Select Committee on Science and Technology Minutes of Evidence



Examination of Witness (Questions 20 - 29)


WEDNESDAY 17 JUNE

SIR ROBERT MAY

  20. You have already mentioned receipt of unsolicited advice, which must occur quite frequently. I should be interested to know how often this is. Obviously some will come from very reputable sources, for example the Royal Society submission on management of separated plutonium. Others may come from pressure groups. Again I would give the example of the low level radiation campaign which has produced a lot of information. How do you deal with this information? May I also expand it to other departments as well?
  (Sir Robert May) May I come at this obliquely? If you just go back to the guidelines on science advice and policy making, in forming those guidelines not only did we consult widely with other departments but we consulted the Royal Society, the Royal Academy of Engineering and a variety of other people we thought would provide useful inputs. We routinely do this. Then there would be a half-way house between the completely independent advice and the things which we deliberately solicit: for example, another example of proactiveness, it seemed to me that it would be useful to have a relatively disinterested group produce a thoughtful paper which recognises the emotional and intellectual and problematic background to nuclear energy and all the real problems which often colour discussion, but at the same time looks at the role it may or may not have post Kyoto in a future where we want to have energy which is on the one hand clean, on the other hand does not produce carbon dioxide. That it seemed to me would be advice better coming from outside the Civil Service, and the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering are working on producing such a thing. It should be quite independent but it is largely OST's suggestion that it would be helpful to do it. From that we shade into things where the Royal Society, the Royal Academy of Engineering simply decides for itself that it would be useful for Government to have advice on something or other and produces it and that goes all the way down to strange characters, purely individuals, who sometimes feel Government would like advice on how to build a perpetual motion machine. There is no simple answer as to how a lot of that whole cascade is handled. If I have to give a single answer, I would say one tries always when OST is doing something to consult widely. One tries when one is aware of independent advice coming in to amplify that which one feels is really useful and one had not thought of.

  21. To follow up on the Royal Society report on the management of separated plutonium, which urges you to commission a comprehensive review, how have you responded? What has been the response to that report? How has the Government responded to that document?
  (Sir Robert May) The answer is that I do not know. That is something which people have read and I am not sure there has been a formal response. I just do not know, is the answer. I will get back to you on that.

  22. You will be able to tell us?
  (Sir Robert May) I can tell you that they sent it to Ministers and I discussed it with John Battle and I am not quite sure where it stands at the moment.

  23. There is not really any laid-down procedure about how to handle that. That is obviously not included in your advice.
  (Sir Robert May) You can understand with the range of such things it is rather difficult to have operational things. If you would permit me, I would turn it back to you and say you have had independent advice from the Royal Society for this inquiry and you will have had much independent advice. You will have some sense of the way you are going to handle that. I should be interested in how you feed those things into your report.

  24. In the advice you also say that departments should take independent advice of the highest calibre. How do they determine which sources are of the highest calibre, both in terms of when they are commissioning work and when they are receiving work? What guidance do you give to departments to help them identify appropriate sources of advice?
  (Sir Robert May) This again is a hugely important question. It raises larger questions about the investment of departments, in making sure they have in place a cadre of people who know what it is they need to know. These people do not themselves need to be scientists necessarily, though many will have to be. They do not need to be experts on the subject under question, but they need to be informed enough to know what kinds of things you need to seek advice on. That is easier said than done but that leads into a larger set of questions. I just wanted to raise that. In most departments there will be a chief scientist or equivalent who has a set of people charged with this role and sometimes it will be discharged by going out for external advice as to how to go about getting the information. Sometimes it could be contracted out. I do not think there is any one simple procedure which will guarantee that you evaluate the advice correctly, but at the heart of it I do believe there is the necessity to have within departments the expertise to know when you need advice and who to ask for it. OST tries to keep an eye on this. I have given you examples already of badgers and bovine TB; in that case there was consultation with OST. If, which was not the case, in that example there had been a move to set up a committee which I did not think was the right committee, I would have tried to intervene. I cannot guarantee I am always going to be aware of such things and ultimately the precaution has to be the department's own way of doing things which, when it is ever in doubt, it will bring to the committee of chief scientists so that we can discuss it together. It is a routine item on the agenda. It is the one tour de table we do.

