Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence



Examination of witnesses (Questions 1 - 19)

WEDNESDAY 17 JUNE 1998

MR GEOFF SCAIFE, DR PETER COLLINGS and MR GERRY MARR

Chairman

  1.  Good afternoon, may I welcome you once again to the Committee, Mr Scaife. Today we are looking at the Comptroller and Auditor General's Report and the Summarised Accounts for the National Health Service in Scotland for 1996-97. Perhaps you would like to introduce your colleagues, for the benefit of the Committee, and then we can get started?
  (Mr Scaife)  Certainly, Chairman. On my left is Dr Peter Collings, who until 1 June this year was Director of Finance in the Management Executive of the Scottish Office. Since that date he has moved to become the Principal Finance Officer for the Scottish Office as a whole. On my right is Mr Gerry Marr, who is my Director of Human Resources.

  2.  Thank you very much. You know the form now. Let us get straight in. I will start with paragraph 4.6, which tells us that Lothian was the only Health Board to report a surplus (as it turned out) of £6.4 million, and in paragraph 4.10 we see that the same Health Board also made cash advances to Trusts of £7.7 million in order to spend enough to meet its cash target. On what basis are you satisfied that the Board's financial plans were taut, that payments that were made earlier than usual represented good value to the Health Service and did not impact on patient care in this year or future years?
  (Mr Scaife)  Chairman, the payments made by Lothian towards the end of the financial year were broadly to do with two things. One was because they believed that GP fund-holders would be late in paying under their contracts to the NHS Trusts in Lothian, so that there would be a period when there might be a cash flow problem. That was one significant sum of money, just over £5 million. The second sum of money, some £2½ million[1], was a payment in respect of pharmaceuticals. The Health Board entered into a payment for a larger quantity of drugs than it might have been expected to and in so doing negotiated a significant volume discount. So in a sense there was some advantage to the Health Board in terms of buying in bulk and achieving a discount. I cannot see any specific advantage to the Health Board in respect of paying money out in effect to cover the gap for GP fund-holders' payments. When we discovered that this had gone on, we made our concerns known to the Health Board and, of course, we have issued guidance to the service.

  3.  Thank you. Others may want to pursue that one because the principle is obviously quite important. Let me move on. The incidence of clinical and medical negligence: the costs seem to be increasing and divert resources from patient care. Can you tell us what you are doing to reduce the number of cases and keep costs down, but in doing so, can I ask you also to address another issue, which is almost, I am afraid, the reverse question. If I assess it right, the various contingent liabilities and so forth that, in your case, add up to about £30 million, for England add up to about a billion, which is about three times as large on a pro-rata basis, I think, and I am quite curious—you may not know the answer to this because obviously you are not responsible for England—but I am interested in why there is a difference? Is it because Scottish doctors are better than English doctors, I hesitate to ask? Is it because Scots are less litigious? Is it because there is a different accounting treatment? I am just curious, if you know the answer; if you do not, I quite appreciate the issue. So could you deal with both those?
  (Mr Scaife)  I am not sure I can comment on the situation in England. The situation in Scotland, though, is quite interesting, in that the number of claims, looking back over time, over a three-year period, is really very constant. In 1995-96 there were 168 claims, in 1996-97 there were 189, an increase, and in 1997-98 there were 164 claims. Obviously the number of payments is slightly different because you can have more than one payment in respect of each claim. Also, it is remarkable that the level of settlements was relatively constant, too. In 1995-96 settlements were valued at £4.1 million throughout Scotland. In the following year, 1996-97, the level of settlements was £4.5 million, and last year, 1997-98, the figure was again down, to £4.1 million. In each year our audits tell us that there are about 500 new claims arising and because claims can take some time to settle, at any one time there are about 1,400 claims in the system as a whole, I suppose about three years' work for the lawyers and lawyers representing the claimants. So that for the 500 claims or so arising in a year, about a third of those, 170, would be settled. So we have really a very settled picture looking back at it. We made provision in the year in question of £13 million, being our estimate, our judgment, of the likely outcome of the cost of current actions, and we also estimated that we would need something like 16 million as the potential cost of future claims. So we are making considerable provision, which is lying well above the level of actual settlements coming through. I am afraid I am not briefed on the English situation and cannot answer for them.

