Select Committee on Procedure Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witness (Questions 19 - 25)

TUESDAY 23 JUNE 1998

RT HON DAVID DAVIS, MP

Chairman

  19. We now welcome the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, the Rt Hon David Davis. Thank you very much for coming. I must say it is very different to see just one witness rather than a phalanx of witnesses, even if the Chairman of Defence did dominate the giving of evidence before but perhaps that is appropriate. Can I start by putting the first question to you? You will have seen the conclusions we came to about the shortcomings of the present system of Supply during the course of our inquiry into the introduction of resource accounting and budgeting, would you agree that in contrast to the work done by the PAC, very much assisted by the NAO, in scrutinising the previous year's Government expenditure, the House and its committees have not always been able to make the best use of the information provided to it on future government expenditure?

  (Mr Davis) Thank you for your welcome. The answer to that is yes, Chairman, although I am not sure the fault of that lies within the select committees themselves. The first point to make, if you are taking the Public Accounts Committee as a benchmark, is that of course the Public Accounts Committee looks at value for money, the delivery of policy rather than the setting of policy, and it is a different sort of task and one which is in some senses more contained, in every sense less political and therefore is, I think, more easily manageable than what the policy committees have to deal with. The other half of the problem in essence comes to the Estimates process itself, which the previous witness was talking about. This procedure essentially dates back to Gladstone, as my committee does, but in my judgment, unlike my committee, the innovations in this century have not been sufficiently material to take into account the changes in power of the executive, the changes in expenditure levels. In Gladstone's era expenditure ran at about 10 per cent of GDP, now it runs at 40 per cent plus and a much bigger figure in absolute terms. So that is one aspect which is a problem for other select committees. I have to say that in my judgment the Estimates procedure we have is obsolete, it is opaque and as a result it amounts to little more than a rubber stamp of the executive's plans. That, I think, is the reason why your report previously, and I told you I agreed with nearly every word—I can tell you the differences in a moment—was so important, because it does highlight what is the weakest part of our parliamentary democracy at the moment, which is an amazing paradox when you consider that the grant of Supply was our original reason for existence.

