WORK
UNDERTAKEN SINCE
LAST SSSC INQUIRY
Benefit Review
14. Since the last SSSC inquiry into CHB fraud,
work has continued on a number of fronts, to inform the levels
of fraud and to secure the benefit. The Benefit Review Programme
aims to measure how much benefit is being paid incorrectly (including
fraud) and establish causes of incorrect payments. The first review
of each benefit sets a baseline to establish the nature and extent
of fraud and abuse and repeat exercises enable BA to identify
changes in those patterns. So far Benefit Reviews have been carried
out on Income Support, Unemployment Benefit, Housing Benefit,
Retirement Pension, Invalid Care Allowance, Disability Living
Allowance and Child Benefit. Analysis of the findings of the Benefit
Review for CHB is not yet complete, and a supplementary memorandum
will be submitted to the Committee when the work is completed.
Child Benefit Centre
Security Assurance Check
15. A Security Assurance Check programme to
target specific risks, was introduced within CBC from September
1997. The check, which is a continuing programme, is an end to
end check of all relevant case details throughout the claim, award
and payment process, and is carried out by an independent team
within CBC, not associated with benefit processing. The aim of
the check is to provide an assurance that the claimant:
— has entitlement to the benefit;
— is receiving the correct payments.
The check also acts as a deterrence against
internal fraud.
16. Each month checks are made on a random sample
of new claims to benefit where the claimant has reported a change
of circumstances, and cases where there has been no contact between
CBC and a claimant for over a year. In all cases information held
is compared with that contained on other computer systems. Contact
is made with the claimant to establish whether there has been
any change in circumstances. Information provided is then corroborated
by an independent third party such as health visitors or schools
where appropriate.
Child Benefit Fraud Detected
17. Allegations of fraud involving CHB are routinely
investigated by the Benefit Fraud Investigation Service (BFIS)
for individual claimant fraud and BA Security Investigation Service
(BASIS), formerly known as Organised Fraud Investigation (OFI),
where benefits are targeted by criminals in a systematic and organised
way, for example, multiple false claims using misappropriated
identities, or large scale forgery and manipulation of instruments
of payment. Additionally, investigations and other security initiatives
are undertaken at CBC either as routine activity within the CBC
fraud section or in initiatives such as Operation Rattle described
below.
18. Combined weekly benefit savings from anti-fraud
activity and security projects involving CHB amounted to £3.8
million in 1996-97. This represents 0.25 per cent of the total
BA overall fraud savings of £1.509 billion recorded in this
year. Countering Child Benefit fraud has not been a priority.
Other areas have been and it is these which have made up the bulk
of the counter fraud savings.
Operation Rattle and other initiatives (see also
Home Office memorandum)
19. Operation Rattle is funded by the BA Security
and Control Programme (SCP). The SCP commenced in 1995 and is
a major programme of planned expenditure on a range of counter
fraud initiatives with the emphasis not only on detecting fraud
but preventing it happening in the first place. The SCP is funded
separately by the Treasury on an "Invest to Save" basis
and supplements that element of core administrative budget allocated
to other fraud work.
20. The Rattle initiative, involving CBC and
the Immigration Department, began in November 1995. It focuses
on families from abroad residing in the UK on a temporary basis,
who are believed to be leaving the country without reporting the
change to CBC, and continue to receive CHB payments.
21. CBC compare their CHB database with information
provided from Alien Registration Cards (record cards held by the
police concerning non-EU and non-Commonwealth citizens) for people
who might be CHB recipients and have left the country. Immigration
staff at major ports provide information about departing families
on a regular basis, though this source of information has ceased
recently due to the cessation of embarkation controls (see Home
Office memorandum paragraph 5). This will have little effect on
Operation Rattle (see paragraph 23).
22. Since the beginning of the project, 62,299
embarkation records have been examined, many of which related
to people without children. In 14,909 cases CHB records have been
traced. Of these 1 in 7, or 2,129 cases have been identified where
CHB was still in payment after departure from the United Kingdom.
Total weekly benefit savings of £710,083 from this initiative
were recorded in 1996-97. CBC continue to examine the outstanding
embarkation records that they have received, estimated to be over
30,000. Further funding is being sought from the BA SCP to process
the outstanding records, as well as studying information obtained
from Police Alien Registration Offices which is an alternative
source of information. The examination of the outstanding records
is expected to be completed by March 2000.
