do so. Refusal to transfer may be regarded by paramilitary groups as a sign that a prisoner is an informer.

18. The regime in HMP Maze is different from any other prison.[21] The approximately 500 prisoners are segregated according to their political affiliation into five separate housing units.[22] As the murder of Billy Wright demonstrated, many of the prisoners are violently opposed to each other. Once in the prison, they are confined to the particular wing where fellow members of their organisation are housed; each wing has its own "officer commanding", who is appointed by the paramilitary organisation and whose task it is to maintain discipline among the ranks of that organisation's imprisoned members. Maintenance of close control of their imprisoned members is an important part of the tactics of paramilitary groups.

19. The treatment of paramilitary prisoners in HMP Maze has been fraught with difficulty. In 1975 the Government decided to end Special Category Status for prisoners and to bring their treatment into line with other, "normal" criminals. As a result of protests, which involved the deaths on hunger strike of prisoners, and other resistance by prisoners, paramilitary organisations and their supporters in the community, a position has arisen in the Maze where attempts to treat prisoners as individuals (which is a central part of normal prisoner management) have been largely foiled. Instead, prisoners regard themselves as prisoners of war and communicate to the authorities via their "officers commanding".[23] Several witnesses said that the Prison Rules were not followed in the Maze.[24]

20. The quasi-military structure of the wings in HMP Maze and the self-image of the prisoners as P.O.W.s combine to make control of the prison unusually difficult. The prisoners enjoy the support of significant sections of the community and this places officers under immense pressure when dealing with them. Partly as a response to the difficult and dangerous conditions under which staff work in the Maze, in 1994 the management decided to withdraw staff from patrolling duties in the residential areas of the wings. As the Narey Report notes, before the withdrawal of staff from the wings, officers were effectively hostages who were unable to enforce orders against the will of organised prisoner groups. The officers were also open to intimidation and psychological conditioning by prisoners and therefore constituted a security risk.[25]

21. The effects of the Belfast Agreement and the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 potentially change the major part of the Northern Ireland Prison Service's work. The law now allows for increased periods of remission of sentence for those prisoners who meet the criteria set out in the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 and who offended before Good Friday (10 April) 1998. It is expected that this will affect the majority of sentenced prisoners in the Maze.[26]

22. In her evidence to us, the Secretary of State declined to be specific about the plans for HMP Maze[27]. However, the Director General of the Prison Service announced on 11 November that the full implementation of the Belfast Agreement could make possible the closure of the Maze by the end of the year 2000.[28]

23. The political situation is liable to change rapidly. However, even if the Belfast Agreement is fully implemented it is likely that there will continue to be some paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland beyond the year 2000, either because they committed offences after Good Friday 1998 or because they belong to organisations which do not subscribe to the Agreement. Such prisoners will serve their full sentences as normal.[29] It is not yet clear under what conditions remaining paramilitary prisoners will be held, whether they will be treated as ordinary criminals or whether the special conditions of HMP Maze (perhaps replicated in another prison) will continue. Given the significant reduction in numbers of paramilitary prisoners held in Northern Ireland prisons, it should be possible for the Prison Service to normalise the arrangements for holding such prisoners. We would welcome a statement from the Secretary of State defining the circumstances in which such prisoners will be held.

"Ordinary" non-paramilitary prisoners

24. The small number of establishments in the Northern Ireland Prison Service creates special problems for the distribution of prisoners. The normal expectation in any prison system is that separate physical provision is made for different categories of prisoners: particularly, that those on remand be held separately from those who are convicted, that women not be held in male prisons and that juveniles be held separately from adult prisoners. At present, adult male prisoners are held in either HMP Maze, HMP Maghaberry or HMP Magilligan. Adult male remand prisoners are held in either the Maze or Maghaberry and almost all male young offenders are held in Hydebank Young Offenders Centre. All female prisoners are held in a separate section of Maghaberry Prison. If the Maze is closed, it is likely that Maghaberry will be the key prison in Northern Ireland, as it will be the only fully secure prison establishment. This establishment has new buildings and a history of housing a wide variety of prisoners. Although no definite evidence was forthcoming from the Secretary of State or the Prisons Minister (Mr Adam Ingram MP) about Maghaberry's role if the numbers of paramilitary prisoners drops and the Maze closes, it is hard to avoid concluding that all types of prisoner will be concentrated at Maghaberry, including young females, fine defaulters and long-term prisoners, convicted and unconvicted prisoners. The 1997-98 Northern Ireland Prison Service Annual Report rightly points out that already the mix of prisoners at Maghaberry, with remand and long-term male and female sentenced prisoners as well as female Young Offenders, causes particular difficulties.[30] The Service's realistic statement of the problems of confining a wide variety of prisoners within one establishment does not accord fully with the optimistic view expressed in the Secretary of State's evidence that Maghaberry will be able to manage effectively the full range of prisoner categories.[31]