  20. So from your own experience of the Committee of Public Accounts, how do you believe that select committees can best handle the Estimates, best deal with the Estimates to make it a really meaningful scrutiny rather than, as you have just said, a rubber stamping?
  (Mr Davis) That brings me right back to the Estimates procedure rather than the select committees but I will deal with them in a second. Forgive me Chairman, I missed the beginning of Mr George's contribution. He and I agree on a very large number of things in this area so forgive me if I repeat something he has already said to you. In my judgement the Estimates procedure, if I can pick a metaphor or an analogy, should be the management accounts for Parliament to be able to see how the executive is delivering the policies that it needs to deliver and whether it is allocating its resources properly and whether it is getting the right turnout of resources. To do that we have to have a process whereby the department or select committee activity is not simply that of looking at documents that come before it but that of understanding it, of being able to criticise it and being able to influence it and it does not manage to do any one of those three things at the moment. It is enormously opaque. These Supply Estimates I brought with me to amuse myself while I was sitting waiting to come and talk tell you almost nothing. There is no link between what is written in here, broadly, and policy delivery. There is a link in the departmental report which of course is not a document that is actually laid before Parliament so here you have in this document most of the things that ought to be in this document so that in itself is ridiculous and a previous PAC did agree to the simplification of this in order to allow data to be put in the departmental reports. The effect of that actually was to make the Estimates less useful. I think they should be produced together and dealt with together and then I think similar to what Mr George was saying I do not think the Estimates should be laid before Parliament for approval until each departmental select committee has commented on the Estimate. Now comment in this case is more than just saying we agree or disagree. The concept of having the nuclear weapon of a refusal seems to me completely nonsensical in this day and age. I do not know whether there are problems with whips influencing select committees, but there certainly would be if the select committee's proposal was to try and bring down the Government. Mr Illsley is nodding at me. He and I have a shared experience in this respect, Chairman. The nuclear weapon should still be there but there must be something before that weapon. What is the difficulty with this? The difficulty with this is the Government is responsible for macro-economic policy. It has to have overall grip on fiscal policy and its delivery. That has implications for overall spending. I suppose it is the reason at the moment that under Standing Orders no Member can propose an increase in expenditure. It seems to me however perfectly reasonable for a departmental select committee to recommend transfers between votes within a department or between heads and subheads. It is a spurious example but it is easy to imagine, but take international development—it may well be that the International Development Committee feels it is appropriate to spend more money in South America and less money in Africa or more money in South East Asia and so on. It may feel it is appropriate to spend more money on the prevention of famine than crisis relief. There are all sorts of possibilities that can arise out of the sort of judgments an expert select committee can make and I cannot see any argument whatsoever against a select committee being able to put down an amendment for a debate on the floor which covers transfers within a class that is within a department. That seems to me perfectly sensible. It is the sort of thing it can do with great expertise. It is the sort of thing it can do without deflating or inflating the importance of its own subject area and problems between departments obviously and therefore it should be possible. It also has a secondary function because I have to tell you, Mr Winterton, after some experience of government, seven years in government, my experience is that ministers themselves are not very gripped of the allocation of resources within their own departments. It is not the top-notch issue for them to deal with. They will worry about the policy, they will worry about aspects of policy, delivery of policy and debating it in the Chamber but exactly how much money goes to each department is not something that they have necessarily gripped in all departments in the past. I think appearing before a select committee that has the power to make that amendment would force them to grip those issues. It would force them to say why do we put however many million, if it is international development into one part of the world or another and, if it is education, into administration rather than class size reduction or whatever it may be. I think if the minister were appearing before a select committee, as it were, defending his case facing the prospect of the amendment of that case and then facing the prospect of standing on the floor of the House and defending it, I think it would have a very salutary effect upon the seriousness with which ministers took this issue. I think those are the two biggest elements that could be done to do something about the committee. Now the third one is the question of resources and I heard listening to the questions before this issue of NAO secondment and, as you know, we do second some NAO personnel from time to time. I have to say I view that argument (which my predecessor tells me has come up every year of the 14 years of his time of Chairmanship) as something of a cop-out because the issue we are dealing with here is proper resourcing of select committees, not robbing Peter to pay Paul, but proper resourcing of select committees. If we do this we will need each select committee to have in effect two major new resources, either its own or on call. The two major new resources are firstly the ability to evaluate detailed policy in terms of the effect of an additional or reduced spend. That is really a policy-driven skill and the committee will also need the ability to understand the accounts presented before it both in terms of the Estimates forward and the appropriation accounts backwards which are also in the departmental information. That is not rocket science. The one area where I had some disagreement with your Committee's previous report, Mr Chairman, was on the question of the complexity of resource accounting. Resource accounting is more complex to create, to present to the accountant inside the department. It should be easier to understand, not more difficult, easier to understand for the committee particularly if the department matches it up, as it should, against achievement of objectives. Then it should be much easier to understand and much more useful to use. It is not rocket science. It is very important, very straightforward delivery of the meaning of numbers and these numbers will mean more than the current ones we see in front of us. If we have all of those things, I am not concerned as to whether they are committee related or separate department of the select committees related, I suspect it will be a mixture of the two and with sensible secondments from time to time of NAO staff, that would be the most intelligent way in my mind to do it. But it would cost I would suspect twice as much as we are currently spending on select committees and so it should. We have probably the least well resourced committees in the democratic world these days. Mr George told you the sorts of numbers we are looking at. Frankly, it is ridiculous for the Mother of Parliaments to try and get by on a shoe string. Those are a few thoughts, Chairman. I can elaborate on all of them.

  Chairman: More than a few and very helpful. Barry Gardiner with a brief but very important question.

