TAX AND BENEFITS:
AN INTERIM REPORT (continued)
Historical Background
16. The foundations of the
welfare benefit system that exists today were laid under the 1945-50
Labour Government. A system of contributory National Insurance
Benefits plus means-tested National Assistance was introduced,
modelled on the proposals of the Report by Sir William Beveridge.[20]
Also in the late 1940s family allowances were introduced for
all families with two or more children. Other support for families
with children included children's additions on national assistance
and national insurance benefits. Taxpayers received child tax
allowances to reduce their tax burden. Family allowances were
only uprated twice in the period from 1948 to 1967 although child
dependency additions paid with insurance benefits and national
assistance were uprated more frequently. Child tax allowances
were also uprated.
17. The benefit system established
in the 1940s assumed that those in employment would have an income
sufficient to support themselves and a small family. In the early
1970s there were major changes in provision for families with
children, designed to address the increasing problem of the working
poor. The introduction of Family Income Supplement (FIS) in 1971
represented an important step in social security provision. This
benefit provided financial support for families with children
where the head of the household was in full-time employment but
earning a relatively low wage. FIS was a means-tested benefit
(based on income, earnings and assets) which was paid for a fixed
period (originally six months, later for twelve) regardless of
changes in circumstance.
18. Family Income Supplement
was intended originally only to be a temporary scheme. In the
year following its introduction the Government published a Green
Paper on proposals for a tax credit system which indicated that
for members of a tax credit scheme the need for Family Income
Supplement would disappear.[21]
The Green Paper recognised the difficulties that the overlap
between the tax and benefit systems caused for effective family
support:
"The combination
of the full tax allowances and family allowances alone results
in nine different rates. Nor can it really be said that the differing
amounts have a logical connection with one another. As a result,
the system of family support is more costly to administer and
more difficult to understand than is necessary."[22]
A Select Committee on Tax-Credit
was established in December 1972 to consider the Green Paper.
The Select Committee reported in June 1973, recommending that
the proposed Child Credits should be a cash payment on a universal
basis through the Post Office to the mother or whoever had day-to-day
control of the child.[23]
19. It was hoped that tax
credits would be introduced in 1977.[24]
Following the change of government in 1974, the tax credit plan
was shelved and FIS continued. One aspect of the tax credit proposals
which did survive was the merger in 1977 of family allowances
and child tax allowances into a single benefit, Child Benefit.
Child Benefit delivered non-means tested cash help to all families
with children, helping those in particular whose income was too
low to take advantage of tax allowances.
20. In 1982-83 the House
of Commons Treasury and Civil Service Committee inquired into
the structure of personal income taxation and Income Support.
Although unable to agree a full Report because of the early dissolution
of Parliament for the 1983 General Election, the Committee produced
a Special Report to which was attached the Report from the Sub-Committee
which had not been fully considered by the full Committee.[25]
The Sub-Committee Report covered much of the same ground as this
Committee's present inquiry, indicating the long-standing and
seemingly intractable nature of some of the problems identified.
21. Between 1984 and 1986
the then Secretary of State for Social Services, Rt Hon Sir Norman
Fowler MP, oversaw a series of reviews of social security provision.
The Government's Green Paper following those reviews considered
further alignment of the tax and benefit systems, whilst acknowledging
the different natures of the systems.
