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Mr. Raynsford: I would not want the hon. Gentleman to mislead the House, even unintentionally. The White Paper made it clear that the Government were considering congestion charging and non-residential parking charging. A decision was deferred until publication of the subsequent transport White Paper. The issue was raised in the London White Paper and Londoners were aware of it.
Mr. Wilkinson: I am grateful to the Minister for that, but I am afraid that it does not exonerate the Government from my charge. A consideration of a matter is different from specific proposals. That bears out the argument of many Conservative Members that it would have been more honest of the Government to put to Londoners a post-legislative referendum, allowing them to judge exactly what the powers of the authority would be and how they would impinge on life in London.
I fear that the effect of congestion charging will be negative on outer London. Motorists will come to the end of the tube line and leave their cars there, not wanting to pay the congestion charge. The congestion will be transferred from inner London to outer London, where traffic is already diabolical. I suspect that it will be made worse. The proposal will penalise those who take the trouble to get in their cars and go to work. Very often they do so for good economic or practical reasons. The idea will cause problems.
A levy on parking spaces is also proposed. Employers are doing more than enough by providing work. They have to make pay-as-you-earn contributions, they have to pay business rates, they have to pay national insurance contributions and now employers in London will have to pay a levy for giving employment. That will make them less competitive and less likely to take on workers. The effect will therefore be negative.
The Bill needs to be scrutinised with the utmost care in Committee. Like the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Mr. Hughes), I am glad that the authority will not become operational until the spring or summer of 2000. We need a careful scrutiny process in both Chambers. We shall need to select candidates for the mayoralty with the greatest care. We do not want people who are in it for an ego trip or for self-publicity. The job will require qualities of the highest order to co-operate with the assembly and work together effectively. That will not necessarily be achieved by someone seeking a high profile for themselves.
The Liberal Democrats suggest that we use the intervening time for a Special Standing Committee. I chaired the Special Standing Committee on the Armed
Forces Bill. Even that fairly modest measure took days and days in Special Standing Committee. They do not even propose an open-minded Committee. The beauty of the Special Standing Committee system is that it takes as wide a spectrum of interested and informed opinion as possible so that it can come to the appropriate conclusions before the Standing Committee sits. The Liberal Democrats are suggesting what such a Special Standing Committee should do. Their instruction talks about the Greater London authority being
The Liberal instruction goes on to discuss
The last two might have merits. We are bruised in our part of London because two of our leading hospitals--Mount Vernon and Harefield--are under threat, but health service issues could not be dealt with by a strategic authority for London without proper borough representatives. Most people are worried about their local hospital, the particular services that it supplies, and the particular features of their locality.
Mr. John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington):
I also declare an interest as a candidate--not for mayor or for the assembly, but for the Standing Committee. I urge the Whips to use the d'Hondt mechanism for selecting its members, because on that basis I may stand a chance of getting on to it.
It is 12 years since the abolition of the Greater London council, and I greatly welcome this excellent Bill. It will restore democratic strategic government to our city, and I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions on his strength of commitment to our capital city in securing parliamentary time, as a priority, to get the Bill through. I also thank my hon. Friend the Minister for London and Construction, for the dedication, expertise and professionalism that he has shown in the drafting of the White Paper and for this mammoth Bill.
I read an article at the weekend about the need to return to the fashion for erecting statues to national and local figures. After reading the Bill, my hon. Friend has my support for being shaped in concrete--[Laughter.] My hon. Friend should be shaped in stone.
I do not want to dwell on the past, but it has been somewhat unseemly not to have had at least one word of apology or regret from Conservative Members for the past
decade, in which London has been left bereft of democratic leadership. It is disheartening that any repentance, even at this late stage, appears to be too much to ask from them.
Whatever one thought of the GLC--many of us had immense criticisms of its structure and role--surely political wisdom dictated reform rather than abolition. Indeed, in the early 1980s there was cross-party support at county hall, and in some parts of the House, as the hon. Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson) said, for reform to establish a streamlined structure, some of which is in the Bill. The Bill will right the wrong of abolition, but in considering it we have to address the question whether it will achieve a reformed authority that will prove effective in representing and forwarding the interests of Londoners.
There are five tests of any democratic body. First, does the authority have clear and suitable objectives? Secondly, does it have sufficient powers to achieve those objectives? Thirdly, is its structure and organisation capable of delivering its goals? Fourthly, can it secure the resources that it needs to fulfil its role? Fifthly, will it command sufficient popular support, democratic involvement and participation to stand the test of time?
On the first test, the objectives of the new authority are set out at clause 25, which states:
The Bill represents a written constitution for the strategic governance of our city. Although I did not expect literary artistry in the drafting of that essential clause--or calls for liberte, egalite and fraternite--we could have been slightly more forthcoming to make explicit the positive role and duty of the new government for our city. We should set out clearly as our authority's objective the securing of the well-being of Londoners and the enhancement of the quality of life in the capital. Drawing on the White Paper to redraft that clause would give more definition to the dynamic and beneficial role that we expect the new authority to play.
I appreciate that much of the inspirational detail of the objectives, role and policies of the new body will be derived from the individual policy strategies which are to be drafted by the mayor. Surely in that key clause, however, there should be more specific reference to the vital role that the authority will play in promoting social cohesion, securing community safety, tackling poverty, achieving greater equality and tackling discrimination in any form.
In addition, a significant omission in the list of strategies for which the mayor has been given development responsibility--at clause 33--is that no specific duty is placed on the mayor to develop strategies of that sort. I am also anxious that a general duty has been placed on the authority to ensure reasonable balance between promoting economic, social and environmental development. My anxiety is not about the spirit of that proposal, but about its prospective implementation, which appears to open up a vista of litigation from individual London boroughs and ratepayers and hamstring the new authority's activities.
