Select Committee on Social Security Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 14


Letter to Committee Assistant from the National Association of Pension Funds (PS 43)

  When they appeared before the Committee on 8 July, the NAPF witnesses promised to provide the Committee with supplementary notes on three matters relating to pension sharing:

    (1)  An estimate of the possible cost of rebuilding pension benefits

    (2)  An estimate of set-up costs for schemes

    (3)  A note on "divorces of convenience" as a result of ill health.

  Notes on items 1 and 3 are enclosed.

  I would like to stress the estimated nature of our calculation for item 1—additional tax reliefs if divorced scheme members were allowed to rebuild their pensions following a pension share. The Government Actuary and the Treasury would, no doubt, be able to provide a more accurate figure. With this caveat, however, we believe our estimate of £4 million per annum (less future tax paid on the pension and less a reduction in means-tested benefits) is of the right magnitude and demonstrates that this change to the draft pension sharing proposals would not be an expensive one for Government and would greatly reduce the complexity for divorced members and schemes.

  I have not enclosed a note on item 2. We have calculated set-up costs on a number of bases, each of which produced differing figures. We do not feel, therefore, that our estimates would be of assistance to the Committee.

  Do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions on the contents of this letter or the enclosures.

Rhoslyn N Roberts

Director of Benefits

Estimate of the tax deferred if members are allowed to rebuild benefits following a pension share
Number of divorces involving non-state pension benefits 50,000
Number of scheme members rebuilding their benefits following a pension share 25,000
Approximate value of tax reliefs for occupational and personal pensions £9 billion
Number of people in occupational schemes = 10 million) 15 million
Number of people with personal pensions = 5 million)
Value of tax relief per person per annum: £9 billion/15 million £600
Assume member `loses' 50 per cent of pension on divorce and rebuilds 25 per cent.
 Extra tax relief per person per annum
£150
Total extra tax relief as a result of rebuilding, per annum* £4 million1


1. This would be partly off-set once the pension was in payment by the tax paid on the additional pension earned as result of re-building. The higher pension for the member, and subsequently for his/her spouse, would also lead to a reduction in State means-tested benefits.
2. All the figures used above have been rounded and represent very broad estimates.
1 Extract from further letter: For the avoidance of any doubt I should point out that the estimate of £4 million a year is in respect of divorces that take place in that year. The cost would increase year on year until divorced couples reached retirement and began paying tax on the additional pension they had built up. It would then remain broadly constant, provided, of course, that there were no changes to the relevant tax provisions, as the tax relief for newly divorced couples would be off-set by the extra tax paid by retiring divorcees on their additional pensions.


"DIVORCES OF CONVENIENCE"

  Pensions are not heritable. The death of the pensioner often means that no further payments are due to any dependants and no capital reverts to the Estate. (There is, normally, a "guarantee period" following retirement of, typically, five years. This provides some return for the pensioner on the capital with which the pension has been secured.) In addition, a pension of, typically, 50 per cent of the member's pension might be payable to a surviving spouse or dependent.

  Pension schemes are funded, and annuity rates calculated, using assumptions about the longevity of pensioners and their dependants. If these assumptions are not borne out in practice, the scheme's funding position will be affected and, potentially, the security of the other members of the scheme.

  NAPF has some concern that "high net worth" individuals with large pensions who discover that their life expectancy is impaired could potentially use the pension sharing arrangements to obtain a financial advantage for their spouses.

  This could be achieved if the couple agreed to divorce and to divide the assets so that all or a substantial proportion of the pension was allocated to the spouse. The spouse would then have a continuing entitlement to a substantially larger pension than that to which she/he would otherwise have been entitled on the death of the scheme member. This could have a significant impact on the funding position of a small scheme, particularly if the pension involved was substantial—as is likely to be the case.

  NAPF recognises that action of this nature will be rare and would only be of significant benefit to, and a realistic option for, wealthy individuals with large pensions. The costs of divorce, together with the new divorce procedures which require a minimum period of nine months for reflection, make "divorces of convenience" unlikely. It is our view, nevertheless, that trustees should have the power to ask for evidence of good health if they wish, before they provide a CETV quote for pensions in payment. If the evidence indicates that the member's life expectancy is impaired, the actuary should be permitted to take this into account when calculating the CETV.

11 September 1998


 
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