Memorandum by the Clerk
of the House
FINANCIAL PROCEDURE
1. The Committee asked for a written statement
on the suggestion put forward in oral evidence on 28 July in connection
with the consideration by select committees of Estimates and other
government financial proposals (notably the three-year spending
plans).
2. In any such proposal, a number of potentially
competing aims have to be reconciled:
— select committees' freedom of
action within their orders of reference should not be significantly
impaired. At the same time, the Committee observed in its Second
Report (HC 438 (1997-98) paragraph 11): "although detailed
consideration of financial matters falls to select committees,
there is no incentive for them to spend time on the Estimates
or on departmental annual reports";
— the right of the Liaison Committee
under SO No 54 to select Estimates for consideration by the House
and to choose select committee reports on Wednesday mornings under
SO No 145 ought to be respected;
— the financial initiative of
the Crown, a principle which preserves to Her Majesty's ministers
the right to initiate and increase spending—a principle
which underlies all financial aspects of the procedure of the
House, and not only Supply—is a central constitutional fact.
On the other hand, it leaves to select committees and to individual
Members only the radical options of voting to deny or to reduce
Supply; and
— any new procedures ought to
interfere as little as possible with the settled sessional pattern
of Estimates guillotines under SO No 55—that certain types
of grant are set down for consideration not later (and in practice
often much earlier) than 6 February, 18 March and 5 August.
3. One of the ways of bringing together
these objectives might be:
(a) to amend SO No 54 by removing the
connection between select committee reports and the consideration
of Estimates to which these reports are related. (It is true that
the Standing Order enables the Liaison Committee to recommend
Estimates for consideration without reference to a select committee
report: but they have never done so);
(b) to give over the three Estimates
days to motions tabled by the chairman of a select committee,
with the leave of the Liaison Committee;
(c) to establish that in giving leave
to make such motions, the Liaison Committee should have regard
to an order of priority of select committee reports, which depends
on the degree to which they affect government financial proposals.
It would not be essential to set out the full details in the Standing
Order: much might be left to the discretion of the Liaison Committee
within the overall framework (for which see paragraph 4 below).
In general, however, a committee report which
concluded that a motion should be made to reduce or vote against
the entirety of an Estimate should have the highest priority.
The next preference would be given to a report
which made proposals for alteration "in the opinion of the
House" (including increases, adjustments, and decreases)
in the three year spending allocations, objectives and targets
announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 14 July, following
the Comprehensive Spending Review (HC Deb (1997-98) 316 cc 187ff).
Debates on such proposals for reduction or alteration would take
place in the context of evidence taken by the committee, and of
the arguments advanced in support of its conclusions.
Failing reports in either of these categories,
other reports might be discussed on a motion for the adjournment,
on the understanding that the Liaison Committee would give preference
to those reports which, though not in either of the two preceding
categories, were largely financial in character.
4. A few ancillary points may be made. It
would be important to leave the Liaison committee with discretion
in the actual operation of any order of the House such as is proposed.
Reports which were substantially about policy ought not to "jump
the queue", simply because they concluded in a motion to
reduce, only loosely connected with the thrust of the report.
Secondly, the scheme is not entirely watertight. If the government
laid a controversial supplementary while the relevant committee
was (for example) abroad on another inquiry, it might not always
be possible, though it would of course be desirable, to hold up
the voting of the supplementary until the Members of the select
committee had had time to take evidence on it, and the Liaison
Committee met and gave it priority. Finally, the change would
not affect Wednesday morning adjournment debates, which would
remain on the existing footing.
5. The aim of the proposal would be to encourage
select committees to look into the government's financial proposals
by offering some preference in securing time for their reports
on the floor of the House. No committee would be obliged however
to undertake such an inquiry if it believed its time was better
spent elsewhere. The scheme would not necessarily give financial
reports an absolute priority over policy reports, but rather alter
the balance between the two, within existing time constraints.
The freedom of choice exercised by the Liaison Committee would
be diminished only so far as it was desirable to find some means
to improve the House's capacity to exercise its traditional role
in the control of Supply. Contentious business would not be brought
on at unexpected times, and the supply guillotine timetable would
not be disturbed.
28 October 1998
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