22. The Fowler Reviews led
to the many changes contained in the Social Security Act 1986,
which were mostly implemented in 1988 (for example the replacement
of Supplementary Benefit by Income Support, the alignment of many
rules across the means-tested benefits, the introduction of the
Social Fund and reforms to Housing Benefit). Despite suggestions
in the June 1985 Green Paper on the Reform of Social Security
there would be closer links between tax and benefits, there was
no major integration.[26]
Instead Family Income Supplement was replaced by a new benefit,
Family Credit. Family Credit was more generous than Family Income
Supplement but had much the same aims, "to ensure that families
on relatively low incomes are better off in work than when unemployed".[27]
The key step was to base entitlement to benefits on income net
of tax:
"By basing
entitlement on income after tax and national insurance contributions,
and assessing Housing Benefit on the same basis, Family Credit
will end the present position where a reduction in benefit as
earnings rise can mean an actual fall in net income after housing
costs are taken into account. Similarly, by creating closer alignment
between the benefits available to those families in work and those
out of work, it will help to ensure that families will generally
be significantly better off in work than when unemployed."[28]
23. The White Paper proposed
that Family Credit should be paid through the wage packet, despite
acknowledging that there had been opposition to this proposal,[29]
as an important step towards closer co-operation of the social
security and tax benefit systems.[30]
The issue, sometimes termed as `wallet versus purse' is discussed
in more depth in paragraphs 61 and 62. The Government suffered
a defeat in the House of Lords on this point and Family Credit
was implemented as a cash benefit paid usually to the mother by
order book or bank payment. According to Mr David Willetts MP:
"It was defeated
in the House of Lords by an alliance of two groups. The small
business lobby complained that employers were going to be asked
to carry out much more complicated calculations to deliver PAYE
than they had in the past. It was feared it would be an unfair
burden on business. There was also a campaign ... about `wallet
versus purse'. The critics wanted a family benefit to go to the
purse of the mother who might well not be working rather than
in the wallet of the working father."[31]
In 1989 the House of Commons
Social Services Committee inquired into the possibility and feasibility
of a Minimum Income but did not produce a final Report.[32]
Objectives
of tax/benefit integration
24. Tax and benefit integration
might underpin a wide range of different policy objectives:
- helping more people
out of work to take jobs
- helping people already
in work, but on relatively low wages, to stay in work and to ensure
that they are always better off in work than not working
- smoothing the administrative
barriers between benefit and work
- improving take-up of benefits,
removing stigma, reducing fraud
- ensuring that families
with children receive more support than single people or childless
couples at similar income levels
- supporting one parent families
over two parent families, or seeking neutrality
- supporting marriage over
cohabitation, or seeking neutrality
- supporting people outside
the labour market caring for children or elderly or disabled relatives
- using the tax and benefits
system to redistribute from rich to poor, or vice versa
- maintaining stable public
finances and controlling the level of public expenditure.
Some of these different objectives
are contradictory, others complementary. Ms Pamela Meadows of
the Policy Studies Institute told us:
"The debate
tends to be muddled because it is not clear whether the objective
is to reward work or to improve the well-being of families. The
two objectives, while not incompatible, produce different policy
recommendations, depending on the relative importance of each."[33]
We believe it is vital that there
are stated aims and objectives for any moves towards tax/benefit
integration. We concur with the memorandum from Andersen Consulting
which stated that:
"clarity and
common agreement on objectives are a pre-requisite to the successful
implementation of major change."[34]
Tax and Benefits:
suitable cases for integration?