On the question whether the new body has sufficient powers to achieve its objectives, I am pleased that it has not only been given a wide breadth of responsibilities, but that a range of explicit powers of direction are linked to those responsibilities.
There are, however, two areas of concern. They stem from threats from above and below. From above, I am extremely concerned that clarity should be achieved on the role of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State to intervene in the policies and operation of the Greater London authority.
London First, a business organisation for London, has identified 30 examples of where the Secretary of State can exercise power over the new authority and has expressed concern that they range from fundamental controls over budget setting and policy development to relatively minor issues such as approving the penalties for parking on strategic roads.
My right hon. Friend has a sweeping power under the Bill to issue guidance to the authority on the exercise of its role, as defined at clause 25. Clarity is needed on how, and where, that guidance will be developed and debated before being issued, and how he is to be held to account for the exercise of that power.
For the first time in local government legislation, there is also an extraordinary duty placed upon the mayor, at clause 33, to have regard to
From below, the threat to the potence of the new authority lies in the fact that lack of definition of the GLA's remit remains in key areas. For example, in planning I am still unsure how the strategic issues over which the GLA will have responsibility will be defined in practice or what consultation will take place to develop the Secretary of State's guidance on the matter.
Planning was always a source of conflict and duplication between the former GLC and the boroughs, and it is important that we avoid such confusion under the new structure. In some areas the proposals in the Bill to exclude London borough councillors from serving on strategic bodies may work to reduce the understanding, support and co-operation from the boroughs.
In assessing whether the new structure is capable of achieving the goals of the new authority, it is clear that, at the bureaucratic level, the bringing together of the expertise from the surviving strategic organisations will provide a proficient professional base for policy advice and research. I support also the introduction of term-limited political appointments, to form the senior policy team for the mayor. That recognises the reality of many key senior appointments in local authorities across the country and the practice, which is to appoint people who are sympathetic to the causes and the objectives of an authority.
The new structure seeks to be as inclusive as possible by ensuring that there is a requirement upon the mayor to consult various interests in the preparation of key
strategies, including in some policy areas, the setting up of strategy groups. However, there is an inconsistency: policy areas such as culture warrant the establishment of a strategy group whereas no strategy groups are envisaged to deal with noise, air quality or waste, for example. Similarly, some unusual omissions in the designation of whom the mayor should consult in drafting a strategy may need to be reconsidered. On biodiversity, for example, the Bill does not require consultation with the London Wildlife Trust or the Groundwork Trust.
Inclusive consultation could have been facilitated if the Bill formally supported the formation of a London civic forum, which was mentioned earlier. I hope that we reconsider that proposal, which is supported by the London Voluntary Service Council, the London Churches Group and the Association of London Government. It would establish a cross-sector, cross-community body that was firmly rooted in London's voluntary sector and civil society to advise the GLA on policy making for the capital. Moreover, it would place a duty on the mayor to consult such a forum.
I believe that the assembly's powers should be strengthened so that it has the right to be consulted on appointments to all the groups and consultation bodies. The lack of a right to recall the mayor has been highlighted. Such a right would not be a Lewinsky or impeachment clause; it would give the assembly the opportunity to exercise democratic control if things went wrong.
We should also consider what qualifications people need to stand for the assembly or for mayor. The Bill allows people to stand merely because they have a business interest or own some land in the city. On that basis, anyone who has made a large amount of money from writing poor novels may stand for the position of mayor in any city in the country on the basis that he has bought a small plot.
A fundamental test of the new structure will be whether it can marshal sufficient financial resources and expend them effectively to implement its policies and realise its objectives. I welcome the restoration of the precept but regret the reserved power to limit the GLA's ability to raise a sufficiently high rate to tackle all the long-term needs of Londoners, dependent on the wishes of Londoners. I also regret that we are not restoring the business rate, although that is another debate.
I am pleased that there will be a right of virement across functional bodies and additional funding sources, such as congestion and parking charges. I suggest that we leave it open to the strategic authority to ask the Secretary of State to reconsider additional funding sources, which may be hypothecated to pay for specific services.
I suggest a further and less contentious innovative proposal for additional resources. The City of London is proposing a Bill to reform its electoral arrangements in a pathetic attempt to dress up the inherently undemocratic sham of an authority that seems capable of serving a good dinner but not of running a vital part of London. I suggest that we insert into the Bill an amendment to the Corporation of London's proposal and allow the mayor to negotiate a voluntary lump sum payment or levy on the corporation to support Londonwide projects. Such an amendment would allow the City of London (Ward Elections) Bill to be passed contentedly; without the amendment, the Bill would be unsupportable. Some may
claim that that is a subtle attempt at blackmail against the Corporation of London; all I say is that no subtlety is intended.
"declared the regional government for Greater London"
and having the power to conduct referendums. It would have tax-varying powers, and the ability
"to transfer powers between the Mayor and the Assembly".
Those are all issues of such magnitude that they could sensibly be discussed and approved only by the House.
"the establishment of parish and community councils in Greater London"--
I would argue that exactly the same applies--and also says that the Greater London authority could have a role in overseeing health and further education services.
"The Authority shall have the purpose of promoting economic and social development in Greater London and the improvement of the environment in Greater London."
It goes on to emphasise economic development, social development, sustainable development, the creation of wealth and improvements in the health of Londoners as key objectives.
"the need to ensure that the strategy is consistent with national policy and international obligations."
That will introduce a national veto and control over local policymaking, which has never before been made that brutally explicit in local government legislation. In respect of international obligations, we are reminded of some past policies of the GLC, where we thought that it would be invading various places.
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