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APPENDIX 2
HM COASTGUARD: CIVIL MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE (PAC 97-98/302)
Supplementary Memorandum submitted by
the Maritime & Coastguard Agency
Question 65
Visit to Chief Emergency Planning Officer Merseyside
Fire and Protection Authority
The senior Coastguard Manager for the area held
a meeting with Chief Emergency Planning Officers affected by the
proposed closure of Liverpool MRSC on 21 May, a second meeting
is planned in June.
Question 68
What is the exact date which you became aware
that NTL started to fall behind in their inspection programme
The NTL contract commenced on 1 April 1995 and
the Coastguard contract manager became aware on 27 September 1995
that the planned maintenance schedule was beginning to fall behind.
Since that date regular steps have been taken to keep the preventative
maintenance programme on schedule.
Question 73
How much is their (NTL) annual contract
In financial year 1997/98 a total of £850k
was expended on the NTL Contract. The preventative maintenance
part of the contract is only a small percentage of the overall
contract (£10k).
Question 73
What will be the result of your negotiations in
asking for a rebate for a service that has only 58% been delivered
No rebate is payable because the total preventative
maintenance schedule was completed within the allotted annual
timescale.
Question 73
Is there a penalty clause for late delivery of
services in the contract
The contract contains no specific penalty clauses,
however there is standard Government contract provision for terminating
the contract for unsatisfactory performance.
Question 139
Consultation document on non-regulated pleasure
vessels
A copy of the document is attached.
Question 143
Breakdown of recreational craft incidents
A spreadsheet detailing the statistics is attached.
Q143
Recreational Craft Related Incidents 1987-1997
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| Year | Total incidents relating to recreational craft | Powered pleasure craft | Sailing yacht auxiliary power | Sailing yacht no power |
Sailing dinghy | Inflatable no power | Inflatable powered | Sailboard |
Rowing boat | Canoe | Airbed or inflatable toy |
| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|
| 1987 | 1207 | 738
| 686 | | 82 |
117 | | 322 |
| | |
| 1988 | 1399 | 796
| 857 | | 83 |
125 | | 334 |
| | |
| 1989 | 1378 | 965
| 818 | | 71 |
160 | | 329 |
| | |
| 1990 | 1431 | 860
| 872 | | 65 |
163 | | 331 |
| | |
| 1991 | 1396 | 981
| 673 | | 269 |
173 | | 281 |
| | |
| 1992 | 1773 | 1059
| 873 | | 349 |
185 | | 366 |
| | |
| 1993 | 1666 | 1144
| 866 | | 296 |
184 | | 320 |
| | |
| 1994 | 2750 | 1620
| 1127 | 135 | 319
| 86 | 236 | 520
| 129 | 104 | 94
|
| 1995 | 3072 | 1989
| 1178 | 129 | 353
| 151 | 218 | 582
| 147 | 116 | 198
|
| 1996 | 2584 | 1788
| 1127 | 109 | 287
| 108 | 182 | 426
| 125 | 91 | 129
|
| 1997 | 2754 | 1791
| 1163 | 103 | 302
| 94 | 221 | 485
| 136 | 95 | 155
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The categorisation of vessel types was refined as of 1 January 1994.
Q139
(NON-LEGISLATIVE) MEASURES FOR THE IMPROVED SAFETY
OF NON-REGULATED PLEASURE VESSELS
A Consultation Document from The Coastguard Agency
Introduction
1. The number of Search and Rescue incidents has risen
steadily over the last ten years and during 1995 HM Coastguard
dealt with over 12,000 incidents in the United Kingdom Search
and Rescue Region. Although there is no clear explanation for
the rise, it has coincided with perhaps a period of generally
increased prosperity and this has been reflected in the fact that
the type of incident has changed over the period, with leisure
related incidents now accounting for 60% of the total and non-regulated
pleasure vessels responsible for 75% of all vessel incidents.
A statistical analysis is at Annex A and the need for more focused
statistics discussed further in paragraphs 42-44.