25. The management of such a diverse group of prisoners will be extremely complex. There are already indications that the priorities which the Governor of HMP Maghaberry has to make in meeting his responsibilities have important consequences for the various activities in the prison. One of his first priorities is to make sure that remand prisoners are presented at court on due dates. There are nine Crown Court centres in Northern Ireland.[32] The widely spread courts system and the legal obligation to produce prisoners means that there are expensive staff costs associated with escort duties. Producing one prisoner for a brief hearing before a court can involve two prison officers being absent from the prison where they are based for the best part of a day. A recent Prior Options review of escorting prisoners to and from court took place in 1997-98. This exercise involved police and other relevant organisations. Possibilities which have been considered are the development of remote television or video links for remand and other pre-trial hearings and contracting out of the escort function.[33] Enabling legislative provisions were included in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.[34]

26. Within a small prison system there is no easy solution to this problem. The question of where to keep remanded prisoners affects the number of prison officers required by the system; it also governs how the officers regard their jobs. At best, prisoners should be kept reasonably close to the courts where they are to be produced. The Prison Rules require that remand prisoners should be kept separate from sentenced prisoners.[35] We agree with this principle.

27. At present, remand prisoners are held at HMP Maghaberry in separate wings from sentenced prisoners. However, staff looking after both groups are inter-changeable. Therefore, a practical consequence of the need to give priority to producing prisoners at court is that on many occasions there are insufficient staff left to manage activities for sentenced prisoners and that many of these have to be cancelled on a regular basis.[36] This is particularly unfortunate since many of the convicted prisoners in an establishment such as Maghaberry are serving long sentences. As NIACRO pointed out, the new political background provides an opportunity for the Service to move away from its emphasis on holding prisoners securely towards rehabilitation and training.[37] A major defect with an option which involves concentrating resources at Maghaberry is that the system may tend to limit its horizons to securely confining inmates. It is undesirable that escort duties should adversely affect the regime of sentenced prisoners because of staff shortages.

Management

28. A continuing theme throughout the inquiry, which appeared in written and oral evidence and which was reinforced by conversations during the Committee's informal visits to three Prison Service institutions, was the quality of the Service's management.[38] Mr Narey referred to the quality of middle management in his report.[39] In his oral evidence to us he said that, based on meeting at least half the prison governors at HMP Maze, there was insufficient quality among them to produce a Governor of the Maze and a Director General of the Service. He compared this situation with the graduate fast-stream in England and Wales which had produced a lot of high quality middle managers in recent years and potential members of the Prisons Board and Directors General.[40] Mr Narey's evidence was supported by that of HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, who commented on the need to improve the quality of management in the Northern Ireland Prison Service, perhaps by allowing secondments to prisons in other parts of the United Kingdom. [41] The evidence from the Prison Governors' Association and, in particular, the Prison Officers' Association indicated little sign of effective trust and good communication within the Service.[42] The low morale in the Service evidently affects a wide range of personnel, including many in middle management, and this affects the quality of management. We examine this more fully below (paragraphs 39 ff).

29. The failure of the Service's managerial level to produce candidates capable of filling the post of Governor of HMP Maze or the Director General of the Service is serious. At present, the Director of Operations, Mr Martin Mogg, is also Governor of the Maze. No one could support the fusion of these two vital jobs, both of which clearly demand the full attention of the job holder. The present group of Northern Ireland Prison Service managers has not provided a suitable candidate for either post: Mr Mogg was previously a prison governor in the England and Wales Service.