  4.  I quite understand that. It might be helpful, however, if you could have a look at the comparators and make sure the comparative treatment is the same, the accounting treatment, or have your finance officer do that, and let us have a note on that because it is an interesting discrepancy, a major difference. As I say, in England it is £1 billion, a lot of money.
  (Mr Scaife)  We will be happy to do that.

  5.  The Millennium Threat: you will be aware that the C&AG recently published a report on the Millennium Threat and we took evidence last week from Mr Langlands on the preparations made by the NHS in England. When and on what basis will you be sure that all critical systems in the NHS in Scotland will be able to cope with the year 2000, and whilst we are on that, if you could you tell us what you expect to spend on dealing with it, that would be helpful?
  (Mr Scaife)  Chairman, we have been working very hard in Scotland to try to deal with the year 2000 problem, the Millennium Bug. Across the service as a whole we have categorised the work that needs to be done into critical and non-critical areas; in other words, those areas where, if we do not get it right, then patient care will suffer directly, and obviously the main focus has been on trying to ensure that we get that right. Of all the NHS bodies in Scotland, 66 per cent. of them are currently forecasting compliance of all their critical systems and equipment by the target date we set, which was 31 December this year, obviously allowing a full year for following up problems and further testing. A further 16 per cent. are very clear that they will be compliant three months thereafter, so by the end of March 1999, and, with rounding, we have about 17 per cent. where, frankly, we are not yet satisfied. We are chasing that up vigorously with the bodies concerned, applying very considerable pressure, so that the NHS in Scotland is very clear. Indeed, Sam Galbraith, the Minister for Health and the Arts, made this his centrepiece along with waiting lists and waiting times, I have to say, at our major NHS event in the year at the end of May when he told every chairman, every chief executive of every health body in Scotland in no uncertain terms that he regarded squashing the Millennium Bug and reducing waiting lists as the two critical things that they had to give their personal attention to and get right. So we are well seized of it.

  6.  Thank you.
  (Mr Scaife)  We are well seized of it.

  7.  Paragraph 6.4 describes the progress made in identifying and dealing with cases of irregular severance payments and it says that no recovery action will be taken because of the delays in identifying the cases. Why did you not complete this work soon enough to be able to take action to recover the amounts overpaid?
  (Mr Scaife)  Chairman, the process of tracking what payments had been made and the possibility of recovery involved searching back over ten years to 1986, a considerable amount of work, work that was going on at a time when frankly the rules were not clear. It was not clear to the service exactly what powers they had and did not have. We tracked down 18 such payments. Obviously we had to investigate every one individually. We had to share the details of that individual investigation with colleagues in the Treasury, they considered every one and we chased them all hard. We obviously looked at the case for recovery bearing in mind that many of these settlements occurred several years ago. We followed to the letter the guidance from the Treasury in terms of how to recover payments and how much to go for but at the end of the day the Treasury have agreed to write off every single one of those 18 payments. We did not recover because many of them were time barred. The payments were made in good faith, they were accepted in good faith, and our judgment, and the judgment of the Treasury, was that we could not recover them.