2. Since 1 April 1995 The Coastguard Agency (COASTGUARD)
has assumed responsibility for the safety of non-regulated pleasure
vessels (NRPV) within United Kingdom territorial and estuarial
waters as excluded from the merchant Shipping (Vessels in Commercial
Use for Sport and Pleasure) regulations 1993 Part II. Such vessels
are under 13.7 metres (44.9 ft) and can encompass anything from
a surfboard to a large yacht. Vessels larger than this are classed
as regulated pleasure vessels and are the responsibility of the
Marine Safety Agency (MSA), as are all vessels operating on inland
waters. A more detailed description of non-regulated vessels is
at Annex B.
3. A key target of COASTGUARD is to reduce the number
of incidents it deals with through the promotion of safety awareness
and accident prevention projects. In the ten years since 1986,
recorded incidents have more than doubled from 5300 to 12,200.
The year-on-year percentage rise is currently running at around
10%. Work is underway in COASTGUARD to look at ways of reducing
the number of incidents. Ideas emerging include a mixture of measurable
national safety initiatives, for example the recently launched
primary schools sea safety campaign, coupled with 'local' accident
prevention projects. The results of consultation from this document,
which is not, nor should be viewed as, a precursor to regulation,
will form another valuable dimension to COASTGUARD's overall sea
and shoreline safety awareness and accident prevention strategy.
4. Currently there are some two million NRPVs using UK
waters. COASTGUARD records showed an increase in the rate of NRPV
incidents in 1995 of some 10% over 1994. Increased incidents not
only result in the tragic loss of life or injury, but also cause
a great deal of distress and anxiety for those involved, their
friends and relatives. Those who crew the rescue units, principally
RNLI volunteers, military, and civilian helicopter personnel,
can also have their own lives placed at risk while carrying out
rescues. Furthermore, the increased use of resources places an
additional cost burden on the taxpayer at large. In short, simply
dealing with incidents as they arise is neither satisfactory in
people nor in cash terms.
5. It is recognised that compared with fatalities on
the roads and in the home, deaths at sea are relatively few. This
is a measure of the effectiveness of the rescue services. But
we should not rely on the rescue services to save life where accidents
can more easily-and at less cost-be prevented. Measures which,
on the one hand preserve the integrity of a freesea for
NRPVs while on the other ensure better and more effective NRPV
safety, must be in everyone's best interest.
6. COASTGUARD wishes to retain much of the freedom enjoyed
by NRPV users and this document addresses issues arising from
their activities and discusses non-legislative measures for improved
safety. COASTGUARD does not under-estimate the complexity of such
issues and the contrasting viewpoints of users, those with responsibility
towards users and those towards whom users have responsibility.
COASTGUARD is also sensitive to the need to balance sensible safety
provision against the traditional freedoms of UK waters.
7. The purpose of this document is to promote debate
and gather views about ways in which incidents involving NRPV
can be reduced. A number of ideas are set out in the following
paragraphs which attempt to address recognisable aspects of the
problem. They do not necessarily represent government or COASTGUARD
policy towards NRPV users. A list of those bodies being consulted
is at Annex C.
8. Safety in the context of this document is taken to
mean freedom from danger, hurt or loss.
The Participants
9. Issues which arise from NRPV activity can be categorised
according to the particular role played by participants; whether
user, affected by user, of dealing with the user. These are summarised
below and are based upon COASTGUARD experience.
The Users' Viewpoint
10. Contrasting views are held by NRPV users which fall
broadly into two categories:
"The sea is possibly the last bastion of freedom
of our island race and ought to be preserved as such without any
restriction";
or
"Legislation or associated measures should be put in
place to prevent ignorant, inexperienced and potentially dangerous
or reckless users from having complete freedom of the sea and
spoiling it for sensible users".
11. There are, of course, middle ground views. An individual`s
view of safety is generally dictated by the user's own
experience, which in many cases is wholly subjective and often
over estimated.
Those with responsibility towards users
12. These can be generally categorised as follows:
13. Authorities-can be taken to include harbour/port/Local
(council)/navigation authorities. These bodies exhibit varying
degrees of control over NRPV users either through local
legislation (e.g. secondary legislation) or by giving timely positive
advice (the get out of the way or else approach!). Policing
existing powers is no simple matter and can be resource intensive
with little return. NRPV users can be considered a nuisance to
these authorities, either through their ignorance of local procedures
or the creation of unnecessary risks to other vessels, people
and the environment.
