Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40 - 59)

WEDNESDAY 28 JANUARY 1998

SIR RICHARD MOTTRAM, KCB

  40.  All scenarios two to six on both assumptions, 25 or 30 years, show a loss to the public purse. Choosing any of them, or if you had chosen an average, if you had chosen any of those different scenarios each one of them showed a loss to the public purse.
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  Each one of them shows that if you use this methodology--

  41.  What you admit yourself was a very conservative set of estimates.
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  If you use these conservative estimates then you generate a feel for the public sector comparator which is as in this report, yes.

  42.  I was interested that you chose these scenarios. You had spent £7.6 million on investigating the trust option. Did you not include that as a comparator? After all, you had a very great deal of experience. You had people in post. Could that not have been an alternative scenario? I assume that one of the reasons for going for the trust option was to improve the efficiency of the way you dealt with your properties.
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  Yes, but we could not pursue the trust option for the reason that it was ruled out. We were then looking at two alternatives: we would retain ownership of the properties and dispose of those we did not need progressively; alternatively, we would construct a process of selling the estate and leasing back those which we needed. Those were the two options open to us. In the case of the amount of money we spent on the housing trust that was not all nugatory money because some of the work which was done on the scale of the estate and the legal background to the estate, was drawn on in the next stage of the work.

  43.  I presume that the trust option was ruled out because it did not transfer the properties to the private sector. None of the scenarios did the same. You could have had an adaptation of the trust option which would have maintained the properties in the public sector but which allowed you to make use of all the additional experience you had built up having spent £7.6 million and appointed your three senior officers.
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  We had a view about the housing trust. The housing trust was ruled invalid for the reasons given. The objectives we were working to were laid down by Ministers. Ministers were entirely clear that the basis on which we decided to go forward with the sale to Annington met their objectives.

  44.  Then you are saying to us that the objective which was primary here was to transfer it to the private sector and gain a capital receipt.
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  No, I am saying that the objectives were the ones laid down in the report; a number of objectives.

  45.  You mentioned earlier the possibility now of transferring it to another part of the public sector, perhaps to the social sector and, indeed, being able to address some of the issues of homelessness and other problems up and down the country. Was that ever investigated as a comparator? As I understand this report, most of the receipt that has been received has gone to the Consolidated Fund. There would have been Consolidated Fund benefits if these properties had been transferred to local government or indeed to some other part of the public sector. Was any of that investigated as part of the comparator on Figure 10?
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  No. Certainly in relation to Figure 10 some of the disposals which we made which are assumed in Figure 10 might well have gone to housing associations. We have done this in the past. Some of the disposals which Annington make in the future may go to social housing. We did not have an alternative model which was, let us assume that we will transfer all our surpluses to a social housing alternative.

  46.  May I look at the other side of the equation? You did include in Figure 10 the performance you were assuming for the new owners. I would have assumed from that set of assumptions that you could work out, using a different calculation, the amount of value that these properties transferred would have to the person who purchased them.
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  Yes.

  47.  Can you give us from those assumptions some indication of how much profit-if I can call it that-you expect the purchaser to receive on a 25 or 30-year prospect?
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  As the report brings out, we did three calculations. Two of those calculations were thinking about the sale from the perspective of the potential private sector purchaser. In each of those cases the benchmark for the sale was exceeded by the amount we received from Annington. As the report also brings out, the NAO have done a calculation of what they think is the underlying rate of return for the people who took on these properties and it appears to be 7.5 per cent according to their calculation.

  48.  Was that calculation done on the assumptions which are included in Figure 10?
  (Mr Hawkswell)  We calculated it mainly on the basis of the rents which the Ministry of Defence expected to be paying to Annington, added to that the residual value of the properties at the end of the 25-year period and then did a calculation to see how that related to the sale price. That came out at a 7.5 per cent rate of return. What I would stress is that that rate of return figure excluded the development gain that Annington might make on properties because we could only speculate as to what that might be. The certainties were the rents which the department were likely to pay and the residual values of the properties.

Chairman

  49.  May I be clear on this? Does that mean in effect that was a minimum return, a guaranteed return you will get?
  (Mr Hawkswell)  No. We calculated this on the basis of the level of rents which the MOD were expecting to pay, which is more than the minimum.
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  May I add a point which may or may not be helpful? This is a forecast rate of return on a certain set of assumptions where obviously Annington is now carrying a whole series of potential risks in relation to those assumptions. What we have done by selling the properties is to transfer a number of those risks to them. I am not arguing we have transferred all the risks engaged here, because quite clearly we have not. When the thing was thought about from the other way round we asked two sets of people to say if they were thinking about it from the point of view of a private sector purchaser and he was thinking about the risks and the benefits he was going to receive, what would he be likely to pay. On both of those calculations Annington paid more than the private sector benchmark price, as the report brings out.

