Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence


ANNEX F

COMMENTARY ON SPECIFIC CONCERNS RAISED ABOUT RAB

  F1. Will the principles and procedures of Supply be maintained under RAB?

  These have been characterised by the PAC as:

    —  no expenditure without legislation

    —  Supplementary Estimates when overspends foreseen

    —  an absolute limit to spending

    —  annuality of voted sums

    —  separate authority for overspends

    —  emergency spending subject to Parliament's authority.

  The Government has accepted that these principles will continue to apply to a resource-based system of supply (Treasury Minute on the Ninth Report from the Committee of Public Accounts 1996-97).

  F2. Since an accruals basis of accounting requires more judgements and estimates than the certainty offered by the existing cash basis, will Parliamentary control be diminished?

  There will be more judgements but mainly in respect of areas previously not featured in the accounts and only partially visible to Parliament - assets and liabilities being the obvious example. The set of statements proposed at Estimate and Accounts stages offers far greater information than now and, because of the output and performance dimension, even more than large private sector organisations. In constructing Estimates, departments will have to provide more of the underlying assumptions and workings behind the headline figures. Generally, there will be more limits voted for a department, which will tend to increase the framework for Parliamentary control. It is unclear whether there might be more requests for Supplementary provision as there would be two types of limit which could be breached - cash and resource. At accounts stage, there will be far more material to explain a department's results and to form the basis of any subsequent investigations by the NAO or Select Committees.

  F3. If, in cash terms, only net expenditure is being controlled, rather than net expenditure and appropriations in aid, will there not be a reduction in control?

  If net expenditure and appropriations in aid were controlled on both cash and accruals bases, departments would effectively be running both an income and expenditure and a payments and receipts system. This would be over-specified, costly and inefficient for departments. The Government proposes to place reliance on accruals measures of income and expenditure to do the brunt of the detailed work in terms of control. Thus, departments would have to recognise expenditure at an earlier point than in a cash system, for example when an invoice is received. If a department was pressing against its resource expenditure limit, recognising the receipt of an invoice might in itself trigger a breach of a Parliamentary limit. The same considerations apply to recognition of income, which would also be controlled in accrual terms. Compared with now, Parliament would not have limits set on gross cash payments. But departments would not be able to accrue expenditure, in advance of paying out cash, without increasing their resource expenditure and moving closer to, or even beyond, their Parliamentary resource limit. The same considerations would apply to income. Thus, there would be control over gross expenditure in accrual terms, since there would be Parliamentary limits on net expenditure and income. There would also be Parliamentary control over the net cash (payments less receipts) required to support the voted level of gross accruals expenditure. Taken together, this is designed to provide Parliament with control over accruals measures of gross and net expenditure which are sufficient to deliver a set limit for net cash outlays.

  In relation to capital expenditure, the reconciliation in the Estimates between resources and cash required would specify the forecast cash expenditure on capital purchases. Departments would have flexibility to manage their working capital to meet both the cash and accruals targets. With a regime for efficient cash management (Annex A paragraph 6) there will be very powerful incentives for departments to manage both cash and resources. This is a discipline that other well-managed parts of the economy take for granted.

  F4. Under resource-based Estimates would cash and/or resources be voted and how would dual voting be reconciled?

  The items which it is envisaged would be voted in a resource-based Estimate are:

    —  the accruals-based figures for net resources and for appropriations in aid for each of the department's requests for resources;

    —  a single appropriations in aid figure for capital receipts; and

    —  the total cash requirement for the department which would be calculated by reconciling the net resource total to the cash figure by means of removing non-cash items; adding capital expenditure and cash generated from the disposal of fixed assets; and by taking account of changes in working capital and in long-term liabilities.

  A forecast operating cost statement and cash flow statement (see Annex B) would give more detail in support of the Estimates. The dual basis of voting would set a "model" of multiple resource limits and a single cash limit, with full requirements shown.