  8.  I suspect that others will take you up on those points. I will move on to one final point before I open matters up to the rest of the Committee. I would like to turn to the auditors' report on the irregular and potentially illegal payments to senior staff at Tayside Health Board described in paragraph 2.8 of the C&AG's Report. I appreciate that while the Procurator Fiscal is considering the Board's report it would be inappropriate to ask questions about individual cases but there are some general issues that I think can be safely dealt with. In particular, can you tell me what action you have taken to ensure that the Board recovers the overpayments where this was recommended by the inquiry report.
  (Mr Scaife)  Thank you, Chairman. I am grateful for the acknowledgement that this matter is still before the Procurator Fiscal. I appreciate that. When the Tayside affair first blew it was a matter that was picked up during the routine audit by external auditors. They were concerned about payments to certain general and senior managers that might be unlawful. In fact, the issue concerned non-adherence to directions about general and senior managers' pay and related to the years 1995-96 and 1996-97. As a consequence of those concerns the external auditors submitted a Section 104 Report to the Accounts Commission for Scotland who oversee the external audit of health bodies. In turn the Accounts Commission submitted a report on 18 August 1997 to the Secretary of State. In response to advice from the Department the Health Board itself set up an external inquiry and established a team headed by the chairman from a Health Board in another part of Scotland. The investigation was to assess and quantify whether there had been any overpayments, ascertain the extent of those overpayments, and to identify responsibilities for any failure in practices and procedures and to establish whether there were adequate grounds to invoke the Health Board's disciplinary procedures and to make recommendations for improvement. The report of the inquiry team was submitted to the Health Board in February. That matter then had to be considered by the Health Board in a formal meeting. The Health Board adopted the report, accepted all of its recommendations, and sent a copy of the report to Tayside Police and the Procurator Fiscal. You ask about specific action. I thought it would be helpful for Members to lay out just what happened here and the concerns that were raised. The point of the inquiry team was to establish what amounts might be involved and what should happen. As soon as we got wind of this there were a series of meetings primarily with the chairman. Ministers had appointed a new chairman to the Health Board on 1 July. We worked firstly with her and obviously requested a full report. By the end of August, very quickly, the general manager of the Health Board was on extended leave of absence and so was her right-hand man, the director of commissioning. It is a bit of a complicated case but the Board general manager earlier in February 1997 had been given consent by the Health Board to take early retirement. The first thing that the Health Board did was to withdraw that consent. A consequence of that was that although the general manager was still entitled to take early retirement, because she had been paying into the superannuation fund and was over 50, the amount of her pension was reduced because it was now without the consent of the Health Board. While the inquiry was going on we had ensured that the Health Board appointed an interim general manager because obviously by this time the management team was depleted. The interim general manager, on behalf of the Health Board, took immediate action to try to ensure that any questionable payments were no longer being paid, notified those concerned of the Health Board's intent to pursue recovery, and subsequently over the following weeks gained agreement from the vast majority to agree to recovery. The Health Board were, however, advised by the Procurator Fiscal not to pursue recovery until he had finished his investigations and until he was clear as to whether there might be criminal proceedings. The fact is this has been chased, it has been chased vigorously by the new management team. They are clear about the amounts, clear about capping any overpayment, but on the advice to them of the Procurator Fiscal have not actually taken the next obvious step which is to require repayment.

  9.  Thank you, Mr Scaife.
  (Mr Scaife)  I hope that is helpful.

  10.  I have been tolerant of you taking some time over that because it is quite complex and because of the sub judice considerations there. Can I ask you to be brisker when dealing with other questions.
  (Mr Scaife)  Yes, of course.

Mr Page

  11.  If I might ask a question first of the NAO. In the report we see that some of the Trusts and Boards failed to meet the various deadlines through the submission of their accounts and completion of the audits. Is any of this serious?
  (Mr Le Marechal)  No, Mr Page. It was a minority of bodies and I understand that in no cases was it more than about a month behind the targeted deadline.

  12.  And none of these accounts has been qualified in any way? They have all been given a tick in the box?
  (Mr Le Marechal)  Correct, yes.

