MANAGING THE MILLENNIUM THREAT
INTRODUCTION
AND
SUMMARY
OF
CONCLUSIONS
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. To save memory space, many computer programmers
in the past referred to years by their last two digits rather
than by all four, 98 rather that 1998; and as a consequence some
computers now cannot tell the year 2000 and the year 1900 apart.
This could mean that some computers and electronic equipment will
produce meaningless information or fail completely.
2. The potential impact is serious: there are few,
if any, areas of modern life that are not touched by IT. Even
if an organisation's own internal systems and equipment are year
2000 compliant, they might still be unable to continue functioning
if others in the supply chain fail. Failures in transports systems,
such as air or rail, or utilities, such as electricity, gas or
water, could have serious consequences for whole populations.
And failures in equipment, such as medical equipment could be
life threatening.
3. Estimates of the costs of remedying the problem
in the United Kingdom vary quite widely. But the Prime Minister
has concluded that estimates which put the cost to the public
sector at up to £3 billion are reasonable.
4. The responsibility for ensuring that government
business continues without disruption in the year 2000 rests with
each government department and agency. At the centre the Office
of Public Service have a monitoring, advisory and coordination
role, which since 30 March 1998 has extended across the whole
public sector.[1]
5. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and
Auditor General, the Committee examined progress in tackling the
Year 2000 threat across central government and the wider public
sector, and within the National Health Service.[2]
6. In the light of this examination, our over-riding
concerns are:
- Readiness of the wider public sector
There is now less than one and a half years before
the Year 2000 and many computer systems and electronic equipment
may start to fail well before then. There are already signs of
slippage in programmes to deal with the problem; costs are rising;
and central monitoring of the wider public sector, including local
authorities and non-departmental public bodies, has only just
begun. The Office of Public Service therefore need to:
- Ensure that business critical systems, including
those that impact directly on citizens and patients, are tackled
first;
- Monitor progress closely, and take or encourage
direct action where progress is too slow, especially on those
systems critical to public business and to public services;
- Ensure that contingency plans are in place, and
are tested.
The NHS got off to a late start in tackling the year
2000 issue, particularly in identifying the potential problems
with medical equipment. While the NHS Executive assured us that
systems will either be ready, or contingency plans will be in
place, they could not guarantee patient safety. They now need
to:
- Take strong and decisive action to ensure that
all NHS organisations and GPs are fully prepared;
- Monitor the position on medical equipment closely,
and take every possible step to ensure the safety of patients;
- Ensure that lack of resources does not result
in the failure of systems and equipment that are critical to NHS
services and patient care.
7. Our more specific conclusions and recommendations,
which underpin these general concerns are as follows:-
On the progress made across central government
and the wider public sector
(i) Progress reports
for central government already show some slippage and some Departments
do not now expect to complete their work until the second half
of 1999. As a result, we cannot be sure that government business
will not be disrupted in the Year 2000, and in some cases there
is little room for manoeuvre if things go wrong. The Office of
Public Service need to direct particular attention to those central
government departments that do not expect to complete their work
until the second half of 1999. (paragraph 27).
(ii) We are concerned that the estimated
cost to central government bodies rose by 9 per cent between November
1997 and June 1998. However we note the view of the Office of
Public Services that although costs may rise above the latest
estimate of £402 million, they should not rise as rapidly
as in the past (paragraph 28).
(iii) We note the Office of Public Service's
view that the £400 million required by central government
can be found from within existing budgets, partly by rescheduling
replacement programmes, without any further impact on services.
And we are encouraged by the assurance from Treasury that if costs
cannot be absorbed by departments they would react sensibly. We
expect the Office of Public Services to draw the attention of
Treasury to any areas where resource constraints put timely completion
of the programme at risk. (paragraph 29).
(iv) We are disappointed that the first
attempt to monitor progress across the wider public sector was
in June 1998, some one and a half years after the programme began.
This has prevented the Office of Public Service from undertaking
a comprehensive risk assessment. In the absence of such an assessment,
and in view of the patchy returns received so far, we are concerned
about the readiness of the wider public sector to cope with the
Year 2000 issue and about whether resources are being targeted
on those business critical systems most at risk. We expect the
Office of Public Service to complete a full risk assessment across
the whole of the public sector by mid1998, to identify bodies
and key risk areas that should be targeted for action or intensive
monitoring (paragraph 30).
(v) It is not possible to predict the full
impact of the millennium threat within an organisation or through
the supply chain. We are concerned, therefore, that only half
of government departments and agencies have updated their business
continuity plans to deal with the year 2000, and that those that
exist vary in scope and detail. We look to the Office of Public
Service to require all public bodies to have comprehensive, robust
business continuity plans in place by January 1999 (paragraph
31).
(vi) We recognise that many of the systems
and equipment that need to be replaced or modified were installed
well before the scale of the Year 2000 issue became apparent.
Nevertheless, we are disappointed that the Office of Public Service
has not given a stronger lead on the issue of supplier liability.
We expect them to provide guidance and support to departments,
agencies and the wider public sector to ensure that wherever possible
suppliers that fail to meet their obligations meet the costs involved
(paragraph 32).
On the progress made in the NHS
(vii) In view of
the potential impact of the year 2000 issue on NHS services and
on patients, we are astonished that the NHS Executive got off
to such a slow start in addressing the problem. The failure to
set deadlines for action in September 1996 was a missed opportunity
to ensure that all NHS bodies took the threat seriously. The action
taken by the Executive subsequently means that they now have in
place the elements of a well managed project (paragraph 50).
(viii) We note that the NHS Executive are
confident that all IT systems will be modified in time, and that
medical equipment will either be modified or replaced where required.
But we are concerned that the deadline of September 1999 for finally
checking that all parts of the NHS are fully prepared, or if not
have contingency plans in place, leaves them very little time
to deal with problems that emerge. We look to the Executive to
take strong and decisive action, including direct intervention
where appropriate, to ensure that all NHS organisations and GPs
are fully prepared (paragraph 51).
(ix) Many of the more sophisticated diagnostic
and treatment services which the NHS use rely extensively on electronic
equipment, and failure of those systems could have serious consequences
for patients. We are therefore appalled that the Medical Devices
Agency did not realise the potential impact of failures until
late 1997. In our view, this delay, and the misleading advice
they gave the NHS in 1996 can only have increased the risks to
patients and the costs of remedial action (paragraph 52).
(x) We welcome the action the NHS has now
taken to tackle medical equipment, their assurance that they were
putting a premium on patient safety and the fact that the NHS
has set aside £150 million to help replace equipment or parts
affected by the year 2000 problem. But we are disturbed that the
NHS Executive could not give us a categorical assurance on the
safety of patients. We expect the NHS Executive to monitor the
position on medical equipment closely, and to take every step
possible to ensure the safety of patients (paragraph 53).
(xi) We note the NHS Executive confidence
that the GP systems will be ready in time (paragraph 54).
(xii) We note NHS Executive's assurance
that that expenditure on year 2000 work will not lead to any downgrading
of patient care. However, we remain concerned about the possible
impact on capital programmes of diverting money to year 2000 work;
about the possible delay to other important projects; and about
the added pressure on already stretched budgets. We expect the
Executive to monitor closely the impact of the costs of tackling
the year 2000 problem, and ensure that lack of resources do not
result in the failure of systems and equipment that are critical
to NHS services and patient care (paragraph 55).
1 C&AG's report, (HC 724 of 1997-98), para 3.9 Back
2
ibid Back
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