30. It would not be appropriate to select particular managers for criticism, since the problem is more deep-seated than the failings of any one person, but there is considerable cause for concern about the ability of the managers in the Service to cope with the demands on the system which likely reforms and changes will require.

Agency Status

31. The Prison Service was launched as an executive agency under the previous Government's Next Steps initiative on 1 April 1995. It was the second agency to be created within the Northern Ireland Office and is one of the largest, with just under 3,300 staff.[43] As with other agencies, the responsibility for the daily running of the Service lies with the Chief Executive[44] who reports to the Minister for Prisons.[45]

32. On paper, agency status has involved producing a business plan, a better understanding of the costs of the Service and a unified treatment of all staff within the Service under one personnel division. However, Mr Shannon conceded that the introduction of agency status had not produced a revolutionary change, since the Service was already free-standing to a great extent under the previous system. Among those who gave evidence to us, there was no serious challenge of the principle of agency status, but many of the benefits of agency status have yet to be achieved.[46] Agency status has not affected the structure of the Service, although the new agency was required to carry out a pay and grading review within the first two years of its existence. The fulfilment of this requirement is the most substantial effect of Agency status so far; the Service exceeded the formal requirement by carrying out an extensive Prison Service Review, which examined the basic structure of the organisation as well as the scales of pay and grading system.[47]

Implementing the Prison Service Review

33. The comprehensive Prison Service Review of the organisation, structure and management of the Service was led by a senior Governor, who was assisted by external management consultants. The task of the Review included an examination of pay and grading arrangements to ensure that they were consistent with the Service's needs and circumstances, in line with the requirement placed on other public sector organisations. The Review was launched on 29 April 1996 and reported in September 1997; staff received a summary of the Review Report in the following month. The report concluded that the present structures and grading arrangements had led to a significant degree of over-grading.[48] The Prison Service expects that adjustment of the grades will provide an opportunity for substantial cost savings in the medium and long term.[49] The findings of the Review have been agreed by management and Ministers and will be implemented over the next two years.[50]

34. A major recommendation of the Review is that all staff in the Service will have to compete for their own jobs under the proposals for re-structuring the Service.[51] The substantial changes recommended in the Review would involve much disruption and concern on the part of staff in any Service. The Prison Service recognised that implementation of the Review presents a "daunting challenge" to management and staff, given that the effect of the Review will coincide with a significant reduction in staffing levels flowing from the Government's proposals for accelerated release of prisoners. It said that it had "considered the risks carefully but [was] convinced that there are benefits to both the Service and staff in taking forward the change agenda promulgated in the Review in tandem with the anticipated staffing reductions".[52]

35. Since the effects of the Belfast Agreement have yet to be worked out, it is impossible to know how the Review will be implemented in practice. It is not yet clear how many staff the Service will need, or where they will be based. In the absence of any clear strategy for change any confidence in the success of the Review, as articulated in the Prison Service's evidence, seems dangerously complacent. The effect of implementation of this ambitious reform, which may well be fully justified, will be to increase the confusion on the part of staff about their prospects and thus further undermine morale. The timing of implementation of the Review is unfortunate, given the other fundamental changes which will affect the Service.

Staff Reductions

36. The Service's justification for the abnormally high ratio of officers to prisoners is based on the very different nature of the prison population, higher levels of security, diseconomies of scale and enhanced regimes.[53] The requirement for so many prison officers will change as prisoners are released under the Belfast Agreement. The Prison Service may well ultimately return to a size similar to the one it was before the Troubles started. It is to be expected that there will be a significant reduction in the number of officers.

37. There is little evidence as yet of a strategic approach to staff reductions consequent on the Belfast Agreement. To some extent this is understandable, since requirements are dictated by progress in the political sphere, which has been swift. Nevertheless, those at present employed in the Service are openly wondering about their future and quite reasonably want to know as soon as possible what their future prospects, if any, are in the Service. As we went around the various prisons in Northern Ireland, this concern was repeatedly voiced by staff, often in the form of the question: "What will our redundancy package be?". The Secretary of State made it clear that there had not been time for negotiations to take place because of the speed of events.[54] At the time of finalising this Report, there is still no indication how staff reductions arising as a result of implementing the Belfast Agreement will be handled. This is unacceptable and places the system within Northern Ireland's Prison Service under dangerous strain. As a matter of urgency, a basic framework setting out the possible options for staff should be made available.