14. Governing bodies-are taken to mean those which
relate to particular NRPV activities, for example, the Royal Yachting
Association (RYA) or the British Canoe Union (BCU). The contribution
made by such bodies to the control and safety of NRPV is varied.
Moreover, not all NRPV users belong to a governing body and some
of those that do treat membership as either cosmetic or a matter
of prestige. This is not to detract from the good work done by
the bodies themselves in pursuit of the safe enjoyment of activities.
The potential for further self-regulation of particular
activities is explored later in this document.
15. Advisory bodies-include those such as COASTGUARD
and others which become involved in dealing with the problems
which arise from NRPV activity, such as the Royal Life Saving
Society UK (RLSSUK Ltd). Governing bodies also assume this role
to some degree. So, more generally, does the Royal Society for
the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA).
16. Clearly there is some overlap between these categories.
The recently formed Sea Safety Working Group under the aegis of
the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI), which comprises
COASTGUARD, MSA, Police, RLSSUK, RoSPA, RYA, and the BMIF, is
intent upon accident prevention for all recreational craft but
is focused more toward NRPV. The formation of this group shows
that there is a common desire to deal with problems arising from
NRPV activity.
Those towards whom users have responsibility
17. The General Public is affected by NRPV activity
in as much as it can create hazards to bathers and anglers. In
securing improved safety measures for NRPVs it is hoped that such
effects on the general public can be minimised.
Problem Types
18. There are two main problem areas:
Incidents (accidents potentially resulting in death,
injury of loss of vessel); from the minor false alarm with good
intent to the full blown emergency resulting in loss of life.
Nuisance (impinging on the safety of others and general
environmental problems); ranging from an aesthetic nuisance to
a navigational hazard or severe environmental damage.
Causes
19. There are several general causes of problems resulting
from NRPV activity, including:
20. Ignorance-can take the form of simple innocence
or a wholesale lack of appropriate education. Leisure craft users
are not required to demonstrate any level of competence before
they are permitted to put to sea, and can knowingly pursue an
activity or venture for which either the craft or user is wholly
unsuitable.
21. Weather-the onset of unexpected adverse conditions
can create problems for even the most experienced mariner. Such
situations arise when they are armed even with the most up-to-date
forecast. (That said, timely weather information is a vital ingredient
to the safety of NRPVs, as is information about navigational hazards,
naturally occurring or otherwise.)
22. Recklessness-Endangering the user, or others,
or the environment.
23. Poor craft maintenance-a common cause of problems
for all types of craft but particularly so for NRPV. For example,
the machinery failure category features highly each year
in COASTGUARD incident figures. Such failures include running
out of fuel or engine failure in its broadest sense to the complete
loss of an engine, say outboard motor from a rotted transom.
24. While lack of craft maintenance can simply be through
ignorance, it can also be the result of user lethargy or simply
a lack of funds-sailing on a shoestring budget is not uncommon.
25. Genuine accidents-can happen to anyone. Many
accidents occur through ignorance, but some are not preventable
even by well prepared and experienced people.
Solutions
What steps can be taken to reduce or eliminate these problems?
26. A number of possibilities come to mind:
27. Bye-Laws-Although this paper is about non-legislative
solutions there already exist powers for harbour authorities to
regulate pleasure vessels in the private acts for particular ports
and for local authorities to do so in bye-laws. While authorities
will want to continue to tailor their rules according to local
problems it would be possible for COASTGUARD to draw up model
clauses for bye-laws which local authorities could take up if
they so wished. COASTGUARD would do that in consultation with
representatives of local authorities.
28. Education/Training/Advice and Experience-COASTGUARD
safety awareness initiatives have already been mentioned.
There may be other ways in which COASTGUARD, in concert with the
RYA and others, could become more involved in local safety training
initiatives.
29. In some types of NRPV use-notably yachting, motor-
boating, canoeing [and others?] the governing bodies already have
structured systems for the award of qualifications and for the
accreditation of training courses. The qualifications invariably
require safety training. There are two challenges; first, how
to make this training, where it is available, more widely taken
up. Second, how to extend the systems of training and formal qualifications
into those areas of NRPV use which are without them.
30. Bodies which currently give advice where it is sought,
such as COASTGUARD, are not resourced to deliver formal training
courses widely through the UK. Should COASTGUARD or some other
national body take on that role?