23. As a result of these findings CBC now have
internal procedures in place for new claims to CHB, in order to
monitor and control CHB records of those families residing in
this country for a temporary and specified period. Arrangements
are in place for CBC to be provided by the Immigration Authorities
with the details of all new registrations of non-EU and non-Commonwealth
citizens with children. Those cases where the stay in the United
Kingdom is likely to be temporary are reviewed prior to the expected
date of departure.
24. Following the SSSC hearing on CHB fraud
in October 1996, the Committee recommended that the work undertaken
on Operation Rattle should be extended to EU and Commonwealth
citizens who probably constitute by far and away the greater number
of people embarking from this country. Information processed in
connection with Operation Rattle relates only to non-EU and non-Commonwealth
citizens who are required by law to register with the Police Authorities.
Difficulties were encountered because there is no passport control
as such for EU Citizens due to the rules covering unrestricted
travel between member states. Passports may be examined on arrival
but no endorsements are required. Commonwealth Citizens are required
to complete a landing card on arrival. These records are held
on computer by the Home Office. Discussions are underway with
the Home Office to establish exactly what data is held, and if
it may be of value to DSS.
25. In addition to the cases identified by Operation
Rattle, during 1996-97, CBC received 75 allegations from third
parties that persons said to be in receipt of CHB had left Great
Britain. Following investigation by CBC all 75 claims were terminated.
Weekly benefit savings of £54,629 were recorded.
Information from National Insurance Recording
System (NIRS)
26. By using the Contributions Agency NIRS Data
Interrogation Facility (CANDIF) it is possible to identify persons
arriving from abroad who have applied for a National Insurance
number (NINO). An initiative is planned for 1998-99 to use this
data to identify CHB claimants and subject them to additional
checks including document examination and checks with school attendance
records. This exercise is being funded from the Security and Control
Programme.
Claims supported by foreign documentation
27. Around 800,000 new claims for CHB were made
in 1996-97. Approximately 16,000 (2 per cent) claims were received
in CBC supported by foreign documentation. Of those, 2,746 were
referred for special scrutiny. The majority of these were cases
supported by documents from countries identified by the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office as posing a potential risk. Of these,
2,116 claims were found to be in order, and 630 claims were disallowed
or withdrawn after examination by CBC fraud section due to:
— doubts regarding the authenticity
of the documents;
— unsatisfactory documentation being
presented in support of the claim;
— no reply to correspondence concerning
the claim.
Weekly benefit savings of £324,859 have
been recorded in respect of this group of cases.
28. As a result of these findings funding from
the SCP has been obtained for 1998-99 to enable CBC fraud staff
to apply the special scrutiny check to all claims supported by
foreign documentation. The aim of this project is to:
— identify cases made with false documentation
where a child does not exist;
— gauge the level of incorrectness
of claims supported by foreign documentation;
— identify any trends or patterns with
documentation from countries not previously thought of as suspect;
and
— secure the gateways of other benefits.
Exercise to scrutinise Child Benefit cases involving
five and six year old children
29. The Social Security Select Committee enquiry
on Housing Benefit fraud[1]
expressed concern about a perceived area of risk to the secure
delivery of CHB. The Committee drew attention to the problems
presented by the lack of evidence pertaining to the existence
and residence in the UK of children for whom CHB is in payment.
30. CBC undertook an exercise with the primary
objective of confirming the continued entitlement to CHB by checking
school attendance records. A sample of 1,000 claimants with children
aged five and six years was selected. The sample was a completely
random sample of claimants with five to six year-old children;
it was not stratified by risk or by geographical location. The
final sample actually involved more than 1,000 children, because
of the inclusion of older and younger siblings in families. The
sample included 1,925 children of all ages, of whom:
— 1,000 were aged between 5 years 6
months, and 6 years 6 months;
— there were an extra 242 children
of school age; and
— 683 children under school age.
There were no children over the age of 16 in
full time education identified in the 1,000 accounts.
31. Of the 1,000 children aged 5½-6½,
existence and residence was confirmed in 987 instances (98.7 per
cent). Of the 13 families where existence and residence was not
confirmed seven had moved abroad and correspondence for the six
remaining families was returned by the Post Office as undelivered.
In each case benefit was withheld. In four of these cases there
has since been contact from the claimant though the existence
of the children has not yet been confirmed. Investigations are
continuing to confirm the residence and existence of the families.
