Select Committee on Public Accounts Forty-First Report


THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOUTHAMPTON OCEANOGRAPHY CENTRE

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Oceanography Centre in Southampton provides a research and teaching facility. The Centre was completed in 1995, about 22 months later than originally planned. By March 1997 the final cost had not been determined because of a dispute with Wimpey, the main contractor.[1] Although Wimpey have yet to submit an itemised claim against the Natural Environment Research Council (the Council), the total cost of the building could be £69.3 million, some £12.6 million higher than the Council's current estimate. A key area of dispute relates to the mechanical and electrical services.[2]

2. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General the Committee took evidence from the Council on the extent of the time and cost overruns; the quality of the building; their management of the construction project; and their expected resolution of the dispute with their contractor.

3. It is our conclusion that the Council should have managed the project with greater expertise. The Council agreed at the outset the one design put to them, without seeking alternatives. They repeatedly rejected advice that they should appoint a professional project manager and, instead, managed the project through a complex network of committees with the result that nobody had a clearly defined responsibility for completing the project to time and within budget. They also made cuts to the specification of the building in order to keep costs within the budget, without having established clear criteria or priorities for the specification changes.

4. We have no reason to doubt that the Council have secured a good quality scientific research and teaching institution, but it is open to question whether they might have secured a better one for the money they paid or the same building at a lower cost. We consider that the Council, and other small organisations who are inexperienced in construction, should realise that it is essential to employ appropriate expertise throughout a project. Our more specific conclusions and recommendations are as follows.

On the time and cost overruns

      (i)  The Southampton Oceanography Centre was opened 22 months later than intended. As a result the scientific work which it was designed to facilitate was put back by nearly two years. The Committee regards this as an unsatisfactory outcome. We are all the more concerned that the eventual total cost of the Centre could reach £69.3 million, should Wimpey be successful in their claim against the Council (paragraph 10).

      (ii)  We consider that, within the cost of the project, the Council should have exercised much tighter control over the cost of their consultants. We note that they would now operate on the basis of a fixed fee. Such terms would have provided the Council's consultants with an incentive to get the project completed on time (paragraph 11).

      (iii)  The potential total cost of £69.3 million for the Centre, some 40 per cent more than the budget set for it, includes items charged to other budgets, notably for relocating the staff who were transferred to it. Since those and other costs were directly related to the project, we consider that they should have been provided for in the main budget. By allocating them elsewhere, the true cost of establishing the Centre was effectively concealed. We regard this as inconsistent with the need for full transparency and accountability (paragraph 12).

On the quality of the building
      (iv)  We find it disturbing that design work on the Centre started only two months before the target date for approval of the outline. As a result the design period was needlessly compressed and only one single concept emerged. We are concerned that no other options were considered and that the architects did not present the Council with possible alternatives. In any major project involving large sums of public funds, several options should be considered and the prospective users consulted. Had this been done, an alternative method of distributing the services might have been found which would have provided flexibility for the future without any increase to the cost of the building (paragraph 22).

      (v)  It is clear from the evidence we took, that the Southampton Oceanography Centre provides many facilities of considerable value to the scientific and teaching work that is undertaken there. It is encouraging to learn that it provides a good working environment; and that the Council are confident that it has the flexibility and durability to last for a further 120 years. It is difficult to assess how far the project's initial objectives have been met because so few of them were set out in full at the outset (paragraph 23).

      (vi)  We note the Council's evidence that they had been rigorous in determining that the Centre's scientific capability was not damaged by the cuts; and that it had very largely reached its core science objectives. It is of course often necessary to adjust the specification of a project in order that its costs may be kept within budget. However, it is important for any cuts to be made by reference to a set of carefully considered priorities that have regard to the main purposes of the project. We are concerned that this was not the case in the building of the Centre, and that the reductions in the specification may have resulted in the exclusion of some facilities that it would have been better to retain (paragraph 24).

On the management of the project
      (vii)  The Council did not follow Treasury guidance that the services of a project manager should be obtained. Instead they adopted a collective approach, involving a number of committees and groups, on the management of the Southampton Oceanography Centre project. As a consequence, the management structure was needlessly complicated and resulted in a weakened grip on a project which over-ran on both time and cost. We find it incomprehensible that the Council should have repeatedly rejected the advice given, by those whom the Council themselves had appointed, against the adoption of a collective approach (paragraph 42).

      (viii)  Given their lack of experience in building work and their decision not to appoint a project manager, the Council's choice of consultants was crucial to the success of the project. Since the building was to be highly serviced and was larger than the Council had previously managed, the Council should have appointed consultants by means of competition and from a wide field rather than simply relying on those with whom they had worked in the past. We are concerned that they appointed a quantity surveyor without competition; and that they did not, in the case of architectural services, seek the advice of the Royal Institute of British Architects about potential firms. It would have been sensible for the Council to have obtained technical advice earlier rather than later in the project (paragraph 43).

      (ix)  It is worrying that the Council's architect did not challenge the users' requirements, often exceeded his delegated limit without authorisation, and was paid £2.5 million against an original estimate of £1.8 million. In the light of these points we are disturbed that the Council's contract with their architect did not provide for them to obtain redress. In the case of mechanical and electrical services, the Council's method of estimating the cost was less accurate than if measured drawings had been used. We consider that, for an area so critical to the building, the Council should have used a more accurate method of estimating the cost (paragraph 44).

      (x)  The payment regime used by the Council in the early stages of the project led to Wimpey being paid in advance of work completed. We are concerned that this should have been allowed to happen. It is a feature of good contract management not to pay for services until they have been satisfactorily performed. We note the Council's assurance that they would look more closely at the payment terms to prevent this happening again (paragraph 45).

On the dispute with Wimpey
      (xi)  We note the Council's position on their dispute with Wimpey and that they have taken legal advice. We wish to be advised on the outcome of the dispute (paragraph 48).


1   HC 494 Session 1997-98: paragraph 1 Back

2   C&AG's Report, paragraphs 1, 4.38-4.39 Back


 
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