31. Most owners of yachts and motor-boats and the users
of many other small craft, are trained, examined and certified
by the RYA, under the aegis of the Radiocommunications Agency,
in the use of VHF radio. Without the Restricted VHF Licence so
obtained they cannot legally operate VHF radio equipment. (This
is the only way that national regulations bear on the training
and qualifications of NRPV users.) Does this encounter with a
structured training regime provide opportunities for putting over
wider safety messages? Would it be reasonable to ask the RYA to
broaden the content of its courses accordingly?
32. Safety Equipment-A great deal of money is
currently spent on resolving NRPV problems through the provision
of rescue services. Does this provide the best value for money?
It could be argued that it would be cheaper to provide safety
equipment free to NRPV users than to rescue them. There are two
problems, one is that those providing the rescue services would
find it difficult to find the money and would understandably be
dubious about realising any financial return. Much 'safety equipment'
is a means of alerting rescuers, rather than a means of preventing
an accident. Radios, EPIRBs and flares may save lives, but rather
than reducing the number of rescues necessary, indiscriminate
'issue' is more likely to lead to more false alarms and unnecessary
call- outs.
33. Instead of cash subsidies for safety equipment, equipment
itself could be provided either directly or through a loan scheme.
However, the same problems arise, who would pay, and what are
the real benefits to accident prevention?
34. Subsidised or free safety checks could be offered
with discounted repairs. Again, who would pay?
35. Incentives-Incentives arise in many forms,
including;
Accreditation to high profile prestige bodies
36. Financial. Some insurance companies already
give discounts, for example, to yachtsmen with RYA qualifications.
This could be extended to include qualifications from other governing
bodies for other types of NRPV. Discounts could also be given
for the carriage of certain safety equipment. (Defined by whom?)
This could be self-certificated or certified by an examiner-a
club official, harbour master, governing body official, or even
a Coastguard officer. What scope do insurance companies have for
the introduction of such schemes? Would the lower risk justify
reduced premiums?
37. Accreditation by prestige bodies. Fulfilment
of certain criteria-training certification, carriage of safety
equipment could result in the formal accreditation by an existing
regulating body or by a newly formed body par excellence
which offered the prestige of membership with certain privileges,
such as insurance and equipment discounts.
38. Awards. Linked to an accreditation initiative
could be an award scheme to recognise certain attributes, such
as best safety record, no claims, for example.
39. Fear of death or injury. The DoT has used
this approach with road accidents and in particular drink driving
campaigns. Should such an approach be directed toward NRPV users?
40. Control and Codes of Conduct/Safety-Without
proper policing adequate control is difficult. A degree
of control over activities which require complementary safety
provision can be brought about by isolating the activity. Are
separation schemes effective in reducing accidents? Do they require
intensive policing?
41. Codes of conduct and safe practice could be drawn
up with governing and advisory bodies-such as that drawn up by
COASTGUARD with the BCU for sea canoeing. Such Codes could
be discretely prescriptive without recourse to legislation. Should
representatives of port authorities and local authorities, and
COASTGUARD, be involved with the drafting and discussion of Codes
of Practice?
Statistics
42. In order to target NRPV safety properly, accurate
statistics are essential. COASTGUARD together with the RNLI and
others are working on a national incident database-SEAREM.
43. The statistics shown at Annex A show simple categories
of incident type. These need to be refined in terms of 'what caused
the incident' if safety strategies are to be better targeted.
44. If effort is to be put into education and training
it not only needs to be accurately targeted, there also needs
to be some objective assessment of its effectiveness. Statistics
themselves will not provide such an assessment. What may be needed
is systematic 'market research' of NRPV users conducted by a professional
market survey company.
Response to Consultation
45. It is COASTGUARD's aim to improve safety among the
users of Non-Regulated Pleasure Craft, so reducing the number
of incidents which put lives at risk and which require the services
of rescue organisations.
46. The Government's policy is to do this without legislation,
regulation or bureaucracy-and without unnecessary expense. This
paper proposes a range of measures to encourage and educate small
craft users.
47. COASTGUARD invites comments on the content of this
document, and in particular proposals for measures to improve
the safety of NRPV. Comments, to be received by 28 February 1997
should be sent to:
Mrs E Wright
The COASTGUARD Agency
Bay 1/14
Spring Place
105 Commercial Road
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