32. Existence has been confirmed for 238 of
the 242 older children (98.3 per cent). The four remaining older
children are members of the families who have moved abroad.
33. On the evidence of the random sample exercise
results suggest that there is a relatively low level of fraud
in CHB of the kind which exercises of this nature could catch
in claims which include children aged five to six years old. This
exercise does of course specifically relate to cases with five
to six year old children, and may not be representative of CHB
caseload as a whole. If the six uncleared cases turn out to be
fraudulent, then the level of fraud determined by the exercise
for cases with five and six year old children is 1.3 per cent;
this would be consistent with a true figure of between 0.7 per
cent and 2.2 per cent with 95 per cent confidence. Should the
six cases have entitlement confirmed, so that the only fraud thereby
related to cases gone abroad, the measured level of fraud would
become 0.7 per cent (£50 million); this would be consistent
with a true figure of between 0.3 per cent (£20 million)
and 1.5 per cent (£110 million) with 95 per cent confidence.
The results of the CHB Benefit Review will be available shortly,
and should enable us to offer a fuller picture with greater overall
levels of confidence.
34. Future exercises targeted on particular
sub-sets of CHB claims will be developed as the Department gets
a fuller picture of where risks lie. The sample of five and six-year-olds
(and 16 to 17-year-olds) was small, and by itself does not give
definitive evidence on levels of fraud, but does add to the overall
amount of data available. The Department is seeking to take decisions
about further counter-fraud work based on all available sources
of data.
Exercise to scrutinise Child Benefit cases involving
16 to 19-year-old children
35. CBC are conducting an exercise, similar
to that for five and six year old children, for those children
aged between 16 to 19 years who are remaining in full-time education.
A random selection of 2,400 claimants in receipt of CHB for either
a 16, 17 or 18-year-old child.
36. The name and address of the school/college
each child attends has been obtained, and checks have been made
to ensure the young person is in fact attending that course of
education. The exercise began in July 1997 after securing funding
from the SCP. Enquiries have been completed and the findings are
currently being evaluated.
Random checking of claimants using automated credit
transfer (ACT)
37. A recommendation in the last SSSC report
into CHB fraud was that the Department should consider a greater
use of random checking of claimants receiving CHB by Automated
Credit Transfer (ACT) and should introduce a more active form
of intervention to check on entitlement. At present all CHB recipients
who are paid by ACT are sent a review form on a yearly basis to
notify any change in their circumstances. The recipient is however
not required to reply where there is no change.
38. An exercise started in August 1997 to check
a random selection of 2,400 CHB claimants. These claimants have
been sent a review form which requires a reply and includes a
declaration for the claimant to sign. The findings will help to
identify whether a more rigorous check or review should be introduced
for all claimants paid by ACT. The enquiry stage of the exercise
has been completed and findings are being studied.
Preparation for the benefit Payment Card
39. The BA, in partnership with Post Office
Counters Ltd., and a private sector supplier, ICL Pathway, are
in the process of introducing benefit payment by means of a magnetic
stripe plastic card, the Payment Card. The Payment Card will replace
under books and girocheques for those customers who wish to collect
their benefit at the Post Office. When fully implemented, the
Payment Card will virtually eliminate fraud at the point of encashment.
40. There are currently (at 31 March 1998) 205
post offices operating the benefit Payment Card system for the
payment of CHB. At the end of March 1998 approximately 25,000
CHB claimants were using the card method of payment to collect
their benefit.
41. Conversion to the Payment Card method of
payment is linked to the Customer Accounting Payment Strategy
(CAPS) initiative and the development of two new computer systems
by DSS; the Customer Payment Computer System (CPCS) and the Personal
Details Computer System (PDCS). CPCS facilitates the payment of
benefits by Payment Card, and issues and reconciles benefit payment
authorisations made to ICL payments systems. PDCS has been developed
within the DSS and will, over time, become the single source for
personal details of all DSS customers.
42. One of the aims of PDCS is to improve the
consistency and accuracy of claimant records. Data on PDCS will
be shared across all benefits, pensions and allowances, and will
form the basis for future information technology development.
CHB is the first benefit to have its customer records transferred
to PDCS and in order to migrate customer records to PDCS a verified
NINO must be held.