25. When looking at objectives
it is important to recognise that the taxation and benefits systems
have very different functions, roles and customers. The primary
purpose of taxation is to raise revenue. Yet it may also be used
to pursue certain `social policy' objectives, as with child tax
allowances or help with pensions and housing costs. In the process
of raising that revenue, tax systems will often have unintended
consequences on individuals and families; on incentives to work,
save and perhaps even to form stable family units. The Meade
Committee (1978) investigated the effects of different tax (and
benefit) systems on incentives and argued that as far as possible,
people's choices should not be determined by the presence of a
tax system.[35]
The tax system in the UK has become more neutral in respect
of savings while the means-tested benefits system, pursuing other
objectives, has strict capital limits which reduce entitlement
for those with substantial liquid assets. The rationale for this
is blurred but arises because the tax and means-tested benefits
systems affect different groups in society. Mr Chris Kelly, Head
of Policy for the Department of Social Security, told us:
"...it is
quite important to realise that the fact there are two systems
is not an accident. It is because it reflects the fact that they
are pursuing different objectives to some extent and are dealing
with an overlapping but distinct group of people. In terms of
barriers that have to be overcome, I think they must flow from
the different characteristics of the two systems which reflect
their different purposes. "[36]
26. Professor Minford described
the different nature of the two systems:
"I am a bit
sceptical ... that there can be any great gains from that [integration]
given that you are really dealing with two very different classes
of problem: the administration of benefits, on the one hand,
with a whole clientèle that is very distinct; and in the
case of the Inland Revenue, taxes, and that clientèle on
the other."[37]
The memorandum from Dr Sheila
Lawlor, the Director of Politeia, questioned whether tax and benefits
ought to be integrated:
"We would
be concerned at the prospect of merging tax and benefits because
(to revert to the themes which made policy successful in this
century for this country) it would be wrong to deny in practice
the centrality of the specific contributory principle (as opposed
to the redistributive one). The National Insurance system from
1942 evolved on the basis of the very idea that contribution and
benefit are linked, and Beveridge (just as predecessors in Britain
in preceding decades) had rejected redistributive taxation as
the basis for funding social security because it did not allow
for the all important direct relationship between contribution
and benefit."[38]
Other evidence submitted to us
revealed very different views on the possibility of tax/benefit
integration. For example, EDS argued:
"Tax and benefit
integration is a reasonable, but not easy, direction for the government
to follow. Integration, properly approached, would help government
overcome the issues of complexity and fragmentation and produce
a fair benefit system which would encourage the taking of work
and be more accessible to the public. We have looked at what
seem to be the major obstacles to integration and have concluded
that none are insurmountable."[39]
27. Nonetheless there is
already considerable interaction between the tax and benefit systems.
In her memorandum to the Committee, Ms Fran Bennett explained
that the change introduced in 1988 to calculate means-tested benefits
in work on net (post-tax) income had limited the scope for Chancellors
to use the income tax system by itself to improve incentives for
low-paid claiming means-tested benefits, since as their net incomes
increased because of reduction in taxation their benefits will
be reduced.[40]
In her oral evidence, Ms Patricia Morgan explained the effects
of "churning",[41]
i.e. taxing people who were also receiving means-tested benefits:
"A lot of
people on Family Credit are paying taxes. Taxes do cut in at
an extraordinarily low rate. I do not think we should tax away
people's subsistence. There always should be a certain amount
of income for the individual and for any dependants which is not
taxed, because you are taxing people into poverty if you are not
doing that."[42]
Memoranda from RADAR[43]
and the Association of Disabled Professionals[44]
discussed the non-taxable nature of many benefits for disabled
people.
20 Social Insurance and Allied Services Cmd 6404 (1942). Back
21 Proposals for a tax credit system, Green Paper, October 1972, Cmnd 5116. Back
22 ibid. Back
23 Report of the Select Committee on Tax-Credit, HC (1972-73) 341-I para 52. Back
24 Proposals for a tax credit system, Green Paper, October 1972, Cmnd 5116. Back
25 Third Special Report from the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Session 1982-83, The Structure of Personal Income Taxation and Income Support, HC 386. Back
26 Reform of Social Security, Volume 1 June 1985, Cmnd 9517. Back
27 Reform of Social Security Programme for Action, White Paper December 1985, Cmnd 9691. Back
28 ibid para 3.73. Back
29 ibid para 3.78. Back
30 ibid para 3.78. Back
31 "Memorandum to Martin Taylor", New Statesman, 13 June 1997. The full version of this article was published by the Social Market Foundation. Back
32 Minimum Income, Memoranda laid before the Social Services Committee, Session 1988-89 HC 579. Back
33 Ev p.57. Back
34 Appendix 18. Back
35 Meade Committee (1978). The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation, Allen & Unwin, London. Back
36 Q 55. Back
37 Q 128. Back
38 Appendix 21. Back
39 Appendix 5. Back
40 Appendix 13. Back
41 Q 171. Back
42 Q 170. Back
43 Appendix 11. Back
44 Appendix 12. Back
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