Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 1

LIABILITIES IN THE DEPENDENT TERRITORIES (PAC 97-98/99)

Part of a memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Note on Question 96: Not reported.

Note on Question 102: Governors' Responsibilities: Financial Services

  1.  In all the Caribbean Dependent Territories except BVI, the Governor has responsibility for international financial services; that is, he or she is responsible for conducting the business of the Government of the Territory in that area. This is reflected in Appendix 1 of the NAO Report (page 43) which lists "Financial Services" under the Governor's responsibilities in TCI and "International Finance" under the Governor's responsibilities in TCI and "International Finance" under the Governor's responsibilities in Anguilla and Montserrat. These terms are synonymous.

  2.  The Governor was given this responsibility in Montserrat in the new constitution of 1989, and in Anguilla (1990) and TCI (1993) by constitutional amendment. It was not necessary to amend the constitution of the Cayman Islands since the responsibility, though not specifically reserved to the Governor, had not been delegated by him to a locally elected Minister. Only in BVI does a locally elected Minister have responsibility for the offshore sector.

Note on Question 115: Insurance Business in the Turks and Caicos Islands and its Regulation

Staffing of the Regulatory Unit

  1.  There are now four professional staff and six support staff in the Financial Services Commission. Three of the professional staff are funded from Technical Cooperation resources and are expatriate. The Insurance Supervisor, who is one of the expatriate UK funded staff, is supported by one experienced local member of staff and has access to the larger pool of support staff. The current Insurance Supervisor has wide experience of the sector and a detailed knowledge of the UK market.

Type of Insurance in TCI and Associated Risk

  2.  There are some 1,911 insurance companies in the Turks and Caicos Islands. Of these, the vast majority (some 85%) are credit life reinsurers. The remainder include 6 domestic general insurers, 6 domestic life insurers, 54 "captives" and 55 other offshore insurers (mainly doing general business).

  3.  The credit life reinsurance companies were established by car sales companies in the USA to provide insurance cover on the life of an individual purchasing a vehicle in credit, usually with a credit agreement which does not exceed three years. The cover is only for the life of the person obtaining the credit and not for the credit risk. Because the term is very short, relative to the normal life expectancy of the person buying the vehicle, the risk is low. Actuarial analysis shows that provided the credit life company stays within its business plan and does not take unauthorised business, there should be few problems. There is a further safety net as much of the credit life reinsurance is for business in the States which is subject to US supervision. The TCI regulator would exchange information regularly with his US counterparts as part of the routine licensing and monitoring process.

  4.  The combination of low risk and supervision in the US means that although staffing levels are low, the current level of staffing should be sufficient to provide adequate supervision for the low risk business. We are considering a reinforcement of regulatory capacity to deal with the activities of the offshore companies doing general insurance, and to boost regulation of agents and brokers. We are also expecting a visit to TCI by DTI Insurance Regulators in 1998 to consider the overall level of supervisory resources.

Note on Question 119: International Business Company Legislation

  1.  International Business Companies (IBCs) differ from ordinary companies in that their business is conducted exclusively outside the jurisdiction in which the company is registered. There is nothing inherently wrong with IBCs which provide an important and growing source of income to some of the Caribbean Dependent Territories (of which BVI has by far the biggest share). However, evidence suggests that IBCs have been used to disguise illegal business activity such as money laundering and fraudulent trading. Proper controls are therefore needed.

  2.  We have proposed a series of measures designed to make it easier to investigate IBC activity and to trace the beneficial ownership. These measures would licence company formation agents (CFAs) and enhance the information on IBCs that CFAs hold (the "know your customer" principle) to ensure that there is a paper trail for investigators to follow. A set of guidelines was sent to the Caribbean DTs for use in drawing up a mandatory code of practice.

  3.  When these were originally put to them, the Caribbean DTs accepted the need for the regulation of CFAs and IBCs but objected to the original requirement that CFAs must themselves always know the beneficial ownership of IBCs on the grounds that this was unreasonable and impracticable when much of their business was done through professional intermediaries in other countries. They argued that such a requirement would effectively end the sale of IBCs, killing off legitimate business as well as the dubious. The guidelines have therefore been amended to require that the CFAs should take reasonable steps to know the beneficial owner, including ensuring that adequate due diligence is done by their foreign business associates.