43. The NINO is used as a unique identifier
for customers whose accounts are on PDCS. The existence of an
account on PDCS is a prerequisite for the use of the benefit Payment
Card by that customer. The requirement for a customer to possess
a verified NINO ensures that the identity of that customer has
been verified to a satisfactory standard, irrespective of the
means of payment.
44. To facilitate the implementation of CAPS/PDCS,
CBC has been taking action to ensure that all CHB accounts have
a verified NINO. Activity has involved automatic scanning of the
Departmental Central Index (DCI) (this has verified the majority
of NINOs), written enquiries (mailshots) to claimants and specialist
DCI tracing action. By 9 March 1998 6,944,819 (97 per cent) CHB
accounts were recorded on PDCS.
45. There are approximately 244,000 CHB accounts
remaining, without verified NINOs, which have not been transferred
to PDCS. Approximately 220,000 claimants have not replied to mailshots.
Further tracing activity, including more forceful mailshots to
claimants where appropriate, will be undertaken. These further
mailshots will require a response from the claimant. Non-response
will raise doubts about continued entitlement to benefit, and
payments will not be automatically renewed until there is contact
with the customer.
46. Twenty four thousand cases where claimants
replied to mailshots have been referred to BA District Offices
for NINO allocation. It is too early to estimate the level of
potential fraud which might be identified from these enquiries,
but we intend to pursue rigorously those cases identified.
OTHER
WORK
Personal Account Security
47. The programme to improve the security of
personal DSS accounts has continued. The programme aims to achieve
a strategic approach to personal account security in order to
reduce the potential for fraud and abuse based on false or misappropriated
identities.
48. Since December 1996 a series of pilot schemes,
known as Securing the Gateways, have been carried out at various
DSS locations. Initially, the pilots tested a more secure and
robust set of procedures in order to confirm a person's identity
when a claim to Benefit is made, or an application is made for
a NINO for benefit or employment purposes. The pilots were later
expanded to include procedures relating to the replacement of
lost or stolen NINO cards and monitoring accounts when a NINO
card is reported lost or stolen.
49. As a consequence of the pilot work, a range
of measures have been introduced. These measures include more
robust evidence of identity checks and improved awareness training
for staff on tracing techniques for allocation and registration
of NINOs. Anti-forgery scanning equipment has been installed within
all BA District Offices and Contributions Agency Compliance Teams.
50. The DSS initiated, and have representatives
on, the Inter-Departmental Identity Fraud Forum. The forum, previously
known as the Evidence of Identity Working Group aims to develop
common multi-Departmental approach to identity issues by:
— improving and formalising liaison
between the participating organisations;
— promoting the development and maintenance
of common procedures for the verification of ID and promoting
good practice;
— seeking ways of changing procedures
that hinder the prevention and detection of ID related fraud and
abuse.
Spotlight campaigns
51. The Spotlight on Benefit Cheats project
was a series of high profile, localised anti-fraud drives which
began in April 1996. Overall the campaign consisted of three phases.
Each campaign began with two weeks of local publicity followed
by a month of intensive counter fraud work. Phase one of the campaigns
commenced in Croydon and rolled out to a further 18 towns and
cities, ending in September 1996.
52. Following evaluation of phase one the preferred
option was to deliver campaigns in locations simultaneously. Phase
two featured 14 geographical locations and ran during November
1996. This was followed by phase three, which consisted of six
geographical areas running simultaneously from 3 February to 28
February 1997.
53. The campaigns have now ceased, but anti-fraud
initiatives continue that build on the methods used and experience
gained from the campaigns. These are targeting risks associated
with BA/Local Authority (LA) administered benefits, e.g. collusion
between claimants and landlords, by supporting closer working
arrangements between BA and LA investigators.
54. Phase two uncovered some CHB fraud and in
its response to the Select Committee report on Child Benefit Fraud
in March 1997, the then Government gave an undertaking to include
specific action on CHB risks in phase three of the Spotlight campaigns.
Annexes one and two gives a breakdown by area and risk type, of
referrals and savings from phases two and three of the Spotlight
campaign.
55. Activity in phase three, as well as focusing
on the risks already identified, examined claims paid by ACT to
bank accounts held on student campuses. The purpose was to address
the potential risk posed by claims to CHB by foreign students
with children. Student entitlement to CHB exists only for the
period of residence in the UK, and should cease when the student
returns home.