Mr Love

  50.  I am still not clear. You used a completely different set of assumptions than were used under the performance in Figure 10. At no point did you do a calculation based on those assumptions? I just want a yes/no answer.
  (Mr Hawkswell)  The calculation was based on the assumptions in Figure 10.[5]

  51.  May I take you now to Figure 14, page 42? You have done a number of sensitivity tests in relation to all of these assumptions, yet again you make very conservative estimates relating to those sensitivities, either to occupancy or to property market growth. I would ask, over the last 10, 20 or 30 years, what has property market growth been either amongst your stock or in Britain generally? Surely it has been closer to two per cent real net growth than it has been to some of the other much more conservative estimates that you have made. If so, should those not have been the assumptions on which you worked?
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  I do not have with me what the historic rate is. In preparing the base case we consulted the Treasury and the Department of the Environment. The base case was derived from discussions we had with them. I am not transferring the responsibility for it to them. I am saying the base case was an educated estimate based on a discussion of that kind.

  52.  May I move on to the occupancy rates? I would assume both assumptions E and F were reasonable estimates. With all the other assumptions, G and H, I assume that you will have either 50,000 or fewer properties at the end of this period. That assumes that your need for these properties is very, very substantially reduced at the end of the period and indeed that assumes that you are going to be disposing of something between 1,300 and 1,600 properties a year. Do you think that is a feasible and realistic option?
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  Do I think G is something which could be an outcome?

  53.  Could you see yourself reducing to as few as 15,000 properties and disposing?
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  Yes, I could. May I say that is not a prediction? I am saying yes, it could be that.

Mr Wardle

  54.  In your answers to Mr Love you said that the housing trust was ruled invalid for the reasons given. I think there are several members of the Committee who did not understand what you meant by that. Were you referring to something in paragraphs 2.39 or 2.40 or is it a reason you had already given and the rest of us missed?
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  No, I was not referring to that. I was referring to the fact that it is touched on in the report. Is it paragraph 2.39?

  55.  Perhaps I have missed it. Could you just spell out now for the Committee what were the reasons?
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  The reason why the housing trust was ruled invalid was because there was insufficient transfer of risk from the Ministry of Defence to the trust for it to be regarded that we were no longer effectively the owner of the trust.

  56.  It took £7.6 million of expenditure and the help of Savills and Coopers & Lybrand to come to this conclusion, did it?
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  No, it took £7.6 million of expenditure and the help of Savills to get a sense of what would be the size and value of the assets which might be put into the trust.

  57.  We will come to that in a moment. I am curious to understand the drift here. I think the transcript of today's proceedings will show that early on you suggested that Ministers had a strong influence here. Later on, when talking about the trust, you talked about the feelings of the armed services. You are the Accounting Officer. At any stage did you disagree, and did you record your disagreement if there was any such disagreement, with the decision to move to the sale as described in this report?
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  All of the calculations which are shown in the report are based on--

  58.  That is not my question. Did you record your disagreement, if indeed there was any such disagreement?
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  I was coming to answer the question. The answer is that I did not record my disagreement. What I thought I said was that we were operating within a policy framework laid down by Ministers, as described in this report. Ministers had before them all the information which is in this report about both the two private sector calculations and the public sector comparator. Ministers reached a decision on what they thought was the right way forward. I did not seek to have any view of mine recorded.

  59.  Elegantly put; thank you for that. I think the Committee understands what you are saying. Is it not really the case that for some time there had been well-known public expenditure round pressures at the Ministry of Defence as defence technology becomes more and more expensive? Did you not have review after review to try to cater for this problem? Did not somebody, after a flurry of proper Treasury procedure and due competition for all the advisers who got so well paid, say "Let's unload these assets"? But is not the truth of it that you sold assets which were quite simply valued in the market on the basis of the rent that you as the Government guaranteed to pay and for no other reason, that you kept all the major problems, being the problems of maintenance, you had no database to tell you what the size and scale of those problems would be, no computerised maintenance problems-I should be interested to know whether you have any-then you unloaded the relatively minor task of dribbling out some of the properties which became surplus to requirements. You sold assets which are bound, if the last 50 or 100 or even 200 years of real estate asset values are anything to go by, in the period of the lease which you have agreed to here, to increase and increase and increase, at a one off price and what is more, just for good measure, you gave away a five-year rent review as well. How could that be a good deal?
  (Sir Richard Mottram)  It could be a good deal in the sense that we were transferring some risks to the private sector. In the judgement of our Ministers, and it is a matter ultimately for them, it is not a core activity of the Ministry of Defence to own housing, except where, for various reasons it turns out that it is very directly in our interest to own housing. It is not a core activity of the Ministry of Defence to speculate about the nature of the future property market. It may or may not be the case that over time rents will continue to grow.


5   Note: See Evidence, Appendix 3, page 43 (PAC 315). Back


 
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