38. There is also a need to improve the balance in the numbers of officers from the various parts of the community within the Prison Service, which is largely staffed by members of the majority part of the community. In uniformed and governor grades 6.9 per cent are Roman Catholic, 77.6 per cent are Protestant and 15.5 per cent are undetermined.[55] One effect of staff reductions will be to limit the freedom of action of the Service to recruit staff in sufficient numbers to redress the imbalance with reasonable speed. The Prison Service has already halted recruitment of new uniformed or governor grades over the past four years, apart from the recruitment of 170 prison auxiliaries in 1996.[56] The Prisons Minister, Mr Ingram, did not think that the perceived imbalance in the number of staff from different traditions within the community was used as a means of criticising the Prison Service to the same extent as it has been used to criticise the RUC, although he acknowledged that any public service or private sector organisation in Northern Ireland has to employ as best it can an even balance of employees from all parts of the community and that the Service needed to address this. [57] A continued imbalance in the composition and recruitment of the Service may well become a target for substantial criticism. A plan to redress the imbalance should be an urgent priority high on management's agenda.

Improving Morale

39. We were unfavourably impressed with the low morale displayed by staff during our visits to the three establishments. This problem was recognised in the Prison Service Review.[58] A similar impression clearly affected the authors of the Narey Report, which refers to a "general air of apathy which pervades much of the establishment".[59] The evidence of the Prison Officers' Association and the Prison Governors' Association reinforced the sense of deep unhappiness among staff in the Service. In his recent report, Sir David Ramsbotham cites a number of manifestations of low morale amongst staff at HMP Maze. These include routine breaching of agreed Safe Staffing Levels by staff when it facilitated an early end to their shifts, a practice group managers tended to leave unchallenged in case the intervention resulted in individuals concerned reporting sick[60] and widespread lack of pride in the uniform staff were wearing.[61]

40. One important sign of low morale is the abnormally high sickness rate, though that also has other causes, particularly in HMP Maze. Despite the high staffing level there is a constant shortage of officers as a direct result of the propensity of officers to go off sick. Although there are about 1.82 officers for each prisoner overall, the actual ratio on duty is one officer to about 1.4 prisoners; at night the ratio is one officer to 12 prisoners.[62]

41. The high staff sickness levels are, in part, a symptom of acute personnel problems. They are also a cause of further discouragement as staff who are trying to cover both their own and colleagues' tasks become seriously overburdened. The Prison Service's latest Annual Report[63] acknowledges that the target of reducing absenteeism by at least 10 per cent was not met; in fact, the problem got worseC there was an overall increase of 7 per cent over the previous year. We note that the sharpest increases occurred at HMP Maghaberry and HMP Maze in the aftermath of serious security incidents.[64] It is also the case that in a system where there is no overtime staff on sick leave are paid as much as if they were on duty; this was not so previously, when absent staff who were unavailable for overtime lost that part of their pay. It is noticeable that sick leave rates markedly increased in the year that overtime was abolished and, although they fell back in the following year, have remained high since then.[65]

42. The first step to addressing the high rate of staff absence is to define its causes. In doing so the management of the Service will gain an insight into the state of morale of staff; it is possible that the process of investigating the origins of this problem will of itself provide some improvement in the low morale which is undeniably an essential component of absenteeism. Only when the causes of absenteeism are identified clearly can management proceed to deal with the problem adequately.

43. The Prison Service Review acknowledged that absenteeism was a significant problem, noting that three years without any period of absence is considered exceptional. However, some of its recommended rewards for those who do not take sick leave, which form part of the proposed strategy for dealing with absenteeism, seem unrealistic, given the circumstances creating much of the low morale.[66] The changes which will affect the Service in the near future if prisoner releases go ahead as planned will not make coping with this issue easier. The same Report indicates that the new tactic to deal with staff sickness is to delegate the management of staff sickness to local management and that "greater emphasis has been placed on encouraging an early return to work while dealing firmly with poor attenders".[67] These are appropriate measures, but they should not eclipse the responsibility of management at the highest level to address the issue of staff absence in partnership with the relevant staff association and local management. Proper structures need to be put in place to create accountability for days taken off sick. Consistent standards must be applied which follow a coherent set of principles.