56. Phase three also examined the discrepancies
between the numbers of 17 to 19-year-old children receiving CHB
and the numbers registered with the Department for Education and
Employment in non-advanced (full time) education. This raised
a concern that CHB was in payment in respect of many school leavers
beyond the point at which entitlement should have ceased. Even
allowing for various compensating factors, the numbers receiving
CHB and continuing in full time education did not seem to tally.
This concern, alongside the continued risk attached to bank accounts
held on student campuses resulted in both activities being carried
forward into 1998-99 via funding through the Security and Control
Programme.
National Benefit Fraud Hotline
57. The National Benefit Fraud Hotline (0800
854440) is a convenient and confidential service for the public
to pass on information to the Agency about suspected benefit fraud.
The Hotline has helped raise public awareness of benefit fraud
and delivered the message that benefit fraud is wrong and those
committing it will be caught.
58. The Hotline was set up to help combat all
social security benefit frauds. Up to the end of February 1998
the Hotline had received 375,435 calls. From these the total weekly
benefit savings of £72.8 million for all benefits have been
recorded. As fraud reported to the Hotline can have an impact
on more than one benefit allegations are not reported by benefit
type.
Generalised Matching Service
59. The Generalised Matching Service (GMS) has
been in operation since April 1995. The service compares data
held on DSS computer systems, using specific IT programs developed
to identify clearly defined risks for further investigation.
60. One example is a case where a customer is
claiming IS for a partner and the partner is also making a claim
in their own right. Another is a case where CHB has ceased because
a child has been taken into care or left full education and IS
remains in payment for that child.
61. GMS is continually assessing benefit systems
and procedures to identify risks and anomalies within the benefit
systems which have not yet been addressed.
62. In 1996-97, the use of CHB data by GMS resulted
in savings of over £1.5 million on CHB and £4.2 million
on other Benefits.
Monitoring of mail redirection
63. Amongst other provisions the Social Security
Administration (Fraud) Act 1997 confers powers on the Secretary
of State to deal with the problem of mail redirection and the
part if plays in facilitating fraudulent claims. There are two
types of mail redirection: recipients of mail at an address can
re-post the items and ask for them to be forwarded to a new address,
and, on payment of a fee, the Post Office can be asked to intercept
all mail for an address, before delivery, and redirect it to a
new address. Both methods have obvious advantages if a person
wishes to state they are living at one address for benefit purposes
whilst actually living somewhere else.
64. Section 20 of the Social Security Administration
(Fraud) Act 1997 confers powers on the Secretary of State to require
postal services not to redirect mail and return it to the issuing
authority.
65. For the purposes of a trial to test the
operational arrangements, Section 20 of the Fraud Act was partially
commenced on 25 August 1997, to bring the relevant clauses of
the Act into force, in respect of the LAs in Richmond and Hounslow.
The trial took place in Autumn last year in these two authorities.
Of 50,000 pieces of correspondence issued by the LAs during the
trial period, a total of almost 1,000 items of post were returned
by the Post Office. There were 164 successful investigations resulting
in weekly benefit savings of almost £200,000. Lessons learned
from the trial are being incorporated into Royal Mail's operational
procedures. It is intended that full national implementation should
take place by mid Summer.
66. Representatives of the Department and the
Local Authority Associations met Royal Mail on Thursday 5 March
to discuss pricing of the "do not redirect" service.
As a result of the meeting, Royal Mail were asked to prepare further
costing options for the service and further meeting to finalise
proposals took place on 27 March. The Department is now considering
Royal Mail's further proposals.
67. The BA is considering the cost implications
of introducing the "do not redirect" powers for BA mail
and a costing exercise is now planned taking account of the LA
trials.
Redirection database
68. Section 21 of the Social Security Administration
(Fraud) Act 1997 enables information to be obtained from the Post
Office's redirection database. Before data can be required to
be supplied by the Post Office this section of the Act needs to
be commenced. It is hoped that agreement will be reached with
Royal Mail this summer to enable this to be done. Initial discussions
have been held with Royal Mail and work is in progress to prepare
for the acquisition of this data. The wording on customer requests
for redirection have been amended to reflect the provisions of
the Fraud Act, namely that data may be supplied to the DSS or
LAs for checking purposes.
69. Before any data can be used from non-Departmental
sources, the Department agreed, during the passage of the Fraud
Act through Parliament, that a voluntary Code of Practice (CoP)
would be published. The Data Protection Registrar is being consulted
in this context and her views are being taken into account in
the drafting of the Code, which is expected to be published in
September 1998 following consultation with external groups such
as the Data Protection Registrar, the Local Authority Associations
and the Housing Benefit Standing Committee, Liberty and the National
Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux.