Mr Gardiner

  21. When the Chairman of the Social Security Committee wrote to us he used a phrase which was the "oversight by hindsight" which was conducted by the National Audit Office and by your own Committee, the Public Accounts Committee and in that letter he spoke of linking that work more closely with the select committee procedure and the influencing of current and future plans from select committees. Would you support that or do you believe that it could risk politicising the National Audit Office?
  (Mr Davis) I will start with the question of the risk of politicisation which the previous witness indicated he did not think was very strong. Let me start by saying that of the countries in the world who have a National Audit Office or its equivalent ours is probably the one that is cleanest of politicisation. It is very very difficult to get that de-politicisation achieved. The GAO in America certainly does not do it and most of the Europeans do not do it. I cannot think of anything that is exactly on our model that achieves what we do. It is not just a question of what sort of work you give to the NAO, but a question of things like the independence of the Comptroller & Auditor General, the fact it takes two votes of both Houses of Parliament to remove him, the separate funding, all these sorts of things. One component of that is that no ministry can turn round two years after the NAO has done a report, let us say in support of a policy recommendation, say, from the Social Security Select Committee, and say, "You recommended this". It has to be that far distant from it to be able to do the job. It has worked remarkably well since 1983, I have to say under a superb chairman, my predecessor really set the gold standard in terms of chairmanship of the PAC. I would be very, very nervous of meddling with something which works well at the moment. What are you trying to achieve in terms of NAO use apart from the slightly green-eyed syndrome that we have got more resources? There are two components, it seems to me. One is the transfer of skill that goes on, and we can do that through secondment. I have to say there is a resource problem here because we are looking at the NAO having a 22 per cent increase in volume of work in the next few years because of resource accounting and we are giving them something like, I suspect, a 7 per cent increase in resources, so there will be a 15 per cent increase in productivity in the course of the next few years. Mr Illsley will remember from his days in the trade union movement, that is going to be a tough one to deliver. It is going to be tough anyway. So you can get some skill transfer, but the skills are not all appropriate necessarily particularly to the resource accounting issue, even value for money skills. Often they are statistical skills, often they are other measurement skills which are important. The other aspect is the question of building bedrocks for policy by having very factual reports. If a committee chairman said to me, "We are interested in doing X or Y exercise, would you have the NAO look at the current state of what is happening and give us a description of it", say, a description of the way the crown court system works, a report on the way the Crown Prosecution Service works, which we actually did not long ago, a report on welfare fraud in housing benefit, then we will always look at it. That will come to us, we will give our criticisms of the current system, there is nothing to stop at all (a) the select committee then picking that up and going with it (b) there is nothing to stop the Government picking it up and going with it, and that has actually happened in three departments which I can tell you about if it would not embarrass them and (c) there is nothing to stop significant briefings being given on the basis of that work being done. So I think you can achieve all the things you need to do on this without jeopardising that particular jewel in our crown, because the one thing we do have is people coming here all the time—in fact it is one of the banes of my life—to see how the PAC and the NAO works.

Mr Davey

  22. Could I pick you up on what I thought was the most important point in your initial contribution, Mr Davis, which was the idea that the select committee could propose an amendment on the floor of the House which would result in switches? You said that should be almost a zero sum gain, no additions or subtractions, but do you not think there should be some flexibility in the system to allow for some slight additions, slight subtractions, because in reality switches between budgets are not one for one? If you are going to be able to be creative in policy and make some benefits which may achieve the objective of the policy in a more effective way, you may want a little bit of flexibility to recommend some additions or indeed some reductions. So I would be interested in your answer to that. Following on from that, do you think the change in the concept of annuality in terms of the setting by the Government of spending totals which the Chancellor has recently announced—
  (Mr Davis) The three year totals?