44. The evidence showed that there was a significant failure of communication between staff and management. There was an apparent lack of respect between the two parts of the Service which was widespread and deeply rooted. Despite persistent inquiries on our part, we saw no evidence of any effective personnel strategy on the part of the Northern Ireland Prison Service management. Until an effective personnel strategy is devised, absenteeism and poor sickness rates are likely to continue.

Training

45. The Service's delivery of staff training revealed shortcomings. The most recent Annual Report refers to a key target of achieving "an average of 5 days training per member of staff". Because of operational pressures and the continuing high level of sick absence this target was not met. An average of 3.0 days training per member was achieved; this compared with 3.69 days achieved for the previous year.[68]

46. In theory, the Service recognises the importance of investment in training and development of staff as part of its struggle to improve standards of performance and to meet its business targets and objectives.[69] The training needs of the Service were analysed in each Prison Service establishment for all staff as part of the annual training plan, reported in the Prison Service College Annual Training Report for 1997-98. This was the first time that the needs of the Service were assessed in this way. The intention was to promote "greater occupational and specialist skills across the Service; a stronger management culture; a safer working environment; and an increased awareness of good equal opportunity practice."[70]

47. In oral evidence, Mr Shannon said that as part of the Service's approach to improving morale it had taken a range of training initiatives and introduced NVQs in custodial care, had improved levels of Control and Restraint training and committed itself to achieving the Investors in People award in the near future.[71] However, he admitted that management had been struggling with getting staff to turn up to training sessions.[72]

48. In the view of the Prison Officers' Association, arrangements for staff training are not satisfactory. Mr Finlay Spratt, Chairman of the Northern Ireland Prison Officers' Association, was scathing about the usefulness of the attempt to achieve Investors in People certification, on the basis that it was unlikely to be properly funded. He referred to the Hare Report on Training for Prison Officers, which had been made some years previously, and which he said in no way had remedied the lack of training of Northern Ireland prison officers.[73] Mr Spratt denied that the Control and Restraint training had been increased at all;[74] he said that because of the lack of training in Control and Restraint techniques his members were left open to court proceedings for assault on prisoners. He also cited as an example of the ineffectiveness of management in this area the failure to provide training in the use of breathing apparatus for use in the event of a fire. During an incident in HMP Maghaberry shortly before he gave evidence, there had been a major fire which rendered one of the wings unusable. Officers had been forced to lie on their stomachs while trying to release prisoners out of the cells, rather than use the breathing apparatus provided.[75]

49. In his recent report, Sir David Ramsbotham was very critical of staff training at HMP Maze.[76] He drew attention to a range of matters, including poor recording of staff training, a dearth of local training and a very low overall average annual level of time devoted to staff training, about half the Service average and less than a third of the Service target. He called inter alia for the formulation of an improved Training Programme which takes into account the unique nature of the establishment and is linked to individual development plans for staff.[77]

50. It appears that the training programme within the Service is not fully effective. We doubt the usefulness of setting a training target denominated in days training per staff member, as the day spent in training may not necessarily have much use for the person being trained. This target itself betrays an over reliance on accomplishing targets which may have little practical relevance. Training of itself is not productive; relevant training is. In addition to the problems created by high levels of staff absence which leads to training being regularly cancelled, training which is not seen by staff as useful will tend to suffer from low turnout of trainees. It is clear that there is little respect among staff for the training provided by the Service. This situation is worsened by absenteeism, which is a major obstacle to the translation of management's good intentions, as articulated in the Annual Training Report, into achievements.[78]

51. We note that the Ramsbotham and Narey Reports draw attention to the relationships between the Northern Ireland Prison Service and other Prison Services in the United Kingdom. There should be an increased use of placements of officers from outside Northern Ireland in Northern Ireland prisons, and the provision of placements for Northern Ireland Prison Service officers in other prison locations.[79] Such interchanges should be seen as integral to a new training strategy.



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