DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT:
REMPLOY LIMITED
MONITORING REMPLOY'S
PERFORMANCE AS
A SUPPORTED
EMPLOYMENT PROVIDER
26. Remploy have achieved all but two of the targets
which the Department have set for them since 1992-93 in Annual
Performance Agreements[21].
Nonetheless, Remploy's operating deficit for each disabled employee
increased in real terms by 16 per cent between 1987-88 and 1994-95
though it has since decreased by 7 per cent[22].
Also, each year since 1990-91, the Department's contribution
to Remploy has exceeded the direct wage costs of the disabled
workforce[23].
27. We asked the Employment Service how, in negotiating
the Annual Performance Agreement, they ensure that the targets
set for Remploy are sufficiently testing. They told us that in
setting targets for Remploy they sought to take account of their
experience of operating with Remploy, Remploy's performance against
targets set in previous years, Remploy's experience in the commercial
market place at any particular time, and the policy set by the
Department, for example, in terms of a greater emphasis on placements
as opposed to factory places. Having taken account of these factors,
the Employment Service annually negotiated a set of targets with
Remploy and, if agreement was reached, these targets were then
put to the Department and to Ministers for their approval[24].
28. We asked the Employment Service why, if the targets
were sufficiently testing, the cost of a Remploy factory place
at 1996-97 prices had increased from £8,353 in 1987-88 to
£10,626 in 1995-96. They told us that, in the period 1987-88
to 1995-96, Remploy had gone through some testing and difficult
market conditions. Also, during that period the balance between
Remploy's fit workforce and their workforce of severely disabled
people had changed with the number of fit employees declining
by 20 per cent and the number of disabled employees increasing
by seven per cent. It was against that background that they had
made a judgement as to the target which should be set for Remploy
for the overall operating deficit per disabled employee[25].
The Employment Service also told us that no specific target had
been set for the cost of a factory place because this might act
as a disincentive to Remploy to move those employees who were
able from a factory environment into an Interwork placement, by
encouraging Remploy to keep more people in their factories in
order to keep unit costs down[26].
29. There are significant variations in operating
deficits between Remploy's business groups and individual factories
with the same group[27].
We asked Remploy what steps they were taking to reduce the very
uneven distribution of funding between their various operations
with relatively cost-effective activities supporting the less
cost-effective. Remploy confirmed that they had some factories
which were operating at a break-even position and others which
were making high losses[28].
Variations within the same business group occurred because factories
were dealing with different products and different markets[29].
They told us that they were concentrating on those which were
making a significant loss and trying to improve them. Remploy's
big difficulty was that they could not just close factories which
were making a loss. They had to bear in mind that they were employing
severely disabled people and, therefore, had to find alternative
business to put in those loss-making factories which was always
quite difficult[30].
30. The Department confirmed that Remploy could not
do what a normal business would do if high losses were being incurred,
that is, close down the biggest loss-making factories. They pointed
out, however, that over the last ten years Remploy had merged
12 factories and changed the trades in another 50. There was
a good deal of restructuring and change going on within Remploy
most of which had been geared to try and deal with the factories
with the highest deficits but the process had taken longer than
it would in a normal commercial company[31].
The Department emphasised to us that it was extremely difficult
to close, merge or restructure one of Remploy's factories because
of the likelihood of opposition from unions, the local community,
local authorities and local charities[32].
31. In addition to the targets set in the Annual
Performance Agreement, each year the Secretary of State agrees
the performance targets for Remploy's executive directors to determine
their non-pensionable bonus. The bonus, which is based on a percentage
of basic pay, is on a sliding scale of performance achieved against
individual targets. Within the bonus arrangements, there are
penalties for gross under-achievement[33].
32. In view of Remploy's deteriorating financial
position since 1987-88, we asked the Department whether the level
of bonuses paid to Remploy's executive directors had been justified.
The Department told us that Remploy's success over the last two
years was considerable. Unit costs had been reduced by four per
cent in 1995-96 and by three per cent in 1996-97 and they expected
a further 10 per cent reduction by the end of the decade. Remploy
had also increased the number of disabled employees by 13 per
cent over the last five years and been very successful in rebalancing
the employment they provided for disabled people from factories
to placements. The Department noted that, until the last two
years, the bonus paid to Remploy's executive directors had been
less than 50 per cent of that available[34].
33. The Department went on to tell us that although
Remploy's executive directors were working in a particularly difficult
and complex organisation, they were relatively poorly paid. Even
taking into account the bonus, their remuneration put them in
the lowest decile of the Haye remuneration survey for companies
of this size[35]. The
Department added that they needed to provide a remuneration package
which was attractive enough to recruit people into a quite difficult
environment and also to retain them there[36].
In the last three years, there had been eight higher level management
changes in Remploy at general manager and director level[37].
34. We asked Remploy how many disabled people held
management positions in the Company. They told us that at present
they had no directors who were registered disabled[38].
In the past, one of the directors had been a disabled person
but he had had to retire and Remploy had been unable to find an
alternative to him. The Department felt that this was a matter
of concern and regret and told us that they had made every effort
to change the situation[39].
35. We asked Remploy about the mix of employment
opportunities they offered to disabled people. Remploy told us
that most of their employees were in factories where the bulk
of jobs was in manual work of various kinds, but they had some
disabled people in office jobs using computers[40].
