Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 60 - 79)

WEDNESDAY 21 JANUARY 1998

Mr J Mortimer, Treasury Officer of Accounts, further examined.

Mr Love

  60.  Can I go back to your stated reason for not wishing to give both contracts to the same person as being the wish to create a market for future contracts. Can you give us some idea of what you estimate to be the number of prisons that will be put out to PFI in the future? What is your programme?

   (Mr Tilt)  That requires a complicated answer. The last Government's policy was one that all new prisons should be procured through the Private Finance Initiative and the then Home Secretary made an announcement in 1993 that we would procure six prisons in that way. We are continuing to complete that programme of six DCMFs and the current round of Agecroft, Pucklechurch and the ones that are currently out for the tender brings us to that number of six. The new Government on coming into office announced that it had some concern about the use and position of the private sector in providing prison places and whilst agreeing to continue with that programme of six DCMF prisons asked us to undertake work to see whether a different version of PFI could be used which would be designing, constructing and financing the building but then managing it publicly. That work is going on and is due to report in the context of the comprehensive spending review in a few months' time. It is a little difficult to say what the programme will be, if indeed there will be a programme, beyond the existing six that are already in the pipeline.

  61.  Can I ask you, and this follows on, it is stated in the report that four new prisons that were built in the traditional methods have been contracted out.

   (Mr Tilt)  Yes.

  62.  Presumably there are no other prisons which have been built by traditional methods but have any other prisons been contracted out since that time?

   (Mr Tilt)  No, there are four plus the six in this programme. Lowdham Grange sits separately actually and would make that up to seven.

  63.  Can I go on. When you were asked a question about the estimate that you had made that there would be ten per cent savings under the PFI from the traditional comparator using the private sector, you stated it was staffing, design, risk connected to overrun?

   (Mr Tilt)  Yes.

  64.  Could that have been achieved by splitting effectively the contract into two, into design and build, and then contracting out to the private sector? Here I am stepping back from the obvious priority that it be funded from the private sector to see if we are getting value for money.

   (Mr Tilt)  Yes, it is very difficult to answer that question. I do not think I can answer the question. I understand precisely the point you are on. If we had had conventional capital available to us, what would have been the outcome if we had built it and then contracted out the management?

  65.  I ask that in the context of the question the Chairman asked earlier on which was about the state of the construction industry at that time. It was, to say the least, extremely competitive. Some of the design and other risks that you have associated with the additional savings I am sure, at least it would be my view, would have been available at that time.

   (Mr Tilt)  The difficulty for us, of course, is that to do it in that way would not have been a DCMF, it would not have qualified because we would have been separating off the service delivery, if you like, from the construction and we would have ended up really in effect with a lease arrangement for the construction if we were not careful. We did not approach it in that way. We have always approached this as a PFI with the need to have a service delivery contract over a fairly long period, 25 years. I was going to answer the point about the building industry and whether it was particularly slack at that time. The analysis that we made of cost and time overruns was based on the earlier Audit Office report, 1994, in relation to a very large prison building programme over I think about 15 years with 21 prisons built where there had almost always been cost and time overruns. Now there would have been times during that programme when the building industry had similar sorts of slack. I think the difficulty was the Property Services Agency had never been able to deliver that absolutely spot on, at the time that we needed it and we were well aware of the risks in all that.

  66.  I understand that. I have lost the thread of the question I was going to go on to ask you. Can I move on and I will come back to that in a second. You mentioned in relation to the £19 million or other savings that you would have got from giving both contracts to the same contractor that you were extraordinarily nervous for two reasons. One of those was delays, and I think you have touched upon that already, but part of the whole contracting business is to write in or to transfer risk so that the risk from delays is transferred to the PFI contractor.

   (Mr Tilt)  Yes.

  67.  Yet you have indicated that although you had done some of that because of the pressures of prison numbers there were still significant risks with yourself?

   (Mr Tilt)  Yes, you are quite right. We did transfer some of the risk. Certainly we transferred risks relating to cost overruns and there were provisions for time overruns but they would not have covered the kind of numbers of prisoners that we would have had to put into police cells if there had been significant delay on either or both of these sites. There was a very real risk for us. The other part of it, as I said earlier, was also a worry about one operator, particularly one without any experience of running a prison, trying to open up two at exactly the same time.

  68.  The other reason you gave was about being nervous about giving both contracts to someone who did not have any previous experience. Yet that was exactly the contractor that came up with the innovative solution. Can I ask you why having come up with something which the Prison Service, over a very long period of time had not been able to develop, and we heard your colleague talking about fewer buildings, simpler structures, tighter ground limits, all of which were developed by this so-called inexperienced contractor, why could that very innovative solution not give you some advantage that they could have carried through?

   (Mr Tilt)  You could turn that round and say that the reason they came up with that was because they had not got experience of running a prison. The first offer that they put into us we modified, we asked them to modify because we thought the first one was even more risky and the contract price increased slightly as a result of us working on it and saying: "We think there are certain requirements you must put into this". I come back to a judgment that was made which was that our experience with opening both public and private sector new prisons is that it is a very difficult period actually. The first 12 to 18 months is not easy. Routines are not in place, prisoners will test those routines out right from the beginning and everywhere we have seen opening new prisons is a difficult business. If you have one company with no experience of it at all trying to do that in two large new prisons you are stretching their resources quite considerably. Now of course they would no doubt have put more resources in if they had got two contracts but there is a limit to the risk that we thought we were prepared to take with them.

  69.  Does that not take me back to my original point about splitting the contract in two? Does that not make an additional argument for that?

   (Mr Tilt)  Yes.

  70.  I am really thinking of splitting it in terms of the Fazakerley contract because it states quite clearly in the report that Fazakerley, when you made a comparison with the public sector, came out pretty well even.

   (Mr Tilt)  Yes.

  71.  Yet you have already indicated there may well have been possibilities to make further savings in the building contract.

   (Mr Tilt)  Yes.

  72.  Does that not throw into some relief whether we actually achieved value for money from the Fazakerley contract?

   (Mr Tilt)  Yes.

  73.  Especially in the light of both Bridgend and subsequently the new contract as well.

   (Mr Tilt)  Yes, I think that is a fair point and certainly as I was hinting earlier on from our point of view, a straight build and then a management only contract is an easier concept and one that we have already made to work well with good cost savings. Of course what we have got out of this that we have not had before is some transfer of risk. We have transferred the cost and risk of maintenance to the contractor so there are no costs to us in terms of maintaining it and we get the building back at the end of the 25 year period in a suitable condition having been maintained so that is an advantage to us.

Mr Campbell

  74.  Can I take you back to figure 11 just to clear one or two points on what you said to Mr Leslie. If you could explain a couple of things for me. I hear what you say about the estimates that you built into your budget initially but the actual cost for your advisers, according to this, is £1.55 million.

   (Mr Tilt)  Yes.

  75.  Which is described by some as twice as high as you had estimated but is actually nearly three times as much. Does that include VAT?

   (Mr Tilt)  No.

  76.  What would the effect of including VAT be?

   (Mr Tilt)  Note one says that it excludes VAT.

  77.  What would the effect of including VAT be?

   (Mr Tilt)  I do not know.

  78.  Would you put VAT on all these services that you sought from advisers?

   (Mr Wilson)  Yes.

  79.  So the figure is an eighth higher, is that right? No, sorry.

   (Mr Tilt)  17.5 per cent.


 
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