  13.  If I could, I would like to take up the line of questioning by the Chairman regarding compliance with the Millennium Bug, the 2000 problem, call it what you will. I must say that out of this report I am getting a confused message. If I look at this report and if I take you to page x, paragraph 3.5, we see that you sent out in August 1996 a request asking them to formulate strategies. A year later you sent out another one saying "an urgent programme of work to ensure that serious problems do not arise when computerised systems encounter a new century for the first time". It gives the impression that nothing happened for a year and suddenly you woke up to the fact that there were going to be all sorts of problems if there were not some emergency action. Were some Boards and Trusts just ignoring your advice and doing nothing or very little?
  (Mr Scaife)  No, they were not. They were taking this very seriously. What they were attempting to do in those initial months, frankly, was to scale the problem. The NHS, as you appreciate, is such a vast organisation the Trusts and Boards were finding out that in Scotland alone there were some 116,000 systems or items of equipment potentially affected by the Millennium Bug. As I have said, they were then categorising what is critical, what is less critical. In Scotland we organised the Health Boards and Trusts, primarily Trusts because it is in the Trusts that you find the problem, into teams so that the teams would work on behalf of their colleagues across the country as a whole on particular aspects of service. So that, for example, you have a team looking at lifts throughout Scotland, identifying who the suppliers are, making contact with them, arranging for them to come in and fix the problem. Another team would have been looking at telecommunications and so on, so a vast amount of work. It is fair to say we have been ratcheting up the pressure. We have also been offering practical support and help by putting all the information about who is doing what on our Intranet, Scotland's Health on the Web, and providing some modest financial support to help people to come to grips with it.

  14.  I am glad to see that you are spreading the knowledge across the system. When was Dundee Teaching Hospital designated as the—I will not call it the guinea pig but the one which was going to be the model from which all lessons could be learned. When was that started?
  (Mr Scaife)  I do not think, Chairman, I have the date for that. It was quite early in the process, I think.

  15.  Was it August 1996 or August 1997? That is the question?
  (Mr Scaife)  I am afraid I do not have the answer to that.

  16.  You appreciate that the later you leave setting up the ideal practice, then the more difficult it is for the message to be spread, the less time?
  (Mr Scaife)  Yes, of course.

  17.  You gave the Chairman some answers about the critical systems that will be checked and in place or satisfactory by the end of this year, but you have a national co-ordinating group that has been set up to ensure the consistent approach to the New Year 2000 problem. Has the group given you any guarantee that all the critical systems will be in place by the Year 2000?
  (Mr Scaife)  They have not given a categoric guarantee. What they have done is made it absolutely certain that every health body has this at the top of their agenda. They have encouraged and since turned into practice the idea that progress in squashing the Millennium Bug will be reported at no less than quarterly intervals to every health body, so that in their public meetings they will have to report on progress and account for their performance to their general public.

  18.  But that, if you do not mind my saying so, is slightly worrying, because what you are saying is that there is certainly at this stage no guarantee that we are going to have every critical system checked and it is not going to fail at the turn of the Millennium?
  (Mr Scaife)  Chairman, what I have said is that the health bodies concerned are forecasting as of now that 66 per cent. of the critical systems will be compliant by the turn of this calendar year, that a further 16 per cent. will be compliant by 31 March. We now know who appears to have a problem where and that is being pursued vigorously and everybody is seized of the need to get this right and to do so quickly, and, of course, we still have some time to go.

  19.  I appreciate that. I am not that brilliant on maths but it looks to me that at the end of March next year 30 per cent. of the critical systems will not be in place and you have nine months to go. It seems to me on what you are telling me that it would not be advisable to be ill in Scotland at the turn of the Millennium?
  (Mr Scaife)  Chairman, the arithmetic suggests that some 17 per cent., as we sit here today, of the bodies concerned are not confident that they will get there at the end of March 1999—everybody clear about what needs to be done, teams of people working on this, pursuing it vigorously, applying the resources that need to be applied to get a result, the Minister personally giving this his personal authority and commitment, bearing down very hard, and people pulling out the stops to achieve this.


1   Note by Witness: The second sum of money, was some £2½ million, not £½ million. Back

 
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