  F5. At what level of detail will Parliamentary voting and authority apply in the resource-based Estimates?

  As shown in the model Estimates in Annex B, the working assumption is that Parliament would be asked to vote net resources and appropriations in aid for each request for resource whilst cash would be voted as a single figure for each department. In addition, Parliament would be asked to vote a single figure for each department for non-operating cost appropriations in aid.

  F6. Will capital be presented and voted gross or net in the resource-based Estimates?

  The intention is that capital purchases and disposals will be shown separately, with a separate limit on non-resource budget appropriations in aid. Details of significant long term capital projects will continue to be shown in the departmental report.

  F7. How will PFI assets be handled in the resource-based Estimates and Accounts?

  At present the Resource Accounting Manual contains only a broad indication of the accounting treatment of Private Finance Initiatives. The lack of detail in this area was due to the fact that the latest version of the Manual was prepared whilst awaiting guidance from the Public Sector and Not-for-Profit Committee of the Accounting Standards Board who had been tasked with preparing an accounting treatment for the Private Finance Initiative. In the meantime, the Government commissioned Malcolm Bates (Chairman of Pearl Assurance plc and Pierter Farnell plc) to review the PFI. That report has now been completed and the Paymaster General issued a Press Notice on 23 June launching a programme of action to reinvigorate the PFI initiative.

  Section 15 of the report recommended that:

    "The Treasury, consulting the ONS and the NAO, should draw up necessary accounting guidance by30 September 1997 and promulgate it widely"

  and noted that:

    "The accounting treatment of PFI transactions is of serious concern to the private sector, but there is no immediate prospect of agreement in the accounting profession. The Treasury therefore should issue guidance pending the deliberations of the Accounting Standards Board."

  Work on preparing interim guidance on this is being taken forward.

  In addition, Section 17 of the report noted that:

    "The Treasury should request Departments to give appropriate assurance to funders that the money necessary to honour contractual commitments under PFI deals with Non-Departmental Public Bodies represent obligations that will be met for the duration of the contract. This step is necessary to address concern with private sector regarding the issue of covenant."

  This has implications for the treatment of PFI transactions under RAB and will be addressed shortly. The resulting policies will be considered carefully and decisions about the Estimates will be taken as necessary.

  F8. Will the resource-based Estimates be supported by a forecast balance sheet?

  There are no plans to do so, because the relevant data is shown in the supporting statements to the Estimates (and in the departmental report, eg details of long term capital projects) therefore the forecast balance sheet would be repeating information already available.

  F9. Are there "creative accounting wheezes" that departments might be able to use to their benefit?

  Concerns have been expressed about the dangers of "creative accounting" for the public sector. However, it is worth remembering that there are a number of constraints on central government which are not present in the private sector (five of which are listed below). The public sector will be subject to rules and scrutiny which provide additional safeguards against massaging the figures in their accounts.

  First, the FRAB will advise on revisions to GAAP and on new accounting standards and these will then be incorporated into the Resource Accounting Manual. Departments will be required to prepare their resource accounts in accordance with the RA Manual which means that they will be required to live within the rules contained within it.

  Second, the PES round and scrutiny of departments' Estimates and resource accounts by the Treasury will result in checks being applied to ensure that accounting policies and the presentation of the accounts are not altered from year to year without a justifiable reason.

  Third, the NAO in auditing the department's accounts will need to approve the accounting policies used in the preparation of those accounts. The onus will be on the department to make the case for any changes to the NAO on the grounds that if the changes were not made then the accounts would not present a "true and fair" picture. In addition, the Comptroller and Auditor General as a single auditor for Government provides consistency across departments.

  Fourth, Government Accounting contains rules on propriety that a department will need to abide by when preparing its accounts.

  Fifth, the public sector is different to the private sector and many of the major problem areas in the commercial world are largely absent in Government. In particular there is an absence of mergers and acquisitions in the public sector, foreign currency transactions are limited and the results of trading do not impact on share prices.


 
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