  4.  Progress on this issue has been slow. BVI have agreed a Code of Conduct that is already being enforced on a voluntary basis by the industry, but legislation is still needed. We understand it is in draft and should be passed in the first quarter of 1998. The Cayman Islands are also in the process of drafting legislation. We have asked the others to follow suit and anticipate their support with similar legislation in 1998.

Note on Question 125: HMG's Powers in Relation to the Dependent Territories

Background

  1.  The Dependent Territories with permanent populations have their own elected governments, each acting under the authority of a constitution laid down by the UK. Although the constitutional division of power between HMG and the local government varies considerably from one territory to another, all the territories remain fully and equally subject to British sovereignty.

  2.  In each territory HMG's powers are exercised by and through the Governor, who is appointed by HMG and responsible to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Powers in individual DTs

  3.  The constitution of the five Caribbean DTs (Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands) are broadly similar in most respects. In each territory the Governor is responsible for defence, external affairs, internal security, the police and the public service. In four of the territories the Governor also has responsibility for the framework of control of offshore financial services; the exception is the British Virgin Islands, where the responsibility for this matter rests with the local government. In all five of these territories HMG has the power to disallow legislation and to legislate by Order in Council for peace, order and good governments.

  4.  Bermuda has a greater degree of self-government than any of the Caribbean DTs. While the Governor has responsibility for defence, external affairs, internal security and the police, some of these powers have been delegated to the Bermuda Government for specific purposes; and HMG does not have the power to disallow legislation except in the limited area of legislation relating to government stock. The consent of the Secretary of State is also required for any legislation relating to currency or banking.

  5.  In Gibraltar, where the local government has had extensive devolved powers since 1969, the Governor has responsibility for "non-defined domestic matters" (primarily defence, external relations and internal security, including the police). The Governor also has responsibility for the financial and economic stability of Gibraltar. HMG has a duty to ensure good government in Gibraltar and a legal responsibility to ensure that Gibraltar complies with international obligations including EU law. Legislation passed by the House of Assembly is scrutinised by the FCO and may be disallowed. In addition, HMG retains the power to legislate by Order in Council for peace, order and good government.

  6.  In the Falkland Islands the Governor has responsibility for all aspects of the government of the Islands but in the exercise of his powers the Governor must generally consult with the Executive Council. However, the Governor may act against the advice of the Council in any case where he considers it right to do so. Legislation enacted by the Legislative Council is scrutinised by the FCO and may be disallowed. HMG also has the power to legislate by Order in Council for peace, order and good government.

  7.  The government of St Helena and its Dependencies is the responsibility of the St Helena Government; but the Governor has a wide range of reserved powers and local legislation is scrutinised by the FCO before enactment and may be disallowed. HMG also has the power to legislate by Order in Council for peace, order and good government.

  8.  The administration of Pitcairn is the responsibility of the Governor, who discharges his duties through a Commissioner in consultation with the Island Council.

Options for strengthening HMG's control of the DTs

  9.  The question of the division of powers between HMG and the DTs' governments is being considered in the context of the FCO's current review of policy towards the DTs. It is too early to say whether the review will result in any proposals for altering the present distribution of powers; but there are various adjustments that could be made to strengthen HMG's control:

9.1 Amending the DTs' constitutions

  Where an existing constitution contains inadequate powers, HMG could increase the Governor's reserved powers by amending the constitution. This could be done by means of an Order in Council in any of the DTs, including Bermuda.

9.2 Direct law-making

  HMG could make greater use of its power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of any territory, except Bermuda, by means of an Order in Council. Such direct laws could be made without the need for any amendment of the constitution of the DT concerned. In the case of Bermuda where HMG no longer has the power to legislate by Order in Council, such direct legislation could be achieved only through an Act of the UK Parliament.

9.3 Disallowing legislation

  HMG could make greater use of its existing power to disallow the DTs' own legislation (this being an unfettered power in all the DTs except Bermuda, where the power is limited as explained above in paragraph 4).

  10.  Successive British Governments have fostered the development of democratic self-government in the DTs; and HMG respects the right of the DT governments to discharge their functions, to be consulted on any constitutional changes proposed by HMG and to put forward any constitutional proposals of their own. We are consulting DT governments on the main political and constitutional questions under consideration in the FCO's current review of policy towards the DTs, and the FCO will take their views into account in formulating recommendations for Ministers. HMG also values the co-operative spirit in which its dealings with the DT governments are regularly conducted.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

December 1997


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries

© Parliamentary copyright 1998
Prepared 21 May 1998