  23. Yes, three years. Do you think that will improve our ability to scrutinise expenditure or make it more difficult?
  (Mr Davis) The first question first. Bearing in mind I was talking about amendment, not recommendation, the right to put down an amendment to be voted on, I think that is a very good discipline, frankly, on select committees. Every select committee in this House has got people on it who are on the select committee because they are fascinated by defence or international development or agriculture, whatever it is, and almost all of them are advocates for increased expenditure in their area. That is not 100 per cent true but there is a large extent to which it is true and it is a natural human characteristic. So I think there is a discipline there in terms of choosing with the resources you have what is the best delivery. I think that is what I would like to see. I am not saying that the select committee chairmen or even the group of select committee chairmen collectively should not say, "This should be more ...", whatever they want to say. It is up to them how they recommend, it is the question of the amendment, and I think that is an important discipline. Bear in mind, if we are going to do this, and it is a point I will maybe come back to at the end, you want to be able to do it in a way which does not fill the Government with panic at the prospect of this happening. It has to be manageable within their own macro-economic management approach, because if they do not, again, we will have huge questions internally within the Government to put pressures on the select committee system, and we will then have to build in all sorts of barriers and it will be very, very difficult to cope with, and so that is important. On the annuality, the Chairman of your Committee actually asked the Chancellor about this precise issue at the statement, and if he will forgive me for saying so did not get a very good answer, he got a rather ambiguous or vague answer. It depends entirely upon the extent to which the Treasury recognises that the House of Commons wants to see an annual cycle continuing irrespective of a three year budget. When I was in business we used to have five year plans but we still had an annual budget and that annual budget was fought over tooth and nail every year, even though in principle I was due to get a 2 per cent increase in my marketing budget or a 10 per cent increase in my production budget, or whatever, and I do not see any difference here. Secondly, frankly, if somebody tries to set a three year budget for a £200 billion a year budget and expects to get that right for every one of the three years, well, they are in cloud cuckoo land. What the Chancellor is putting down is indicative. I expect he will try and stick to it as hard as he possibly can in the relevant X Committees and so on, but he will obviously have to alter and shift that slightly from year to year, and I think the select committees can play a serious part in this. Because if something alters dramatically, if agriculture has a huge crisis, if the Health Service is seeing dramatic increases in the waiting lists or dramatic mortality rates, once the new information systems come in, then the select committee can add some power to the minister's elbow in saying, "This is something which ought to be put right" and that is a very powerful recommendation to be made. That demands annuality. I think the things are entirely consistent. Nearly every other big organisation manages the two and I do not see why we cannot. A small technical footnote—I think I read in your report some concern that resource accounting could have an impact on annuality, resource accounting will make annuality easier, not more difficult.

Mr Stunell

  24. Some of us are absolutely fascinated with budgets and accounting and have written books on it and so on, but the average Member of Parliament probably is not. To what extent are we going to finish up being prisoners of our advisers and officials, and not able to make any independent, political input into the process?
  (Mr Davis) They are supposed to be the servants of the committee. On my Committee, the Committee of Public Accounts, we have, after all, what everybody wants, this vast grouping of technical advice. Two things. One, the direction the technical advice goes will very quickly become one of the important decisions the committee takes. Let's imagine, to take the argument I was making earlier, switching resources from A to B, one of the questions a select committee will put to its technical support is, "What will the impact be of a 5 per cent reduction there, what will the impact be of a £10 million increase there?" That is what will start to happen, just as in business, or indeed in most areas where you have technical support, you put well-guided policy questions to your technical support and get them to evaluate marginal changes on one side or another. Similarly, one of the things—and I did not mention this in my original comments—that I think is missing from the current system is any feedback on how well the Government has actually delivered on what it has said it was going to deliver. The appropriation accounts you will notice do not have to get cleared. That is it, they are through, a good year late, and nobody pays any attention to them. They actually ought to be in the departmental report and you will be saying to your technical advisor, "I want to know how well they have delivered on what they said they were going to do two years ago." This is not rocket

Chairman

  25. Mr Davis, can I thank you very much indeed for the evidence you have given to us this afternoon. It will be very helpful to us in our inquiry. As we are running a bit behind can I say thank you for coming and we will look for the next witness.
  (Mr Davis) Chairman, may I say one thing before I leave and it is a factual issue we have not covered today but it was slightly off target. You made the point in your original report that the Committee should also look at borrowing levels. Can I just say that I think that also should include forward commitments. I am concerned when we start to come under resource accounting that we do not see a lot of off-balance sheet funding. I am happy to give you a paper on this. I have not touched on that area today because the other area has been very interesting.

  Chairman: Can I say thank you again and if you can send us a paper on that particular area of activity we would be very grateful.


 
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