Remploy added that it had always been their intention to move
into markets which required a relatively high skill. In fact,
Remploy factories had changed over the years from simple hand
work to areas such as electronics where qualities and skills were
required and where a much higher rate of pay for labour could
be justified. In the last ten years, there had been a 12 per
cent improvement in real terms in the rate of pay of Remploy's
disabled workforce[41].
36. Since 1989, Remploy have bought eight companies,
six of which were experiencing financial difficulties, for £8.4
million mainly to increase their market share and extend the range
of products which they manufacture[42].
Of that sum, £3.1 million was for good will[43].
The logic behind making the acquisitions was to improve the performance
of the existing factories; and its main benefits accruing to Remploy
have been 340 jobs for disabled people and increased sales which
in 1996-97 amounted to £16.5 million[44].
However, we note that on acquisition, there were 450 fit employees
in the eight companies. The workforce now consists of 240 fit
employees and 320 disabled employees working mainly in 12 Remploy
factories. Of the 210 fit employees who are no longer employed
by Remploy, 100 left due to natural wastage, and 110 were made
redundant. Redundancy costs to date have amounted to £0.8
million. Further minor rationalisation may take place in the
future[45].
37. These acquisitions included the purchase in July
1989 of Spencer (Banbury) Ltd, which incorporated Silhouette Ltd,
for £2.4 million[46].
In August 1997, Remploy sold off the Silhouette business because
the long learning curves, intricate manufacture and short term
nature of the lingerie business proved to be too difficult to
integrate into Remploy's factories[47].
38. We asked Remploy whether overall they had made
a profit or a loss for the tax-payer on the buying and selling
of Silhouette. They told us that they had made a loss. Therefore,
we asked Remploy whether it had been a wise decision to purchase
the company. Remploy explained that Silhouette Ltd and Spencer
(Banbury) Ltd were two operating companies which had been inextricably
linked, the one making ladies' lingerie and the other making healthcare
products. The main purpose of the acquisition had been to obtain
the Spencer name and product line. Remploy estimated that about
100 disabled people had been making these products since 1989
and the gain of these jobs needed to be offset against the financial
loss on the sale of Silhouette Ltd[48].
Conclusions
39. We note that Remploy have achieved all but two
of the targets which the Department have set for them since 1992-93
in their Annual Performance Agreements. However, we also note
that, despite substantially meeting their targets, Remploy's operating
deficit for each disabled employee increased in real terms by
16 per cent between 1987-88 and 1994-95 although it has since
decreased by 7 per cent. Also, since 1990-91 the Departmental
contribution to Remploy has exceeded the direct wage costs of
the disabled workforce. We look to the Department and the Employment
Service to ensure that the targets set for Remploy in future years
are sufficiently challenging and that pressure on Remploy to improve
their financial performance continues to be maintained.
40. We observe that there are wide variations in
the operating deficit per disabled person between Remploy's business
groups and between individual factories within the same group,
with relatively cost-effective activities supporting the less
cost-effective. We are concerned that this cross-subsidisation
between Remploy's groups and factories is not a cost-effective
use of the taxpayers' money. We stress the need for Remploy to
reduce these variations by continuing to merge factories, to reduce
overheads and to change their commercial activities where significant
operating deficits are being incurred.
41. We note the Department's view that it is necessary
to pay performance bonuses to Remploy's executive directors to
attract and retain the right calibre of staff. We look to the
Department to monitor the arrangements for setting bonus levels
to ensure that the amounts paid continue to be commensurate with
the performance of the Company against their objectives.
42. We are concerned that Remploy currently have
no directors who are registered as disabled to act as role models
for disabled staff. We recommend that Remploy should seek to
increase the severely disabled people represented in their directorate
and senior management when vacancies arise and people of the right
calibre are available. We endorse Remploy's intention to move
progressively into areas of work where the pay and quality of
work for severely disabled people can be improved.
43. We are concerned that Silhouette Ltd, which Remploy
purchased for £2.4 million in 1989 as part of Spencer (Banbury)
Ltd, was sold at a loss in August 1997 because the long learning
curves, intricate manufacture and short term nature of the lingerie
business proved to be too difficult to integrate into Remploy
factories. We recommend that Remploy ensure that any future businesses
that they consider acquiring are of a nature suitable for their
severely disabled workforce.
21 C&AG's
Report, para 5g) Back
22 Evidence,
p15, para 33 Back
23 C&AG's
Report, para 3.15 Back
24 Q7 Back
25 Q8 Back
26 Q8 Back
27 PAC
31, para 34 Back
28 Q39 Back
29 Q40 Back
30 Q39 Back
31 Q39 Back
32 Q76 Back
33 C&AG's
Report, paras 3.10-3.11 Back
34 Q37 Back
35 Q38 Back
36 Q57 Back
37 PAC
66 Back
38 Q46 Back
39 Q47 Back
40 Q19 Back
41 Qs
113-114 Back
42 C&AG's
Report, para 3.27 Back
43 Qs
74-76 Back
44 Evidence,
p1, paras 43-44 Back
45 C&AG's
Report, para 3.31 Back
46 C&AG's
Report, para 3.28 Back
47 Evidence,
p17, para 42 Back
48 Qs
16-17 Back
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