  Chairman: You mentioned the possibility of the need sometimes to seek advice from elsewhere. Dr Kumar would like to ask you some questions about that.

Dr Kumar

  25. In your submission to this Committee you said that greater attention had to be paid to the manner in which scientific advice is elicited. What do you see as the major weaknesses in the current systems in your experience in government departments?
  (Sir Robert May) If my memory is correct, that phrase "more thought should be given to the ways in which scientific advice is elicited" pertained not so much to the quality of the advice as such as paying more attention not only to the science and the quality of the science as such but paying attention also to public confidence in being seen to do the right thing. In re-reading the background paper which we gave you in which that particular phrase occurs, it did occur to me that it was badly drafted. I would say in general the elicitation of scientific advice in itself is handled well across Whitehall. What is not handled so well always is going beyond the substance of the issue to the different but in my mind equally important issue of not merely doing the right thing but being seen to do the right thing, not merely consulting a representative set of people but being seen to consult a representative set of people. In the guidelines on science advice and policy making that, amongst other things, is why we suggested that by and large committees should have on them people who are expert in areas outside the area under question so that they have the ability to see beyond the immediate technical question to larger issues and to reassure people that larger issues are being kept in mind. In short, there are always exceptions and we could always do things better. In general the seeking of scientific advice is not done badly but it is fairly clear that we do not always succeed in communicating to the general public that it has been done in as open a manner as it might be.

  26. What would be one concrete thing which you would say you would do in that situation?
  (Sir Robert May) I would want to do several concrete things, many of which are spelled out in the guidance. If there is one word it would be openness. It would be making sure that the process of gathering the advice takes on all the difficulties of public debate, that you consult widely, that you consult contrary opinion, that the contrary opinion be expressed, that you make such data as are available, available to anyone who wants them, recognising that the result will often be a variety of opinions contending in the marketplace. This is uncomfortable often round Whitehall but in my view is the best single way there is to engender public confidence.

  27. The lead responsibility for reviewing existing research on the commissioning and use of expert advice has been transferred over to the Health and Safety Executive. Can you tell us why that is rather than to your own department?
  (Sir Robert May) That is a good question. I am afraid I digress again into a little bit of history here. In this Cabinet committee of chief scientists and their equivalents we talk about these things and the Health and Safety Executive had initiated a study particularly focused on risk assessment. The Health and Safety Executive is particularly expert in risk assessment, both in its general sense and in its more technical sense. It has a large number of people who are experienced in that and a large number of particular examples. Indeed the problem of communicating the notion that we are not certain about things, that there are different levels of risk, is one of the trickiest problems of public communication. The Health and Safety Executive were undertaking a study of this kind. They brought it along to EASO and in that discussion, not only did a larger variety of departments recognise they had an interest in this, but also it was felt that it raised a variety of helpful procedural issues which fleshed out in more detail the broad statements of principle enshrined in the science advice and policy making. So we asked the Health and Safety Executive to carry this forward on behalf of the Chief Scientists' collective, as it were. It is healthy to see a department in Whitehall like OST not saying this is their territory, they will defend it, but rather getting together in this collective way and recognising here is a group of people who might be better placed to flesh out some of the details, particularly initially in the direction of risk assessment, but then widening it in this direction. That is how it happened. I had no problem with it.

  28. What role are you and your office playing in these exercises?
  (Sir Robert May) The Health and Safety Executive are doing this both on its account but on behalf of all of us, and I chair the committee and the working groups of this group of chief scientists.

Chairman

  29. As Chief Scientist, although it is not being done in your own department, the OST, you are still very much involved in it and you chair the committee it reports to.
  (Sir Robert May) Very much. It is a happy story which illustrates how EASO is working reasonably well, that we can seize this initial risk assessment study, amplify it in discussions, see a wider use, put it back to the people who began it to share with all of us, instead of all sitting round defending little bits of turf.


 
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