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Madam Speaker: That is not a matter for me.

Mr. Harry Barnes (North-East Derbyshire): On a point of order, Madam Speaker. It has been pointed out by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) that there is no opportunity for a vote at the end of the debate, except on the motion for the Adjournment. Early-day motion 148 could fruitfully be used as the basis for a debate now, so that we could have the proper vote at the end.

Madam Speaker: I do not have the powers to change the business. Would that I were so powerful.

4.29 pm

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Robin Cook): We have arranged for this debate in the House at the first available opportunity after military action to give hon. Members the opportunity to debate that action and the background to it.

All hon. Members will wish to remember that we debate this matter in the security of our Chamber while British service men are in action in circumstances of some danger. At the outset, I follow my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in recording the appreciation of all in the House for their courage and professionalism. I open the debate by setting out why we had to call upon them to take that military action.

My starting point is the report submitted by Richard Butler to the Security Council. That report could not make it more clear that Saddam has not kept the commitments which averted military action only last month. The report details the familiar pattern of obstruction, delay and deception.

Mr. Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North): Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Cook: I shall give way to my hon. Friend in a moment if he allows me to continue with this passage.

Since the work of the United Nations Special Commission resumed, it has requested 12 sets of documents that could answer crucial questions about Iraq's chemical weapons and missile programmes. Iraq has responded to only one of those 12 requests.

The Iraqi authorities have blocked attempts by UNSCOM to carry out site inspections. Only last Wednesday, a team of inspectors was refused entry to a storage facility on the ground that it was a political headquarters of the Ba'ath party.

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Let me describe to the House the precise nature of the building in question. It is a large rectangular warehouse. A thick steel trap-door, 3 m ² , gives access to a cellar beneath the warehouse which is of the same size. The shed is guarded by members of the interior security service, commanded by an officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel. Let us be frank. This lieutenant colonel is not on duty to safeguard political election posters, even if elections were allowed in Iraq. Baghdad's pretence that the warehouse and its underground cellar are political offices is only another of the empty pretexts with which it has persistently sought to hinder the work of the UN inspectors.

Mr. Corbyn: Can my right hon. Friend explain when Richard Butler's report was received by the Security Council, and what steps were taken by the British or American Governments to call a special meeting of the Security Council to gain its authority before any military action could be taken? Or was the action taken without the Security Council's authority after the production of the report?

Mr. Cook: The action has been taken with the full authority of repeated Security Council resolutions, supported by all members of the Security Council. Let us not forget that the lead-in time for this military action is not the day or so since Richard Butler's report; it is the 10 months since Saddam first threw out the inspectors last February. It is during that period that two successive resolutions have given us the authority to carry out this action.

Mr. Edward Leigh (Gainsborough): Will the Foreign Secretary give way?

Mr. Cook: I shall give way on this occasion, but then I must make progress.

Mr. Leigh: Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that aerial bombing will not destroy Saddam's capability, only degrade it, and nor will it remove him from office? Will he confirm that it may be difficult for UNSCOM to return once the bombing stops? Given that military action on the ground is ruled out, what is the right hon. Gentleman's and the Government's game plan for the future? How do they intend to resolve the crisis? Or are they asking the House to support military action again and again, which may well be necessary?

Mr. Cook: If the hon. Gentleman wishes to intervene at such length with so many different questions, he can take full part in the debate. The Prime Minister has already made it perfectly clear that to displace Saddam Hussein would require a commitment of tens of thousands of ground troops and the acceptance of casualties well beyond anything that we are asking the House to accept. We have clear objectives, which I will deal with in my speech, both substantially to set back Saddam's weapons programmes and to diminish the military threat that he

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poses to the region, and we are confident that this aerial strike can achieve those objectives. I shall lay them out before the House in my speech.

Mr. Neil Gerrard (Walthamstow): Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Cook: No, I must return to my text, but my hon. Friend will have other opportunities to intervene.

In two further cases, in addition to the one that I have described, inspections were delayed after Iraq declared the sites to be sensitive. When the inspectors were finally granted permission to enter, they found that the building had been swept clean.

Such attempts to hinder and obstruct the work of UNSCOM have been standard practice in Baghdad ever since the inspection regime was imposed by the United Nations. Given Saddam's undertaking last month that UNSCOM would have unconditional and unrestricted access, it is to be deplored that Baghdad still practises the same sustained web of deceit and deception. Saddam still avoids answering questions and prevents UNSCOM from finding the answers.

I must also tell the House that, in the period since Saddam gave his undertaking to co-operate, he has introduced new, fresh restrictions on the work of UNSCOM. The Baghdad authorities have demanded a formal letter of request for the inspection of a sensitive site, including details of what was sought at the site--presumably in order that they could more easily remove any such documents and material from the site. Until August, UNSCOM had provided data on Iraqi missile tests and engines. Since UNSCOM went back in November, Iraq has refused to release such data. Until August, UNSCOM was allowed to carry out its own study on the engine components of missiles to establish their range. Since November, UNSCOM has been denied the removal of missile components for analysis.

Since Saddam pledged full co-operation in November, UNSCOM has experienced no greater co-operation than before. On the contrary, it has been subjected to even greater deception and obstruction. That is why the conclusion of Mr. Butler's report is stark and unequivocal. The inspectors are not able to carry out the disarmament work which they are mandated to do.

Mr. Butler has received the full wrath of the Baghdad propaganda machine. I share the views expressed by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister as I have known Mr. Butler for a number of years. I first met him long before he became the head of UNSCOM. I know him to be a man of great independence of mind and integrity. He is also whole-heartedly dedicated to the United Nations and the international rule of law. Nor is his report the report of one isolated individual. It would be overwhelmingly endorsed by all the inspectors who know from experience the repeated obstacles that have made their job so frustrating.

Mr. George Galloway (Glasgow, Kelvin): If Mr. Butler is such a paragon of virtue, why did Mr. Prakash Shah, the special envoy of Mr. Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, describe him to me, on the basis of more than 20 years' knowledge, as a congenital liar?

Mr. Cook: We must all speak from our own experience. As Mr. Butler is not in the Chamber to defend

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himself against the grave charge that my hon. Friend has made against him--a charge that we are not permitted to make against each other--I will vigorously rebut that charge and say that throughout the period in which I have known Mr. Butler, not just as a colleague but as a friend, he has shown himself to be consistently honest and dedicated to international and political ideals that in other circumstances my hon. Friend would share. It is, therefore, important for all of us to remember, when we read propaganda against Mr. Butler, that he is so unpopular in Baghdad not because he is a liar or deficient in his job, but because he does his job only too well.

Mr. Menzies Campbell (North-East Fife): I am grateful to the Foreign Secretary for giving way. Does he remember that Mr. Butler's predecessor was Mr. Rolf Ekeus, a Finnish diplomat of considerable distinction, whose experience at the hands of Saddam Hussein was exactly the same as that of Mr. Richard Butler?

Mr. Cook: The hon. and learned Gentleman makes a fair point. No leader of UNSCOM who has done the job effectively has been able to earn any reception or good word in Baghdad. Perhaps we should worry if he did receive a good word in Baghdad.

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