70. As no data matching can be undertaken pending
publication of the CoP, steps are being taken in the meantime
to ensure the registrations with the Data Protection Registrar
enable the disclosure and receipt of data between Royal Mail and
DSS.
71. Subject to the publication of the CoP, and
after the initial development work has been completed, data matching
will be piloted. Data from the Post Office redirection database
will be compared against the Department's records of benefit claims
using the GMS. Where a redirection is discovered to be in place,
and there is a live benefit claim, the case will be considered
for further investigation. The pilot will test the effectiveness
of the matching rules and the value of the data.
MR
SUNDAY AFOLABI
(SEE ALSO
HOME OFFICE
MEMORANDUM)
72. The Chairman of the Select Committee asked
for an explanation of the circumstances of the case of Mr Sunday
Afolabi as reported in the Mail on Sunday of 21 September 1997.
73. During the summer of 1996, CBC became suspicious
when they noticed similarities in half a dozen claims from the
Brixton area of London. Further trawls of CHB records and searches
using the GMS identified approximately 25 suspect claims. CBC
referred their findings to the BA Security Investigation Service.
74. The investigation, resulted in the arrest
and prosecution of Sunday Afolabi. Sunday Afolabi, also known
as Edward Okesokun, fraudulently obtained a total of £37,233
by making false claims to CHB and OPB between July 1995 and February
1997. He claimed CHB using at least 29 different female identities
and supported the claims using birth certificates he obtained
mainly from Lambeth Register Office. These certificates were for
genuine children and were meticulously altered by changing the
childrens' names.
75. Afolabi was convicted for offenses of forgery
and deception at Inner London Crown Court on 16 September 1997.
He was sentenced to three years imprisonment, a £11,000 confiscational
order was made and he was recommended for deportation. That recommendation
is currently being considered by the Home Office.
76. Whilst we are constantly seeking to improve
detection , prevention and deterrence of benefit fraud it is inevitable
that some determined fraudsters will slip through the net. Afolabi
was able to claim CHB through skilful manipulation of birth certificates.
77. Since this incident further fraud awareness
and scrutiny sessions for staff have re-enforced the already rigorous
checks which are carried out on new claims. Security measures
employed by CBC, including the checking of all GB birth certificates
against a database of stolen, lost and missing blank birth certificates
and scanning using ultra violet lamps will make this type of fraud
far more likely to be detected and stopped.
CONCLUSION
78. This memorandum details the position on
CHB fraud in respect of the specific information requested by
the Committee. The anti-fraud and security work in CHB forms part
of the Government's concerted action to bring about a permanent
reduction in fraud in all benefits.
79. Fraud undermines the integrity and purpose
of the social security system and the Government is committed
to tough action to stop it. The Government campaign to deal with
fraud has a three-pronged approach, improved detection, more effective
deterrence and better prevention. In the long-term, the most cost
effective way of dealing with the problem of benefit fraud is
to stop it happening in the first place.
80. As is evidenced by the information in this
memorandum, there is activity on all three fronts relating to
CHB:
— Improved detection is being achieved
through the work of BFIS, BASIS, anti-fraud operations like Rattle,
initiatives such as the five and six year old exercise and the
examination of benefit paid by ACT. The GMS and the National Benefit
Hotline continue to identify cases for investigation. Migration
of CHB accounts to PDCS has the potential to identify fraudulent
claims and the Security Assurance check introduced into CBC has
a dual detection and deterrence capability.
— Deterrent messages feature in the
media reporting of high profile prosecutions and other publicity
surrounding the work of BFIS and BASIS activity.
— Prevention will be informed by the
Benefit Review work (still to report on CHB). It will inform the
level and nature of fraud and incorrectness. Already in train
is the fraud prevention being effected through the Personal Account
Security work, which has delivered better security procedures
at the start of claims, by improving evidence of identity requirements.
81. The Departmental project flowing from the
Review of Departmental Counter Fraud Strategies will ensure coherence
between DSS objectives for counter fraud work and those that govern
operations and policy processes, in particular those aimed at
controlling programme loss.
Department of Social Security
May 1998
1 Third Report from the Social Security Committee,
Session 1995-96, Housing Benefit Fraud, HC 90. Back
