Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 1

MAJOR PROJECTS REPORT 1997 (PAC 97-98/353)

Supplementary Memorandum from MoD Procurement Executive

Question 51

   An explanation of the difficulties in determining the cost of the delays on the ASW Merlin.

  To calculate the net cost to the Department of the 63 month slippage of Merlin's In Service Date (ISD) it is necessary to establish the costs incurred in running on the Sea King ASW fleet since the original Merlin ISD of December 1993 and the costs that would have been incurred if Merlin had met the original ISD.

  The full cost of ownership of the Sea King ASW fleet—including such items as the cost of employing crews and support personnel, fuel, spares, training, ship operating costs and overheads—are spread over several budgets.

  The Department is working towards introducing output costing, although it will be some time before the full costs of individual equipment becomes available under RAB. The Department does, however, have an estimate of the costs of spares and minor modifications to the entire Sea King fleet since 1993 and this has been used to generate the cost of £150 million shown at in the Project Summary Sheet.

  Estimates of the cost of running the Merlin fleet, in terms of spares support are based on computer models and limited experience with non-standard aircraft running under trial conditions. The system now planned to be used to support Merlin as a contractor logistics system known as the Merlin Spares and Support Availability System (MSSAS), a key feature of which is the transfer to the private sector of the risk of supporting immature equipment. This system was not envisaged prior to Merlin's original ISD, so extrapolating from MSSAS costs would not give an accurate figure for the cost of spares support had Merlin met its original ISD. As costing systems improve, we will provide fuller information in future MPRs.

Question 55/56

   Mistakes to project summary sheets.

  I have had the opportunity to reflect further on this issue raised by the Committee and I have also spoken to those involved with completing the project summary sheets. There is no doubt in my mind of their commitment to produce a full and accurate report to the Committee. I would like to reiterate what I said to the Committee that underneath each page of the Report lies a large number of costs often aggregated across a great many subsystems. As I also explained, the data on the projects sheets has to be researched back for many years and is, in general, generated purely for the purposes of this Report. Notwithstanding these factors, I realise that the level of changes required to the initial draft project summary sheets must be significantly reduced and I have therefore set the following actions in hand:

    (a)  a reassessment of the training requirements and arrangements for those involved, with particular attention to helping staff facing the task for the first time;

    (b)  an improvement to the guidance notes (in consultation with the National Audit Office);

    (c)  a review of the timetable for production of the initial draft project summary sheets.

MoD Procurement Executive

24 June 1998


 
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